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
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The American Historical Review

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In This Issue

The June issue of the *AHR* contains five articles on a range of subjects: competition over the trans-Appalachian West in the eighteenth century, the economic history of Weimar Germany, the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, the trials of "collaborationists" in postwar China, and a reconsideration of the historical strength of the American state. Five featured reviews are followed by our usual extensive book review section.

Articles

In "The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History," **François Furstenberg** contends that historians have largely failed to insert the trans-Appalachian West—the region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River—into a larger American and Atlantic context. He argues that from 1754 to 1815, the major Native American and imperial players—Britain, Spain, France, and the United States—fought what can be called a "Long War for the West" over control of the region. This Long War continued with only brief interruptions from the outbreak of the Seven Years' War to the end of the War of 1812, as the geopolitical action shifted among various "hot spots" across the trans-Appalachian West. Notwithstanding the treaty of 1783, the United States' hold on the region remained highly contingent, and the ultimate fate of the trans-Appalachian West remained obscure. Would it become a permanent Native American country? Would it fall to some distant European power? Or, perhaps the most unlikely scenario of all, would it join with the United States? Only in the wake of the British defeat in the War of 1812 was the region's fate as part of the expanding United States settled once and for all.

In "Trouble with Numbers: Statistics, Politics, and History in the Construction of Weimar's Trade Balance, 1918–1924," **Adam Tooze** begins with the observation that given the quantifying habits of modernity, statistical sources are ubiquitous in modern history. And, as William Sewell has recently argued, this makes it important for historians to integrate quantitative source material and quantitative methods into their historical practice. Tooze notes, however, that achieving this integration in fact poses considerable challenges. Using three histories of the early Weimar Republic as an example, he shows how his own early work on the history of statistics and the

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rival narratives provided by Gerald Feldman and Niall Ferguson all exhibit characteristic blind spots in their use of historical data. Drawing on insights from the study of science, he further argues that these blind spots can be seen as symptomatic of what Bruno Latour calls the Janus-faced quality of modern fact-making. Through interweaving stories about the production of Weimar's trade statistics with the story of their use by both contemporaries and historians, Tooze seeks to respond to this challenge and to demonstrate the fruitfulness of an approach that we might, following Sewell, call hermeneutical quantification.

In "The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order," **Francine Hirsch** investigates the role of the Soviet Union in the Nuremberg Trials of 1945–1946. She argues that Nuremberg is still seen through the distorting lens of the Cold War, suggesting that it is high time for a new narrative of the trials that gives a full accounting of the role of the Soviet Union. Hirsch evaluates the contributions that the USSR and its legal experts made to the jurisprudence of the trials. She also looks at the efforts of the Soviet Union's secret Commission for Directing the Nuremberg Trials to influence the course and outcome of the trials—and to affect the postwar moment in general. She argues that Nuremberg became one of the first fronts of postwar competition between the USSR and its former wartime allies—a competition in which the USSR did not fare well. The United States proved far more adept at shaping the trials and using them to advance a postwar agenda. It seized control of Nuremberg and made "the Nuremberg narrative" its own. In the end, Hirsch suggests that although Nuremberg was a failure for the USSR, it taught the Soviets important lessons that shaped their development as an international power.

In "Globalizing *Hanjian*: The Suzhou Trials and the Post–World War II Discourse on Collaboration," **Margherita Zanasi** explores the transmission of the notion of "collaboration" across the globe immediately after the Second World War. In particular, she focuses on the Chinese Nationalists' appropriation of the *résistance* discourse surrounding the trial of Philippe Pétain (the leader of the French collaborationist government in Vichy). In this trial, Pétain became the central figure in a black-and-white narrative of patriotism versus treason, a narrative that came to represent a monolithic, potentially global phenomenon with no local variations. As such, this narrative served as a source of legitimacy for condemning China's collaborators. By comparing the Pétain and the Suzhou trials, this article illustrates the globalizing effects of the discourse on modern nationhood, which determined how the experiences of World War II and foreign occupation were understood in both France and China. In each country, however, there were differences in the circumstances of collaboration, leading to differences in the nature of postwar punishment, highlighting the limits and complexity of the globalizing effects of the shared experience of World War II.


In "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," **William J. Novak** attempts to explain, critique, and ultimately displace the long-standing historiographical and theoretical tendency to view the American state as somehow "weak." He reviews the histories

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
that have constructed and reinforced the myth of American statelessness and introduces the key texts in an emerging historical revision. Given present-day realities as well as a new generation of work on American state power, nationally as well as internationally, the article argues for a new historical appreciation of the rise of a global hegemon. This, it asserts, is what needs more explanation in modern American history. In the second half of the article, Novak suggests that early American pragmatism and social science offers up some useful alternative models for evaluating the history of the American state. In contrast to the European models of classic social theory, the critical and realistic approach to state power allows more room for the examination of such things as the rule of law, the distribution of power, and the public-private distinction in the creation and perpetuation of powerful techniques of American governance. This article will be the subject of a future *AHR* Exchange.

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The cartoon on the cover was drawn by Boris Efimov, a Russian political cartoonist and propaganda artist who attended the Nuremberg Trials to sketch caricatures of the Nazi defendants. Born in 1900, he is still working today, drawing cartoons and writing his memoirs. When asked by contributor Francine Hirsch for permission to use some of his cartoons in her article in this issue, he seemed puzzled why anyone would want to remember what he himself would prefer to forget—"but which even 107 years has failed to erase."



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Antoine Simon Le Page du Pratz (ca. 1695–1775) traveled to North America with a group of colonists in 1718 and lived in Louisiana until 1734. This map, drawn from the popular English translation of the book he published after his return to France—Thomas Jefferson, among others, owned a copy—shows the locations of the various Indian nations and French settlements across the trans-Appalachian West. It depicts the eastern border of the trans-Appalachian West as a coastline—a visual rendering, perhaps, of the geographic significance of the Appalachian Mountains in Atlantic history. "A map of Louisiana, with the course of the Missisipi [*sic*], and the adjacent rivers . . . ," from Antoine Simon Le Page du Pratz, *The History of Louisiana, or of the Western Parts of Virginia and Carolina* . . . , 2 vols. (London, 1763). Courtesy Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.

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The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History

FRANÇOIS FURSTENBERG

> The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West.
>
> Frederick Jackson Turner, 1893

FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY MILLION YEARS AGO, there was no Atlantic Ocean. Africa, Europe, and North America were all connected. North America straddled the equator, and what is now the Atlantic coast lay under water. As the Earth's tectonic plates collided in this period of intense geological activity, the African plate slamming into the North American plate, the ocean floor buckled, and great sheets of bedrock began slowly rising up in the air. Humans would one day call these the Appalachian Mountains. Over the millions of years that followed, slices of rock crumpled and were thrust miles into the sky as the Appalachians reached exalted heights, nearly as tall as the present-day Himalayas. Eventually the continents began to separate. Vast plains and mountain chains were torn asunder, and water poured into the breach: thus, some 220 million years ago, the Atlantic Ocean was formed. The new ocean separated not just the new continents, but the already ancient Appalachian Mountains themselves. They were, one might say, the first Atlantic crossing. Most of the Appalachians drifted west with the American plate, while the remainder stretched across the ever-growing Atlantic, from Norway to the Scottish highlands, across Ireland and Newfoundland, extending to the Atlas Mountains in northern Africa. Although we think of them as a North American phenomenon, the Appalachians are, in truth, a trans-hemispheric chain—older than the Atlantic itself.[1]

By the time humans came to inhabit North America, the Appalachians had been weathered down to their current heights. Less striking than the Alps, smaller than

Having taken entirely too long to complete, this article has entailed a great many debts. The research was made possible by grants from the Fonds québécois de la reserche sur la société et la culture and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Helpful comments were received from audiences at the Université de Paris 7–Denis Diderot and the ReDEHJA, the Champlain–St. Lawrence Seminar, the Department of History at the University of Windsor, and especially the ever-sharp crowd at the Johns Hopkins History Seminar. Thanks, more specifically, to Drew Cayton, François Dansereau, Kate Desbarats, Michael Johnson, Sarah Knott, Greg Nobles, Dan Richter, Dorothy Ross, Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, Rob Schneider, Anders Stephanson, Thomas Wien, and the outstanding reviewers for the *AHR*.

[1] I am grateful to Heather Short for tipping me off to these matters, and for kindly mitigating the geological ignorance displayed in the above paragraph. See also the U.S. Geological Survey Appalachian Highlands Province website, http://wrgis.wr.usgs.gov/docs/parks/province/appalach.html (accessed April 14, 2008).

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the Himalayas, not as rugged as the Rockies, they belie not just their age but also their significance. For the Appalachian Mountains may have been the continent's single most important feature. Separating the eastern seaboard from the Mississippi Valley, the Iroquois in the uplands from the Algonquian peoples along the coasts and valleys, the British from the French colonies, the ocean-facing coast from the western-oriented backcountry, the Appalachian Mountains were responsible for the great problem of North American, and perhaps even Atlantic, history from 1754 to 1815: the fate of the trans-Appalachian West.

If this seems like a surprising claim, that may be because the region between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River stands astride—or rather between—several national historiographies. French-language historians mostly abandon the Ohio and Mississippi valleys as sites of interest after the Seven Years' War—*après la Conquête!*—much as colonial French administrators did before them. English-Canadian historians, for whom the Seven Years' War created Canada (and the Revolution, the Loyalists), similarly lose interest in a region that seems neither British nor loyal after 1783. As for the historiography on the early United States, most of it focuses on the East, with the West treated as something of a sideshow, destined to form part of the expanding nation. The newer historiography on the Atlantic world, which aims to transcend the limits imposed by national historiographies, would seem to offer some hope. So far, however, it has tended to remain content sailing aboard ships or landing along coastlines, leaving the more grueling trek into continental interiors to the national historiographies it so haughtily claims to supersede.[2]

[2] On the persistence of teleological accounts of national expansion among historians of the early U.S. republic, see Jack P. Greene, "Colonial History and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 54 (April 2007): 235–250. Important exceptions that focus on the West include Andrew R. L. Cayton, *The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780–1825* (Kent, Ohio, 1986); D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years Of History*, 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1986), esp. vols. 1 and 2; Andrew R. L. Cayton, " 'Separate Interests' and the Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West," *Journal of American History* 79 (1992): 39–67; Gregory H. Nobles, *American Frontiers: Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest* (New York, 1997); Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800* (New York, 1997); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 1991); James E. Lewis, *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783–1829* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998); Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); Stephen Aron, *American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State* (Bloomington, Ind., 2006); Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York, 2007); and Malcolm J. Rohrbough, *Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, and Institutions, 1775–1850*, 3rd ed. (Bloomington, Ind., 2008). For a consideration of why the "West" so often gets overlooked in U.S. surveys, see James A. Hijiya, "Why the West Is Lost," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 51 (April 1994): 276–292, along with the comments that follow in "Comments and Response," ibid. 51 (October 1994): 717–754. An exception to the French neglect of the trans-Appalachian West after 1763 is the outstanding study by Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique française*, rev. ed. (Paris, 2006), 671–719. A few historians have recently begun to take broader perspectives on the region. See Andrew R. L. Cayton, " 'While We Are in the World, We Must Converse with the World': The Significance of Ohio in World History," in Geoffrey Parker, Richard Sisson, and William Russell Coil, eds., *Ohio and the World, 1753–2053: Essays toward a New History of Ohio* (Columbus, Ohio, 2005), 1–22; Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000* (New York, 2005), esp. 104–206; Paul W. Mapp, "French Geographic Conceptions of the Unexplored American West and the Louisiana Cession of 1762," in Bradley G. Bond, ed., *French Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World* (Baton Rouge, La., 2005), 134–174; and Mapp, "Atlantic History from Imperial, Continental, and Pacific Perspectives," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 63 (October 2006): 713–724.

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MAP 1: The Trans-Appalachian West: the region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. This digital topographic image of North America, created from data collected by NASA's space shuttle *Endeavour*, highlights the Appalachian Mountains as the formidable geographic obstacle they were. Courtesy NASA/JPL-Caltech.

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But what happens if we take a different approach, viewing late-eighteenth-century North America not from the perspective of the East Coast looking out toward the Atlantic, but rather from the multiple perspectives of the Atlantic world looking in toward the trans-Appalachian West and vice versa? By drawing on the arguments and sensibility of an older diplomatic historiography, and connecting that to the methodological and historical insights of a newer ethnological and social history of the frontier and more recent scholarship on empire, we gain new insights on North American history from 1754 to 1815. In particular, certain continuities emerge over more familiar ruptures—including, in the U.S. context, the all-important division between "colonial" and "early national" periods. Taking an Atlantic perspective on the continental interior, it appears that the Seven Years' War, which ostensibly ended in North America in 1760 and in Europe in 1763, in fact continued with only brief interruptions to 1815—in the form of the American Revolution of the 1770s, the Indian Wars of the 1780s and 1790s, and the War of 1812. Call it a Long War for the West. During this Long War, as the action shifted among various "hot spots" across the trans-Appalachian West, the great issue animating Native, imperial, and settler actors alike revolved around the fate of the region: Would it become a permanent Native American country? Would it fall to some distant European power? Or, perhaps the most unlikely scenario of all, would it join with the United States? Only in the wake of the British defeat in the War of 1812 was the region's fate as part of the expanding United States settled once and for all.[3]

FACING EAST, AS IT WERE, FROM NATIVE AMERICA, the years from 1754 to 1815 most clearly emerge as a single, coherent period of extended struggle to maintain Native control of the trans-Appalachian West. As historians now largely accept, where Native military power encountered the distant reaches of European empire, and none could claim supremacy, Euro-American interaction most often resulted from negotiation born of "mutual weakness." European empires in the West existed—as they later would in other forms of non-settler colonialism—not through military or demographic domination, but by fostering various forms of consent or "persuasion" among local allies; European imperialism drew settlers and colonial administrators into Native "diplomatic, economic, judicial, and family ways" as often as it did the reverse. The result was a complex system of shifting alliances continually beset by diverging Native and European interests.[4]

This system began to collapse in the Ohio Valley—the "hot spot" of the trans-Appalachian West in the mid-eighteenth century, where the Long War for the West

[3] Jack P. Greene has recently urged historians to recognize "the profound continuities between the colonial and national segments of the American past." Greene, "Colonial History and National History," 248–249. It is something that Greg Nobles notably accomplished in *American Frontiers*; my thanks to him for suggesting the idea of a "Long Seven Years' War." Thomas Bender, too, has recently suggested that the period from 1754 to 1783 should be seen as "a continuous war." Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York, 2006), 79–87.

[4] The phrase "facing east" is borrowed from Richter, *Facing East*; "mutual weakness" is from White, *The Middle Ground*, 351; "diplomatic, economic, judicial, and family ways" is from Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, 2006), 118. For the Native context, see also Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge, 1995).

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began. It was there that Native control over hunting grounds and trade routes was most contested. It was there that the British Empire confronted the French over issues of territorial sovereignty. And thus it was there that George Washington, a young and inexperienced soldier and surveyor, along with Tanaghrisson, an Iroquois leader, ambushed a party of sleeping French soldiers in 1754, unleashing a chain of events that led to worldwide warfare and to the reconfiguration of Europe's global empires.[5]

From the perspective of France's Native American allies, the French imperial collapse in the Seven Years' War was an ambiguous event. On the one hand, the territorial cessions being drawn on maps in Paris bore little connection to realities in the trans-Appalachian West, where Native American nations—unlike their French allies—remained undefeated: "Although you have conquered the French," said an Ojibwa chief to a British trader, summing up the common sentiment, "you have not yet conquered us!" On the other hand, the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which ended the war, radically transformed North America's geopolitical landscape, upending the imperial balance of power and with it longstanding patterns of Native-European interaction. "To preserve the Balance between us & the French," one British official had remarked before the Seven Years' War, "is the great ruling Principle of the Modern Indian Politics." The disintegration of France's North American empire was thus bound to alter relations between Native and European powers.[6]

And so it did: France's defeat marked the beginning of a unipolar North America. The English, a Delaware chief remarked, had "grown too powerfull." British provocations only made matters worse: the arrogance of General Jeffrey Amherst, who referred to Native Americans as "pernicious vermin"; his desire to render Indians into defeated subjects rather than allies ("it is not my intention ever to attempt to gain the friendship of Indians by presents"); the occupation of French forts throughout the Ohio Valley; and especially the continual encroachment of British settlers into the region. Sir William Johnson, the British superintendent for Indian affairs, reported that even Mohawks—the oldest of British allies—felt themselves in "danger of being made slaves, and having their lands taken from them at pleasure." Native Americans throughout the West discerned a sinister British design to seize their land and render them impotent.[7]

[5] On these events, the best account is Fred Anderson, *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2000).

[6] "You have not yet conquered us!" is quoted in Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–1815* (Toronto, 1992), 32; British official quoted in Calloway, *American Revolution*, and in Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York, 2006), 7. "Neither the capitulation at Montreal nor the Treaty of Paris," historians Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal rightly observe, "ended their war against the British"; *L'Amérique française*, 678 (my translation). For geopolitics in the Ohio Valley, see Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*; in the Great Lakes region, see especially White, *The Middle Ground*; in Iroquoia, see Taylor, *The Divided Ground*; in the Southwest, see Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), esp. 77–104; in the Missouri area, see Aron, *American Confluence*; and generally in the backcountry, see Richter, *Facing East*, 151–188; Nobles, *American Frontiers*, 57–96; Havard and Vidal, *L'Amérique française*; and Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore, Md., 2003).

[7] "Grown too powerfull" is quoted in White, *The Middle Ground*, 278; Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (Oxford, 2006), 66; and Richter, *Facing East*, 164. "Pernicious vermin" is from Havard and Vidal, *L'Amérique française*, 674 (my translation);

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Eager to restore a balance of power, some western nations urged the French to reconsider their capitulation. "Take courage, Father," said a warrior in the Illinois country to a French officer, drawing on venerable diplomatic traditions. "Don't abandon your children." Pleading for a new offensive, a Shawnee leader presented lingering French soldiers with a wampum belt naming forty-seven villages that remained committed to maintaining the French alliance. Alas, these and other overtures were rebuffed. Exhausted by war, its navy in tatters and its treasury drained, France was not about to renew hostilities. Dreams of a resurrected French Empire in North America after 1763 would thus be kept alive not by diplomats, merchants, or colonial administrators in Paris, Nantes, or Québec, but by Native Americans in the trans-Appalachian West.[8]

And so the western Indians fought on, with even some Iroquois nations abandoning their former allegiance to resist Britain's new imperial power. Their objectives essentially carried forward previous French imperial policy: to contain British settlement between the Appalachians and the Atlantic. The hot spot of the trans-Appalachian West now shifted from the Ohio Valley to the forts and frontier settlements along the Appalachians and the Great Lakes, where Native nations allied under the Ottawa chief Pontiac launched a series of devastating assaults on British settlements. If Pontiac's War of 1763–1764 failed to push the British into the Atlantic, it succeeded in restoring some autonomy to Native Americans in the West. Concerned by the specter of a costly war and its impact on the nation's tottering finances, British policymakers abandoned Amherst's disastrous policies, turning instead to the traditional French approach of alliance through gift-giving and intertribal diplomacy. More importantly, Britain agreed to limit colonial settlement in the trans-Appalachian West, reserving the area as an autonomous Native American territory—an objective that would persist in various forms over the next several decades.

THE BRITISH IMPERIAL CRISIS OF THE 1770s AND 1780s began, like the French crisis before it, on the imperial periphery: at the crest of the Appalachians, where imperial authorities found themselves squeezed between the conflicting demands of the rebellious Native and settler populations. This will come as little surprise to those who have followed recent scholarship on eighteenth-century empires, which has largely turned away from the perspective of older diplomatic historians—imperial conflict as seen from European capitals—to focus instead on imperial edges, emphasizing local forces in what are variously called frontiers, borderlands, or marchlands. Shifting its sights from traditional state actors, this newer historiography focuses on local

"it is not my intention" is from Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies*, 32; Johnson quoted in Taylor, *The Divided Ground*, 16. The most complete study of Pontiac's War is Gregory Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002). On Native fears of English power, see also Richter, *Facing East*, 193; Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*, 121.

[8] "Don't abandon your children" and the forty-seven villages are from Havard and Vidal, *L'Amérique française*, 677–678. On this issue, see also Dowd, *War under Heaven*, 112–113; Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies*, 34; White, *The Middle Ground*, 275–279; and, among other sources, François-Alexandre-Frédéric la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, *Voyage dans les États-Unis d'Amérique, fait en 1795, 1796 et 1797*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1799), 1: 78.

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agents—missionaries, fur traders, petty colonial officers, land speculators, settlers, and of course Native Americans—people who navigate native grounds, middle grounds, or divided grounds. It all added up, as historian Richard White puts it, to "a world system in which minor agents, allies, and even subjects at the periphery often guide[d] the course of empires." Local actors were the driving force. "Most of the agency in the construction of . . . early modern empires," Jack P. Greene has recently insisted, "rested in the hands of the colonizers or settlers themselves." Ultimately, the arrows of influence that emerge from this scholarship reverse those of the older diplomatic history: rather than imperial capitals imposing their will on populations of distant peripheries, the actors on those peripheries impose *their* will on policymakers in the center. The tail in effect wags the dog. With so much emphasis placed on imperial margins, however, the metropole often drops out of such studies, and it might be asked whether the pendulum has swung too far—whether an older imperial perspective can be integrated into this new narrative by setting metropole and periphery in dialogue with each other.[9]

From the perspective of London, the vast territory acquired by Britain in the Seven Years' War created daunting new challenges. The scope of its victory, the territoriality of an empire that had theretofore defined itself as maritime, the multitude of new peoples and ethnicities now under British dominion, all led to a fundamental rethinking of the nature of empire, and ultimately to the greatest crisis the British Empire had yet seen. In seeking to accommodate the objectives of their new

[9] White, *The Middle Ground*, xi; Greene, "Colonial History and National History," 240–241. On frontiers, see John Mack Faragher, "The Frontier Trail: Rethinking Turner and Reimagining the American West," *American Historical Review* 98, no. 1 (February 1993): 106–117, and the works cited therein, along with Nobles, *American Frontiers*; on borderlands, see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814–841, along with the responses in "Forum Essay: Responses," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1221–1239, and the works cited therein; and Aron, *American Confluence*. On marchlands, see Bernard Bailyn, *The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction* (New York, 1986), 112–131; Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991); and Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 62–64. On native grounds, see DuVal, *The Native Ground*; on middle grounds, see White, *The Middle Ground*; on divided grounds, see Taylor, *The Divided Ground*. The "new imperial history" mostly addresses the British Empire; for an excellent survey of its themes, see Kathleen Wilson, "Introduction," in Wilson, ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (Cambridge, 2004), 1–26, along with the works cited therein. My use of "edges" makes reference to Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*; and to Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850* (New York, 2005), one of the finer studies in the new imperial vein. By older diplomatic history perspectives, I have in mind work such as Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," *American Historical Review* 3, no. 4 (July 1898): 650–671; Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams," *American Historical Review* 10, no. 2 (January 1905): 249–279; J. A. James, "Louisiana as a Factor in American Diplomacy, 1795–1800," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 1, no. 1 (June 1914): 44–56; Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783–1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley* (Boston, 1927); Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy, 1763–1801* (New York, 1972). A recent debate between peripheries and centers in Atlantic history occurred here in the *AHR*: Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 764–786; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?" ibid., 787–799; Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 5 (December 2007): 1415–1422; and Cañizares-Esguerra, "The Core and Peripheries of Our National Narratives: A Response from IH-35," ibid., 1423–1431.

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American subjects—Native American and Catholic—imperial policymakers ran headlong into the ambitions of their older subjects.[10]

The first conflict emerged in the wake of Pontiac's War, when the government enacted the Royal Proclamation of 1763, forbidding colonists from "making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands," and ordering those who had settled there "forthwith to remove themselves." Even as it eased Native tensions, the proclamation infuriated local settler populations, who, seeing their hard-won western land claims denied, began to look suspiciously on the distant imperial authority. Settlers' fears of losing control of the West were reignited a decade later by the Québec Act of 1774, which granted religious and legal rights to the *habitants* in the Saint Laurence Valley. By detaching the Ohio Valley from the seaboard colonies and attaching it to the new province of Québec—restoring, in effect, the configuration of New France as the French had insisted it was in 1754, and as the British had sworn it could never be—the Québec Act further alienated British settlers. To them, it was a stunning reversal. Britain had long maintained, after all, that its seaboard colonies extended beyond the Appalachians; British colonists had sacrificed and suffered in defense of this territorial principle. And now, close on the heels of its greatest triumph, the Crown was enacting precisely the policy it had waged war to prevent: it was making the Ohio Valley part of Canada! "Deeply antithetical to the interests of real estate speculators, war veterans, and other Whites eager to acquire Indian lands," the government's western policy unleashed fierce anger, setting British settlers in opposition to imperial authorities.[11]

The story here becomes too familiar to need retelling. These and other attempts to rationalize imperial governance led the settlers, like Native Americans before them, to discern a sinister design to seize their land and render them impotent. Like the Native Americans before them, they feared being made into "slaves" and having their property taken from them at pleasure. And so they, like the Native Americans before them, rebelled. One notable difference between the two rebellions was France's decision to help the British settlers—precisely what it had refused to do a decade earlier for its longstanding and loyal Native allies, a difference that helps explain the more successful outcome of the second North American revolution in two decades. The relationship between these two parallel rebellions—the 1763 event part of an ongoing indigenous rebellion in the West; the 1776 event a settler rebellion

[10] Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), esp. 106–147; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 100–145; Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), 155–161, 213–228.

[11] Quotations from the Royal Proclamation are drawn from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/proc1763.htm (accessed April 14, 2008); "deeply antithetical to the interests" is from Richter, *Facing East*, 215. On the impact of the Royal Proclamation, see Edward Samuel Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (1916; repr., Gloucester, Mass., 1969), 225 n. 4; Meinig, *The Shaping of America*, 1: 295–296; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 164–169. On British policy during this period, see Meinig, *The Shaping of America*, 1: 284–307. Land speculation is a major—and largely underreported—part of this story. On land speculation as it bears on these issues, see especially Charles Royster, *The Fabulous History of the Dismal Swamp Company: A Story of George Washington's Times* (New York, 1999); W. J. Eccles, *The French in North America, 1500–1783*, rev. ed. (Markham, Ont., 1998), 198, 245–246; Richter, *Facing East*, 200, 211, 214; Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*, 125–133.

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centered along the coast; each intimately related to the other—would determine the particular configurations of North American history for another forty years.[12]

The end of war in 1783 did not settle the fate of the trans-Appalachian West, however. "If ever a peace failed to pacify," Arthur Preston Whitaker once aptly remarked, "it was the peace of 1783." Once again, the Ohio Valley lay at the center of the geopolitical conflict. Britain ceded the region to the United States hoping to divide the Americans from their French allies. Whatever goodwill was achieved by the gesture, however, was immediately extinguished by British postwar diplomacy, and it thus seems appropriate to wonder about the wisdom of the British cession. Legally, at least according to British law, the Ohio Valley had belonged to Canada since 1774, and negotiators might have insisted it should thus remain. Militarily, Britain's Native American allies, fiercely opposed to U.S. power, remained dominant in the region. Diplomatically, the British government was in an even stronger position to claim the Ohio Valley for its Native allies, for here was an issue on which Britain and its enemies agreed: Britain, Spain, and France all united in hoping to see the region between the Appalachians and the Mississippi dominated by Native American power, a buffer zone to stall U.S. expansion at the Appalachians. Had the British negotiated the peace of 1783 in combination with European and Native powers—granting concession to the indigenous rather than settler populations—U.S. borders might well have remained permanently fixed at the Appalachians.[13]

Clearly, many Britons came to question the wisdom of the 1783 cessions, directed as they were to a coalition of quarrelsome states verging on disintegration. "We might as reasonably dread the effects of combinations among the German as among the American states," declared Lord Sheffield, fitting two spectacularly mistaken predictions into a single quip. "Every circumstance proves, that it will be extreme folly to enter into any engagements, *by which we may not wish to be bound hereafter.*" Even as British policymakers began to reconsider their engagements, crown officials in the Northwest, who "shared their Native allies' sense of betrayal by the crown's diplomats," continued to support western nations: holding on to key forts in the region, supplying Native allies with gifts and gunpowder as the French had once done, and resisting U.S. encroachments into the Ohio Valley. This British-Native alliance would long threaten settler interests in the region. "As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts," bemoaned a U.S. congressman in 1792, "we can never hope to succeed against the Indians"—nor, he might have added, in establishing sovereignty in the West.[14]

[12] On sinister designs and revolution, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays* (New York, 1965), and Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 39 (July 1982): 401–441. On white Americans' fear of being made "slaves," see François Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father: Washington's Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation* (New York, 2006), esp. 193–199. On Pontiac's War and the American Revolution as two wars for independence, see Richter, *Facing East*, 190. On indigenous and settler rebellions, see Greene, "Colonial History and National History," 237–238.

[13] Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier*, 1; Bender, *A Nation among Nations*, 102. On this issue, see Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley"; Corwin, *French Policy*, 228; Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 168–169; Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste: Aux origines de la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis, 1789–1812* (Paris, 1994), 47, 50. This book has been translated into English and published as *The Nationalist Ferment: The Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1812*, trans. Lillian A. Parrott (Columbus, Ohio, 2004).

[14] John Holroyd, Earl of Sheffield, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States* (Dublin,

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If British-Native alliances seemed poised to keep American settlers from the Northwest, Spanish-Native alliances were designed to do the same in the South. Although Spain had taken possession of Louisiana after the Seven Years' War, imperial authorities valued Louisiana not per se, but rather as what the Spanish minister Conde de Aranda called a "recognizable barrier" to protect its invaluable Mexican possessions.[15]

Asserting Spanish sovereignty in Louisiana was thus never a priority, and Spanish authorities mostly adapted themselves to the realities of a colony in which French settlers vastly outnumbered Spanish, Africans vastly outnumbered Europeans, and Native Americans remained the dominant military power. Their forts in the Arkansas River Valley staffed by French officers long after 1763, Spanish officials soon adopted French diplomatic *moeurs* and began to play by Native rules. Breaking with the muscular policy still operating in New Spain, Louisiana authorities practiced a diplomacy of extensive (and expensive) gift-giving and trade. The accommodations forced upon Spain by Louisiana's French and Native populations would have repercussions elsewhere in Spanish North America. Influenced by his nephew, Louisiana governor Bernardo de Gálvez, the reform-minded secretary of the Indies, José de Gálvez, was soon promulgating a "French-inspired Indian policy" across Spanish America's northern frontier.[16]

Spanish imperial policy in the trans-Appalachian West had two primary objectives: to protect Mexico from British/American expansion, and to ensure Spanish dominance in the Gulf of Mexico. These aims determined the Spanish response to the American rebellion in the 1770s. Despite their reluctance to support the colonial rebellion—"Spain," a member of the Spanish royal council presciently warned in 1777, "is about to be left alone, face to face with one other power . . . which has assumed a national name . . . and which is accustomed to war even before it has begun it. I think that we should be the last country in all Europe to recognize *any* sovereign and independent state in North America"—Spanish authorities eventually

1784); see also Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 161. "Shared their Native allies' sense of betrayal" is from Richter, *Facing East*, 224; the quote from the U.S. congressman is from *Annals of Congress*, 2nd Cong., 1st sess., 338, quoted in Julius William Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (1925; repr., Gloucester, Mass., 1957), 20. On this issue, see also Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 163–167; Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste*, 313–321; Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies*, 12–86; Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783–1815* (Norman, Okla., 1987), esp. 5–13; White, *The Middle Ground*, 413–517; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 226–267; and from a different perspective, Matthew Rainbow Hale, "Neither Britons nor Frenchmen: The French Revolution and American National Identity" (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2002), 105–106.

[15] Aranda quoted in David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 199. See also Corwin, *French Policy*, 228. Spanish imperialism in Louisiana thus perpetuated the French policy of alliance with what a French governor in 1744 had called "the Indian nations that serve as a barrier on this continent." Quoted in Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves*, 78. See also Peter J. Kastor, *The Nation's Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America* (New Haven, Conn., 2004), 25–26.

[16] Gálvez quoted in Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 230. For social and diplomatic conditions in Louisiana, see Kastor, *The Nation's Crucible*, 25–34; on Louisiana demography, see the essays by James Pritchard and Paul Lachance in Bond, *French Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World*; on French officers in the Arkansas Valley, see DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 118–151; on Gálvez and Spanish policy more generally, see Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 204–270; DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 158–159; and Bender, *A Nation among Nations*, 68, 75–76. Many thanks to Richard Kagan for telling me about the Gálvez connection.

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bent to French pressure and entered the war, providing the United States with crucial military assistance. In return, they demanded a reacquisition of the Floridas in the immediate term, and the restriction of American settlers from the trans-Appalachian West in the long term. These aims were only partly fulfilled. In 1783, Spain obtained the entire gulf coastline, turning the Gulf of Mexico into a "Spanish lake" protecting Mexico from hostile European powers, and securing the indispensable corridor between Cuba and Florida for its transatlantic shipments of precious metals. It failed, however, to create a Native buffer zone in the Southwest to restrict American expansion.[17]

After 1783, the Southwest in general—and New Orleans in particular—emerged as the hot spot of the trans-Appalachian West. In order to preserve control over the Gulf of Mexico and shore up its Louisiana buffer, Spanish officials pursued a two-pronged strategy to keep Americans from the Southwest: frustrate trade along the Mississippi, and offer logistical and material support to Native allies. Spanish officials refused to grant Americans trading rights through New Orleans, hoping, as a 1782 French government report put it, to close "the Missisipi [*sic*] to the Americans, and to disgust them from making establishments on that river." Thanks to these efforts—and to the feeble U.S. response—the Spanish Empire seemed poised not just to block American expansion, but even to pluck away U.S. territories south of the Ohio River. Meanwhile, Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws turned to Spanish agents as their best hope to hold off American settlers. Shifting their allegiance from the defeated British, Native leaders such as Alexander McGillivray reached out to receptive Spanish officials to forge new alliances opposing U.S. expansion.[18]

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PARIS, it was unclear that France had been permanently chased from North America in 1763. Only in retrospect does the year emerge as a defining moment, and even then it can appear as one of those turning points at which history failed to turn. In certain respects, "France" remained in North America: French settlers continued to populate the West, French officers continued to conduct Spanish diplomacy in Louisiana, and French diplomatic *moeurs* continued to shape Native relations with both the Spanish and the British. Most important, perhaps, French policymakers continued to harbor ambitions—and sponsor attempts—to reestablish their North American empire. This continuing French presence in the

[17] Spanish official quoted in Corwin, *French Policy*, 109; "Spanish lake" is from Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier*, 3, and Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 265. On Spanish diplomacy during the Revolution, see also Corwin, *French Policy*, 105–120, 266–267, 227; and Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 166–174.

[18] Report of Montmorin to Vergennes, quoted in "Papers on Spain Received from Edmond Charles Genet, Enclosed in TJ, Memorandum to George Washington, dated July 11, 1793," in Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 33 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J., 1950–), 26: 477. On the Spanish response to the American Revolution, see also Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 279–285; James H. O'Donnell, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1973), 95–98, 135, 138–139; and, farther west, DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 158.

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trans-Appalachian West—demographic, diplomatic, cultural, and imperial—decisively influenced the Long War for the West.[19]

French imperial planners retained a keen interest in North America for two reasons: to counter the ambitions of Great Britain, France's principal rival for global hegemony; and to protect its all-important Caribbean colonies, especially Saint Domingue, which now lacked a mainland base for provisions and military operations. Countering British imperial dominance, according to the mercantilist view that prevailed among French imperial thinkers, meant destroying its commerce with its colonies—an ambition realized by the American War for Independence. "In taking the United States away from Great Britain," read a 1786 Navy Department report, "it was above all their commerce that we wanted to take away." And they succeeded spectacularly, bringing an end to the first British Empire. Although French officials failed to achieve two wartime aims—to establish the trans-Appalachian West as neutral Native American territory and to reclaim Louisiana—they did restore a balance of power in North America. Postwar French policy thus aimed to ensure the permanent estrangement of Great Britain and its former colonies, ideally with the United States as a French client state.[20]

Detaching the colonies from Britain furthered French imperial planners' second principal ambition: to safeguard the French sugar islands. Through its new ally, France now had a base to provide lumber, tar, and other resources for its navy, provisions for its slaves, and logistical support for wartime operations. French naval planners recognized that the mainland colonies had proved indispensable to British operations during the Seven Years' War, and they expected great things from their new ally. Over the course of the 1780s, French engineers scoured American forests, sending detailed reports on the best lumber, hoping to make France "less dependent on northern Europe for its naval munitions." Naval strategists, meanwhile, urged French captains to acquaint themselves with mainland ports: "Their utility will be even greater for the French flotillas than they were for the English," read a 1788 navy report, already looking toward a new round of conflict. By this reasoning, the French territorial losses of 1763 were "more than compensated by the revolution of the

[19] The phrase about turning points is borrowed from the great Trevelyan, who was referring to 1848. On 1763 as turning point, see Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen*.

[20] "Mémoire sur le commerce de France, avec les États-Unis en France" [1786], Marine B/7/460, Archives Nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. The importance of mercantilist thinking is stressed in Corwin, *French Policy*, 17–21. On French-British rivalry for global hegemony, see Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 3 vols. (London, 1985), 3: 379; Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London, 1994), 47–58; and Beverly J. Silver and Eric Slater, "The Social Origins of World Hegemonies," in Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, eds., *Chaos and Governance in the World System* (Minneapolis, 1999), esp. 159–176. Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire*, makes this rivalry a central theme. On the hopes to turn the trans-Appalachian West into neutral Native American territory, see Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," 250; Eccles, *The French in North America*, 264. On French ambitions for Louisiana, see Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Administrations of James Madison* (repr., New York, 1986), 239; Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," 249–279; Corwin, *French Policy*, 9–11, 233, 240–242, 282; Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*; and Eccles, *The French in North America*, 248–252. See also *Treaty of Alliance between the United States and France, February 6, 1778*, esp. art. 6; and Pichon to Talleyrand, 1er thermidor an 9, Georgetown, C.P. États-Unis, vol. 53, p. 173, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Quai d'Orsay, Paris [hereafter MAÉ]. "Je lui [Madison] rappellai qu'au contraire le traité de 1778 était conçu de manière à exclure cette colonie [la Louisiane] de la (Re(é)nonciation). Je l'assurai que depuis la Révolution on y avait sérieusement songé plusieurs fois."

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United States . . . The King has acquired a new domain infinitely more useful and less onerous than Canada ever was."[21]

The Franco-American alliance would be more than military, however; it would principally be tied together by an expanded trade network linking France, the United States, and the French Caribbean. The 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and the United States in effect offered a mutual grant of most favored nation status, creating a Franco-American trade zone that—so the anti-mercantilist circles in Paris hoped—would permanently tie France to the United States through the power of *doux commerce* and "reciprocal interest." The economic realities, however—French agrarian interests fearful of American competition, powerful tobacco monopolies, and French *commerçants* with a vested interest in mercantilist practices—would ultimately determine otherwise, scuttling hopes for Franco-American comity and pushing the United States back into British Atlantic trade networks.[22]

As for the United States, its primary objective after the Revolution was to become an independent nation-state; and as many at the time recognized, the greatest obstacles to that ambition lay in the trans-Appalachian West. From 1783 through the end of the eighteenth century and beyond, it remained possible that the region would become a neutral Native American territory, or that it would fall to some distant European power. U.S. sovereignty in the trans-Appalachian West would be ensured only by overcoming three challenges: the geography of North America, and of the Appalachian Mountains in particular; Native American resistance; and the ambiguous loyalties of western colonists.[23]

In recent years, scholars of colonial British North America have abandoned an anachronistic view that assumes "an inner propulsion toward modern nationalism," as the literary scholar Michael Warner puts it, emphasizing instead "the localism of early modern colonists, on the one hand, and the transatlantic contexts of empire and trade, on the other." With a few exceptions, however, the same cannot be said of scholars of the early U.S. republic: most still assume an inner propulsion that drives the trans-Appalachian West into the orbit of U.S. sovereignty. If the maps drawn in London in 1783, and by Jefferson and others in the years that followed (see

[21] M. Demoustier, "Considérations sur quelques objets qui intéressent particulièrement la Marine du Roi, par une suite des nouveaux rapports qui dérivent de la Souveraineté des États Unis de l'Amérique," December 12, 1788, Marine B/7/461, AN; on the lumber reports, see "Compte rendu par M. Rolland sous-ingénieur constructeur sur des bois de l'Amérique Septentrionale," December 23, 1785; "Suite des observations déjà adressées par M. Rolland, sous-ingénieur constructeur . . . ," March 31, 1786; and others, all in Marine B/7/460, AN.

[22] "Reciprocal interest" is from Demoustier, "Considérations sur quelques objets." For a fine analysis of commerce and the Franco-American relationship, see Marcel Dorigny, "La *Libre Amérique* selon Brissot et Clavière: Modèle politique, utopie libérale et réalisme economique," in Dorigny, ed., *De la France et des États-Unis: Étienne Clavière et J.-P. Brissot de Warville* (Paris, 1996), 7–29. On failed French hopes to capture the U.S. market, see Eccles, *The French in North America*, 265; Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 175. On the pro-American, anti-mercantilist circles in Paris, see Durand Echeverria, *Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (New York, 1966), esp. 24–31, 41–42, 130–132.

[23] The outstanding discussion on this subject is to be found in Rossignol, *Le ferment nationalist*, 31–65. See also the excellent analysis in Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*. Hinderaker rightly observes: "The Revolution may have begun on the seaboard, but it would be really tested in the west." Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 227.

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Map 2)—maps still used in history surveys today—extended U.S. sovereignty to the Mississippi River, such cartographic imagining was hardly in accord with the realities on the ground, where vexing geographic obstacles could not be so easily erased, Native Americans remained dominant, and settlers remained little swayed by feelings of national loyalty.[24]

In seeking to control both sides of the Appalachians, U.S. policymakers were attempting something that no political entity, Native or European, had ever accomplished without rapidly disintegrating. Unlike the Atlantic Ocean, which served as both barrier and bridge between Europe and America, the Appalachian Mountains were an unambiguous obstacle dividing the East from the West. "Nowhere," Henry Adams once observed, "did the eastern settlements touch the western. At least one hundred miles of mountainous country held the two regions everywhere apart." Also unlike the Atlantic, the Appalachians could be crossed at only a few points. The two most important passages lay along the Mohawk River in New York—dominated by the Iroquois, which helps explains their strategic importance—and, some seven hundred miles of rugged terrain to the southwest, through the Cumberland Gap, the old Indian trail that had been converted into a wagon road. (See Map 3.) By the last third of the eighteenth century, only two other roads crossed the Appalachians: Forbes Road, connecting the Susquehanna to the Ohio Valley, and Braddock's Road, connecting the Potomac to the Monongahela Valley. Travel along these routes was grueling and expensive, however, and eastern and western settlements were accessible to each other only with great difficulty.[25]

The separation was not simply one of distance; it was more fundamentally one of orientation, founded in the diverging paths of North American waterways. In the original thirteen states, where most settlement lay within fifty miles of the tidewater, the economy and society naturally faced out toward the Atlantic. "The inhabitants of the Atlantic coast give [to the West] the name *Back-Country*," a French traveler once observed, "indicating by this term their moral attitude, constantly turned towards Europe." Not so in the western settlements: "Scarcely had I crossed the Alleghanys [*sic*], before I heard [the residents] . . . call the Atlantic coast the *Back-Country*; which proved that their geographic situation has given their views and their interests a new direction, in conformity with that of the waters that serve as roads and doors toward the Gulf of Mexico." Waterways were indeed the key. Through them, nature had decreed that the trans-Appalachian West would be more connected to New Orleans, and even to the Caribbean, than to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston. For it was not from any eastern port, but down the Mississippi, via New Orleans and through the Caribbean, that all commerce from the vast region must

[24] Michael Warner, "What's Colonial about Colonial America," in Robert Blair St. George, ed., *Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), 49–70, quotation at 50. See also Greene, "Colonial History and National History," 235. On mapping and the West, see also Albert Furtwangler, *Acts of Discovery: Visions of America in the Lewis and Clark Journals* (Urbana, Ill., 1993), 84–86; Gregory H. Nobles, "Straight Lines and Stability: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo-American Frontier," *Journal of American History* 80 (June 1993): 9–35, 25; Nobles, *American Frontiers*, 60–62; and Martin Brückner, *The Geographic Revolution in Early America: Maps, Literacy, and National Identity* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), 211.

[25] Adams, *History of the United States*, 6. On the two roads, see especially Anderson, *The Crucible of War*; also Albert Perry Brigham, "The Great Roads across the Appalachians," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 37 (1905): 321–339. By roads, I mean something on which one could drive a wagon.

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


MAP 2: This map, based on Thomas Jefferson's plan for the West, blithely erases the geography on display in Map 1, obscuring the rivers, streams, and mountains that had such geopolitical importance with straight lines and classically inspired names. Reprinted from the Jefferson Papers, courtesy Princeton University Press.

eventually pass. "In the style of road building in the Roman Empire," historian Malcolm J. Rohrbough has observed, "the watercourses of the West all led to New Orleans."[26]

[26] Constantin-François Volney, *Tableau du climat et du sol des États-Unis d'Amérique* (Paris, 1825), 19; for settlement near the tidewater, see Adams, *History of the United States*, 5; Malcolm J. Rohrbough, *The Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, and Institutions, 1775–1850* (New York, 1978), 113.

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MAP 3: The Appalachian Mountains. The routes along the Mohawk River and the Cumberland Gap, indicated here, were the two most important passages across the Appalachian Mountains. The difficulty of moving people and goods across the mountain range—and the fact that all waterways to the west of the mountains fed into the Gulf of Mexico, rather than the Atlantic—created significant challenges to U.S. sovereignty in the trans-Appalachian West. Courtesy NASA/JPL-Caltech.

These geographical forces made the Southwest in general, and New Orleans in particular, the hot spot of the trans-Appalachian West after 1783. Without control of New Orleans, no part of the region was safely American. Barges and boats from distant reaches of the Ohio Valley floated goods to New Orleans, and thence into international markets. By the nineteenth century, settlers in the Ohio Valley were building ships large enough to sail straight into the Caribbean; landlocked Marietta, Ohio, at the foot of the Appalachians, was a shipbuilding center! As a strategic site without parallel, New Orleans thus secured control of the entire Mississippi River Valley; it was, as a 1787 French government report put it, "the key to the West." The challenge for the United States was clear. It would have to overcome what nature had made so difficult: the unification of the East with the trans-Appalachian West.[27]

[27] For ships sailing into the Caribbean, see Pichon to Talleyrand, 14 prairial an 9, C.P. États-Unis, vol. 53, p. 140, MAÉ; for shipbuilding in Marietta, see Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 30; "the key to the West" is from "Extrait d'un mémoire sur les rapports commerciaux de l'Amérique septentrionale

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The second great challenge to U.S. sovereignty in the West was Native American power. If the American War of Independence was what scholars call a settler rebellion, it had the particularity of occurring amid an indigenous rebellion that began with the Seven Years' War and extended into the nineteenth century. In many respects, the ultimate success of the settler rebellion—long-term national sovereignty—would hinge on the outcome of the indigenous one; one had to fail for the other to succeed. The Long War for the West thus continued through the 1780s and into the 1790s, as the United States sought to establish its military supremacy in the Mississippi Valley, where Native Americans, as historian Eric Hinderaker remarks, refused to "accept the principle that the lands abandoned during the war had been forfeited by the Indians or won by the United States." With British and Spanish support, Native nations dealt the United States a series of devastating defeats, remaining "the dominant military power in the valley."[28]

If Native Americans posed an immediate military threat to U.S. sovereignty in the West, the tenuous loyalties of the region's settlers posed a longer-term existential threat. Ever since Bacon's Rebellion in the seventeenth century, backcountry politics had been marked by strong traditions of localism and distrust of centralized authority. While these traditions had drawn many settlers to support the American rebellion, they could just as easily foment resistance to the new authority rising up on the eastern seaboard, confronting the United States with a "crisis of integration" of precisely the kind the British Empire had just experienced. Given past and present connections between westerners and the British Empire, the bonds tying western settlers to Britain "were potentially much stronger" than those tying them to the eastern states. There were many good reasons to suspect that western settlers might break away from the United States to make a separate peace with Spain or Great Britain.[29]

Settlers in the trans-Appalachian West were the key players here; the establishment of U.S. sovereignty in the region depended on them. Early U.S. attempts to retain settlers' loyalty were far from auspicious, however. Throughout the 1780s, Native attacks on settler communities went unchallenged—the U.S. military mustered a mere 350 troops to man its forts in the Ohio Valley in 1788—while federal

avec l'Europe," AF IV 1211, doc. 58, AN. Thus, a Pittsburgh newspaper in 1787 complained vociferously about Spanish imperial policy, which left its residents "destitute of any market for the produce of our soil." Quoted in Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 218.

[28] Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 232, 243; Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste*, 47. On the American Revolution continuing in the West into the 1790s, see Griffin, *American Leviathan*.

[29] "Crisis of integration" is from John M. Murrin, "1776: The Countercyclical Revolution," in Michael A. Morrison and Melinda S. Zook, eds., *Revolutionary Currents: Nation Building in the Transatlantic World* (Lanham, Md., 2004), 65–90; "were potentially much stronger" is from Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 202. On the tenuous national loyalties of settlers, see especially ibid., 236–260; Cayton, "Separate Interests"; Nobles, "Straight Lines and Stability," 28, 34–35; Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste*, 58–65; Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 212–239. On politics in the backcountry and settlers' distrust of elite authority, see also Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York, 1986); Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*; Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990); Michael A. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier* (Charlottesville, Va., 1993); and Nobles, *American Frontiers*. The support of backcountry settlers during the Revolution, according to Eric Hinderaker, was based as much on "calculations of mutual interest and convenience" as on long-term national loyalty. Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 199.

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power, when it did intervene, chased squatters off public land as often as it protected them from Indian attack. Worse still, from a settler perspective, was U.S. diplomacy. In 1786, John Jay, then secretary for foreign affairs, agreed to relinquish U.S. rights to Mississippi River trade to Spain in exchange for commercial benefits favoring the eastern states. Although the Confederation Congress blocked the agreement, long-standing suspicions that the U.S. government cared only for eastern interests had been raised. "Choose lands for a settlement that are near those of the navigable waters that *run towards* the Atlantick ocean," read one piece of advice for prospective settlers published in various newspapers in 1789, adding ominously, "and which are within the jurisdiction of the U. States." Certainly western settlers had good reason to distrust eastern elites, particularly Federalists, who in unguarded moments could be caught referring to westerners as "a parcel of banditti, who will bid defiance to all authority," as George Washington once put it—"our *own* white Indians," in the words of a Connecticut man. For such men, there was little doubt that "the Western Country," as John Jay warned in 1787, "will one Day give us Trouble."[30]

It was precisely this fault line between eastern elites and western settlers that the international situation exacerbated. Nothing inflamed the resentment of settlers more than the Spanish policy of harassing commerce along the Mississippi River, and many feared that their welfare would be sacrificed on the altar of eastern interests. "The right to unrestricted access of the Mississippi was the *sine qua non* of western loyalty," observes Andrew Cayton. "And many frontiersmen, particularly residents of Kentucky, were convinced that the United States was not interested in obtaining it." As American settlers poured into western lands, provoking Native reprisals, it was becoming imperative for the U.S. government to assert its sovereignty—or risk losing the region entirely. Nor was Spanish policy the only threat. Great Britain, still controlling key forts in the Great Lakes, was poised to sail down the Mississippi and take control of Spanish posts, including New Orleans, thus controlling access to the Gulf of Mexico. British officials, meanwhile, pursued overtures to alienated western settlers, who, ever more disenchanted with their government's policies, began to wonder if Great Britain might prove more solicitous. In this regard, the phenomenon of "late loyalists"—Americans lured en masse to Upper Canada by the promise of cheap land and low taxes—served as an ominous warning about tenuous settler loyalties. A national "separation," Thomas Jefferson warned in 1787, "was possible at every moment."[31]

[30] The figure of 350 troops is from Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 38; "choose lands for a settlement" is from the *Salem Mercury*, May 19, 1789, and Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 224 (who quotes this same text from the *Pennsylvania Gazette*); "a parcel of banditti," "our *own* white Indians," and "will one Day give us trouble" are all quoted in Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 7, 8, 23. On settler conflict with the U.S. army, see also Andrew R. L. Cayton, "The Significance of Ohio in the Early American Republic," in Cayton and Stuart D. Hobbs, eds., *The Center of a Great Empire: The Ohio Country in the Early American Republic* (Athens, Ohio, 2005), 1–10; Patrick Griffin, "Reconsidering the Ideological Origins of Indian Removal," ibid., 11–35, esp. 19; and Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 212–213. On Jay's 1780s diplomacy, see Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 171–174; on the response, see Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 23. On Federalist contempt for settlers, see also Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 239, 246; Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*, 133–140; and especially Lewis, *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood*.

[31] Cayton, "Separate Interests," 44; Jefferson to James Madison, June 10, 1787, quoted in Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 23. On threats of western secession, see also Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 167. On British military opportunities in the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, see George W. Kyte, "A Spy

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The danger of a western separation marked U.S. politics of the 1790s to an extent overlooked by most historians of the period. Not so George Washington, who took the threat very seriously. His concern about sectional division always focused more on East vs. West than on North vs. South. His influential farewell address in 1796 pleaded with western settlers to remain loyal to the United States:

> The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort . . . it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.

Securing the loyalties of trans-Appalachian settlers—keeping them from "an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power"—was, in short, a matter of existential importance to the young nation. No one really knew whether the semi-United States could survive as a little strip of settlements huddled along the Atlantic coast and hemmed in by the Appalachian Mountains. At the very least, they would have become what both French and British policymakers were trying to make them: the client states of a great power.[32]

THE YEAR 1789 STANDS AS AN IMPORTANT DATE in this story of the trans-Appalachian West. It saw the inauguration of a new U.S. government, which moved quickly to secure the West—with military force against the Ohio Valley Indians, and with diplomatic overtures to open the Southwest. Despite the more robust military commitment, however, the new government would have, in its first years, no more success than the previous one in defeating Native Americans, who, as long as the British and Spanish maintained a western presence, found ready support to resist U.S. expansion.[33]

But 1789 marks a turning point for a second reason: that year, some ten weeks after Washington's inauguration, revolution exploded in France. Its reverberations

on the Western Waters: The Military Intelligence Mission of General Collot in 1796," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 34 (December 1947): 427–442, esp. 438. On late loyalists, see Alan Taylor, "The Late Loyalists: Northern Reflections of the Early American Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 27 (Spring 2007): 1–24.

[32] John Clement Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799*, 39 vols. (Washington, 1931), 35: 214–238. On these geopolitical issues, see also Meinig, *The Shaping of America*, 2: 4–14; Gregory H. Nobles, "Breaking into the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early American Frontier, 1750–1800," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 46 (October 1989): 641–679, esp. 668; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 252. Washington, it bears noting, began his career surveying western territories, was an early stockholder in the Virginia Company of Ohio, was granted vast tracts of land in the Ohio Valley for his military service, and died holding 9,744 acres of choice land along the Ohio River, and more than 31,000 acres in other parts of the Ohio Valley. See http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/will/property.html (accessed April 14, 2008). For more on Washington and land, see especially Royster, *The Fabulous History of the Dismal Swamp Company*.

[33] On efforts by the federal government to assert itself in the West, see Cayton, "Separate Interests," and Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 1–80. On the role of the federal state in promoting western expansion in the Southwest, see Adam Rothman, *Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

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would be felt throughout Europe, across the Caribbean, and deep into the North American interior. Although the impact of the French Revolution on the United States has generated much scholarship, historians usually attend to its partisan and ideological implications along the East Coast, obscuring its other legacy: the sectional tensions it fomented between eastern elites and western settlers. As frontier regions across the United States seethed with unrest during the 1790s, local political conflicts repeatedly merged with transatlantic geopolitics.[34]

From this western perspective, the Democratic-Republican clubs of the 1790s take on an entirely new dimension. Consider, for instance, a 1793 address by a Kentucky Republican society that complained about the federal government's "neglect bordering on contempt." "Our brethren, on the Eastern Waters," it charged—in a most suggestive formulation—"possess every advantage." Similar complaints proliferated across the West. "Patriotism, like every other thing, has its bounds," warned a Republican club in western Pennsylvania. "If the general government will not procure [unrestricted Mississippi navigation] for us, we shall hold ourselves not answerable for any consequences that may result from our own procurement of it."[35] Just what those consequences might be was suggested by William Blount, territorial governor, a senator from Tennessee, and a major investor in western lands. Concerned by French ambitions in the West, Blount planned to seize parts of Louisiana with an army of frontiersmen and form a separate peace with Great Britain—a plot that became infamous as the "Blount Conspiracy."[35]

But nowhere did sectional tensions merge with partisan conflict more dramatically than in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, which saw insurgents in western Pennsylvania call on other westerners to join the insurrection as "citizen[s] of the western country." Settlers across the Ohio Valley responded, and for a time the events seemed to portend a settler rebellion like that of 1776. "We are too distant from the grand seat of information," charged one angry Kentuckian. As the frontier disturbances spread from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia across the Ohio Valley to

[34] In the 1790s, "the frontier of every state south of New York experienced unrest." Slaughter, *Whiskey Rebellion*, 117; see also 46–60. On frontier unrest in this period, see especially Nobles, *American Frontiers*, 99–132. On the impact of the French Revolution in the United States, see especially Simon P. Newman, *Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 1997). See also David Brion Davis, *Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L. McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism* (New York, 1993); David Brion Davis, "The Impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions," in David P. Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, S.C., 2001), 3–9; David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997); Seth Aaron Cotlar, "In Paine's Absence: The Trans-Atlantic Dynamics of American Popular Political Thought, 1789–1804" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2000); Hale, "Neither Britons nor Frenchmen." No work that I know of has examined the sectional impact of the French Revolution on the United States.

[35] "Neglect bordering on contempt" is quoted in Griffin, "Reconsidering the Ideological Origins of Indian Removal," 28; "patriotism, like every other thing," is quoted in Jon Kukla, *A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America* (New York, 2003), 169. On Blount, see Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question, 1795–1803* (Gloucester, Mass., 1962), 105–107; Frederick Jackson Turner, "Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795–1797," *American Historical Review* 10, no. 3 (April 1905): 574–606; and John Arthur Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, *American National Biography*, 24 vols. (New York, 1999), s.v. "William Blount."

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Kentucky and Ohio, some Kentuckians proclaimed their willingness to "renounc[e] the allegiance to the United States and annex themselves to the British."[36]

French officials were well aware of these sectional tensions, of the open talk of disunion among westerners, and of western Republicans' sympathy for France—sometimes at the expense of their loyalty to the United States. During his travels through the United States, the journalist, speculator, and aspiring *philosophe* Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville had observed the "defiance that the residents of the West showed" toward Congress, which "leads many people to believe . . . there will be a scission." He saw how easily westerners, desperate for Mississippi River navigation, could seize New Orleans. "If ever Americans march towards New Orleans, it will fall under their power." By the mid-1790s, Brissot was back in France shaping Franco-American policy, where he would prove instrumental in appointing the infamous "Citizen" Edmond Charles Genet as minister plenipotentiary to the United States.[37]

Although Genet is best remembered for his antics along the East Coast, his tentacles—like those of France—extended deep into the continental interior. Soon after arriving in Philadelphia in 1793, Genet sent a French agent to Kentucky to enlist former Revolutionary general George Rogers Clark in a plot to seize Spanish New Orleans. Identifying himself in a published proposal for volunteers as "Major General in the armies of France, and Commander in Chief of the French Revolutionary Legions on the Mississippi River," Clark planned to sail down the Mississippi with an army of frontiersmen and join the French navy in an attack on the city. The plan nearly succeeded. In 1794, Clark reported that "upwards of two thousand men have been waiting With impatiance to penetrate into that Country Declare them selves Citizens of France and Give freedom to their neibours on the Mississipi." Emphasizing "the universal Applause of the people throughout those back Countrys in Favour of the Enterprise," Clark claimed that his soldiers had abandoned their allegiance to the United States in favor of France, a power they believed would look with greater solicitude on their commercial interests.[38]

This mission posed monumental risks to U.S. interests. Many believed that an

[36] All these quotations are from Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 233–234. See also Nobles, *American Frontiers*, 99–103.

[37] J. P. Brissot de Warville, *Nouveau voyage dans les États-Unis de l'Amérique Septentrionale: Fait en 1788*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1791), 2: 435, 434. On Brissot and Genet, see Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack," 661; Marcel Dorigny, "Sonthanax et Brissot: Le cheminement d'une filiation politique assumée," *Revue française de l'histoire d'outre-mer* 84 (1997): 36; and Tamara Corriveau, "Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Étienne Clavière et la libre Amérique: Du gallo-américanisme à la mission Genet" (M.A. thesis, Université de Montréal, 2008).

[38] "Major General in the armies of France" is from Kukla, *A Wilderness So Immense*, 176; George Rogers Clark, "George Rogers Clark to Genet, 1794," *American Historical Review* 18, no. 4 (July 1913): 780–783. For Genet's plan, see Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., *Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791–1797* (Washington, D.C., 1904), 204–205; on Clark, see Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack"; Editorial Note, "Jefferson and André Michaux's Proposed Western Expedition," in Boyd et al., *Papers*, 25: 75–81; Kukla, *A Wilderness So Immense*, 156–178; and Havard and Vidal, *L'Amérique française*, 701–703. On Genet's western antics, see also François Barbé-Marbois, *Histoire de la Louisiane et de la cession de cette colonie par la France aux États-Unis de l'Amérique Septentrionale: Précédée d'un discours sur la constitution et le gouvernement des États-Unis* (Paris, 1829), 168–173. Clark had fought the British during the American Revolution with a band of Kentuckians in close alliance with French *habitants* in the country—so close, in fact, that he claimed at the time to be fighting in the name of the king of France. On Clark's revolutionary activities, see Havard and Vidal, *L'Amérique française*, 688.

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attack on Spanish territory would unleash a wider war in the region. Spain would ally with Great Britain—still in the Great Lakes, still poised to sail down the Mississippi—in an imperial war for all the western territories. "It must be remembered that Spain is in a strict alliance with Great Britain," the *Boston Gazette* warned in January 1794, "and that if we raise troops, or suffer them to be raised from among ourselves with a view to carry war into the dominions of Spain, we may rest assured the arms of both kingdoms will be turned against us"—along with, the author might have added, Native American power.[39]

In light of all this—the tenuous loyalties of American settlers across the trans-Appalachian West, the imperial adventures taking place throughout the region—Jay's Treaty of 1794 emerges as a diplomatic triumph. Today the treaty is best remembered for the partisan war it unleashed—a perspective, however, that ignores the more important sectional peace it ensured. Jay's Treaty secured Britain's evacuation of the long-disputed western posts, isolating the Ohio Valley Indians, crippling their resistance to U.S. expansion, and setting the stage for the Treaty of Grenville, which saw Native leaders abandon their longstanding demand for an Ohio River boundary between Native American country and the United States. By defusing a crisis with Britain, it strengthened the United States' negotiating position with Spain so much that Spanish officials soon acceded to longstanding settler demands to open Mississippi River trade in the 1795 Treaty of San Lorenzo. Even as Jay's Treaty reduced Spanish, British, and Native American threats in the trans-Appalachian West, however, it created a new and even more ominous French menace.[40]

IT IS IRONIC THAT FRANCE'S DEFEAT in the Seven Years' War, by forcing it to retrench in the Caribbean, inaugurated what might be called the golden age of the French Atlantic. The development had major implications for the trans-Appalachian West, whose waterways fed into the Gulf of Mexico and thence to the Caribbean; and it explains why, from 1794 to 1803, Saint Domingue emerged as the hot spot with the greatest impact on the trans-Appalachian West.

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of Saint Domingue in this period. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the French colony—one-half of a single Caribbean island, with an area one-sixth the size of Virginia—had experienced an economic boom without precedent, and by 1789 it was the richest, most productive colony not just of the French Empire, but of any empire. Feeding this economic dynamo with labor, the French slave trade grew so dramatically in the 1780s that it briefly surpassed the British trade for the only time in history, transporting some 37,000 Africans—nearly equivalent to the population of Philadelphia, greater than that of New York City—every single year from 1783 to 1792. In all, more than 791,000 Africans would be taken to Saint Domingue from 1700 to 1789, by which time some 465,000 slaves worked the island's rich plantations, producing over half the

[39] *Boston Gazette* quoted in Hale, "Neither Britons nor Frenchmen," 107.

[40] Richter, *Facing East*, 235; Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste*, 56–57. In this respect, contra the work of James Lewis and Peter Onuf, it could be argued that Federalists, far more than Republicans, were most responsive to the demands of western settlers.

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world's coffee, and more sugar than all the other British colonies put together. The sum of its trade was staggering. The port of Cap Français—a city larger than Boston—was plied by more ships than Marseille, creating vast fortunes for French merchants and bankers, and showering wealth on port cities such as Bordeaux and Nantes—indeed, on French society at large. By 1789, some 218 million *livres* worth of goods arrived in France from Saint Domingue, two-thirds of which was re-exported to European markets; an estimated 1 million of France's 25 million inhabitants depended directly on the colonial trade for their livelihoods. And in 1791 it all came crashing down, in a revolution that quickly fused with the bitter imperial conflict between revolutionary France and Great Britain in the Caribbean.[41]

The United States would soon be drawn into these Caribbean events. Fleeing the turmoil after the burning of Cap Français in 1793, thousands of desperate refugees—white, colored, and enslaved—poured into port cities across the United States. As the crisis deepened, the abolition of slavery in Saint Domingue was ratified in the name of the French republic, and a force never before seen in the modern era—of slaves become citizens—was mobilized to crush France's enemies. With the British navy crippling French shipping, France was forced to open its colonies to unrestricted trade with the United States in 1793. American exports to the besieged island surged: from $3.2 million in 1790 to $5 million in 1793, reaching $8 million by 1796. Even as it helped preserve French control of Saint Domingue, however, this trade made France ever more reliant on the United States. "The force of events hands the French colonies over to us," a smug Thomas Jefferson told French minister Fauchet in 1795. "France enjoys sovereignty and we, profits." Rather than make the United States into its client state, as France had hoped after American independence, France was now becoming dependent on the upstart nation.[42]

None of this should have been particularly troubling; since the 1770s, French officials had counted on the benefits of U.S. assistance in future Caribbean warfare. As late as 1789, the French consul in New York was predicting "great advantages": "French fleets . . . will repair there, provision themselves at good prices, reestablish their crew, find arms, naval munitions, masts and lumber of all kinds. The cooperation of the United States will keep England checked in Canada . . . and put the English Antilles in the greatest danger." Such advantages explained why France had sacrificed "blood and treasure," as one ministerial report put it, to achieve U.S. independence. Indeed, the Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, still

[41] Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1990), 22–23; Bernard Gainot and Marcel Dorigny, *Atlas des esclavages* (Paris, 2006), 22–23; Davis, "The Impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions," 4; Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 21, 22, 30. If the township of Northern Liberties is included in the Philadelphia population figures, the total is 38,435.

[42] American export figures from Ashli White, " 'A Flood of Impure Lava': Saint Dominguan Refugees in the United States, 1791–1820" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2003), 53–55; Jefferson quoted in Fauchet to the Commissioner of Foreign Relations, in Turner, *Correspondence of the French Ministers*, 564; also quoted in White, "A Flood of Impure Lava," 54. See also Pichon to Talleyrand, 1er thermidor an 9, Georgetown, C.P. États-Unis, vol. 53, p. 171, MAÉ. On migration from Saint Domingue to the United States, see especially White, "A Flood of Impure Lava"; on transatlantic French refugee networks, see especially Darrell R. Meadows, "Engineering Exile: Social Networks and the French Atlantic Community, 1789–1809," *French Historical Studies* 23 (Winter 2000): 67–102. On Franco-British warfare in the Caribbean and the transformation of slaves into citizens, see especially Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004).

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in force, guaranteed safe harbor to French ships, "whether publick and of War or private and of Merchants." It was on the basis of such strategic thinking that Genet came to the United States and began outfitting French corsairs in 1794. His actions were the fulfillment of the military advantages that French officials had long hoped would redound from the U.S. alliance.[43]

Instead of these many expected benefits, however, including those mandated by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, French diplomats met with a cold neutrality from the United States. Even worse, far from remaining strictly neutral, the Federalist-dominated administration began tilting toward a British alliance. For it was at precisely this time of total warfare between France and Britain—at the moment, one might say, of France's greatest need—that the Washington administration reneged on its commitments to France and negotiated the Jay Treaty, signaling a *rapprochement* with the ex–mother country. From the perspective of Paris, Jay's Treaty was the last straw, confirming the sense that French intervention during the Revolution had failed to secure any real strategic benefits.

By the mid-1790s, then, French policymakers came to realize that they could no longer depend on their fickle ally; they would need a more secure continental foothold. And so they turned their sights to Louisiana. "By the acquisition," read a 1796 memoir submitted to the French minister of foreign affairs, "we should have in abundance wood for construction, pasture for animals, rice, indigo, cotton, peltries, and a thousand other valuable products which would be at the ports of our colonies." New Orleans was the key. Not only would it ensure French dominance in Louisiana and supplies for the Caribbean colonies, it would ensure U.S. obedience to French interests: "retain it in the line of duty by the fear of dismemberment which we can bring about." It was a prospect that many Americans feared above all others. A French Louisiana, warned a New York newspaper in 1802, could "hold forth every allurement to the inhabitants of the Trans-Alleghany settlements . . . and inveigle them by degrees into the idea of forming a separate empire." Equally ominous was the impact that a French Louisiana might have on American slavery; the specter of France's transracial Caribbean armies loomed large. "A few French Troops with . . . arms put into the hands of the Negroes," Mississippi's territorial governor warned in 1798, "would be to us formidable indeed."[44]

[43] "Great advantages" is from [Antoine René Charles Mathurin] de la Forest, "Mémoire sur la situation actuelle des États Unis relativement [*sic*] à l'industrie américaine et au commerce étranger," New York, February 18, 1789, Marine B/7/461, AN; "Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and France; February 6, 1778," the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/france/fr1788-1.htm (accessed April 14, 2008). Article 21 of the French Treaty, from which the above quotation is drawn, was one that Genet's instructions specifically highlighted, directing that it be "religiously observed." See Genet's instructions, reprinted in Turner, *Correspondence of the French Ministers*, 208.

[44] "By the acquisition" is from J. A. James, "Louisiana as a Factor in American Diplomacy, 1795–1800," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 1 (June 1914): 45; "retain it in the line of duty" is quoted in Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," 269; "hold forth every allurement" is from the *New York Daily Advertiser*, February 12, 1802; excerpts quoted in French in Pichon to Talleyrand, 2 ventose an 10, C.P. États-Unis, vol. 54, MAÉ; "a few French troops" is quoted in Rothman, *Slave Country*, 16. See also "Mémoire abrégé de la Louisiane présenté au Général Bonaparte, premier consul de la République françoise par le général de division, *Victor*," le Quinze Thermidor de l'An 10è, AF IV 1211, doc. 53, AN. On biracial French crews in the Caribbean, see especially Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens*. The prospect of French control of the Mississippi River was, according to Peter Kastor, "nothing less than a fundamental threat to the preservation of the union." Kastor, *The Nation's Crucible*, 38.

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"BEFORE BONAPARTE COULD REACH LOUISIANA," Henry Adams once remarked, "he was obliged to crush the power of Toussaint . . . If he and his blacks should succumb easily to their fate, the wave of French empire would roll on to Louisiana and sweep far up the Mississippi; if St. Domingo should resist, and succeed in resistance . . . America would be left to pursue her democratic [*sic*] destiny in peace."[45]

The road to Louisiana, in other words, ran through Saint Domingue—not just metaphorically but also geographically. By giving France control of the Windward Passage between Cuba and Saint Domingue, which separates the Atlantic Ocean from the Caribbean Sea, the island secured French access into the Caribbean and to the Gulf of Mexico. (See Map 4.) With navigation dependent on winds and currents, ships headed for the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico passed almost of necessity through the Windward Passage. Without that access, the Caribbean archipelago was not a beachhead but a thousand-mile barrier keeping France from the vast North American interior (now that its former door through the Saint Laurence River was closed). Even today, the Windward Passage remains of such importance that the CIA considers it one of the Atlantic Ocean's five "strategic straits," which the United States secures from its nearby naval base in a Cuban bay that once served as a pirate stronghold.[46]

And so in 1802 Napoleon sent his brother-in-law, General Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc, along with a force that would eventually total more than 80,000, to conquer Saint Domingue. If a commitment to preserving the plantation order explains why the British navy let Leclerc's force cross the Atlantic, American support for the French mission is harder to fathom. Certainly Jefferson, now president, had no wish to see France installed in Louisiana. "There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy," said Jefferson in 1801. "It is New Orleans." No amount of lingering attachment to France could alter this view. "France, placing herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance." To be sure, the alternative to a French recapture of the island was profoundly troubling to Jefferson, whose terror—not to say hysteria—at the prospect of a republic of former slaves in the Caribbean is well known. The thought of an independent Saint Domingue inspired nightmares of "the Cannibals of the terrible republic" pulling into American ports, sending "black crews, supercargoes & missionaries thence into the Southern states," and fomenting insurrection throughout the nation.[47]


Napoleon, on the other hand, ought to have been more sanguine at the prospect.

[45] Adams, *History of the United States*, 256, 264. See also Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste*, 246.

[46] CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zh.html (accessed April 14, 2008). On the pirate stronghold, see Marion Emerson Murphy, *The History of Guantanamo Bay*, 2nd ed. (Guantánamo Bay, 1953).

[47] The figure of 80,000 is from Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 251; "There is on the globe" is quoted in Kyte, "A Spy on the Western Waters," 433, and in Meinig, *The Shaping of America*, 2: 10; "the Cannibals of the terrible republic" is from Jefferson to Aaron Burr, February 11, 1799, in Boyd et al., *Papers*, 31: 22; "black crews, supercargoes & missionaries" is from Jefferson to Madison, February 12, 1799, ibid., 29–30. On Jefferson and Haiti, see Michael Zuckerman, "The Power of Blackness: Thomas Jefferson and the Revolution in Saint-Domingue," in Zuckerman, *Almost Chosen People: Oblique Biographies in the American Grain* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), 175–218; Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968), 375–386; Tim Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti," *Journal of Southern History* 61 (1995): 209–248; Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson's Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville, Va., 2000); and Garry Wills, *"Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power* (Boston, 2003).

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MAP 4: The Caribbean. The Windward Passage, indicated above, served as France's doorway into the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the North American continent. In the eighteenth century, when winds and currents played such a determinant role in maritime travel, the Windward Passage was a strategically essential point—as it remains today. Courtesy NASA/JPL-Caltech.

Indeed, some evidence suggests that in late 1801, Napoleon considered simply "recogniz[ing] Toussaint," and granting Saint Domingue autonomy within the French Empire. "The government of the blacks recognized in Saint-Domingue and legitimized by France," French minister Talleyrand warned the British in 1801, would be a "formidable base for the [French] Republic in the New World." This vision of American colonies attached to the metropole by bonds of mutual interest and commercial exchange was one that French imperial planners had once reserved for the United States, and which Talleyrand—who lived in the United States for several years and toured the backcountry extensively—had outlined shortly after his return to France in a speech "on the advantages to be had from new colonies in the present circumstances." Had it been pursued, it would have provided France not just with a strategic military base, but also with a highly motivated army of black soldiers—much like the one that French general Victor Hugues had used to crush British shipping in the Caribbean—to rebuild its colonial system in North America. Allied to France, Talleyrand warned, Saint Domingue would become "the scepter of the New World." Here were the outlines of a different French Empire: committed to the preservation of emancipation, rather than the reestablishment of slavery, and manned by battalions of freed slaves who would be so formidable that neither the Americans nor the British nor even an alliance of the two would easily have dislodged them from the mainland.[48]

[48] Talleyrand's threats quoted in Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 260; Charles Maurice de Tal-

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It is possible, even likely, that Talleyrand's warnings were just diplomatic bluster to persuade the British to open the Atlantic to the French fleet. But it is tantalizing to ponder the implications of this road not taken. With a base of operations in the Caribbean, 50,000 French soldiers not killed in the vicious attempt to reconquer Haiti, and a biracial army sent to hold Louisiana in alliance with Native Americans—still loyal to and nostalgic for their former ally—France might have permanently stalled U.S. expansion at the Mississippi River, perhaps even pushed it back to the Appalachians, finally establishing the region as the long-desired Native American buffer. France would have regained some of the territory it had lost forty years earlier, and fulfilled the promise its diplomats were continually making to Spanish officials: that it would serve as a barrier against U.S. expansion. In which case not just the trans-Appalachian West, not just Louisiana, but all of the Spanish land left exposed by the Louisiana Purchase—Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California—might have resisted the voracious Americans. As for the inner configuration of the American republic, one can only imagine the consequences that a biracial French army would have had on the slave regime just then beginning its furious expansion through the cotton belts of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.[49]

If this venture far down the road of fantasy has a purpose other than self-indulgence, it is to highlight the still-contingent U.S. hold on the trans-Appalachian West. In the end, of course, Napoleon's fatal insistence on fighting Toussaint led to the collapse of his American ambitions. Jefferson played the diplomatic game perfectly, luring the French into Saint Domingue with promises of assistance before abandoning them in the quagmire. The game was up. France had lost its last doorway into the North American interior, and it was obvious that Louisiana could not be held. Nor was it worth holding. "Louisiana had been destined to supply this other colony," recalled François Barbé-Marbois, Napoleon's finance minister, "and since Saint Domingue was lost to France, Louisiana also lost a part of its importance." Napoleon had no choice but to stem the hemorrhaging. "I already consider this colony entirely lost," he said, as he began shifting his attention to North Africa.[50]

But Napoleon had one last matter to clear up as he withdrew from America. "It was left to him," wrote Barbé-Marbois, "only to prevent France's loss from becoming

leyrand-Périgord, *Essai sur les avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les circonstances présentes, par le citoyen Talleyrand: Lu à la séance publique le 15 messidor an 5* (Paris, 1798), esp. 12–13. Dubois, it should be noted, does not believe that these diplomatic threats made to Britain were serious.

[49] The cited figure of 50,000 is from Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 298.

[50] Barbé-Marbois, *Histoire de la Louisiane*, 219; Napoleon quoted ibid., 287 (my translation). On Jefferson's diplomacy vis-à-vis Haiti, see Robin Blackburn, "Haiti, Slavery, and the Age of Democratic Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd. ser., 65 (October 2006): 643–674; Guillaume Simard, "Les relations diplomatiques franco-américaines lors de l'expédition du général Leclerc: Le commerce, le territoire, la race et l'opinion, 1800–1804" (M.A. thesis, Université de Montréal, 2007). On French worries about losing access to the Gulf of Mexico, see Mémoire Secret, doss: "Iles d'Amérique," AF IV 1211, doc. 32, AN. On the strategic issues more generally, see Yves Bénot, *La démence coloniale sous Napoléon: Essai* (Paris, 1992), 102. On the reorientation of Napoleon's foreign policy after Haiti, see Yves Bénot and Marcel Dorigny, *Rétablissement de l'esclavage dans les colonies françaises, 1802: Ruptures et continuités de la politique coloniale française, 1800–1830: Aux origines d'Haiti: Actes du colloque international tenu à l'Université de Paris VIII les 20, 21 et 22 juin 2002* (Paris, 2003), especially the contribution by Alyssa Sepinwell. On the importance of the Haitian Revolution to this reorientation, see Robert L. Paquette, "Revolutionary Saint Domingue in the Making of Territorial Louisiana," in David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, eds., *A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean* (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), 204–225.

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Britain's advantage." American diplomats, aware of these fears, played up the danger: Robert Livingston warned that if France did not act, Louisiana would soon "fall into the power of the English." And so Napoleon hastened to turn the colony over to the Americans and grab whatever cash he could. Although the purchase was financed in the London capital markets—raising money for France to wage war against Great Britain—the British government did not object because it believed that an American Louisiana was less threatening than a French Louisiana. "It would have been wise for this country to pay a million sterling for the transfer of Louisiana from France to America," wrote British prime minister Henry Addington at the time. Britain's Native American allies, alas, were not consulted, and would not have agreed.[51]

THE LONG WAR FOR THE WEST did not end with this second French loss of Louisiana. The dynamic that had shaped events in the trans-Appalachian West since 1754 continued, European imperial competition joining with enduring Native/settler conflict to keep the region's fate uncertain. A simmering warfare persisted in the years after 1803, as American settlers pushed west and up the Mississippi River into Native lands. In 1805, a confederation of nations led by the Sioux began appealing to British officials for support, but to no avail. Only after the increasing tensions between the United States and Britain in the wake of the 1807 *Chesapeake* affair—and after persistent rumors in the West that Napoleon planned to reestablish a French empire in America—did Francis Gore, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, begin organizing Britain's Indian allies in earnest. This British-Native military mobilization, building on years of village politics in Indian country, stirred up the embers of western settler unrest, which burst into flame in 1812, a war that in retrospect emerges as the last battle of the Long War for the West.[52]

If the United States and Great Britain fought a war in the East and on the Atlantic over questions of maritime rights and impressment, American settlers and Native Americans in the Mississippi Valley fought a far more consequential war whose objectives were, on the one side, continued U.S. expansion into Native and British land, and, on the other, the preservation of the West as an Indian country forever protected from American settlement. If this seems familiar, that is because these objectives echoed those for which France had gone to war in 1754, for which Pontiac had fought in 1763, and which the British had pursued since 1783: the restriction of American settlement from the trans-Appalachian West, and the creation of a buffer between the United States and British and Spanish territory. Like previous wars, the War of 1812 saw the emergence of pan-Indian unity and ideology: where in the past

[51] Barbé-Marbois, *Histoire de la Louisiane*, 287, 284–285 (my translation); Livingston quoted in Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies aux Premier Consul, 29 Frimaire, an 11, AF IV 1190, doc. 39, AN; Addington quote from "Memorandum, Account of Week's Events by Sir F. Baring," N. D. Northbrook Papers, 1 A4.13, Baring Archives, London. See also Mémoires et Nottes [*sic*] sur la Louisiane et les Florides, AF IV 1211, doc. 55, AN; and Pichon to Talleyrand, 14 prairial, an 9, C.P. États-Unis, vol. 56, p. 140, MAÉ; Kastor, *The Nation's Crucible*, 40.

[52] White, *The Middle Ground*, 53, 54, 512–513; Reginald Horsman, "British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807–1812," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 45, no. 1 (June 1958): 51–66; Richter, *Facing East*, 228. The account of the War of 1812 as a war driven by western settler interests was first put forth by a follower of Frederick Jackson Turner's; see Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*.

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it had been led by Neolin and Pontiac, now it was led by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa. As previous wars had seen Native leaders urging a return of the French to counterbalance British power, this war saw Native leaders in the North and Southwest reach out to the British and Spanish to balance U.S. power.[53]

This western war began with the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, in which Tenskwatawa's force of Shawnees, Kickapoos, Winnebagos, Potawatomis, and others attacked Benjamin Henry Harrison's U.S. troops, and it ended with the Treaty of Ghent in 1815, which once again left Native Americans empty-handed. British diplomats began the negotiations in Ghent insisting as "a *sine qua non* for peace" that the Native nations be included in the treaty negotiations, and that a 250,000-square-mile area in the Northwest between the United States and Canada—equivalent to roughly 15 percent of the U.S.—be set aside for Native Americans, which the United States would be forever barred from purchasing. It was a prospect that the British almost certainly could have accomplished in 1783, with the help of Spanish and French diplomats, who would have proven supportive. By 1815, however, it was too late: American negotiators contemptuously dismissed the cession of what they considered to be their territory as "injurious and degrading." Too many American settlers had poured into the Mississippi Valley, their American loyalties now cemented by the searing experience of war and the increased political power they exerted in Washington, where Kentuckian Henry Clay served as speaker of the House of Representatives, and where the presidency would soon pass to Andrew Jackson of Tennessee. The French, defeated once and for all at Waterloo, no longer threatened Britain's global hegemony. The Spanish, now isolated in the West and under pressure from settler independence movements across the Americas—many of them modeled on the United States—were no longer in a position to challenge U.S. territorial claims, which they finally ceded in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1820. Most important of all, Native nations across the trans-Appalachian West were now bereft of international military support. The Long War for the West was finally over. It was a decisive victory for the United States and a final defeat for Native nations of the trans-Appalachian West, who could never again hope to make their lands into an autonomous Indian country.[54]

"NO NATION HAS A HISTORY DISCONNECTED from that of the rest of the world": so reads the first of Harvard professor Albert Bushnell Hart's fundamental principles of history, composed in 1883. Meant to promote the study of U.S. history in relation to Europe, Hart's formulation guided the "imperial school" of historiography that integrated American colonial history into European imperial history. Exactly a decade after Hart proposed his formulation, Frederick Jackson Turner broke from an approach to American history that looked out to the Atlantic. "The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast," he insisted in his seminal essay,

[53] Richter, *Facing East*, 228–235; White, *The Middle Ground*, 502–503, 514.

[54] Quotations from Henry Clay, *The Life and Speeches of Henry Clay*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1859), 1: 81–82, 85. See also Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana, Ill., 1989), 289–294.

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"it is the Great West." Turner's move has long been cast as the founding turn toward American exceptionalism in U.S. historiography. Locating the source of Americanness somewhere to the west of the Appalachians in the Mississippi Valley, Turner's frontier was, according to Daniel Rodgers, "the site of Europe's negation." Where Hart's formulation is disconcerting, undermining, as it does, contemporary claims for the innovativeness of an internationalized American history, Turner's frontier is reassuring. It reminds us of the exceptionalist past we heroically overcome.[55]

The problem is that Turner was not as parochial as later detractors would claim. Look beyond his 1893 essay, and one finds a flood of publications that he edited and wrote—volumes of French ministerial correspondence; articles on Genet, Louisiana, and George Rogers Clark; work both in English and in French, based in archives in Paris, London, and Madrid.[56] All this work and more—by Turner, Henry Adams, and a generation of students and followers—set the action of the Mississippi Valley amid vast forces of European empires clashing against land-hungry American settlers and nascent nation-builders in a grand panorama of what we today might call *histoires croisées*: in which Europe, far from negated, remained ever-present. Even as we rightly condemn Turner for founding a pernicious form of western history, it would appear that we remain trapped in a framework that he himself did not advance: of a Mississippi Valley segregated into a purely national field, disconnected from the larger forces of international history. By continually denouncing exceptionalism, we may, ironically, reinscribe it.

To whom does the trans-Appalachian West belong? That was the great question animating imperial, Native, and settler actors alike during the Long War for the West, as each group battled alone and in shifting alliances to retain a hold on the region. But on a different, historiographical, register, the question remains as pressing today as it did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Does the region belong to U.S. history, imperial history, Native American history, frontier history, Atlantic history, or some combination of them all in a confused, even entangled, form?[57] That Turner and his generation first raised the question—flawed though their answers may have been—should be humbling to currently triumphant Atlanticists, who have so largely neglected the ancient mountains in favor of far younger oceans. In so doing, they have failed to recognize what historians of the past keenly sensed: how the history of the trans-Appalachian West shaped the destinies not just of Native America, nor of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, nor even of the most pow-

[55] Hart quoted in John Higham, *History: Professional Scholarship in America*, updated pbk. ed. (Baltimore, Md., 1989), 161; Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893* (Washington, D.C., 1894), 200; "the site of Europe's negation" is from Daniel Rodgers, "Exceptionalism," in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, eds., *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton, N.J., 1988), 25. On the imperial school, see especially Jack P. Greene, "The Flight from Determinism: A Review of Recent Literature on the Coming of the American Revolution," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (1962): 235–259. The literature on Turner and exceptionalism is vast; see, however, in addition to Rodgers and Higham, Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge, 1991), 266–267.

[56] Much of it cited in this article.

[57] On entangled history or *histoire croisée*, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia," *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 735–762; Subrahmanyam, *From the Tagus to the Ganges* (New Delhi, 2005); Subrahmanyam, "Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 5 (December 2007): 1359–1385; Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds"; Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories."

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erful global empires of the nineteenth century, but by extension of modern world history itself.

With the trans-Appalachian West thus set in its fullest context, we are ultimately poised to return to U.S. history, and there to better recognize the sweeping forces of imperialism and global warfare that buffeted a young and fragile United States, decisively shaping its history as well as its geography. Of course, few at the time could have seen the irony of the U.S. victory in the Long War for the West, which, by opening the Mississippi Valley to a contested U.S. expansion, half slave and half free, would eventually generate sectional conflicts so severe that the country would be confronted with the greatest existential crisis of its history. To the victor went the spoils. In the near term, however, the U.S. victory resolved the fate of the trans-Appalachian West. Never more would tenuous western loyalties, Native American resistance, or European imperialism threaten U.S. sovereignty east of the Mississippi. And with that victory, it became possible to imagine that the trans-Appalachian West had in a sense slipped out of Atlantic history to land in American history, looming no more as a national *frontière*, but merely becoming significant as the frontier *in* American history.

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Trouble with Numbers: Statistics, Politics, and History in the Construction of Weimar's Trade Balance, 1918–1924

ADAM TOOZE

A TORRENT OF NUMBERS ACCOMPANIES both the bureaucratic communication and the public discourse that are characteristic of modernity. And there is no area where their dominance is more pronounced than with regard to economic affairs. From as early as the seventeenth century, "political arithmetic" was a favorite tool of economic punditry, but it was in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century that the production of economic data became quasi-industrial.[1] States and interest groups constructed systems of economic statistics in the form that we know them today, as instruments of real-time observation with a new and reified conception of "the economy" as their object.[2] Clearly the history of statistics is intertwined with the history of what Michel Foucault termed governmentality.[3] However, since they circulated both inside and outside the structures of power, the role of the new data in enhancing governmental capacity, even in a broad Foucauldian sense, was never straightforward.[4] At moments of crisis, rather than smoothly tracing the course of history, the flow of numbers could become a turbulent maelstrom. By the early twentieth century, the mechanisms of economic reporting were so powerfully developed that they had the capacity to swamp political actors with wave upon wave of bad economic news.[5]

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[1] Alain Desrosières, *La politique des grands nombres: Histoire de la raison statistique* (Paris, 1993); J. Adam Tooze, *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge, 2001); Paul Studenski, *The Income of Nations* (New York, 1958); Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago, 1998).

[2] Despite its counterintuitive charm, Timothy Mitchell's dating of the "invention" of the modern notion of the economy to a period as late as the 1930s is not convincing. See Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," *Cultural Studies* 12, no. 1 (1998): 82–101.

[3] For the original statement, see Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France (1977–1978)* (Paris, 2004), 76, 107–108, 280.

[4] Those seeking a more ironic vision of the relationship between power and knowledge than that offered by Foucault are richly served by Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London, 1992), and Niklas Luhmann, *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1990).

[5] J. Adam Tooze, "Weimar's Statistical Economics: Ernst Wagemann, the Reich's Statistical Office,

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Furthermore, as competing interest groups equipped themselves with teams of economists and statisticians, the "facts" themselves became the object of disorienting controversy.[6]

There was a time when the flood of data filling the basement of the modern archive inspired hopes of a more "social scientific" history. And the project of quantitative history is by no means dead.[7] However, across most of the diverse discipline we call history, this enthusiasm has cooled and in some cases curdled into an attitude of hostility and incomprehension.[8] The history of this divorce has varied across national academic communities and between institutions.[9] Not everywhere has there been a complete rupture. For those inspired by the "linguistic turn" or Foucault's concept of power/knowledge, there were ways of continuing to engage with quantitative sources.[10] A characteristically creative response came from Joan Wallach Scott, in her pathbreaking analysis of the categories of nineteenth-century French industrial statistics.[11] But, as William H. Sewell, Jr., observes in *Logics of History*, although Scott was still writing about statistics, she had discarded the questions asked by quantitative historians. Once a statistical inquiry's "categories had been subjected to criticism and reinterpretation," Scott left open the question of whether or not the actual data contained in the reports could be used "in a statistically critical fashion." Did the numbers have anything left to tell us about the extra-textual world? For Sewell, "the fact that the question was not posed . . . speaks volumes about the epistemic assumptions of history's cultural turn."[12] Of course, in the 1980s, Scott was already embarked on a trajectory of unusual epistemological radicalism. But historians across the discipline have turned away from materialist notions of "the social" in favor of a textual-linguistic conception of culture. Quantitative sources and the question of what they might tell us about the world have become a minority interest.

Although Sewell is properly appreciative of what we have learned since the 1980s, in *Logics of History* he presents a powerful critique of the "textual turn." Instead, he argues that we need to expand our understanding of language games to include a far wider range of meaningful expression. In addition, he calls for a reengagement

and the Institute for Business-Cycle Research, 1925–1933," *Economic History Review*, n.s., 52, no. 3 (1999): 523–543.

[6] A. Tooze, "The Crisis of Gelehrtenpolitik and the Alienated Economic Mind: Economists and Politics in Interwar Germany," in Martin Daunton and Frank Trentmann, eds., *Worlds of Political Economy: Knowledge and Power in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, 2004), 189–217.

[7] For the continuing vitality of one of the original centers of quantitative history, the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, see its website at http://www.hpss.geog.cam.ac.uk/. But note the group's affiliation to geography, not history.

[8] One well-intentioned contributor to the recent H-German forum on the question "Do we need a new economic history of Germany?" opined that after Foucault and Said, questions relating to subjects such as nineteenth-century wage levels or investment patterns "belonged" not to history, but to the departments of "applied economics" or "marketing." See http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/econ/Rubin_Essay.htm (accessed April 25, 2008).

[9] See Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), and William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005).

[10] For a Foucauldian reading, see P. Miller and N. Rose, "Governing Economic Life," *Economy and Society* 19, no. 1 (1990): 1–31.

[11] Joan Wallach Scott, "A Statistical Representation of Work," in Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988).

[12] Sewell, *Logics of History*, 50–51.

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with what he suggestively calls the "built environment," the world that people make and communicate about. On this ontological foundation, Sewell calls for a return to questions of macro-explanation. And in this connection he insists that if we are not to deprive ourselves of an essential basis of historical judgment, we must reengage with quantitative source material.[13]

Sewell's critique is certainly welcome. But it is also provocative. In particular, one cannot help but wonder at his willingness to ground his bipartite description of humanity as *homo faber* and *homo sapiens* on what he refers to without hesitation as the "nature of things."[14] This, Sewell admits, is an "Enlightenment conceit." And it would seem to stand in contradiction to his emphatic embrace of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century hermeneutical tradition, for which the question of such "natural" foundations is a fundamental problem.[15] Furthermore, although one can only agree with Sewell that we should reject any fundamental epistemic divide between quantifying and non-quantifying approaches to history, the question is how to effect this reengagement without relapsing into naïve positivism. We have learned in the last generation that statistics have a history. Science studies has illuminated the profoundly perplexing, Janus-faced aspect of modern fact-making, helping us to understand how facts might appear at some times as self-conscious constructions and at other times as mere reflections of reality. But with regard to contending histories of the early Weimar Republic, even historians who accept Sewell's basic premise of epistemic continuity find themselves facing difficult questions of method and narrative style when handling contested historical statistics. And if we wish to write critical, political histories, our problem is even more severe. If we want to probe the options open to historical actors, then, as Sewell argues, we have little option but to actually employ the statistics we know to be historically constructed as tools for dissecting historical reality. Insofar as there are solutions to these many problems, they clearly cannot lie in strategies of disciplinary purity buttressed by dubious epistemological posturing. The solutions should surely be sought in a widening and deepening of our common strategies of interpretation.

There seems no better field in which to explore this complexity than the history of the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic was one of the protean moments of modernity.[16] Sophisticated but often violent debate raged over every aspect of the ordering of politics, culture, and society. Not for nothing can the first German democracy claim to be one of the birthplaces of the modern critique of ideology and

[13] Ibid., 75–80.

[14] Ibid., 331, 363, 365.

[15] For a historical account of this issue in the hermeneutic tradition, see James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (Oxford, 1986). My concern here is not to point out internal inconsistencies in Sewell's position, but, by calling into question Sewell's unproblematic reference to a natural order, to clear the way for the arguments from science studies that will be mobilized later in this article. A critique of the way in which "Nature" is used to found social ontologies is at the heart of this approach; see Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) and *Politiques de la nature: Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie* (Paris, 1999).

[16] For a remarkable overview, see Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, eds., *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994). The outstanding synthesis remains Detlev J. K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, trans. Richard Deveson (London, 1991). For a recent survey, see Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (London, 2003).

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the cynical discipline of the sociology of knowledge.[17] Not surprisingly, the economy bulked large in many of these arguments.[18] The high-pressure fusion of political drama and theoretical controversy has made both the final crisis of the Weimar Republic between 1929 and 1933 and the earlier inflationary disaster of 1918–1924 into perennial topics of scholarly debate.[19] And in these arguments, questions of fact are simply inescapable. Interweaving stories about the production of Weimar's trade statistics with the story of their use by both contemporaries and historians demonstrates the fruitfulness of an approach that, following Sewell, we might call hermeneutical quantification.[20]

IN THE AUTUMN OF 1922, THE BIRTH CRISIS of the Weimar Republic was reaching its climax.[21] Eighteen months earlier, on May 5, 1921, Germany had faced the draconian London reparations ultimatum. Desperate to avoid further Franco-British sanctions, including the military occupation of large parts of western Germany, a center-left government headed by the populist Center Party politician Joseph Wirth had decided to continue the policy of "fulfillment" pursued since the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Wirth, along with his liberal and social democratic coalition partners, hoped that a show of compliance would yield concessions from the reparations creditors.[22] By 1922, this commitment had cost the lives of Finance Minster Matthias Erzberger and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, victims of right-wing gunmen egged on by vicious antisemitic invective.[23] And no concessions had resulted from Britain and France. Wirth and his coalition partners thus faced a crucial choice: Should they make a new and serious effort at domestic consoli-

[17] David Frisby, *The Alienated Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany, 1918–1933* (London, 1992)

[18] For brilliant insights, see Keith Tribe, *Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750–1950* (Cambridge, 1995).

[19] For an innovative summation of debates about the final crisis of the Weimar Republic, see Albrecht Ritschl, *Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur, 1924–1934: Binnenkonjunktur, Auslandsverschuldung und Reparationsproblem zwischen Dawes-Plan und Transfersperre* (Berlin, 2002). On the inflation, see Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924* (Oxford, 1997); Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, *The German Inflation, 1914–1923: Causes and Effects in International Perspective* (Berlin, 1986); Niall Ferguson, *Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897–1927* (Cambridge, 1995). On German monetary thought in the period, the indispensable reference remains Howard S. Ellis, *German Monetary Theory, 1905–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934).

[20] In adopting this phrase, I was under the near-simultaneous impact of a lecture by Melissa Lane on Dilthey (Cambridge History Tripos Part II, October 16, 2007) and a reading of Sewell, *Logics of History*, 369–372.

[21] Feldman, *The Great Disorder*, 453–512; Ernst Laubach, *Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22* (Lübeck, 1968); Hermann J. Rupieper, *The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922–1923: Politics and Economics* (London, 1979).

[22] Laubach, *Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth*; Heinrich Küppers, *Joseph Wirth: Parlamentarier, Minister und Kanzler der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1997), 99–122.

[23] Klaus Epstein, *Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy* (Princeton, N.J., 1959), 284–389; Christoph E. Palmer and Thomas Schnabel, eds., *Matthias Erzberger, 1875–1921: Patriot und Visionär* (Stuttgart, 2007). On Rathenau's highly ambiguous role in postwar German politics, see Michael Geyer, "Insurrectionary Warfare," *Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 3 (2001): 459–527. For his belated conversion to the idea of fulfillment, see David Felix, *Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic: The Politics of Reparations* (Baltimore, Md., 1971), 23–24. On the assassinations, see Martin Sabrow, *Der Rathenaumord: Rekonstruktion einer Verschwörung gegen die Republik von Weimar* (Munich, 1994).

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dation, in the hope that this further show of goodwill would persuade the Entente to reduce reparations? Or had the gamble on democracy at home and cooperation abroad, the gamble on which the Weimar Republic had been founded, already failed? Was there really no alternative to confrontation? On both sides of the Rhine, nationalists were bracing for a new resort to violence.[24] To avoid the catastrophe of a Ruhr invasion, it seemed that a fundamental decision on economic and financial policy could no longer be avoided, and this raised the question of what state the German economy was actually in.

At this pivotal moment in Germany's history, on October 24, 1922, the embattled chancellor took time to write the following letter to his minister of economic affairs, the Social Democrat Robert Schmidt:

> My esteemed colleague
>
> I assume that you are informed about the discussions in recent days at the War Burdens Commission in Berlin about the methods of trade statistics . . . If the statistics of our foreign trade are as false and our balance of trade is as much in deficit as one must assume on the basis of these discussions, then our situation with regard to a number of domestic and foreign political questions presents itself in a completely different light. With such a severe deficit in the balance of trade, the question of the stabilization of the Mark must be judged on a completely different basis than the assumption of the current figures.[25]

The entire basis of the "fulfillment" strategy on which Wirth and his colleagues had staked their country's future was thrown into question by the apparent evidence that Germany's accelerating inflation had resulted not in a trade surplus, but in a deficit of more than 1 billion prewar Gold marks. As Wirth insisted,

> the balance of payments is of greatest importance for our entire economic policy, and by failing to inform the domestic and foreign public of the disastrous state of the German trade balance, we have deprived ourselves of one of the most effective means of propaganda in the struggle for a reduction of the reparations burden and against the treaty of Versailles . . . I must admit that the results of these discussions have surprised and shocked me in the greatest degree.

For anyone interested in the role of statistical information in modern government, Wirth's letter offers a ready-made case study of the interaction between power, on the one hand, and the technicalities of statistics, on the other. Here we have the German chancellor insisting in an urgent letter addressed to a senior ministerial colleague on the need to open the black box of his nation's trade statistics.[26] It is a source that confronts us in the most direct way possible with some of the basic and powerful questions asked by recent reflections on the history and sociology of statistics, notably the work of Alain Desrosières, Laurent Thévenot, and Theodore M. Porter. In *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge, 2001), I developed this approach in relation to the

[24] Marc Trachtenberg, *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923* (New York, 1980).

[25] For this and the following, see Bundesarchiv [hereafter BA] R43 I/1173, No. 354, Reichskanzlei to RWM, October 24, 1922.

[26] On the notion of black boxes, see Bruno Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society* (Cambridge Mass., 1987).

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history of German economic statistics.[27] The crisis of 1918–1923 appeared in that narrative as a moment of fundamental transition from the Wilhelmine era, with its culture of wide-ranging professorial engagement (*Gelehrtenpolitik*), to the new era of technocratic policy-science epitomized by institutions such as the Institute for Business-Cycle Research (Institut für Konjunkturforschung), founded in conjunction with the Reich's Statistical Office (Statistisches Reichsamt) in 1925. Although not cited explicitly in *Statistics and the German State*, the problems of Germany's trade statistics can clearly be located within this wider process of governmental transformation. It was problems such as those facing Wirth that caused the Weimar political class to invest in a new system of national economic statistics with which to underpin a new apparatus of national economic policymaking. In the process, statisticians and their clients both in and outside government reconceived the state's relationship to civil society in the medium of economic information.

Viewed in these terms, the history of statistics certainly yields important insights into the history of the modern state and its evolving use of expert knowledge. But, like Scott's essay, *Statistics and the German State* did not address Sewell's follow-on question. The construction of the statistical organization as a system of power and knowledge was at the center of attention, whereas the statistics as historical sources were left largely uninterrogated. To avoid confusion, it is worth stressing that this silence did not arise from an epistemological critique, from doubts about our access to a world beyond the text. Indeed, in analyzing modern economic knowledge in historical and pragmatic terms, *Statistics and the German State*, like the French work that inspired it, was in fact attempting to sidestep the entire epistemological problematic. Having located the subject of statistical knowledge in history, we were not about to reinstate a Kantian dichotomy and place the statistical object beyond human reach. This literature's failure to address itself more closely to the actual content of the historical data arose rather from the original, productive "shift" with which any such history of statistics must begin, namely the insistence that there is more to numbers than the question of "accuracy." The polemical energy involved in tearing up the empirical foundations of economic and social history, to reveal them as rooted in institutional, political, and indeed economic history, overshot its mark. Paradoxically, by casting the question of "accuracy" aside, we disarmed ourselves. If our aim is to de-reify the data and to demonstrate the centrality to modern societal organization of the processes through which quantitative truth claims are made and put to use, then there is in fact no better way to do this than to focus as closely as possible on the disputes that arise in relation to particular truth claims at moments of crisis. What caused no lesser figure than the German chancellor to occupy himself with the organization of the Statistical Office was the fact that he desperately wanted to know the state of the balance of trade. And if we want to go further in understanding how knowledge interacted with power, we should address ourselves to the frantic efforts made by his subordinates to answer this question. We should overcome our inhi-

[27] Alain Desrosières and Laurent Thévenot, *Les catégories socio-professionnelles* (Paris, 1988); Desrosières, *La politique des grands nombres*; Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton, N.J., 1995); Laurent Thévenot, "Les investissements de forme," in *Conventions économiques* (Paris, 1985), 21–72; Tooze, *Statistics and the German State*.

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bitions and move from a generalized history of statistics as a form of governmental knowledge to a history of the construction and use of particular facts.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER GERMANY was in surplus or deficit was of such vital importance to Wirth and his colleagues because it was a fundamental factor in the argument over Germany's ability to pay reparations. If Germany was to make real transfers of reparations—that is, if it was not to pay reparations simply by taking up new credits from other lenders—then it needed to achieve an excess of exports over imports; in other words, it needed a trade surplus. This accounting identity was beyond dispute. But what implications it carried for German policy depended on how the balance of trade was inserted into a wider worldview.

For nationalists such as the economist and politician Karl Helfferich, it was axiomatic that Germany, as an overcrowded country with insufficient "living space" and only coal by way of raw materials, was a nation fated to a "structural" trade deficit.[28] The concept of economic "structure" became newly fashionable in the 1920s as an intellectualized expression of the nationalists' refusal to accommodate themselves to the postwar order. The term was used to describe the unalterable, entrenched difficulties facing any country attempting the kind of adjustment that was assumed by liberal economic theory, but which was denounced as impossible for Germany.[29] And the nationalists had data to back them up. In the five years before World War I, despite its reputation as a champion exporter, Wilhelmine Germany's average annual trade deficit had been 1.46 billion Marks. To finance this "structural" imbalance, Germany had relied on "invisible earnings" from shipping, insurance services, and property income totaling as much as 1.75 billion Marks per annum.[30] In a good year such as 1913, this enabled Germany, despite its trade deficit, to achieve a healthy current account surplus, adding further to its holdings of foreign assets. The war had destroyed this equilibrium. German exports had collapsed. Furthermore, the main sources of "invisible" income had been stripped away by the vengeful foe. To nationalist opponents of reparations, it was clear that it was impossible for Germany to achieve the underlying surplus of foreign exchange out of which it might pay reparations. Attempting to pay would involve throwing newly printed German money onto the exchanges to buy foreign currency. This could only engender inflation and domestic social instability. To avoid this disastrous scenario, Germany should defy the Entente and renege on the treaty.

The attraction of the nationalist position was that it proclaimed Germany's inability to pay as a quasi-natural fact. But if taken seriously, it carried with it the risk of catastrophic confrontation with Britain and France. Furthermore, it flew in the face of conventional liberal trade theory, which insisted that the balance of trade was not a structural given, but was determined by the balance of competitiveness. This,

[28] John G. Williamson, *Karl Helfferich, 1872–1924: Economist, Financier, Politician* (Princeton, N.J., 1971); Karl Helfferich, *Der Zusammenbruch der Erfüllungspolitik* (Berlin, 1921); Helfferich, *Das Geld*, 6th ed. (Leipzig, 1923).

[29] For a contemporary comment, see H. Wolff, "Struktur und Konjunktur," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv* 17 (1927/1928): 205–235.

[30] Significantly, these historical data were compiled by the Reichsbank in the spring of 1922; see BA R2501 6430, 17–22.

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in turn, depended on prevailing international exchange rates and the price of goods in Germany relative to those abroad.[31] Prices and exchange rates were at least to some degree within the power of the German government to control. Crucially, the nationalist position was vulnerable to empirical refutation. If the structural reading of Germany's economic situation was to have any credibility, there could be no trade surplus.

And it was precisely on the possibility of achieving a trade surplus that the pragmatic foreign policy of the Weimar Republic had rested since 1919.[32] The so-called policy of "aggressive fulfillment" took it to be essential that Germany should make an effort to pay reparations, because otherwise it would face sanctions, threatening the very survival of the German state. If Germany started from a position of trade deficit, then the initial efforts to buy up foreign exchange would certainly depreciate the Mark, as the nationalists feared. But once this depreciation gathered momentum, it would unleash a wave of highly competitive German exports that would drive British, French, and American goods out of world markets. As John Maynard Keynes predicted in his global bestseller *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Germany could achieve the trade surplus necessary to pay reparations, but only at the expense of mass unemployment in the countries demanding reparations from it.[33] Keynes feared Bolshevism. The Germans hoped that Britain and France would see reason and reduce their reparations demands.

Desperate as the situation clearly was, the advocates of aggressive fulfillment insisted that Germany still had some control over its own fate. But it was clear that theirs was a strategy fraught with risk, and not one that could be continued indefinitely. Managing an aggressive depreciation was a delicate balancing act. If the German currency depreciated too far and too fast, the entire country would be vulnerable to being bought up by rapacious foreign speculators. Alternatively, if German producers and workers got wise to the depreciation and began to adjust their wages and prices too rapidly in the opposite direction, then rising costs would offset any advantage to exporters. Germany might even see its competitiveness eroded, encouraging imports rather than exports. In any case, regardless of the effect on international competitiveness, any severe depreciation of the currency was bound to damage savers and undermine the stability of bourgeois society and long-term investment. Given these daunting risks, everything depended on skillful economic management and the speed with which Germany's diplomats could extract concessions from Britain and France.

We of course know that France refused to budge, and the punitive occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 resulted in a hyperinflationary disaster that jeopardized the long-term prospects for political stability in Germany.[34] Not surprisingly, this has

[31] Christian F. Trippe, *Konservative Verfassungspolitik, 1918–1923: Die DNVP als Opposition in Reich und Ländern* (Düsseldorf, 1995), 163–165; Lewis Hertzman, *DNVP: Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918–1924* (Lincoln, Neb., 1963), 74–76, 205; Annelise Thimme, *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918* (Göttingen, 1969), 86–95.

[32] On the discussion in 1919, see Feldman, *The Great Disorder*, 146–150, and Ferguson, *Paper and Iron*, 198–268.

[33] For a highly contentious account of Keynes's role, see Niall Ferguson, "Keynes and the German Inflation," *English Historical Review* 110, no. 436 (1995): 368–391.

[34] The damaging long-term effects of the inflation have been stressed by Michael L. Hughes, *Paying for the German Inflation* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988); Theo Balderston, *The Origins and Course of the*

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focused historians' attention on a third option—the possibility, after a period of depreciation, of stabilizing the German currency and domestic prices at levels sufficiently competitive to enable the long-term repayment of reparations. Given the damage that aggressive fulfillment was doing to Germany itself, it was the choice between outright confrontation and stabilization that Weimar's politics actually revolved around between 1920 and 1924. And it was this choice that was at the heart of two major historical works on the German inflation that appeared virtually simultaneously in the mid-1990s, Gerald Feldman's magnum opus *The Great Disorder* and Niall Ferguson's ambitious first book, *Paper and Iron*. Many considerations entered into the stabilization debate. But in assessing the feasibility of stabilization, everything again depended on the balance of trade. Given the damage that "shock therapy" might do to Germany's fragile polity, economic stabilization could be attempted, it was agreed in Berlin, only if the trade balance indicated that the country was already reasonably close to a sustainable surplus.[35] Indeed, so central is this question of the trade balance that Feldman and Ferguson both felt it necessary to make brief forays into the history of the Statistical Office, both citing Wirth's letter to Schmidt of October 24, 1922. Revealingly, however, they approached the question of Weimar's trade statistics in different ways.

As Feldman demonstrates in his extraordinary epic, the tragedy of Weimar politics originated in the fact that although stabilization had by 1922 come to be widely seen as the only real alternative to apocalyptic confrontation, its supporters could not agree on how it should be implemented. Big business predictably favored a "capitalist" deflation, based around a rollback of the concessions won by German labor in 1918–1919, a return to longer working hours, a curtailment of trade union power, cuts to welfare spending, and reduced taxes. In the summer of 1920, Britain and the United States had imposed deflations along these lines.[36] Germany's political system was of course far weaker than theirs. So the more appropriate analogy is perhaps Italy, which also adopted deflation in 1920.[37] The resulting financial crisis was to contribute to the erosion of the liberal center ground and the emergence by 1921–1922 of a fascist threat.[38] Mussolini's March on Rome took place less than a week after Wirth penned his exasperated note to Schmidt.

German Economic Crisis: November 1923 to May 1932 (Berlin, 1993); and Bernd Weisbrod, "The Crisis of Bourgeois Society in Weimar Germany," in Richard Bessel, ed., *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts* (Cambridge, 1996), 23–39.

[35] Foreign observers, including even Keynes, disagreed, arguing that a trade surplus would follow swiftly upon the restoration of fiscal discipline. Keynes agreed with the Germans only in insisting that a reparations moratorium should come first. See the correspondence between Keynes and the Reichsbank in BA R2501 6430, 167–180.

[36] The global deflation of 1920–1921 still awaits its historian. For the U.S., see Allan H. Meltzer, *A History of the Federal Reserve* (Chicago, 2003). On the UK, the indispensable reference points remain A. C. Pigou, *Aspects of British Economic History, 1918–1925* (London, 1947), and E. Victor Morgan, *Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914–25* (London, 1952).

[37] Compare and contrast Kenneth O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–1922* (Oxford, 1979), and Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, N.J., 1975).

[38] Douglas J. Forsyth, *The Crisis of Liberal Italy: Monetary and Financial Policy, 1914–1922* (Cambridge, 1993).

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Not surprisingly, Wirth could not persuade his coalition partners to take the risks involved in this path. As an alternative, elements in the German labor movement and the Ministry for Economic Affairs developed a strategy of what might be termed social democratic stabilization, involving a state-managed effort to engineer a trade surplus by means of import controls, backed up by an egalitarian program of progressive taxation, rationing, and domestic redistribution.[39] If pushed for historical analogies, one might point to the British Labour government after 1945, with its policy of "austerity."[40] It was a strategy along these lines that Robert Schmidt and his allies—notably State Secretary Julius Hirsch—continued to advocate into the autumn of 1922, up to the point at which Wirth's government collapsed, and Wilhelm Cuno and the advocates of nationalist confrontation took power.

The grandeur of Feldman's *Great Disorder* derives not only from the depth of its scholarship and its biblical extent, but also from its tragic sense. Feldman plunges us into the full complexity of the political and economic argument in Weimar Germany, and without adopting a safe point of distance. He provides a panorama of the actions and thoughts of dozens of protagonists from all sides, yet he is clearly not indifferent between the parties. Against the irrational, nationalist antisemites of the right, Feldman sets a compelling portrait of those who struggled for stabilization, and particularly those who advocated the policy of social democratic stabilization.[41] For Feldman, the period between October and November 1922, at which point the Social Democrats withdrew from Wirth's coalition and his government collapsed, was "the last opportunity for stabilization that has genuine historicity."[42]

But what, then, are the implications of Wirth's cry of confusion and dismay for Feldman's narrative? The advocates of a social democratic stabilization needed to show that there had been at least some improvement in Germany's trade position by the autumn of 1922. Wirth clearly wished that he could simply have relied on the relatively optimistic data coming from the Reich's Statistical Office. The prospect of having to intervene in the statistical laboratory itself filled him with a mixture of frustration and anxiety. The historian who perches on the shoulders of men such as Wirth cannot but share this mixture of emotions. For anyone who remains committed to the project of constructing encompassing macro-narratives, a source such as Wirth's letter is a trap door that opens onto entire realms of irreducible and threatening complexity. After all, to make the judgments that propel narratives such as Feldman's, we need to form some idea of the "real" constraints acting on men such as Wirth. But here is the rub: more often than not, it is on historical statistics that

[39] Apart from Feldman, *The Great Disorder*, 156–187, 344–384, 465–489, particularly important are Peter-Christian Witt, "Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik in der Übergangswirtschaft 1918/1919," in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter-Christian Witt, eds., *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zür politischen Sozialgeschichte—Festschrift für Fritz Fischer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag* (Düsseldorf, 1978), 79–96, and Witt, "Staatliche Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1918–1923: Entwicklung und Zerstörung einer modernen wirtschaftspolischen Strategie," in Gerald D. Feldman et al., eds., *The German Inflation Reconsidered: A Preliminary Balance* (Berlin, 1982), 151–179.

[40] Jim Tomlinson, *Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–1951* (Cambridge, 1997).

[41] This seems a fair reading of *The Great Disorder*, 489–490, where Feldman refers to Hirsch and his allies as "fighters" for an "alternative that might have worked and that was very much worth risking," and to their failure as a "lost opportunity for stabilization."

[42] Ibid., 490.

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TABLE 1
Germany's Contested Trade Balance 1913–1924 (Million Gold Marks)

	Feldman		*Ferguson*
	Pilotti, Reparations Commission	*SRA, Statistik des Deutschen Reiches vol. 310 (1924) and SRA July 1925, Table 4, page. 121*	*SRA, Monatliche Nachweise*
	1913 unit prices	*1913 unit prices*	*Gold mark estimates*
1913	−1007	−1007	
1914			
1915			
1916			
1917			
1918			
1919	−602	−4302	−4131
1920	−223	−223	3
1921	−1246	−1269	−692
1922	−112	−94	−2230
1923		461	−5
1924		−1797	−1816

we must rely to define these constraints. In the autumn of 1922, it was not just Wirth's world that was thrown into confusion, but the world of his historians as well.

Of course, Feldman was far too scrupulous a scholar to have simply swept Chancellor Wirth's letter under the carpet. Indeed, he describes it as a "document of exceptional importance," citing it at length to indicate Wirth's increasingly impatient mood by the autumn of 1922 and his willingness to doubt the conventional wisdom of fulfillment.[43] But Feldman never addressed head-on the substantial question of the accuracy of the trade data. Instead, a few pages after his discussion of Wirth's outrage, Feldman cites other numbers compiled by the Reparations Commission, which purport to show that despite Wirth's anxieties, Germany's trade balance was actually close to equilibrium. (See Table 1.)[44] This is clearly helpful to Feldman's position. But how these figures could be reconciled with Wirth's anxiety that Germany might in fact be running a large trade deficit is a question that Feldman leaves unexplored.

Like the exclusively political treatment of economic statistics offered in *Statistics and the German State*, but for different reasons, Feldman fails to reach closure. He acknowledged that knowing the state of the trade balance was crucial to Wirth. He acknowledged that there were fundamental problems with the data. Furthermore, he could not bracket Wirth's doubts as the passing anxieties of a harassed politician, because his entire massive oeuvre hinges on the claim that stabilization in 1922 was a real possibility, and this depended on there being a favorable balance between exports and imports. And yet Feldman provides us with no truly convincing grounds

[43] Ibid., 484–485.

[44] Ibid., 600, citing R. Pilotti, "The Value of German Imports and Exports from 1919 to 1923," Reparations Commission, Delegation of the Committee of Guarantees, February 16, 1924, Library of Congress, Ayres Papers.

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for suspending Wirth's doubts about the optimistic picture presented by the Reparations Commission.

In Feldman's defense, one could reply that he was simply staying true to the conventions of the genre within which he wrote. To confront his readers with a complex technical discussion of the data would have been out of character with the grand sweep of his narrative. Furthermore, it might have required Feldman to adopt the point of view of a truly external narrator commanding a position of omniscience above that available to his protagonists—a position that he generally refused. It is this refusal, in turn, that grounds the sympathy that he maintained with even his more disagreeable characters. As Feldman never lets us forget, most of what we know as historians, we owe to the efforts by historical actors to make sense of their surroundings.[45]

But to a self-confident economic historian firmly camped on the quantitative side of the methodological divide, much of the preceding discussion is likely to seem merely otiose. The empirical question that both *Statistics in the German State* and Feldman's *Great Disorder* skirted around is the kind of question that is meat and drink to quantitative historians. Cognizant of relevant technical problems, we must simply apply ourselves to the relevant published and unpublished sources and come up with our best guess as to the trade balance.[46]

There are, of course, numerous histories of the German inflation written in this objectifying mode.[47] However, for a near-perfect contrast to Feldman, we need look no further than Niall Ferguson's early work *Paper and Iron*. Superficially, the main difference between Ferguson and Feldman is political. Whereas Feldman's sympathies are with the advocates of what we have dubbed a social democratic stabilization, and whereas Feldman is still willing to hold open the possibility of a stabilization in the autumn of 1922, Ferguson argues that the debate on fiscal reform in Germany between May 1921 and November 1922 was "to some extent phoney . . . as the Chancellor himself was not in earnest about trying to balance the budget."[48] Instead, Ferguson argues for a stabilization along capitalist lines to have been implemented in the first half of 1920. With the United States and Britain leading the way, 1920 witnessed an unprecedented worldwide deflation. Even Germany's inflation came to a temporary halt, ushering in a period of so-called "relative stabilization." Ferguson acknowledges that the retrenchment necessary to make this stabilization permanent might have occasioned a bout of protest from the left. But on the basis of his Hamburg case study, he judges that fears of revolution were exaggerated. Furthermore, whatever repression might have been needed to deal with the Communists was more

[45] This is most evident in Feldman's extensive use of the minutes of the Reichswirtschaftsrat (BA R401), an institution that is normally dismissed as a powerless talking shop, but one, as Feldman shows, in which a lot of the work of argumentative "puzzling" was done.

[46] For an excellent example of this approach, see A. O. Ritschl, "Nazi Economic Imperialism and the Exploitation of the Small: Evidence from Germany's Secret Foreign Exchange Balances, 1938–1940," *Economic History Review* 54, no. 2 (2001): 324–345, which uses new data to challenge conventional ideas about both Nazi autarchy and its imperial designs in southeastern Europe.

[47] Apart from those already cited, see Frank D. Graham, *Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany, 1920–1923* (Princeton, N.J., 1930); Constantino Bresciani-Turroni, *The Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany*, trans. Millicent E. Sayers (London, 1937); Karsten Laursen and Jørgen Pedersen, *The German Inflation, 1918–1923* (Amsterdam, 1964); and Steven B. Webb, *Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Weimar Germany* (New York, 1989).

[48] Ferguson, *Paper and Iron*, 319.

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than justified in light of the damage done to the fabric of German society by the subsequent hyperinflation.

The political stakes in this argument could hardly be higher. The history of the Weimar Republic is written under the shadow of Nazism. Feldman's ultimate goal was to show how German social democracy might have retained its determining influence in the Weimar Republic. Ferguson, by contrast, is trying to map a consistent capitalist route around the disaster of National Socialism. But they are also separated by subtle yet profound differences in methodology and narrative emplotment. By contrast with Feldman's equivocation on the matter of the data, Ferguson follows Wirth's letter to its logical conclusion. The official statistics that showed a reassuring trade surplus were bogus. Casting himself in the role of the pioneering economic historian, Ferguson sets out to "rework" the data, producing a new time series that confirms Wirth's worst fears. The strategy of aggressive depreciation had backfired.[49] Rather than driving German exports into foreign markets, the surge in domestic inflation that had accompanied the external depreciation of the Mark had reduced competitiveness and generated a gaping trade deficit. The only moment at which the costs of stabilization might have been bearable was 1920, in which year Ferguson, too, believes that Germany achieved a small trade surplus.

By contrast with the painstaking subtlety of Feldman's magnum opus, Ferguson cannot be accused of taking his historical protagonists too seriously. The reference to Wirth's efforts at stabilization as "phoney" is characteristic of the caustic treatment he metes out. At one point, Ferguson even indulges in sensationalist speculation about the way in which a supposed homosexual attraction between Keynes and the German negotiator Carl Melchior might have influenced the campaign against reparations.[50] But for all the journalistic color, Ferguson is absolutely consistent in his methodology. First, resolve the quantitative issue. Produce new data, which expose the real failure of the strategy of fulfillment (Table 1). Then, with Excel-generated graphs to hand, hold up the weak-kneed political strategy of the Weimar government for indictment. We are presented with a consistent narrative of ironic, critical distance. What must concern us are the costs of this distance. In particular, Ferguson fails to fully explain how his new data for 1922 could differ by such a wide margin from previously accepted accounts. Ferguson, like Feldman, claimed that his numbers ultimately derived from official sources, in his case the monthly trade statistics of the Reich. But were these not contaminated by the same problems that had rendered previous judgments uncertain?

Clearly, statistics are troublesome material for historians. The three histories we have discussed all attempt to make use of the data, but each does so in a way that exhibits characteristic blind spots. By insisting that statistics were made and made for a purpose, *Statistics and the German State* ended up deflecting attention away from the descriptive content of the data. In constructing his epic of political struggle, Feldman needs the data to provide a factual frame, but cannot make them freeze into a solid background. Ferguson, qua economic historian, uses his command of the quantitative sources to assert a vantage point of distance, but can do so only by ignoring the fact that his data are in fact fragile historical artifacts. In the final anal-

[49] Ibid., 228–246, 324–342.
[50] Ibid., 212.

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ysis, economic historians, like the rest of us, feed off the scraps left by contemporaries, which sucks them into a dependence that their narrative posture denies.

Is there not a hidden logic to these recurring frustrations? Are we not dealing here with the consequences of what Bruno Latour famously referred to as the Janus-faced quality of modern knowledge?[51] On the one hand, statistics of society and the economy are self-consciously and very overtly the products of a labor of construction. On the other hand, once established, they become objective facts, mere passive reflections of an external economic or social reality. Our three histories are trapped by this duality. *Statistics and the German State* writes the history only of statistical construction. Ferguson, by contrast, treats the data as the objects the statisticians wished for them to become. Both positions are consistent, but at the price of seeing only one "face" of the process. Feldman seeks to straddle the divide, but ends up with an argument marred by inconclusiveness. We can escape this impasse by constructing a history of the politics of the German trade balance that takes in both sides of this Janus-faced reality, seeking to account for both the constructedness and the givenness of historical statistics. To paraphrase Latour, what we need is a three-dimensional, stereoscopic rendering of the recalcitrantly bifurcated history of fact-making.[52]

IF WE PURSUE THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN TRADE BALANCE back through the archive, it becomes clear that the problems for the statisticians did not start in 1922. Their first brush with nationalist indignation came two years earlier. In 1919, there had been little doubt that Germany had run a substantial trade deficit. Imports had rushed in to satisfy pent-up demand, and exports were far below prewar levels. But in the autumn the exchange rate collapsed, making German goods more competitive, and in December 1919 the Ministry of Economic Affairs imposed strict trade controls. Then, in the early summer and autumn of 1920, the German currency strengthened on the exchanges. There was little doubt, therefore, that the trade balance had improved. But by how much? For much of 1920, the diplomats were locked in a series of difficult negotiations over reparations, at Spa and then Brussels. Despite the signs of stabilization, Germany's negotiators insisted that the trade balance remained vulnerable and that any large reparations demands were likely to result in an immediate currency crisis and renewed inflation. The Allies, by contrast, insisted that the signs of improvement were real and that the healthy trade balance could become permanent, if only the German government was willing to raise taxes and cut spending.

When the trade figures for 1919 and early 1920 were first released, they offered little support for the German position. From early 1920, they showed a steady improvement in the balance of trade, culminating in April and May 1920 with an export surplus of more than 1.6 billion Marks.[53] True to its constructive attitude toward fulfillment, the statisticians' chief political patron, the Ministry of Economic Affairs,

[51] Latour, *Science in Action*, 4, 96–100. For a parodic discussion of the partitions in modern knowledge, see Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 4–7.

[52] Latour prefers an acoustic metaphor referring to a "stereophonic" rendering in *Science in Action*, 100.

[53] BA R31.01 6696, No. 158, Reichswirtschaftsstelle für Wolle to SRA, October 10, 1920, 3. As reported above, it then took a further six months to complete the 1920 data up to August.

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did not flinch. The numbers were included in an official German memorandum to the Brussels Conference, with no more than an obscure technical appendix by way of explanation. But the nationalist press in Berlin was outraged. The incompetent statisticians had robbed Germany's delegation of its best defense.[54] Meanwhile, the French and Belgians seized on Germany's healthy trade data to argue for increased reparations.[55] Under pressure from the representatives of the member states and the Reichsbank, the embarrassed Reich's Ministry of Economic Affairs was forced to issue an exculpatory press release.[56]

This was first and foremost a political necessity. However, the nationalist critique had in fact exposed a genuine technical problem, a problem rooted in the nineteenth-century origins of official statistics. The system of trade statistics that the Weimar Republic inherited from the Kaisserreich was a weird hybrid of modern census technology and the "statistique des notables" of the early nineteenth century.[57] Since the creation of the German nation-state in the 1870s, the basic recording of international trade had been done by the customs posts that compiled summaries of cross-border shipments for the Imperial Statistical Bureau.[58] These, however, were records of physical weight, not value. To get from the tonnage of trade to values, the statisticians needed estimates of average prices for each class of goods. The necessary advice, documentation, and guesswork were provided by an annual meeting of the so-called Consultative Committee for Trade Statistics. This was staffed by an array of businessmen, managers, and "experts" delegated from trade associations and chambers of commerce. By the early twentieth century, this rough-and-ready procedure for estimating Germany's balance of trade had become the object of increasingly vocal criticism and was modified so that on the export side, the system now operated more formally. Exporters were required to declare both the tonnage and the value of their shipments, and the questionnaires were no longer compiled locally, but were shipped en masse to the Statistical Office for central processing with Hollerith punch-card machines. Just prior to 1914, a similar system of direct reporting was also planned for imports, but its implementation was held up by the inability of the Statistical Office to cope with millions of additional returns.

The inflationary conditions of the postwar period cruelly exposed the imbalances in this system of trade statistics with one leg (exports) in the twentieth century and the other (imports) mired deep in the early nineteenth century. In the autumn of 1920, with the nationalists railing against the trade surplus, the Statistical Office realized that different modes of reporting might seriously bias the results. Whereas exports were reported directly to Berlin on a weekly basis, and their values therefore

[54] See the press clippings in Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussisches Kulturbesitz [hereafter GstA] I, Rep. 120 C VIII 2a, No. 25, Bd. 3, Bl. 65, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 493, October 7, 1920, "Zur Statistik des deutschen Aussenhandels."

[55] See the *Vossische Zeitung*, 481, September 30, 1920, "Die Veröffentlichung der deutschen Aussenhandelsziffern." This report was filed by the Reichs Chancellery; see BA R43 I/1172, No. 368.

[56] GStA I, Rep. 120 C VIII 2a, No. 25, Bd. 3, Bl. 115, RWM VI/3 to the Bayersicher Stellvertretenden bevollmächtigten zum Reichsrat (Rohmer), December 14, 1920. For the Reichsbank view, see BA R2501 6594, 141–144.

[57] Jean-Claude Perrot and Stuart J. Woolf, *State and Statistics in France, 1789–1815* (London, 1984), describes the French system of "statistique des notables."

[58] The following narrative is based on the preamble to the abortive general trade statistics reform law of 1921; see BA 07.01, Film 19065N/2108, No. 32ff., Begründung.

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kept up with inflation, imports were still valued annually by the Consultative Committee at out-of-date prices. Despite appeals from the statisticians, the interest groups had refused to provide staff for more regular meetings. The resulting undervaluation of imports biased the overall result toward a trade surplus. The organizational solution was obvious: to implement the long-overdue trade statistical reform, to require value declarations for both imports and exports, and to implement centralized processing for both sets of returns. It was only from the spring of 1921 that this fully symmetrical system of reporting began to operate. And it generated little controversy, because in 1921, with the rest of the world lapsing into depression, there could be no question that Germany did run a substantial trade deficit.[59] But as soon as the surplus returned in the early autumn of 1922, so did the protests. And again it was the Reichsbank, with its intensely nationalistic leadership armed with a large staff of economic experts, that was the first to react. On October 10, Vice-President Otto Georg von Glasenapp of the Reichsbank gave a carefully edited interview to the United Press of the United States, insisting that "although on paper Germany showed a favorable trade balance in August, the exact reverse was really the case."[60] Behind closed doors, the language was less measured. On October 13, the hapless representatives of the Reich's Statistical Office were subjected to a withering attack by von Glasenapp, who accused them of nothing less than sabotage.[61] A day later, it was the Reichsbank that alerted Chancellor Wirth to the "truly shocking fact that the German import statistics are completely wrong and virtually useless."[62] A week after Schmidt received his humiliating missive from Wirth, the Reichsbank followed it up with another memorandum stressing that figures showing Germany's true trade deficit were "a question of life and death for the German people and the German economy."[63]

The mood in Berlin was clearly overwrought. But at first, the Reich's Ministry of Economic Affairs did not yield to the nationalist bombast. State Secretary Julius Hirsch and his colleagues conceded that there were technical difficulties with the data, and that Germany might well have been suffering a modest deficit in 1922. But relative to 1921, the balance had clearly improved. Furthermore, in treating the structural deficit as the unalterable source of Germany's economic difficulties, the Reichsbank and its nationalist supporters were confusing cause and effect. A surplus not only was possible, but could be made permanent if Berlin was willing to implement a determined domestic stabilization.[64]

But in the first days of November 1922, the advocates of stabilization lost the political battle. Wirth's government collapsed, to be replaced by the right-wing Cuno administration. It rejected domestic stabilization and steered Germany toward a showdown in the Ruhr. Hirsch resigned from the Ministry of Economic Affairs under threat from the same menacing antisemitic libel that had legitimized the killing of Erzberger and Rathenau. In less dramatic circumstances, the head of the Depart-

[59] BA R2501 6430, 143–163.
[60] Ibid., 181–182.
[61] BA R2501 6594, 157–167.
[62] BA R43I/1173, No. 352, Reichsbank-Direktorium to Reichskanzlei and RWM, October 14, 1922.
[63] BA R43I/1173, No. 363, Reichsbank to Reichskanzlei and RWM, October 30, 1922, 4.
[64] BA R43I/1173, No. 356, RWM to Reichskanzlei, October 26, 1922.

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ment for Trade Statistics in the Reich's Statistical Office was sacked.[65] And the Statistical Office again changed its story.

In a detailed memorandum, for which the new minister of economic affairs took full responsibility, the estimates of the trade balance for 1922 were completely revised.[66] And again, a good technical explanation was found.[67] This time the problem was located not in the statistical machinery itself, but in the asynchronicity in the payment systems for foreign trade induced by the inflation. To avoid the impact of currency depreciation, German merchants sought to pay as early as possible for imports. Exporters, by contrast, took payment in foreign currency at the last moment possible. With the German currency in free fall, this slight time lag was enough to seriously understate the value of imports relative to exports. The solution, ironically, was a return to the old system of consultation. From November 1922, the national data emerged from a monthly meeting of experts at which the import returns were "adjusted" to bring them in line with current prices and exchange rates. The result, satisfyingly enough, was to show that between January and September 1922, rather than a steady improvement culminating in a surplus, Germany had in fact piled up a cumulative deficit of 1.5 billion Gold marks. The orthodox view was confirmed. Germany was fatally destabilized by a structural external imbalance.

This defeat for the advocates of fulfillment has echoed down the generations. The new data series that Niall Ferguson constructed to make his case against Gerald Feldman, in fact, derives directly from this "corrected" trade data published after October 1922 in the *Monatliche Nachweise* of the Statistisches Reichsamt.[68] Unaware of the precise circumstances of their production, it was on numbers produced to satisfy the nationalists that Ferguson rested his case. Of course, Ferguson's purpose is quite different from that of Helfferich et al. He argues not for confrontation in 1923, but for stabilization in 1920. As we have seen, the nationalists insisted that there had been a trade deficit even in 1920. But Ferguson and the nationalists do agree on at least two points: their rejection of the entire strategy of aggressive fulfillment and their insistence that the "facts" refute the possibility of a stabilization in 1922, precisely the possibility that State Secretary Julius Hirsch and latterly Gerald Feldman wanted to hold open.

At this point, one might conclude that the history of German official statistics in fact reduces to a political power play, and that our journey through the interstices of the statistical apparatus has been a pointless detour. The numbers cannot be treated as independent evidence for either side of the argument, because they were nothing more than a political pinball. In the limit, we would be left with no basis on which to form a quantitative judgment about the state of the German economy. But this is reductive. The technical arguments advanced for each correction, although clearly convenient, deserve to be taken seriously. Embattled and fragile as it was, the Reich's statistical system retained at least a measure of autonomy, an autonomy best indicated by its continued ability to generate unwelcome surprises for the impatient politicians and civil servants, not only in 1920 and 1922 but again in 1923.

[65] BA R43I/1173, No. 397, RWM to Reichskanzlei, November 10, 1922.

[66] BA R43I/1173, No. 334, RWM to Reichskanzlei, November 4, 1922, and the Reichsbank's copy in BA R2501 6594, 168–178.

[67] See the extensive discussion in BA R2501 6594, 168–178.

[68] Ferguson, *Paper and Iron*, 235–236.

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The evidence of an unalterable trade deficit suited the new government of Chancellor Cuno and his cabinet of nationalists, who replaced Wirth, Schmidt, et al. But it was anathema to the Entente. And because Germany continued to report the tonnage of trade as well as the hotly contested value figures, it was possible for further rounds of debate to ensue. In early 1923, British, French, and Italian experts on the Reparations Commission found a new series of problems, this time not in the import but in the export data. Comparisons of the papermark values declared by German exporters for their consignments at the customs post with the domestic prices charged for similar categories of goods indicated that German exporters were declaring artificially low prices. And German experts had been making similar discoveries of their own.[69] The Reich's Statistical Office noted large discrepancies between the value of identical export consignments declared in papermarks, as opposed to those declared in inflation-proof Gold marks. It appeared that those exports valued in papermark terms were being recorded at the official minimum price rather than their actual market value. The consequence of these discoveries for the assessment of Germany's trading position was dramatic. After the scandal of 1922, the Statistical Office had rejiggered its procedures to arrive at an estimated deficit of 2.23 billion Gold marks for the entire year. By contrast, the Reparations Commission, allowing for the undervaluation of exports, estimated a deficit of little more than 250 million. This was very close to the figure that Hirsch and the Ministry of Economic Affairs had sought to defend in the autumn of 1922. Seventy years later, these were the numbers that Feldman cited to buttress his case for the possibility of stabilization. By July 1923, the archive reveals that the Reich's Statistical Office had convinced itself that the real figure for 1922 was a surplus in excess of 150 million Gold marks.[70]

This time, however, the Statistical Office did not make the mistake of casually announcing the inflammatory news to the general public. Instead, a series of confidential meetings were summoned under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The ensuing debate was full of bitter irony. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Statistical Office, and the Finance Ministry all insisted that since "no one abroad" regarded the current German trade statistics as anything other than self-serving eyewash, something had to be done to restore their credibility. The Reichsbank admitted that the numbers published following its dramatic intervention in the autumn of 1922 were probably useless. But it managed to secure agreement that they should be spared a further humiliating round of public revisions.[71] It was left to the liberal economist Anton Feiler and former minister of economic affairs Schmidt, both of whom had been among the most important advocates of stabilization in the autumn of 1922, to spell out the devastating political implications of the new data: "The false statistics produced hitherto [since November 1922] were the basis for inactivity in fiscal and monetary policy and the basis for current economic policy." At the time of the meeting in the summer of 1923, inflation had reached astronomic rates, and Germany was threatening to descend into anarchy. As Feiler and Schmidt insisted, "Doing away with this [statistical] foundation would put those in the right

[69] See the clipping in BA R2501 6594, Horten "Der Wert der deutschen Ausfuhr" Plutus, June 19, 1923.

[70] GStA I, Rep. 120 C VIII 2a, No. 25, Bd. 3, Bl. 648, Berlin, July 25, 1923, Vermerk.

[71] BA R2501 6430, Reichsbank memo zu No. 21811, July 14, 1923.

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who had all along demanded a different policy"—in other words, a policy of stabilization.[72]

Once more, driven by the logic of its own internal system of relations, the statistical reporting system had overturned the nationalist shibboleth of a structural trade deficit. And it would be convenient, of course, if the argument had ended with this final set of revisions. In the face of continuing opposition from the Reichsbank, however, the news of the trade surplus was held back.[73] Instead, a third set of figures was published, based on the notional exercise of applying 1913 unit prices to the volumes of the early 1920s.[74] These showed the modest trade surplus that would have resulted if Germany had been able to import and export at prices prevailing in the halcyon Wilhelmine era. The statisticians felt able to defend these numbers because their method of calculation was at least transparent and formally consistent. The nationalists accepted them through gritted teeth, but only because it was obvious that they had no practical bearing on the situation as of 1922–1923.[75] Furthermore, the Reichsbank still had room to insist that given the change in the terms of trade since 1913, at current prices a favorable trade balance was not plausible.[76] It was not until 1924, in the comparative calm following the end of inflation and the reparations settlement brokered by the Americans, that the Reich's statisticians were finally permitted to publish a definitive official version showing a relatively healthy balance for both 1922 and 1923.[77]

OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF COMPLEXITY that lurks within the statistical system has not, therefore, yielded consensus. Supporters of Feldman's interpretation may wish to make use of the paper trail we have unearthed to bolster their case. The view that the trade balance was in surplus clearly had strong support both inside and outside Germany. By contrast, the data on which Ferguson sought to base his case—the revised figures of the autumn of 1922—were in the end abandoned even by the Reichsbank. Nevertheless, the argument continued. Certainly, given the general unreliability of all the numbers and the convictions of well-informed contemporaries such as the Reichsbank, Ferguson's position cannot be conclusively rejected. If one contrasts the deflation in Britain and the United States with Germany's inflationary conditions, a trade deficit in 1922 can hardly be ruled out.

But if we cannot break the deadlock from internal archival sources, why not address Ferguson in his own terms? Why not ask the economic historians' question? Is there not some means of gaining "external" purchase on this question? Of course, for evidence about the state of the German economy, one is generally confined to German statistical sources, which in the period between 1918 and 1923 all suffer from

[72] GStA I, Rep. 120 C VIII 2a, No. 25, Bd. 3, Bl. 648, Berlin, July 25, 1923, Vermerk.

[73] As the Reichsbank noted with satisfaction; BA R2501 6430, 270, Aktenvermerk.

[74] Early drafts ibid., 266–267.

[75] This was the basis on which the SRA defended itself against renewed attacks by the Foreign Office and the Reichsbank; see ibid., 226–228.

[76] Ibid., 271ff. Besprechung 25.8. (1923) and BA R2501 6594, 209, Note to RWM, February 1924. And see the arguments along these lines made with regard to the trade balance in 1920 in BA R2501 6594, 137–140.

[77] The new gold-based figures were in fact ready as of January 1924; see BA R2501 6594, 202–208.

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the same profound problems. But in the case of foreign trade, this does not apply. German exports and imports, although widely dispersed, were concentrated on a manageable number of large economies. And in the trade of those countries, the German share was significant. In principle it should therefore be possible to construct at least an approximation of the German trade balance by compiling the figures for trade with Germany from the accounts of its major trading partners.

Efforts in this direction have been made in the past. Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich examined Germany's trade balance with Britain, France, and the United States and came to the conclusion that Germany provided those economies with welcome export opportunities during the deflation of 1920–1921.[78] With these countries, at least, Germany's trade balance certainly did deteriorate after 1920, giving support to Ferguson. However, Holtfrerich says little about 1922. Furthermore, given the truly global reach of Germany's trading connections, a three-country sample is too small to give an accurate picture of the overall balance. We need a more comprehensive overview.

Apart from its laboriousness, there are difficulties facing any such attempt. The system of international trade accounts is not fully consistent. One should not expect to find exports recorded in the German data as going to France showing up one for one in the French import account. To make matters more complicated, Germany was not the only country suffering from monetary disorder. After the suspension of the gold standard system in 1914, all the economies of the world suffered more or less severe inflation, and their exchange rates fluctuated in some cases quite violently. We must therefore make do with translating the trade accounts of Germany's largest trading partners into dollars, the most stable world currency. Also, if we are not to lose sight of our earlier argument, we must of course constantly remind ourselves that in compiling these data from standard handbook sources, we are relying on precisely the same kind of bureaucratic-technical apparatus that we have just deconstructed in Berlin. The assumption on which we proceed is simply that these other statistical agencies were in better shape than the Statistisches Reichsamt. (See Table 2.)

As our new trade data show, the depreciation of the German currency clearly did not create a huge surge of German exports into the markets that the advocates of aggressive fulfillment were particularly targeting, namely France and Britain, Germany's major reparations creditors. As Table 2 confirms, Germany's balances with those countries in fact deteriorated. However, these data also suggest that this was not typical of all of Germany's trading relations. With the smaller European economies, most notably the Netherlands, Germany achieved a trade surplus. And this is confirmed by unpublished data compiled by the Reich's Statistical Office, which showed exports to the Netherlands in the latter half of 1921 exceeding those to Britain, France, and the United States combined.[79] If the focus, therefore, was less on applying political pressure than on achieving the overall trade surplus necessary to finance reparations, then the evidence suggests that the strategy was more successful than Ferguson is willing to admit. The balance of both internal and external

[78] Holtfrerich, *The German Inflation*, 212–215.
[79] BA R2501 6594, 133.

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TABLE 2
German Trade with Major Commercial Partners 1913–1935 in m $

		1913	*1919*	*1920*	*1921*	*1922*	*1923*	*1924*	*1925*
Austria	Exports to					81	71	75	67
	Imports from					35	32	39	44
	Balance					46	39	36	23
Belgium	Exports to	146	13	70	105	67	48	75	78
	Imports from	180	85	95	82	47	24	73	87
	Balance	−34	−72	−24	23	20	24	2	−9
Denmark	Exports to	88	78	84	82	100	119	109	123
	Imports from	48	62	51	38	19	19	61	85
	Balance	40	16	32	45	81	100	48	38
Finland	Exports to				20	28	42	35	44
	Imports from				6	8	7	11	19
	Balance				14	20	35	24	26
France	Exports to	206	103	188	195	119	71	107	112
	Imports from	167	213	106	140	162	66	207	183
	Balance	39	−110	82	55	−43	6	−100	−71
Italy	Exports to	116	10	55	56	59	60	66	90
	Imports from	65	10	29	35	46	32	68	81
	Balance	51	0	26	21	13	28	−2	9
Netherlands	Exports to	455	170	311	219	235	196	220	239
	Imports from	594	227	145	86	65	73	189	189
	Balance	−139	−57	166	133	170	123	31	50
Sweden	Exports to	75	69	102	75	82	91	94	101
	Imports from	46	33	38	27	27	24	35	55
	Balance	29	35	65	47	55	67	58	46
Switzerland	Exports to	121	92	137	76	70	75	89	91
	Imports from	59	132	43	34	37	22	60	71
	Balance	63	−41	94	43	33	53	29	20
UK	Exports to	389	4	110	81	117	159	164	232
	Imports from	200	66	81	69	139	195	190	213
	Balance	190	−62	29	12	−22	−36	−27	19
Canada	Exports to	15	0	1	2	3	5	7	10
	Imports from	4		7	4	10	16	24	31
	Balance	11	0	−6	−2	−7	−10	−17	−21
Argentina	Exports to	36	1	40	52	76	93	81	92
	Imports from	26	9	21	37	43	50	79	81
	Balance	9	−8	18	15	33	43	2	11
USA	Exports to	189	11	89	80	117	161	139	164
	Imports from	332	93	311	372	316	317	440	470
	Balance	−143	−82	−222	−292	−199	−156	−301	−306
Total	Export	1837	551	1187	1041	1154	1193	1261	1443
	Import	1721	931	926	929	953	878	1477	1608
	Balance	116	−380	261	112	201	315	−216	−165

SOURCES: The trade data for this table are taken from B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970* (New York, 1975), and Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750–1988* (New York, 1993). The exchange rates are the dollar rates provided by eh.net at http://www.measuringworth.com/exchangeglob.

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evidence supports Feldman's view that the German trade account in 1922 was in a sufficiently good state to make stabilization at least a hypothetical possibility.

IT MIGHT SEEM, THEREFORE, THAT WE HAVE given the last word to the economic historians. The international data appear as a *deus ex machina* to pronounce a satisfyingly ironic conclusion to our protracted cogitations. Ferguson may have won the methodological battle, but he lost the historical war. Indeed, it seems that we might have spared ourselves the entire elaborate archival detour. Standard statistical sources were all that was necessary to decide on the possibilities open to Weimar's decision-makers. Economic history's victory in the methodological civil war hands victory in the argument over stabilization to Feldman. But in coming to this abrupt conclusion, we would be in danger of losing sight of what the discussion was actually about. What was fundamentally at stake in this argument was the possibility of rational politics in the early Weimar Republic. Compared to the dogmatism of the nationalists, the attraction of Feldman's heroes was precisely their resilient rationalism. They continued to bet on their capacity to read events and to manipulate the German economy. But this was a gamble at long odds, and by 1922 it had failed. It was not, as Ferguson suggests, a lack of will that made the debate over stabilization increasingly phony, but the chaotic course of inflation, which made well-informed debate impossible. By the autumn of 1922, the advocates of stabilization could no longer convince even Chancellor Wirth of the factual evidence on which they based their claim that a disaster could still be avoided. In this sense, if the overriding aim was to preserve the capacity of the German political system to act coherently, then by 1922 it was too late for rational politics.

But does this not push us back toward Ferguson and his counterfactual of a conservative stabilization in 1920? The balance of statistical evidence certainly points to a trade surplus in 1920. However, this evidence was contested by the nationalists even then. More importantly, in the wake of the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 and the bloody suppression of the general strike that followed it, neither left nor right had the stomach to impose a stabilization on their terms. It was not until the Entente announced the full extent of their reparations demands in the spring of 1921 and Germany was faced with the prospect of a descent into hyperinflation that the real argument over stabilization began. In this sense, Ferguson's counterfactual would also seem to fail the test of political plausibility.

But if this is our conclusion, is the methodological boot now not on the other foot? Perhaps it was the economic historian's insistence on determining what the trade balance actually was that was the irrelevance. If in judging the plausibility of a counterfactual all that matters are contemporary perceptions and politics, then perhaps we could have spared ourselves the distasteful detour into the world of statistical handbooks and anachronistic spreadsheets. All we needed to do was to insert a fleshed-out account of the chaos within the Statistical Office into Feldman's grand narrative of Weimar politics. This, however, would again be to risk collapsing the complex, stereoscopic rendition of reality that we have been struggling to develop. And preserving this stereoscopic view is crucial because only with both aspects of

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the data in view can we fully grasp the tragedy of the Weimar Republic. It is one thing to say that Weimar's politicians could not agree on the terms of stabilization. It is quite another to say that they could not agree despite the fact that stabilization was a real possibility.[80] And we twist the knife even further when we argue that they were not in a position to seize the opportunity when it came in the autumn of 1922 precisely because their previous policy of aggressive fulfillment had undermined the conditions necessary for rational political decision-making.

[80] Of course, from a nationalist standpoint, the story, rather than tragic, is bitterly ironic. Weimar's politicians endlessly squabbled while ignoring the fact that stabilization and fulfillment were never really an option. See, for instance, Helfferich, *Das Geld*.

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The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order

FRANCINE HIRSCH

THE NUREMBERG TRIALS OF NOVEMBER 1945 TO OCTOBER 1946 are still seen through the distorting lens of the Cold War. Nuremberg was a foundational event of the postwar era, generating numerous retellings in memoirs, monographs, and films. The classic account of the trials is an Anglo-American tale of liberal triumph in which the high-minded U.S. chief prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, along with representatives of the other Western powers, put the desire for vengeance aside and gave the Nazis a fair trial before the law—marking one of "the law's first great efforts to submit mass atrocity to principled judgment" and ushering in a new era of international human rights.[1] This narrative became established in the West during the long decades of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, when Soviet materials relating to the trials, and to postwar diplomatic relations in general, were off limits in the Soviet archives.

For politicians and historians who helped create the classic narrative of Nuremberg, the role of the Soviets in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was, and remains, an awkward fact. Most English-language accounts describe Soviet participation in Nuremberg as "the Achilles' heel" of the trials: regrettable but unavoidable, a Faustian bargain that the U.S. and Britain made in order to bring closure to the war and bring the Nazis to justice.[2] Popular works that have shaped conventional

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[1] This triumphalist account dominates the literature. For examples, see Bradley F. Smith, *The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record, 1944–1945* (Stanford, Calif., 1982), and Lawrence Douglas, *The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust* (New Haven, Conn., 2001). The quote is from Douglas, *Memory of Judgment*, 1. For a somewhat more tempered triumphalist account, see Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), 147–205. One of the few works to offer a sustained critique of the Nuremberg narrative and its "legacy to posterity" is Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory* (New York, 2001).

[2] For an account based primarily on the British archives and on memoirs, and told from an Anglo-

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wisdom about the trials give little attention to the substantive role that the Soviets had in all aspects of the IMT.[3] Those commentators who do focus on Soviet participation often do so in order to highlight the flaws of such tribunals and to make a point about "victors' justice," in the most extreme cases as part of a larger project to discredit the historical record of the Holocaust.[4]

Even with the Cold War long over, the classic narrative of Nuremberg has proven resilient. The few post-1989 studies that challenge our assumptions about the IMT and its meaning, almost all of which are from Russia, have received little attention in the United States.[5] Meanwhile, new evidence from the former Soviet archives, much of which has just become available to researchers, suggests that there is still a great deal that we need to understand about what happened at Nuremberg and in its wake.[6] This evidence shows how the IMT functioned as a medium for postwar

American perspective, see Ann Tusa and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial* (London, 1983). For an account based in part on the U.S. archives and told from the U.S. perspective, see Joseph E. Persico, *Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial* (New York, 1994). U.S. and British memoirs take a similar view. See, for example, Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (New York, 1992), and Airey Neave, *Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Trial of the Major Nazi War Criminals in 1945–6* (London, 1978). The quote is from Christopher J. Dodd, *Letters from Nuremberg: My Father's Narrative of a Quest for Justice* (New York, 2007), 341. See also Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance*, 196. Bass argues that "Soviet vengeance was utterly unhindered by liberal legalistic norms."

[3] This is especially true of the spate of newspaper articles about Nuremberg that appeared in connection with the sixtieth anniversary of the IMT, and also in connection with the trials of Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein. Many spoke about "the lessons of Nuremberg" and "the Nuremberg standard." Also notable is the PBS American Experience documentary *The Nuremberg Trials*, which aired in 2006—and which celebrated Nuremberg as the triumph of U.S. Chief Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson and gave no real attention to the positive role of the Soviets in the trials. To be sure, there were some exceptions to this tendency to downplay the role of the Soviets: law professor Michael J. Bazyler, speaking in Nuremberg on the sixtieth anniversary of the start of the IMT, noted that "Soviet contributions to the trials were numerous," even as he concluded that Soviet participation "diminishes the legacy of the IMT." Bazyler's speech was published as "The Role of the Soviet Union in the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg," in Herbert R. Reginbogin and Christoph J. M. Safferling, eds., *Die Nürnberger Prozesse: Völkerstrafrecht seit 1945* (Munich, 2006), 45–52. (The quote is from p. 51.)

[4] David Irving, recently arrested in Austria on the charge of Holocaust denial, features a good discussion of the Soviet prosecution at Nuremberg in his *Nuremberg: The Last Battle* (London, 1996), published in Russian as *Niurnberg: Posledniaia bitva* (Moscow, 2005). Soviet participation in Nuremberg also receives pride of place in the publications of the Institute for Historical Review, an organization notorious for disseminating Holocaust denial literature. See, for example, Mark Weber, "The Nuremberg Trials and the Holocaust," *Journal of Historical Review* 12, no. 2 (1992): 167–213.

[5] Here I am referring in particular to the excellent work of Natalia Lebedeva and other Russian scholars, whose findings have not been assimilated into popular Western accounts of the trials. See, for example, Yuri Zorya and Natalia Lebedeva, "The Year 1939 in the Nuremberg Files," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 10 (October 1989): 117–129. For a first-rate discussion of the Soviet Union's compilation of evidence for the IMT, see Marina Sorokina, "People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, no. 4 (2005): 797–831. Also deserving of greater attention is George Ginsburgs's excellent *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg: The Soviet Background to the Trial* (The Hague, 1996), which documents the Soviet Union's preparation for Nuremberg and contribution to the legal underpinnings of the IMT. Ginsburgs, an American legal historian of the USSR, did not use Russian archival materials (which were unavailable to him), but drew on numerous other sources, including Lebedeva's published and unpublished work. The most comprehensive and insightful Soviet scholarly work on Nuremberg is N. S. Lebedeva, *Podgotovka Niurnbergskogo protsessa* (Moscow, 1975). In the 1970s, Lebedeva had privileged, albeit limited, access to Soviet archives. See also Lebedeva's recent essay about the Nuremberg Trials, "SSSR i Niurnbergskii protsess," in N. S. Lebedeva and V. V. Ishchenko, eds., *Niurnbergskii protsess: Uroki istorii* (Moscow, 2007), 139–165. In her essay, Lebedeva references a number of the same archival sources that I do in this piece. Her essay and edited collection were published while this article was in press.

[6] Much archival evidence about the role of the Soviets in the IMT has only recently become available to researchers. Russian scholars have had a leading role in bringing such evidence to light with the

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cooperation among states with different visions and goals—and also how it became the battleground for an intense political and ideological struggle among those same states about the meaning of World War II and the shape of the new international order. Given the prevalence of international tribunals in our current political landscape and the frequent invocations of "the Nuremberg model," it would seem that attaining a more complete picture of Nuremberg, and of the behind-the-scenes politics of the trials in particular, is a matter of more than just academic interest.

A new narrative of Nuremberg that includes a full accounting of the role of the Soviets contains numerous twists and turns—and more than a few surprises. First, there is compelling evidence that the Soviet Union made significant contributions to the legal framework of the IMT and also to a new postwar vision of international law. It did so despite the fact that Soviet domestic legal practices contradicted Western liberal principles of the law. Furthermore, making the USSR's contributions to the jurisprudence of the IMT all the more striking, it is clear that there were direct continuities in personnel and objectives linking the Soviet delegation at the Nuremberg Trials to Stalin's notorious Moscow Trials of 1936–1938. The Russian archival record leaves no question that the Soviet regime and its secret Commission for Directing the Nuremberg Trials envisioned Nuremberg as a "show trial"—that is, as an exercise in didactic legalism—and made a significant effort to control the Soviet legal team and the course of the trials.[7]

Yet despite these intentions, and despite the major contributions that the Soviet participants made to the actual trial, Nuremberg turned into an embarrassment for the USSR. In Nuremberg we see not just "intimations of the coming Cold War" but in fact one of the Cold War's first major battles, taking place at a critical moment when the postwar relationship between the United States and the USSR was still unformed and before the USSR had achieved the status of an international superpower.[8] The Soviets did not fare well in this contest. Indeed, it was the U.S. that seized control of the IMT and made Nuremberg its own. The IMT became a devastating propaganda failure for the Soviet "propaganda state." It exposed Soviet inadequacies before the world and ultimately shaped Soviet leaders' attitudes toward the postwar order.[9]

THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW EXPERIENCED A RENAISSANCE in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, a direct result of both the changing international situation and the

publication of document collections. See G. P. Kynin and I. Laufer, eds., *SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949: Dokumenty iz Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1996–2003). See also Wojciech Materski, Anna M. Cienciala, and Natalia S. Lebedeva, eds., *Katyn: A Crime without Punishment* (New Haven, Conn., 2008).

[7] On political trials and didactic legalism, see Judith N. Shklar, *Legalism: Law, Moralism, and Political Trials* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).

[8] Persico argues that in Nuremberg "we see intimations of the coming Cold War in microcosm." *Nuremberg*, x–xi.

[9] On the Soviet "propaganda state," see Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1928* (Cambridge, 1985). The Soviet term for show trial, *pokazatel'nyi protsess*, referred to a trial with explicit educational goals, and did not have pejorative implications.

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


FIGURE 1: The Palace of Justice, site of the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [hereafter USHMM], courtesy of William O. McWorkman.

deadly political intrigues of Stalin's Great Terror. This represented a major turnabout. Indeed, as late as 1935, Soviet legal experts at Moscow's Institute of Law, the USSR's premier legal institution, rejected international law because of its "bourgeois underpinnings."[10] The most vocal critic was Evgenii Pashukanis, a leading figure of Soviet Marxist jurisprudence and the director of the institute, who had tyrannized the field for more than a decade. According to Pashukanis, "the victory of the bourgeoisie" throughout Europe had led to the establishment of the rules and institutions of modern international law, "which protected the general and basic interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e. bourgeois property." Pashukanis explained that "bourgeois jurists" refused to acknowledge a simple fact: that capitalist states and socialist states were destined to engage in a struggle against one another and thus could not enter into meaningful agreements.[11] An important proponent of a more pragmatic approach

[10] The Institute of Law went through several name changes in the 1930s. From 1930 to 1935 it was the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, from 1936 to 1938 the Institute of State and Law, and from 1938 to 1953 the Institute of Law. I will refer to it throughout as the Institute of Law.

[11] Evgeny Pashukanis, "Selections from the Encyclopedia of State and Law: International Law," in Piers Beirne and Robert Sharlet, eds., *Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law* (London, 1980), 168–183, esp. 171–172. In March 1935, the Institute of Law had a heated discussion about Pashukanis's ideas on international law. Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences [hereafter ARAN], f. 360, op. 4, d. 400, ll. 1–14. Pashukanis revised some of his ideas in response to this discussion (as can be seen in E. Pashukanis, *Ocherki po mezhdunarodnomu pravu* [Moscow, 1935]), but the revisions did not go far enough.

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to international relations was Andrei Vyshinskii, who taught law at Moscow State University (MGU) and who had been appointed deputy state prosecutor of the USSR in 1933. Vyshinskii defined law as "a set of normative prescriptions" and maintained that international law could be used to reinforce and secure the Soviet state order.[12]

One of Vyshinskii's subordinates at MGU was Aron Trainin, a brilliant professor of criminal law, trained before 1917 in Western European legal traditions.[13] After the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934, Trainin, at Vyshinskii's behest, undertook an investigation of international legal projects pursued during the interwar period, with the goal of coming up with a Soviet version of international criminal law. Trainin began this project quietly, since international law was still in disrepute. Before long, however, Vyshinskii's star began to rise. In 1935 Vyshinskii was named procurator general of the USSR, and between 1936 and 1938 he helped Stalin conduct the infamous Moscow Trials, a series of show trials that initiated Stalin's Great Terror throughout the USSR. In January 1937, Vyshinskii's rival, Pashukanis, became a victim of the Terror; he was arrested, like hundreds of thousands of other Soviet citizens, on charges of "Trotskyism" and shot. Vyshinskii assumed the post of director at the Institute of Law—and emerged as the undisputed leader of the Soviet legal profession.[14] The field of Soviet international law was about to come into its own.

The year 1937, known best in the USSR for extralegal measures and kangaroo courts, also brought the publication of Trainin's major work, *The Defense of Peace and Criminal Law*. This book criticized the League of Nations for failing to make the provocation of aggressive war a criminal offense and for failing to create an international criminal court to punish aggressors. Immediately following World War I, the League of Nations had contemplated creating a High Court of International Justice to try crimes against "the universal law of nations." But the signatories had been unable to agree which crimes "the universal law of nations" prohibited, and in 1920 the idea was abandoned.[15] Trainin lamented this missed opportunity and the

[12] Quoted from Beirne and Sharlet's introduction to *Pashukanis*, 33. They are citing A. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1948), 62. Vyshinskii's ideas are set out in A. Ia. Vyshinskii, *K polozheniiu na fronte pravovoi teorii* (Moscow, 1937).

[13] Trainin began his career as a criminal lawyer and did not take up international law until the mid-1930s. For biographical sketches, see ARAN, f. 1711, op. 1, and the introduction to A. N. Trainin, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia: Zashchita mira i ugolovnyi zakon*, ed. R. A. Rudenko (Moscow, 1969), 5–14. Most Soviet legal scholars of Trainin's generation received a broad legal education grounded in a range of Western European traditions. For examples, see V. E. Graber, *The History of International Law in Russia, 1647–1917: A Bio-Bibliographical Study*, trans. and ed. W. E. Butler (Oxford, 1990). Aron Trainin should not be confused with Il'ia Trainin. The latter was a member of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of Crimes of the Fascist German Invaders and Their Accomplices, and had a leading role at the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Law during the 1940s.

[14] Vyshinskii publicly denounced Pashukanis as a "Trotskyite" who had been advancing "pseudo-Marxist" legal theories with the intention of weakening the USSR before its enemies abroad. Vyshinskii, *K polozheniiu na fronte pravovoi teorii*, 5. On Vyshinskii's rise to power, see Arkady Vaksberg, *Stalin's Prosecutor: The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky* (New York, 1990), and Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin* (Cambridge, 1996).

[15] A. Trainin, *Zashchita mira i ugolovnyi zakon* (Moscow, 1937), 21–32. Trainin described unsuccessful international efforts to label "aggressive war" a punishable criminal offense, noting that the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the Pan-American Conference of 1928 renounced wars of aggression, but that neither provided mechanisms to punish such offenses. See also Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 20–23. On the League of Nations and its failed efforts to create an international court, see

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enduring absence of a "criminal code to defend peace," noting that in current international law, "hunting rabbits unlawfully is punished more severely than organizing the military destruction of people."[16] Vyshinskii attached his name to Trainin's work as editor and wrote an impassioned introduction in which he proclaimed that "criminal law must be utilized for defending peace, must be mobilized against war and against the instigators of war."[17] The threatening actions of Hitler's Germany—including the formation of the Axis Alliance between Germany and Italy, and the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, both in 1936—made the publication of this work timely. But it was Vyshinskii's newfound power that made it possible.

IT WAS TOWARD THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR that the Soviets began to fully envision international law as an instrument for reshaping the international order. Trainin, who spent the duration of the war at the Institute of Law, had a major hand in this endeavor. He wrote extensively on questions of war, peace, and international law, often working on direct assignments from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.[18] Trainin's wartime efforts culminated in his 1944 work *The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*.[19] This book, which was published amid an international outcry about Nazi atrocities and several months after the first public Soviet trial of German war criminals in the USSR, proposed a set of "international legal principles" for trying the Nazis and the other Axis powers.[20] Again, Vyshinskii attached himself to the work as its editor and wrote the introduction. By now, he was well ensconced in the world of Soviet diplomatic relations as deputy commissar of foreign affairs.[21]

The main innovation of Trainin's new book was its argument that "the Hitlerites" should be tried not just for "war crimes" committed during the course of war, but also, and more importantly, for launching a war of aggression—and thus committing

Benjamin B. Ferencz, "The Legacy of Nuremberg: International Criminal Courts," *Pace International Law Review* 10 (1998): 203–235. At the Paris Peace Conference, the victors had proposed using such a court to prosecute individuals for "crimes against humanity." Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York, 2006), 2–3.

[16] Trainin, *Zashchita mira i ugolovnyi zakon*, 90.

[17] V. I. Vyshinskii, introduction to ibid., 4.

[18] ARAN, f. 499, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 9, 37–38; d. 32, ll. 124ob–125, 143–156. Trainin moved to the Institute of Law in 1938.

[19] Trainin presented the main arguments of this work for discussion at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences' Division of Economics and Law (to which the Institute of Law belonged) on November 23, 1943. ARAN, f. 499, op. 1, d. 32, ll. 27–50.

[20] A. N. Trainin, *Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost' gitlerovtsev*, ed. A. Ia. Vyshinskii (Moscow, 1944), translated into English as *The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, ed. A. Y. Vyshinsky (Moscow, 1944). On this work and its significance, see Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, chap. 4. The first public Soviet trial was the Kharkov Trial, conducted by the Military Tribunal of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in December 1943. Trainin wrote extensively about the legal aspects of this trial. Arieh J. Kochavi, "The Moscow Declaration, the Kharkov Trial, and the Question of a Policy on Major War Criminals in the Second World War," *History* 76 (1991): 401–417; Alexander Victor Prusin, "Fascist Criminals to the Gallows! The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 1945–February 1946," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 1 (2003): 1–30.

[21] Vyshinskii assumed this post in 1940. On Vyshinskii's diplomatic career, see A. Gromyko, "'Zagadka' Vyshinskogo," in O. E. Kutafin, ed., *Inkvizitor: Stalinskii prokuror Vyshinskii* (Moscow, 1992), 296–305. Also Vaksberg, *Stalin's Prosecutor*.

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a fundamental "crime against peace." Arguing that "peace is the greatest social value" and the basis of all "international association," Trainin argued that "crimes against peace" constituted the gravest international offenses.[22] The idea of a "crime against peace," that is, of treating war itself as a punishable criminal act, had been raised in international conferences.[23] But Trainin gave the concept its definitive formulation, which would later serve as a basis for the Nuremberg Charter. According to Trainin, "crimes against peace" included "acts of aggression," "propaganda of aggression," "the conclusion of agreements with aggressive aims," "the violation of treaties which serve the cause of peace," "provocation designed to disrupt peaceful relations between countries," "terrorism," and "support of armed bands (fifth columns)."[24] He argued that such an understanding of "crimes against peace" should become part of "a new convention on international crime," which would be part of a "general system of treaties defining the new regime of international relations after the defeat of Hitlerism."[25]

Trainin's new work was also significant for its contribution to an ongoing discussion among the Allies about using the legal concept of "complicity" to try the Nazis for participating in a criminal conspiracy against peace. Most works about Nuremberg describe the "complicity charge" as a U.S. innovation that met with resistance from the other Allies.[26] In fact, however, the Soviets were keen proponents of this charge from early on, recognizing its great utility. Trainin, for his part, devoted an entire chapter to the concept of complicity, defining it as "a complex phenomenon" that "embraces various understandings among criminals" and can include "the dangerous form of participation in an organization, bands, blocs, gangs, conspiracies," and so on. In such cases, he explained, a member of an organization "may not know all the other members" of the organization "but should answer for all their criminal activities." (Here Trainin acknowledged an intellectual debt to Vyshinskii, noting that he was borrowing from the definition of complicity that the latter had elaborated in 1938 during the Moscow Trials.) According to Trainin, the concept of complicity, which was firmly established in Soviet domestic law, was even more important in international law, because in international crime the perpetrator never acts alone, but "with the aid of a complicated executive apparatus" and with "the

[22] Trainin, *Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, 47–48; Trainin, *Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost' gitlerovtsev*, 35–36. Also Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 26, 78–79. Ginsburgs rightly credits Trainin with making "a pioneering attempt to gain recognition for the phenomenon of crimes against peace and the idea that such offenses must incur the severest penalties congruent with the common tenor of criminal jurisprudence." He notes that Trainin's ideas had "revolutionary" implications for "the future development of international law doctrine." Unfortunately, Ginsburgs's important study, published more than a decade ago, has not altered the common misperception that it was the United States that came up with the formula for "crimes against peace."

[23] In this work, too, Trainin discussed past international efforts to label aggressive acts as "criminal" (noting the Kellogg-Briand Pact, along with the 1927 Universal Peace Congress in Athens and the Inter-Parliamentary Congresses of 1924, 1928, 1930, and 1932), arguing that none went far enough.

[24] Trainin, *Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, 54; Trainin, *Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost' gitlerovtsev*, 40. Trainin differentiated crimes of "interference with peaceful relations between nations" from "crimes connected with war." (In these and subsequent examples I am citing the English-language version of Trainin's work in the text, which is consistent with the Russian version.)

[25] Trainin, *Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, 133; Trainin, *Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost' gitlerovtsev*, 101.

[26] For recent examples, see Persico, *Nuremberg*, 16–18; Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial*, 20; and Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 225. Borgwardt maintains that "conspiracy was a purely Anglo-American legal doctrine."

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assistance of numerous human organizations." In such cases, he added, "higher-ups" (such as "the Hitlerite officers and the German commanders") bear the greatest criminal responsibility, since "they are guilty of the formulation and execution of a policy representing a continuous insult to the foundations of international law and of creating a system of governmental banditry."[27]

Trainin's new work was translated into English, French, and German, and soon surfaced in important political circles in the West. In October 1944, it was discussed at a meeting of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (of which the USSR was not a member).[28] In December, it made the rounds of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. War Department. In January 1945, Murray Bernays of the U.S. War Department's Special Projects Branch cited Trainin's definition of a "crime against peace" when penning his own memo on the topic for the White House.[29] Soon after, Trainin's work was handed off to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson—who would soon be named the United States' chief prosecutor at Nuremberg and who would express his approval of Trainin's characterization of the criminal nature of aggressive war.[30] In May and June of 1945, on the eve of the London Conference to draft the charter of the IMT, Trainin's work circulated among the British. D. Maxwell Fyfe, who would head the British delegation at the London Conference, reportedly declared it "a godsend" for clarifying important issues of the day.[31]

Trainin was part of the Soviet team that went to London. He later went to Nuremberg, too, where he served as an adviser to the Soviet prosecution. In London, the Four Powers (the United States, Britain, France, and the USSR) adopted his nomenclature and the essence of his definition of "crimes against peace"; they listed "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" as separate, albeit related, charges.[32]

[27] Trainin, *Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, 110, 112, 115; Trainin, *Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost' gitlerovtsev*, 81–82, 85. The key chapter (chap. 8) is titled "Souchastie v mezhdunarodnykh prestupleniiakh: Gitlerovskaia klika" ("Complicity of the Hitlerite Clique in International Crimes" in the English-language version). Also Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 79–80.

[28] At the October 10, 1944, meeting of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, the chairman noted that the commission had received three copies of Trainin's *The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites*, all in Russian. At the October 31, 1944, meeting, Dr. Bohuslav Ečer from Czechoslovakia (the only commission member who knew Russian) presented an analysis of Trainin's book. On November 11, 1944, a written transcript of this analysis was circulated to all commission members. National Archives and Records Administration–College Park, Record Group 238: World War II War Crimes Records, Entry Number 52: Reference Files 1933–1946, Box 7: Miscellaneous Reports and Correspondence, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Minutes—October 10, 1944; Minutes—October 31, 1944; Report—October 31, 1944. Trainin's work was also discussed at subsequent meetings.

[29] In this secret memo from January 4, 1945, Bernays explained the Soviet view "that the launching of an aggressive war is today a crime in international law" and that "this is made clear in a book entitled, 'The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites' by A. N. Trainin, a Soviet professor of law . . . who expresses not only his own opinion but also the official attitude of the Soviet Government." Truman Library, Rosenman Papers, War Crimes File, Memorandum from Murray C. Bernays and D. W. Brown, January 4, 1945. On the memo, see also Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 92–93. Ginsburgs is citing N. S. Lebedeva, "K istorii sozdaniia Mezhdunarodnogo voennogo tribunala," in L. L. Ananian, ed., *Uroki Niurnberga: Materialy k mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, Moskva, 11 noiabria–13 noiabria 1986 g.: Doklady sovetskikh uchastnikov konferentsii*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1986–1988), 1: notes 3, 79.

[30] Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 93. Ginsburgs is citing Robert H. Jackson, *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1949), 299.

[31] Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 93. Ginsburgs is citing Lebedeva, "K istorii sozdaniia Mezhdunarodnogo voennogo tribunala," notes 2, 3, and 84. The London Conference was held from June 26 to August 8, 1945.

[32] In Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, "crimes against peace" were defined as "planning, prep-

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


FIGURE 2: Aron Trainin, in the center with a mustache, speaks with his colleagues at a meeting in London to work out the Allied agreement to create the International Military Tribunal. Iona Nikitchenko, who would later be named the USSR's chief judge at Nuremberg, is on his right. London, England, August 1945. Photo by Charles Alexander. USHMM, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library.

At the London Conference, the Four Powers also decided to integrate the complicity charge into the Nuremberg Charter, agreeing that "leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit" specified crimes "are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan."[33] This definition, advanced by the Americans, was accepted enthusiastically by the Soviets. It was, after all, remarkably similar to the one that Trainin himself had put forward.

The exact degree to which the Soviets, versus the other members of the Four Powers, were responsible for the formulation of the charges in the Nuremberg Charter remains unknown. What is clear is that historians who credit the United States with coming up with the major legal innovations of the Nuremberg Trials far over-

aration, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." *Nuremberg Trial Proceedings*, vol. 1, published online through the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (accessed April 11, 2008).

[33] This definition was set out in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, ibid.

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state their case.[34] The Soviets and the Americans came from different political systems with different legal traditions but found common ground when it came to formulating the Nuremberg Charter. The Soviets were quite comfortable with the idea of "complicity," having perfected their own rendition of the charge during the Moscow Trials to implicate people for the dubious crime of Trotskyism. Moreover, it was the Soviets, on record as criticizing the League of Nations for not going far enough to condemn and criminalize "aggressive war," and more comfortable than the Americans with the ex post facto application of the law, who provided the legal rationale for the charge of "crimes against peace." It was through such contributions that the Soviets helped shape the IMT and also laid important groundwork for the development of postwar international human rights law. These contributions would soon be forgotten in the West—a direct result of the politics of the Cold War.

WHILE TRAININ AND HIS IDEAS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW made it to London and Nuremberg as an indirect result of Stalin's Great Terror, the connections between the brutal politics of the Soviet 1930s and Nuremberg in fact go far deeper. For Stalin and Vyshinskii, there was a strong link between the Moscow Trials of 1936–1938 and the Nuremberg Trials. It is important to remember that at the Moscow Trials, Grigorii Zinov'ev, Nikolai Bukharin, and numerous others had been convicted on trumped-up charges, not simply as Trotskyites, but as Trotskyites who had organized with the direct aid of the Hitler regime and aimed to establish a fascist dictatorship in Russia.[35] Both sets of trials, from the Soviet perspective, were intended to bring "the Hitlerites" (a label that included Nazi Germans as well as their supporters) to justice. As if to reinforce this link, Stalin recruited for Nuremberg some of the same judges and prosecutors who had served during the Moscow Trials. Principal members of the Soviet team at Nuremberg—Judge Iona Nikitchenko, Assistant Judge Aleksandr Volchkov, and Assistant Prosecutor Lev Sheinin—had made their careers by helping Vyshinskii convict Zinov'ev, Bukharin, and other "old Bolsheviks" in the 1930s, thus facilitating the spread of Stalin's campaign against purported "enemies of the people." The USSR's chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Roman Rudenko, had gotten similar experience between 1936 and 1938 as the chief prosecutor for a series of show trials of engineers and mine managers in Ukraine.[36]

[34] See, for example, Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*, and Smith, *American Road to Nuremberg*. Smith states that "what the world now knows as the Nuremberg trial system was primarily developed in late 1944 and early 1945, almost exclusively by a group of American government officials" (x).

[35] This charge was reiterated in slightly different forms at all three of the Moscow Trials. At the 1937 trial, Vyshinskii maintained that it had been established that Trotsky and his allies had "entered into negotiations with one of the leaders of the German National-Socialist Party with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Soviet Union." A. Y. Vyshinsky, *Traitors Accused: Indictment of the Piatakov-Radek Trotskyite Group* (New York, 1937), 6.

[36] Nikitchenko was approximately fifty years old in 1946; he had joined the Bolshevik Party in 1914 and had headed a military tribunal during the civil war. A. Poltorak, *The Nuremberg Epilogue* (Moscow, 1971), 153–155. Rudenko was approximately forty years old and procurator of the Ukrainian SSR in 1946; he had been a party member for some twenty years. Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge, 1998), 223. On Sheinin's career, see Arkadii Vaksberg, "Pravaia ruka velikogo inkvizitora," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 42 (5264) (October 18, 1989): 12. All of the members of the Soviet legal team, along with Gorshenin and several political advisers, were part of the USSR's Commission on the Nuremberg Trials, which met several times a week

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


FIGURE 3: Aleksandr Volchkov and Iona Nikitchenko, the USSR's assistant judge and chief judge on the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946. Photo by Charles Alexander. USHMM, courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library.

During the Nuremberg Trials, these men continued to report directly to Vyshinskii, who from 1945 headed the Soviet Union's secret Commission for Directing the Nuremberg Trials. This Moscow-based commission included in its ranks such highly placed figures as the new procurator general of the USSR, Konstantin Gorshenin; the people's commissar of justice, Nikolai Rychkov; the president of the Supreme Soviet, Ivan Goliakov; and the head of the Counterespionage Division of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Viktor Abakumov. It also included high-ranking officials from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID), as well as a representative from the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the Fascist German Invaders and Their Accomplices (ChGK), a Soviet institution established in November 1942 to compile evidence about Nazi war crimes committed in the USSR.[37]

in Nuremberg. (This commission should not be confused with Vyshinskii's secret Moscow-based Commission for Directing the Nuremberg Trials.)

[37] In August 1945, Molotov and Beria began planning the "establishment of a commission under Vyshinskii's leadership"—should it be decided to participate in an international tribunal. According to their correspondence, the commission would include representatives from the Office of the Military Procurator, the NKVD, SMERSH, and the People's Commissariat of Defense. This was the precursor to the Vyshinskii Commission. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation [hereafter AVPRF], f. 06, op. 7, p. 20, d. 210, ll. 9–10. SMERSH, an acronym for "death to spies," was the USSR's main counterespionage organ. Other members of the Vyshinskii Commission were Vsevolod Merkulov (head of the NKGB), Bogdan Kobulov (from the NKGB), Sergei Kruglov (from the NKVD), Ivan Lavrov

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FIGURE 4: Roman Rudenko, the USSR's chief prosecutor on the International Military Tribunal, addresses the court. The members of the Soviet delegation sit behind him in their military uniforms. Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946. Photo by Charles Alexander. USHMM, courtesy of Robert Kempner.

The "Vyshinskii Commission," as it came to be known, attempted to micromanage all aspects of Soviet participation in the IMT. It approved all Soviet lawyers, political advisers, journalists, artists, translators, stenographers, and other personnel for Nuremberg. It found and groomed witnesses for the Soviet prosecution, using NKVD agents to prepare them for cross-examination. It screened all written and visual materials for use in the trials, and worked with the Soviet prosecution to select documents (from captured German archives and other sources), photographs, and newsreel footage to introduce as evidence of Nazi intentions and Nazi crimes. It line-edited, and rewrote entire sections of, the speeches and written communications of the Soviet legal team—leaving behind an astonishing paper trail. Commission members circulated marked-up drafts of the speeches of the Soviet prosecution for weeks before sending copies to Commissar of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov, and then to Stalin, for comments, suggestions, and final approval.[38] During the course of the trials, Vyshinskii traveled several times to Nuremberg to give direct orders to the Soviet legal team and to Soviet journalists. He made such trips in his role as deputy commissar of foreign affairs, since his commission was secret and he had no official connection to the IMT. Back in Moscow, Vyshinskii reported to Molotov and Stalin on a regular basis, seeking their opinions on matters large and small.

(from the NKID), and Pavel Bogoiavlenskii (from the ChGK). State Archive of the Russian Federation [hereafter GARF], f. 7445, op. 2, d. 391, ll. 49–56. On the ChGK, see Sorokina, "People and Procedures."

[38] In most cases, copies of such materials—and copies of high-level correspondence about the course of the Nuremberg Trials in general—also went to Anastas Mikoian, Grigorii Malenkov, and Lavrentii Beria.

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Western lawyers and journalists at Nuremberg were well aware that Nikitchenko and Vyshinskii had played active roles in the Soviet show trials of the 1930s. Moreover, while details about the Vyshinskii Commission and its attempts to direct the Nuremberg Trials have come to light only recently, it was commonly understood at the time that the members of the Soviet prosecution (and all Soviet personnel in Nuremberg in general) were under close surveillance and were perpetually awaiting directives from their superiors back home. Western memoirs of Nuremberg make note of the evasiveness and "obvious embarrassment" of the Russians, who were under tight rein from Moscow, and depict Vyshinskii as an "ominous figure" lurking in the dark corridors of the Palace of Justice. Many Western works about Nuremberg do not mention Trainin at all—but those that do, remember him as a "distinguished legal academician" and as "an agreeable man to do business with."[39]

It is tempting to draw a sharp line between Trainin and Vyshinskii—to see Trainin as a great legal mind with Western sensibilities and to see Vyshinskii and his commission as the embodiment of Soviet totalitarianism. And it is true that while Vyshinskii was a known executioner, Trainin spoke the language of "Western civilization," expressing deep concern about the humane treatment of populations during wartime and peacetime. Drawing a line between these men might allow us to separate the USSR's positive contribution to the IMT from other, unsettling elements of the Soviet past. If we can imagine Trainin as a closet dissident who embodied Western values, we can insert him into the Anglo-American narrative of Nuremberg with little impact. Of course, it is not that simple. Trainin and Vyshinskii were on the same side and were working toward common goals. Both understood that law was about politics, and that international law was about international politics, power, and prestige. In this, the two men were not dissimilar from the representatives of the Western powers, who also saw international legal mechanisms as a means for advancing their countries' political agendas. But more to the point, both Trainin and Vyshinskii saw the IMT as a vehicle for furthering official *Soviet* goals both abroad and at home. Trainin was far from a lone wolf; there was no such thing among Soviet academics who occupied official posts during this period. His entire oeuvre, including his works on the defense of peace and international criminal law, had been vetted by dozens of colleagues and subjected to hours of discussion at the Institute of Law before seeing publication. And it was Vyshinskii, head of the institute, official editor of most of Trainin's works, and supreme architect of the Soviet show trial, who invariably had the last word, using his renowned rhetorical skill to refine Trainin's prose and add final flourishes.

FROM MOSCOW'S PERSPECTIVE, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, like the Moscow Trials, were to be an exercise in education and enlightenment—a show trial extraordinaire. The Soviets took it as a given that the Nazi leaders were guilty and deserved to be hanged. The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War—the "Nazi-German war of aggression" described at Nuremberg—had devastated the USSR, leaving 27 million Soviet citizens

[39] Taylor, *Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 59, 211; Tusa and Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, 75; and Sidney S. Alderman, "Negotiating on War Crimes Prosecutions, 1945," in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston, 1951), 69.

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dead and another 25 million homeless. The Soviets had held their own highly publicized trial of three Germans and one Russian collaborator in December 1943 in Ukraine, charging not just the four accused but also the heads of the German state and armed forces (in absentia) with "methodically striving for the extermination of the Slavic peoples."[40] The Soviets pushed for and agreed to participate in an international tribunal of major Nazi leaders (this time present and accounted for) for the sake of catharsis, and with the faith that a public trial and conviction of "the Hitlerites" would serve positive political goals—demonstrating the evils of fascism and the valor of the peace-loving Soviet people.[41]

The Soviets, like the other participants in the IMT, had assembled a team of prominent journalists, writers, artists, cartoonists, photographers, and filmmakers at Nuremberg to bring the trials to the population back home as well as to an international audience in Europe, North America, and beyond. Included in their ranks were the writers Il'ia Erenburg and Vsevolod Vishnevskii, the photographer Evgenii Khaldei, the political cartoonist Boris Efimov, the filmmaker Roman Karmen, and other figures with reputations in the USSR and abroad. Karmen, whose wartime footage was used as evidence at Nuremberg, attended the trials for their ten-month duration, producing newsreels for Soviet viewers as well as the film *Judgment of the People*.[42] All of the Soviet correspondents reported to the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbiuro), the official Soviet press and propaganda administration that had been established in 1941 to cover, and control information about, the war. Sovinformbiuro also conducted "soft espionage," providing Soviet authorities in Moscow and Berlin with reports about the course of the trials—and about the conduct of the Soviet personnel, in particular.[43]

The Soviet regime was accustomed to using the drama of the courtroom to "enlighten" its population and to initiate major political campaigns. In this sense, a direct line connects the Nuremberg Trials not just with the Moscow Trials of the mid-1930s but also with the Soviet show trials (and mock agitation trials) of the 1920s.[44] But there were important differences between these other trials and the Nuremberg Trials. First, while the international media did not know what to make of the so-called "bourgeois wreckers" and Trotskyites who stood trial in the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s, there was general agreement worldwide that the Nazis as a group bore significant guilt.[45] Second, outside the borders of the USSR, on the

[40] Kochavi, "The Moscow Declaration," 404.

[41] Official Soviet goals for the trials were articulated in the Soviet newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*. For a collection of articles, see G. I. Aleksandrov, ed., *Sud istorii: Reportazhi s Niurnbergskogo protsessa* (Moscow, 1966).

[42] On the Soviet correspondents at Nuremberg, see Boris Polevoi, *V kontse kontsov: Niurnbergskie dnevniki* (Moscow, 1969); Poltorak, *Nuremberg Epilogue*; Il'ia Erenburg, *Sobranie sochinenii v vos'mi tomakh*, vol. 8: *Liudi, gody, zhizn'*, books 5–7 (Moscow, 2000); and Boris Efimov, *Nevydumannye istorii* (Moscow, 1976). For Karmen's account of Nuremberg, see Roman Karmen, *No pasaran! Gody i liudi* (Moscow, 1972).

[43] In 1944, Sovinformbiuro expanded to include a special division on propaganda for foreign countries.

[44] On the Moscow Trials, see Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York, 1991). On the agitation trials of the 1920s, see Elizabeth A. Wood, *Performing Justice: Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).

[45] In the 1930s, a number of Western observers, including prominent journalists such as Walter Duranty from the *New York Times*, accepted the Moscow Trials at face value. Others, such as the members of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials,

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


FIGURE 5: Hermann Goering as drawn by Boris Efimov. This caricature was part of the artist's series "Fascist Menagerie." It was published in the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiia* on December 5, 1945. Efimov's political cartoons appeared in the Soviet press alongside articles on the course of the trials. Reproduced courtesy of Boris Efimov.

international stage of Nuremberg, the Soviets could not control "the script"—the course of the trials or the narrative that the trials told—despite their best efforts to do so.

The Vyshinskii Commission, operating from Moscow before and during the ten months of the trials (and unable to establish a private Moscow-Nuremberg phone line), experienced great difficulties in its efforts to "direct" the trials and to manage Soviet personnel on the ground. Vyshinskii wanted the members of the Soviet legal team to consult with his commission about each decision regarding the IMT, no matter how minor. But for the Soviet legal team, connecting long-distance through back channels with a secret commission, often with short deadlines, posed insurmountable problems. For Nikitchenko and Rudenko, it was uncomfortable and inconvenient to have to wait for the go-ahead from Moscow, given that the other chief judges and chief prosecutors were not under similar constraints. Much to Vyshinskii's extreme displeasure, Nikitchenko and Rudenko sometimes made important decisions on their own, without his commission's approval—in one near-disastrous case, signing English-language documents before the Russian-language translations were completed.[46]

established in May 1937 in the United States, believed that the defendants in the Moscow Trials were innocent.

[46] They made this particular blunder shortly before the trials began. The Vyshinskii Commission discussed it at a meeting in Moscow on November 8, 1945—harshly criticizing Rudenko and Nikitchenko (who were present) for irresponsible behavior. GARF, f. 8131, op. 38, d. 238, ll. 18–21.

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FIGURE 6: Joachim von Ribbentrop as drawn by Boris Efimov, from the series "Fascist Menagerie." This caricature was published in the Soviet newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* on December 15, 1945. Reproduced courtesy of Boris Efimov.

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


FIGURE 7: "Plan for decorating the Christmas tree" by Boris Efimov, from the series "Fascist Menagerie." The tree is decorated with evidence of Nazi crimes. The defendants named from left to right are Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Jodl, and Alfred Rosenberg. The cartoon was published in *Izvestiia* on December 27, 1945. Jonathan Zimmerman provided a scan of the original cartoon. Reproduced courtesy of Boris Efimov.

To be sure, the very decision to participate in an international tribunal meant relinquishing a certain measure of control. All of the countries of the prosecution made compromises that affected the staging as well as the content of the IMT. For example, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to the Americans' proposal to convene the IMT in Nuremberg, in the U.S. zone of occupied Germany, and the Western powers agreed that the Soviet judges could wear their military uniforms during the trials. Moreover, representatives from each of the Four Powers, coming from different legal systems and traditions, made compromises regarding the format of the judicial proceedings: the inclusion of opening and closing statements, the rules for cross-examination, and so forth.[47] Soviet leaders were willing to compromise on procedural issues as long as Nuremberg told a straightforward tale of good versus evil—as long as the Allies agreed from the start that the "Hitlerites alone" (the Germans and the other Axis powers) would be treated as villains. The Soviets, who mistrusted the British and the Americans to begin with, had cause for concern on this score; they were uncertain whether classified information about the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939—whose secret protocols dividing Poland and the Baltic states into Soviet and German spheres of influence implicated the USSR in a major crime against peace—had surfaced in diplomatic circles in the West.[48]

[47] On these difficulties and compromises, see Ginsburgs, *Moscow's Road to Nuremberg*, 99–103; Tusa and Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, 74–78; Taylor, *Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials*, 122–123; and Alderman, "Negotiating on War Crimes Prosecutions," 65–69.

[48] Protocols of the meetings of the Vyshinskii Commission and of the meetings of the Soviet team in Nuremberg betray an anxiety about how much information the other delegations had about Soviet foreign policy. There was particular concern about what the Americans might have discovered from

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The Four Powers all had similar concerns (albeit to a greater or lesser degree) about their own political systems, wartime behavior, and foreign policies being scrutinized before the world. At a November 1945 meeting of the chief prosecutors some eleven days before the start of the IMT, representatives from each of the Four Powers agreed that the prosecution would stand together and prevent the German defense from making "political attacks" against them in open court, "in connection with the aggressive war charge" in particular. The prosecutors also agreed that the four delegations would all submit memorandums to one another divulging information about their countries' own wartime transgressions—in order to be best prepared to quash the defense's attacks. Yet important details about how the IMT would handle the defense's efforts to incriminate the countries of the prosecution were lost when correspondence about this issue was translated from English into Russian. Both the original correspondence and the Russian-language translation maintained that the prosecution would object to the defense's attempts to introduce information concerning the politics and policies of the Allies. But whereas the original noted that the tribunal (comprising judges from all of the Four Powers) could still overrule such objections, the Russian-language translation contained no such caveat. Neither the origin of nor the reason for this deviation from the original is known. What is clear is that the Soviets and the Americans were left with different expectations about whether the German defense team was likely to succeed in its bid to make accusations against the Four Powers in open court.[49] The British submitted a memorandum within a month; it noted that the German defense could be expected to focus on examples of "so-called British imperialism" from the period well before the start of World War II.[50] The Soviets and the French held off on submitting memorandums, perhaps uncertain about what the Americans and the British would do with the information.[51]

Meanwhile, back in Moscow, Vyshinskii did not miss a beat. He (presumably in collaboration with other members of his commission) put together, and committed to paper, a list of issues or hot-button topics that the Soviets wished to keep out of the courtroom. The issues were "the relationship of the USSR to the Versailles peace," "the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and all questions related to it," "Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's visit to Berlin and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow," "questions connected with the sociopolitical

captured Nazi documents and from interrogations of the Nazi defendants. See, for example, GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 391, ll. 45–46, 54–56.

[49] The details of the November 9 meeting are recapped in a March 8, 1946, English-language letter from Jackson to Rudenko and Auguste Champetier de Ribes. Jackson noted that it was "agreed that we would all resist such attacks" and that "the United States, being late in the war and remote from the scene, was little exposed to attack itself and was perhaps in the best position to lead the effort to restrict the proof closely to the charges and try to stop political discussions." GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 8, l. 394. The Russian-language translation of the letter (ll. 47–48) reads the same as the original *except for* the caveat about the tribunal's right to overrule the prosecutors' objections. It is an open question whether this difference between the original and the Russian-language translation was intentional. It is possible that the Americans or even the Soviet legal team tailored the translation out of concern that Moscow would balk at mention of the judges overruling the prosecutors' objections.

[50] Cited from Zorya and Lebedeva, "The Year 1939 in the Nuremberg Files," 121.

[51] Jackson noted in his March 8 letter that on "December 1, 1945 Sir David Maxwell Fyfe circulated a memorandum in accordance with this decision" but that "[n]o information has been received from the French or the Soviet Delegations." GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 8, l. 394.

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structure of the USSR," "the Soviet Baltic republics," "the Soviet-German agreement about an exchange of the German population of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia," "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and in particular questions about the Straits and the supposed territorial pretensions of the USSR," "the Balkan question," and "Soviet-Polish relations (the questions of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)."[52] As the list indicates, Vyshinskii and his colleagues were well aware that a number of the USSR's actions and policies both before and during the war had violated international norms or treaties. At a November 26 meeting in Nuremberg, Vyshinskii (in town for a short visit) discussed the list with select members of the Soviet delegation, including Nikitchenko, Rudenko, Volchkov, Sheinin, and Trainin.[53] Their mandate was to prevent these issues from becoming topics of discussion during the trials.

Not until March 1946, when it became clear that the German defense intended to raise some of these issues before the IMT, did the Soviet delegation submit to the other delegations a written list of topics that it wanted to keep out of the courtroom. Rudenko sent the list to Jackson on March 11—three days after Jackson wrote him that he had "basis to believe" that the defense was planning to focus on Soviet (as well as English and French) war crimes and crimes against peace in its presentations to the court. In the letter, Rudenko spoke to the importance of taking measures to prevent "the accused and their defense" from using "the present legal process" to focus on issues outside of the jurisdiction of the IMT. He then provided a list of those issues that the Soviets were most concerned about, including most of the items that Vyshinskii had enumerated several months earlier. The three primary issues were "questions connected with the sociopolitical structure of the USSR," "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union," and "the Soviet Baltic republics." Then, getting into specifics, Rudenko listed those issues related to Soviet foreign policy that the USSR considered most sensitive (and thus most essential to exclude from public discussion): "the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and questions related to it (the trade agreement, the establishment of borders, negotiations, and so on)," "Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and the negotiations in November 1940 in Berlin," "the Balkan question," and "Soviet-Polish relations."[54]

Perhaps the most surprising thing about this episode is the timing. The Jackson-Rudenko exchange, and Rudenko's submission of the Soviet list of hot-button topics, took place just days after Winston Churchill's famed "Iron Curtain" speech, when tensions between the Soviets and the Western powers were especially high. Deliv-

[52] Ibid., d. 391, l. 47.

[53] Ibid., ll. 43–46. Those in attendance approved the list of questions. It has long been known that such a list existed. Zorya and Lebedeva discuss it in detail in "The Year 1939 in the Nuremberg Files," 120–122. Michael Marrus, drawing on the work of these scholars, writes that the Soviet delegation in Nuremberg "prepared a list of topics that they wanted banned from the trial and discussed these with Vyshinsky when he came to Nuremberg" in late November. Marrus, *The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–46: A Documentary History* (Boston, 1997), 133. The archival evidence states, however, that it was Vyshinskii who presented the Soviet delegation with the list.

[54] For Rudenko's letter, see GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 8, l. 170. Jackson had written in his March 8 letter to Rudenko and de Ribes that he had "reason to believe that the defense plans to attack Soviet policy as constituting aggression in connection with the Finnish, Polish, Balkan and Baltic States situations, and the French policy in the West and in the treatment of prisoners of war, as well as to attack English policy on all of the grounds anticipated in Sir David's memorandum." GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 8, l. 394.

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


FIGURE 8: "The twelfth hour of the Hitlerites" by Boris Efimov, from the series "Fascist Menagerie." The cartoon, which was published in *Izvestiia* on January 1, 1946, depicts the trepidation of the Nazi defendants. In fact, 1946 brought hope to the defendants as tensions grew between the Soviets and the other countries of the prosecution. Reproduced courtesy of Boris Efimov.

ering his speech in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5—while the Soviet prosecution was finishing its presentation of the USSR's case against "the Hitlerites" back in Nuremberg—Churchill went so far as to metaphorically throw the Soviets into the dock with the Nazis. He proclaimed that "Communist parties or fifth columns" constituted "a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization" and called for Anglo-American resistance to Soviet aggression and tyranny.[55] American newspapers (which circulated at Nuremberg) ran the speech the following day under the headline "Unite to Stop the Russians"—causing glee among the Nazi defendants. Arkadii Poltorak, a member of the Soviet legal team at Nuremberg, recalled that as news of the speech spread, "unconcealed hope shone" on the defendants' faces, and the dock in the courtroom resembled "a disturbed hive."[56]

The Soviets responded to Churchill's speech with outrage, declaring that the British and the Americans were trying "to push into oblivion the sacrifices of the Soviet people that had insured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke." Stalin, seeking to distance the Soviets (and himself) from the Nazis, publicly countered that

[55] Sir Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," in Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963*, ed. Robert Rhodes James, 8 vols. (New York, 1974), 7: 7285–7293.

[56] Poltorak, *Nuremberg Epilogue*, 90. Poltorak was the Soviet appointee to the General Secretariat of the IMT. He noted that after this news spread, the Nazi defendants attempted to take advantage of "the new situation" and "drive a wedge" between the Soviets and the West—that Hermann Goering, for example, "began to speak in detail of the plans which Britain and France laid as early as 1940 for the bombing of the Caucasian oilfields" (91–93). Molotov and Vyshinskii, who were at the USSR's consulate in Paris for dinner on March 5, described the speech as "nothing less than an appeal for a new war." AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 1, d. 8, ll. 29–34, reprinted in Kynin and Laufer, *SSSR i germanskii vopros*, 2: 475–479.

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


FIGURE 9: The defendants in the dock at the International Military Tribunal. In the front row from left to right are Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walther Funk, and Hjalmar Schacht. In the second row are Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Franz von Papen, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Konstantin von Neurath, and Hans Fritsche. Seated in front of them are their defense lawyers. The Soviet chief prosecutor, Roman Rudenko, is in the bottom left corner. Nuremberg, Germany, 1946. Photo by Charles Alexander. USHMM, courtesy of Gerald (Gerd) Schwab.

it was in fact Churchill and Hitler who shared much in common—that both subscribed to race theories and had imperialistic ambitions.[57] Churchill's speech and its implications became a topic of concern for the members of the Vyshinskii Commission, who suggested that Rudenko's upcoming closing speech had gained special political significance in light of Churchill's attempt to blur the line between villains and victims. The leaders of the Communist Party's Administration of Propaganda and Agitation spoke to this issue in a report to Gorshenin, arguing that Rudenko needed to show how the barbarous crimes of the Hitlerites were rooted in "fascist ideology" and make clear how "fascism's destruction"—which the Soviets were in large part responsible for—had benefited "all of humanity."[58] These recommendations were integrated into Rudenko's closing speech. But Churchill's impact on the spectacle of Nuremberg could not be undone.

In allowing Rudenko to give the USSR's list of sensitive topics to Jackson and the other chief prosecutors, Vyshinskii and those above him had decided to treat the

[57] Joseph Stalin, "Reply to Churchill," reprinted in the *New York Times*, March 14, 1946, 4.

[58] The head of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Grigorii Aleksandrov, forwarded this memorandum—which was penned by his next in command, L. F. Kuz'min—to Gorshenin on August 26, 1946. Kuz'min explained that an "illumination of these questions was acquiring special significance" in light of Stalin's response to Churchill's speech. GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 373, ll. 87–90.

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public war of words between the Western powers and the USSR as bluster. They remained committed to the IMT and put their trust, at least for the moment, in what one Soviet diplomat and informant later referred to as "the gentlemen's agreement" made among the Four Powers (or at least the four chief prosecutors) to maintain a united front in Nuremberg and to prevent the IMT from becoming a forum for discussing the victors' own breaches of international law.[59] By now, Vyshinskii and his commission might also have concluded that the intelligence departments of the Western powers had information about the USSR's foreign policy and wartime behavior anyway (which does seem to have been the case)—and that there was thus little to lose, and perhaps something to gain, in laying at least some of their cards on the table. In any case, those members of the Soviet team who believed that the four chief prosecutors would honor their commitment to stand together would prove to be mistaken. The international courtroom of Nuremberg would not be free from the politics of postwar competition.

AS THE "GRAND ALLIANCE" OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR came undone, the IMT became both the site and the subject of an intense propaganda struggle between the USSR and the Western powers. The Soviets had a difficult time, proving far less adept than the other countries of the prosecution (and the U.S. in particular) at shaping, and directing the flow of, information about the trials. Back in Moscow, Vyshinskii and his commission received frequent telegrams from members of the Soviet legal team about the IMT's progress. They also received regular "intelligence reports" about the trials and about everyday life in Nuremberg from NKVD agents and also from Sovinformbiuro. These reports (sent by telegram or passed off by hand from Nuremberg to Berlin and thence to Moscow) were not encouraging. The members of the Soviet legal team and the Soviet press corps had limited, if any, prior experience on the international stage. They were far from Moscow, and there was a lot of room for things to go wrong.

In December 1945, about six weeks into the trials, Mikhail Dolgopolov—a senior editor at Sovinformbiuro and "informal informant" to Soviet leaders in Moscow—sent a six-page classified letter to his superiors highlighting some of the practical problems that the Soviet propaganda team was facing in Nuremberg. He sent the letter to the head of Sovinformbiuro, Solomon Lozovskii; it was subsequently forwarded to Molotov and Gorshenin.[60] The letter made it clear that the USSR was having significant problems presenting itself in a positive light, not just through the media but also to the international audience that was at Nuremberg. This aspect of international relations—the immediate and practical side of self-presentation—was something that the Soviets had not given much thought to ahead of time. As the trials unfolded, its importance became apparent.

Dolgopolov complained that Soviet representatives in Nuremberg were completely "cut off from life in the Soviet Union." The Soviet correspondents did not receive Moscow newspapers for weeks at a time and did not have a single radio

[59] AVPRF, f. 07, op. 13, p. 41, d. 9, l. 115.

[60] GARF, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 407, ll. 1–6. The letter was dated December 30, 1945. Lozovskii forwarded it to Molotov on January 15, 1946, and Molotov forwarded it to Gorshenin on January 27, 1946.

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receiver in their residence. He contrasted this with the situation of the other delegations, who received "London, Paris, and other newspapers" as well as "new magazines and books" on a regular basis, sent from their home countries. These materials were laid out in the room of the press camp at the Faber Palace for all to read. He explained that the Soviet representatives found themselves "in a state of complete disinformation," and thus at a significant disadvantage. He noted that it was difficult to work without seeing Moscow newspapers and periodicals, and that without official news from Moscow, the Soviet correspondents were "deprived of the chance to answer the numerous questions of foreign correspondents, who turn to us on different occasions in connection with the appearance in their newspapers of all sorts of reports about the Soviet Union."[61]

According to Dolgopolov, the Soviets were failing to take advantage of this unique international setting to present the Soviet Union to the world in the best possible light. Whereas the American administration had opened "a field movie theater" to serve the personnel at Nuremberg, a captive public of "correspondents from all over the world," the Soviets had no similar venue. "We are letting slip away an excellent opportunity to show our films to representatives of the world press," he complained. Even more troubling, Soviet technical personnel in Nuremberg were making a bad impression. The "overwhelming majority" of Soviet interpreters (who had the crucial task of providing the Soviet legal team with simultaneous translations of the speeches and statements that the other prosecutors, judges, and lawyers made in court) were incompetent at their jobs, and "everyone is talking about this." Furthermore, even those technical personnel with top-notch skills were doing a poor job representing the Soviet Union, because of their unpolished appearance. "The clothing of our female personnel is so bad and looks so poor that the Americans and English make fun of them," Dolgopolov reported. "It had to be explained that we choose personnel not for their external appearance and attractiveness" but for their abilities. But this failed "to convince our foreign colleagues." He suggested that if Soviet citizens were going to be sent abroad to major events such as "the Nuremberg Trials, where they will meet representatives from all over the world," it was essential "to give some attention" to such things.[62]

Finally, Dolgopolov addressed the difficulties that the Soviets were having combating U.S. efforts to spread negative information about the Soviet Union both in Nuremberg and in the American zone in general. He recounted rumors about life in the USSR and the treatment of returnees, and gave a detailed description of a chance meeting that he and some of his colleagues had had with a Soviet citizen during a weekend trip to Munich. The Soviet citizen had identified himself as an Azerbaijani who had been "taken prisoner by the Germans at the very start of the war" and was now "working as an orderly in a hospital for the Americans." According to this Azerbaijani, he and the "many other" Soviet citizens living in the American zone wanted to return to the Soviet Union but were afraid of being subjected to punitive measures. Dolgopolov wrote: "We tried to dispel the fear of this Azerbaijani and attempted to find out who was spreading such rumors." The Azerbaijani told

[61] Ibid., ll. 1–2.

[62] Ibid., ll. 2–4. He noted that the journalists and the court could relax only when the USSR's most skilled interpreter, Oleg Troianovskii, was translating into Russian.

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him, "All of ours" talk about arrests and deportations back home, and "the Americans do too."[63]

Dolgopolov's letter ended on a note of hope, calling for a greater mobilization of the Soviet press corps to disseminate information about the USSR's case against the Nazis. He explained that in mid-January 1946, Soviet Chief Prosecutor Rudenko would begin to present the USSR's case before the IMT, and "judging from the talk of other correspondents, henceforth they intend to cover the trials in their newspapers even less." Rather than bemoan this perceived lack of interest in covering the Soviet case, Dolgopolov proposed that the Soviets take measures to "fill this gap": that they send more journalists, photographers, and writers to Nuremberg, and increase Soviet reportage of the trials for both the Soviet and the foreign press.[64]

This letter made the rounds of Soviet leaders. It is clear that Molotov read it with considerable attention: it is covered with annotations in his handwriting. The Soviets did send more correspondents to Nuremberg in the weeks that followed. But other, similar secret reports that were passed on through Sovinformbiuro (including a series of letters penned by the writer and informant Vsevolod Vishnevskii, raising some of the same complaints) suggest that Soviet personnel at Nuremberg continued to experience significant difficulties presenting themselves, the USSR, and the Soviet narrative of World War II to an international audience.[65]

While Dolgopolov focused on issues of Soviet self-presentation and propaganda in his correspondence, other informants sent reports about the substance of the trials—and by spring 1946, these reports were the most troubling of all. In early April, the diplomat, journalist, and Sovinformbiuro informant Mikhail Kharlamov sent a letter to Georgii Malenkov, the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, detailing serious problems that had arisen during "this new stage" of the trials. It had been about a month since Chief Prosecutor Rudenko had finished presenting the Soviet case against the Nazis, and also about a month since Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech. Now the German defense team was presenting its case before the IMT, introducing documents as evidence and calling witnesses. And it was attempting, with success, to use the court "to make provocative attacks" against the USSR—to accuse the USSR of war crimes and thus (in Kharlamov's words) to "complicate" the position of the Soviets. This was having the effect of "weakening the strength of the evidence put forward earlier by the Soviet prosecutor." It was also exacerbating—and laying bare for the whole world—the split between the Soviets and the Western powers. According to Kharlamov, as a result of "the tactics of the defense" and "the international situation," the united front of the prosecution had come undone and "ceded its place to the isolation" of the Soviets.[66]

Kharlamov explained that the German defense team was "focusing on the events of 1939 and on the Polish problem." The defense had pressed "to present testimony from the diplomatic adviser [Friedrich] Gaus about the alleged conclusion on the eve of the Hitlerite attack on Poland of a secret agreement between the USSR and Ger-

[63] Ibid., ll. 4–5.
[64] Ibid., l. 6.
[65] See, for example, GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 2196, ll. 159–166.
[66] AVPRF, f. 07, op. 13, p. 41, d. 9, ll. 112–116. Kharlamov was head of the group of Soviet journalists at Nuremberg. The letter was dated April 4, 1946.

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many about the division of spheres of influence." Despite Soviet protests, "the court allowed the defense to read out Gaus's provocative testimony in open court on April 1"—feeding "this food right away to the reactionary Western press." In addition, "the tribunal had allowed Ribbentrop to add to this attack . . . testifying that the USSR had been prepared to go to war on the side of Germany under certain conditions." Moreover, it was not just the "events of 1939" that the defense was intent on taking before the IMT and the world. Kharlamov complained that the Soviet legal team had "not seriously concerned" itself "with protesting the defense's request to summon fascist witnesses" before the court to testify about the Germans' innocence (and the USSR's guilt) in the Katyn massacre of Polish military officers. As a result, "our prosecution lost the opportunity to prevent them from being called" to the stand. He also complained that the Soviet prosecution had not been energetic enough in protesting a number of the defense's claims: that "the arming of our country had compelled Germany to arm itself," that "the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact had compelled Germany to break the Locarno Pact," and that "our 'instigation' in Yugoslavia had compelled Germany to invade that country in the spring of 1941."[67]

A number of these accusations against the USSR—about Katyn and about the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, for example—were in fact true. But for the Soviets, this was beside the point. From the Soviet perspective, the British and the Americans had gone back on their word and had helped the German defense to turn Nuremberg into a forum for attacking the USSR. Kharlamov complained that the Soviet prosecution team "was not able to establish the needed support from the other prosecutors" to keep questions about "the events of 1939" out of the courtroom "even though there exists a prior mutual gentlemen's agreement [*predvaritel'naia vzaimnaia dzhentl'menskaia dogovorennost'*]" to do so. It had somehow slipped from view, Kharlamov continued, "that we are a country of victors, that we went to Nuremberg in order to prosecute the German fascist criminals and not to become the object of their provocative attack."[68] According to Kharlamov, both the defense's attack on the Soviet Union and the Western powers' role in allowing it to happen had taken the Soviet legal team by surprise. In fact, thinking that the most critical part of the trials was over, Gorshenin and Trainin (who had been in Nuremberg while the Soviet prosecution was presenting its case to the IMT) had already returned to Moscow.[69] Unprepared for the defense's attack, and expecting their wartime allies to prevent items on the list of hot-button issues from being discussed in open court, Rudenko and his team had let their guard down, allowing the defense to denigrate the USSR before the whole world.

Kharlamov argued that it was essential to strengthen the Soviet prosecution at Nuremberg, and recommended the immediate dispatch of more advisers.[70] Upon receiving this note, the Vyshinskii Commission sent Gorshenin and the political adviser Vladimir Semenov to Nuremberg.[71] But the damage could not be undone: the Western powers, in allowing the German defense to present evidence that incrim-

[67] Ibid., ll. 113–115.
[68] Ibid., ll. 115–116.
[69] Ibid., ll. 112, 114–116.
[70] Ibid., l. 116.
[71] The memo was forwarded to Molotov and Vyshinskii. The latter penned the directive to send more

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inated the Soviets in crimes against peace, had distanced themselves from the USSR and undermined Soviet efforts to use the trials to present an unambiguous narrative of good versus evil. At the same time, the Americans seemed intent on using Nuremberg to advance their own agenda—an agenda that included setting themselves up as the moral arbiters of the postwar order. Vyshinskii and his commission had to face the fact that they had little, if any, hope of further "directing" the Nuremberg Trials.

The final reminder to the Soviets that they could not control the storyline of Nuremberg—and the biggest affront to their vision of what Nuremberg should be—came in October 1946 with the verdict. Much to the Soviets' dismay, three of the twenty-two major German war criminals standing trial—Hans Fritzsche, Franz von Papen, and Hjalmar Schacht—were found "not guilty" on the grounds of "reasonable doubt." The court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that these defendants had knowingly participated in a conspiracy to commit any of the crimes enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter. (In addition, the IMT did not find the Reich Cabinet, the General Staff, and the German High Command to be criminal organizations.) Judge Nikitchenko gave a dissenting opinion in all of these cases, stating that there had in fact been sufficient evidence of guilt—that these decisions by the IMT did "not correspond to the facts of the case" and were "based on incorrect conclusions."[72] Stalin and Molotov were furious about these verdicts and responded in part with secret plans to instigate a "massive campaign of protests against the freeing of the three criminals" in "the entire Soviet zone" of occupied Germany and in Berlin.[73] Having lost control of Nuremberg, the Soviets concluded that international legal institutions were of limited use to them, and refocused their efforts on shaping the postwar order through other means.

GIVING THE SOVIETS THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE in the Nuremberg Trials—recognizing their positive and negative contributions to the trials, and understanding how Nuremberg became one of the first fronts of the Cold War—leads to a fundamental shift in our conceptualization of the IMT, and, in fact, of the entire postwar moment. Indeed, it is clear that a number of longstanding assumptions about Nuremberg, from the idea that the IMT marked a moment of international cooperation outside of the Cold War to the depiction of the trials' legal innovations as Western inventions, are overstated or flat-out wrong. The Four Powers all saw the IMT as a medium for advancing their own state interests and foreign policies. The Soviets, for their part, had emerged from the Second World War exhausted but triumphant, and their leaders saw Nuremberg as a forum through which to establish the USSR as a major international actor at a time when the postwar order was still emerging. But the

advisers to Nuremberg. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 13, p. 41, d. 9, l. 111. See also ibid., d. 8, l. 109, cited in Kynin and Laufer, *SSSR i germanskii vopros*, 2: 790, fn. 302.

[72] "Judgment: Dissenting Opinion of I. T. Nikitchenko," in *Nuremberg Trial Proceedings*, vol. 1, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/juddiss.htm (accessed April 11, 2008). At the time, international public opinion about whether Fritzsche, von Papen, and Schacht had been treated too leniently was mixed. The three were later tried and convicted by German courts.

[73] AVPRF, f. 012, op. 7, p. 106, d. 178, l. 49, reprinted in Kynin and Laufer, *SSSR i germanskii vopros*, 2: 712–713.

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Soviet team at Nuremberg became frustrated time and again as the USSR's wartime allies (and capitalist rivals) demonstrated a superior understanding of how to use the international arena to their advantage. The Soviets made significant contributions to the jurisprudence of the IMT from start to finish, with the contribution of the concept of "crimes against peace" in particular. But in spite of these contributions, the Soviets found themselves isolated at Nuremberg, with little influence over the actual course or outcome of the trials.

Indeed, a full accounting of the trials shows how the actions of the Western powers in Nuremberg alienated the USSR and exacerbated postwar tensions. Soviet complaints about the Anglo-American betrayal at Nuremberg did have merit.[74] Neither the Soviets nor their wartime allies wanted to have their own foreign policies and wartime actions scrutinized on the international stage, and thus the Four Powers had all agreed at the start that the IMT would be a form of "victors' justice." Once the trials were in progress, however, the U.S. and its Western allies (who were uncomfortable with Soviet participation in the IMT to begin with and who saw Soviet grabs for power in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia as a serious threat) used Nuremberg to pursue what looked like a deliberate anti-Soviet agenda. The Western prosecutors and judges allowed incriminating evidence against the Soviets to be introduced and read in open court. Meanwhile, British, French, and U.S. war crimes (which arguably included incidents of mistreatment of POWs, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the firebombing of German cities) were kept out of the courtroom. The Soviets resented this double standard and saw the willingness of the other countries of the prosecution to allow the defense to attack the USSR as a calculated political tactic. In allowing Nuremberg to become a forum for censuring Soviet policies and behavior, the Western powers sent a clear message to the USSR that the international courtroom would not be a neutral space free from Cold War politics. The Soviets would remember this when negotiations began about the creation of new United Nations organizations, such as an International Criminal Court for Genocide.[75]

Nuremberg shaped the Cold War era in other respects as well. Through their participation in the IMT, the Soviets gleaned important lessons that shaped their development as an international power. The Soviet Union, drained of resources and personnel after a long war fought on its soil and lacking the international public relations expertise of the United States, was in a vulnerable position at Nuremberg. And while Nuremberg was a bitter disappointment for the Soviets, it taught them what a "superpower" was supposed to look like. Indeed, the IMT served as a critical

[74] Vladislav M. Zubok argues that in March 1946, the Soviets were already losing interest in international institutions, concerned that "the Western powers" would see their participation "as a sign of Soviet weakness and readiness for unilateral concessions." Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007), 51–52. Nuremberg no doubt bolstered the Kremlin's view that the U.S. was intent on the Soviets' having a "subordinate role" on the international stage.

[75] The Soviet Union joined the United Nations at its founding in 1945 but remained suspicious of its agenda. (Of course, the same could be said for the U.S.) For a brief survey of Soviet attitudes toward the UN, see Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Methods and Objectives* (New York, 1962). Between 1946 and 1948, the *New York Times* chronicled Soviet objections toward various UN propositions and also documented Western and other efforts to use the UN to take the Soviets to task. See, for example, "Court for Genocide Opposed by Russia," *New York Times*, April 13, 1948, 11.

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training ground for the Soviets, whose diplomats, legal experts, and interpreters had had limited prior experience on the international stage. It provided ample evidence that the war-torn USSR needed to put more resources into securing better equipment and preparing its personnel for important diplomatic work.

The Soviets also learned at Nuremberg that their methods of agitation and propaganda, which had worked just fine within the USSR, were not suited for the international arena. The Soviet regime's demand for extreme centralization, as well as Soviet journalists' practices of evading the questions of their foreign colleagues and keeping all information secret until orders from Moscow instructed otherwise, handicapped Soviet public relations efforts. The Soviets recognized the weaknesses of their approach. It now seems improbable, but after Nuremberg, the United States and Britain served as critical propaganda models for the USSR. In the months following the trials, Soviet leaders and agitation experts engaged in serious discussions about appropriating propaganda and information-management techniques from the American and British press corps. Some Sovinformbiuro officials even wanted to turn their organization into a more flexible public relations machine based on the Anglo-American model—but Stalin seems to have nixed this particular idea (which was unusually blatant in its suggestion that the USSR borrow from the West) before it got off the ground.[76] As it recovered from the war, the USSR did train new personnel for diplomatic work abroad and did revamp its propaganda and agitation apparatus, doing so on its own terms.

Just as Nuremberg had exerted a significant impact on the development of the early Cold War, the Cold War shaped the postwar human rights regime. In the wake of the trials, the language of international law and universal rights, which had gained traction at Nuremberg, would become further politicized and would be wielded as a potent weapon in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet leaders and legal experts, for their part, understood the political efficacy of this language, and worked on introducing Nuremberg-inspired legislation in the USSR. In late November 1946, Aron Trainin, back at Moscow's Institute of Law, reviewed a draft of the new Soviet Criminal Code and noted the "extraordinarily important" fact that it included "a special section on 'International Crimes against Peace and Humanity.'"[77] Trainin praised this effort to introduce into Soviet law "those ideas of international criminal justice that had found expression in the Nuremberg Trials," asserting that the Soviet criminal code would be the first in the world to include these new "norms of international law."[78]

In subsequent decades, the United States and the USSR would both invoke the language of Nuremberg to take each other to task for violations of international law.[79] One of the most famous incidents took place in 1960, when the new procurator general of the USSR—none other than Roman Rudenko—tried the American U-2

[76] On the transformation of Sovinformbiuro into such an agency, see Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 125, d. 386, ll. 30–34.

[77] The meeting, a session of the Division of Economics and Law, was held on November 28, 1946. Trainin spoke on the theme of "Legal Questions of the Nuremberg Trials." ARAN, f. 499, op. 1, d. 71, ll. 74–118, esp. l. 96.

[78] Ibid., ll. 96–97.

[79] In the 1950s, Trainin wrote a report detailing how the U.S. had committed "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity" in Korea. It is not clear who commissioned this report or what became of it. ARAN, f. 499, op. 1, d. 502, ll. 1–4.

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pilot Francis Gary Powers for trespassing into Soviet airspace. In his much-publicized final speech to the court, Rudenko attacked the U.S. government for organizing and inciting "monstrous crimes against peace."[80] Looking further ahead, in the brisk Cold War climate of the late 1960s and 1970s, Soviet and U.S. leaders would each criticize the other's domestic policies as constituting "crimes against humanity." Meanwhile, dissident groups in the USSR and civil rights organizations in the U.S. would use this same language of law and rights to wage struggles for reform within their own countries.[81]

With the Cold War now over and with international courts and tribunals so widespread in our current political landscape, it is high time to revisit the Nuremberg Trials. This does not make the endeavor any less daunting. No scholar who cares about international human rights wants to disparage Nuremberg and all that it symbolizes in our culture. But reconsidering Nuremberg in light of new evidence from the Soviet archives does not mean discounting the IMT's significance as a major foundational event of our era. Nor does it mean throwing out Nuremberg as a positive precedent. Instead, it means recognizing that the IMT, like other "principled interventions," was a combination of principle, self-interest, and compromise from start to finish—a mixture that simultaneously enabled and handicapped the proceedings.[82] Moreover, and equally important, reconsidering Nuremberg means acknowledging the multiple uses of the law and its institutions. The same legal mechanisms (i.e., tribunals) and legal principles (i.e., complicity) can be used for positive or negative ends, to buttress legitimate or illegitimate processes, in liberal or authoritarian states. The IMT showed that international legal principles, which were based on a hodgepodge of national laws and precedents, could transcend their origins. At the same time, the postwar era has also shown that universal principles, once established, can be used for ends that contradict their original intentions. In the postwar USSR, the international legal principles codified at Nuremberg would be invoked to punish so-called "enemy nations," Soviet "returnees" from German POW camps, and other groups on trumped-up charges of forming fifth columns and plotting terrorist acts against the Soviet state.[83]

Ultimately, acknowledging the Soviet contribution to Nuremberg means looking with open eyes at the complex political forces that shaped the IMT and the postwar order. Nuremberg was as much about politics as it was about justice—and it could not have been otherwise. The USSR and the Western powers all had somewhat different ideas about the meaning of "justice" and how it should be served. But the

[80] Rudenko assumed this post in 1953. "1960: Moscow Jails American U-2 Spy Pilot," BBC News, On This Day (August 19, 1960), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/19/newsid_2962000/2962600.stm (accessed April 11, 2008).

[81] On the Cold War and the U.S. civil rights movement, see John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000). On the Soviet dissident movement in the 1960s and 1970s, see Joshua Rubenstein, *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights* (Boston, 1985).

[82] On the concept of "principled interventions," see Richard Falk, "Reframing the Legal Agenda of World Order in the Course of a Turbulent Century," in Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, and R. B. J. Walker, eds., *Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics* (New York, 2002), 46–69. A recent work by a journalist that captures this mixture brilliantly is Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, 2003).

[83] These so-called "enemy nations" (groups such as the Chechens) were accused, in most cases without merit, of collaborating with the Nazis.

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Four Powers all saw Nuremberg as a political event with significant consequences for the making of the postwar order. It was this vision of the IMT that brought them to the table and made them willing to negotiate in the first place. It was also this vision of the IMT that motivated them to find common ground and draw up international laws and rights that, however flawed in practice, still provide a set of ideals toward which states and their citizens can aspire. And yet it was also the shared recognition that Nuremberg was about politics that motivated the United States to pursue its postwar agenda through the IMT at the expense of the Soviet Union. While all of the countries of the prosecution saw Nuremberg as a political contest, it was a contest at which the United States particularly excelled. The fact that the Anglo-American narrative of the IMT continues to prevail testifies to the success of the U.S. and its Western allies in making Nuremberg their own.

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Globalizing *Hanjian*: The Suzhou Trials and the Post–World War II Discourse on Collaboration

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ON APRIL 6, 1946, THE SHANGHAI-BASED NEWSPAPER *SHENBAO* DEVOTED most of its front page to the trial of Chen Gongbo, China's most prominent *hanjian* (literally "traitor of the Chinese people," generally translated into English as "collaborator"), which was taking place at the Jiangsu Higher Court in the nearby city of Suzhou.[1] Chen Gongbo was a well-known political personality in China, having been a longtime leader of the ruling Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or GMD) and the minister of industry from 1932 to 1936. In 1940, together with Wang Jingwei—also a prominent longtime leader of the GMD and chairman of the Executive Yuan, the executive branch of the Nationalist Government, from 1932 to 1936—he had established a government in Nanjing in collaboration with the Japanese: the Reorganized Nationalist Government, or RNG (1940–1945). Chen had held important positions within this collaborationist organization, and after Wang's death in November 1944, he had succeeded him as its acting chairman.[2]

Chen was accused primarily of "plotting with the enemy" and "opposing the central government." In his defense, he described his work with the RNG as negotiating with the Japanese in an attempt to preserve China's resources, protect its people, and slowly erode Japan's control over China. Although he admitted that he had not ultimately been successful in achieving his goals, he portrayed himself not as a collaborator but as a nationalist. On April 12, the court pronounced its verdict, sentencing Chen to death, thus refuting his explanation of his collaboration and his claim to patriotism. The sentence was swiftly carried out on June 3, 1946.[3]

The theme of "collaborationist nationalism" that emerged at the Suzhou trial

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[1] *Shenbao*, April 6, 1946.

[2] For a discussion of Chen Gongbo and Wang Jingwei in prewar China, see So Wai-Chor, *The Kuomintang Left in the National Revolution, 1924–1931* (Oxford, 1991), and Margherita Zanasi, *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China* (Chicago, 2006).

[3] Chen was indicted on thirteen counts. For a complete list, see *Shenbao*, April 6, 1946; and "Jiangsu gaodeng fayuan jianchaguan qisu shu" [Counts of Indictment of the Prosecutor of the Higher Court of Jiangsu] (March 18, 1946), in Nanjing Municipal Archives, ed., *Shenxun Wangwei Hanjian bilu* [Records of the Trials of the Collaborators of Wang Jingwei's Puppet Government] (Nanjing, 1992), 39–44; Chen Gongbo, "Zibaishu" [Self-Defense] (November 1945), ibid., 2–39; "Jiangsu gaodeng fayuan xingshi panjue" [Criminal Sentence of the Higher Court of Jiangsu] (April 12, 1946), ibid., 64–69; *Zhongyang Ribao*, June 4, 1946.

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inevitably evokes the theme that characterized the trial of Marshal Philippe Pétain, the leader of the French collaborationist government in Vichy, held in Paris in late July 1945.[4] Pétain and his lawyers based his defense on the theory of "shield and sword." Pétain was the "shield" that, from within France, protected the population from the Nazi invaders, while the leader of the French Provisional Government, Charles de Gaulle—who had joined the Allies' war effort and had returned to Paris at the head of the postwar government—was the "sword" that attacked the invaders from outside. In spite of Pétain's claims that his actions had been inspired by nationalist goals, the jury found him guilty of "intelligence with the enemy" and thus decreed the illegitimacy of his narrative of war and nationalism.[5]

The fact that two geographically and historically different countries had developed a similar discourse of collaboration was to some extent the result of a shared wartime experience. Both China and France had labored for years under foreign occupation and witnessed the establishment of collaborationist regimes. The globalizing effect of the discourse on nationhood also influenced the way foreign occupation and the World War II experience came to be understood, the way the ideologies of resistance and collaboration were constructed, and the way the postwar French and Chinese governments approached collaboration trials. Foreign occupation had created deep political divisions in both countries, raising questions about national defense, the meaning of political legitimacy, nationhood, and patriotism, and had led to the formation of two governments presenting competing narratives of war and nation. In this context, the collaboration trial of Chen Gongbo, like that of Pétain, became a political ritual, an integral part of a process begun by the postwar regime of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The prewar leader of China's Nationalist Government, who, like de Gaulle, had chosen resistance from outside the occupied territories, Jiang was aiming to eliminate all questions and uncertainties generated by the occupation, establish the unchallenged legitimacy of his leadership during the war, and reaffirm a unified and linear national narrative.

France and China were not the only two countries to experience collaboration during World War II. Collaboration is an inevitable phenomenon of any occupation, developing "precisely at the intersection between the occupier's intent and the occupied's perception about the range of the options at their disposal."[6] Thus it developed in every European occupied country, generating common political themes that, in spite of profound local differences, also came to be reflected in postwar

[4] Timothy Brook has used the term "collaborationist nationalism" in discussing the ideology of the Reformed Government, the collaborationist formation that preceded the RNG. See Brook, "Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied China," in Brook and Andre Schmid, eds., *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000), 159–190.

[5] Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 20.

[6] Ian T. Gross, "Themes for a Social History of War Experience and Collaboration," in István Deák, Jan Tomasz Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), 26–27. In a similar vein, Timothy Brook, inspired by the work of historians Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, argues that even the most authoritarian and brutal occupying forces cannot function and set up a viable control system in occupied areas without collaboration. From the point of view of the occupied, collaboration is one response—if not the only one—to the inevitable problem of how to deal with the invading forces. Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 11; Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York, 1981).

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collaboration trials.[7] While the interconnectivity of the discourse on collaboration in Europe—with its common themes and local variations—has been explored to some extent, the question of how this important political discourse played out globally remains largely unexplored. In spite of the fact that the shared experiences of occupation and collaboration extended well beyond Europe and generated an astounding number of postwar trials in many countries around the world, historians have generally limited their attention to the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials and the part they played in judicial and political globalization.[8] The discourse that surrounded the trial of Chen Gongbo and its complex relationship with the European discourses on collaboration, however, reveals that collaboration trials constituted an important aspect of the process of political globalization brought about by World War II. In China, in fact, the Pétain case came to supply the privileged terms of reference and comparison for the trial of Chen, who, as the most important surviving leader of the RNG, was perceived as Pétain's Chinese counterpart. Glossing over important differences in the two countries' historical, political, and legal circumstances, the Chinese discourse on collaboration appropriated images and language from the French discourse, reconstructed them into universal tropes that went beyond the realities of the shared historical experience, and redeployed them for explaining Chinese collaboration and justifying its punishment.

This process of appropriation reveals not only the impact of World War II on the process of globalization in the realm of political thought, but also the role played by two other, equally important factors: a shared experience of war and occupation and the local recasting of selected elements of this shared experience into global symbols that transcended their original universal value.[9] The global discourse on collaboration, therefore, emerged from the "spatial dialectic" between unifying transnational processes and "strategies of localization."[10] These "strategies of

[7] See, for example, the instances of collaboration and the trials in various European countries discussed in Deák, Gross, and Judt, *The Politics of Retribution in Europe*. The impact on European political life of the collaboration experience and its related discourse is exemplified by the role that collaboration, and its counterpart resistance, played in postwar politics and memory. See, for example, Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, and Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past* (Hanover, N.H., 1998). For the case of Italy, see the controversial work of historian Renzo De Felice; De Felice and Pasquale Chessa, *Rosso e Nero* (Milan, 1995).

[8] For the global impact of Nuremberg and Tokyo, see, for example, Bruce Mazlish, *The New Global History* (New York, 2006), 25–32, and Mazlish, "An Introduction to Global History," in Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens, eds., *Conceptualizing Global History* (Boulder, Colo., 1993), 20. The impact of the discourse on war crimes even extended to the United States. See, for example, Lisa Yoneyama, "Traveling Memories, Contagious Justice: Americanization of Japanese War Crimes at the End of the Post-Cold War," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 6, no. 1 (2003): 57–93.

[9] World War II is generally regarded as an important step in the "increased interdependence and interconnectivity" and the "enormous compression of space and time" that characterizes the process of globalization; Mazlish, *The New Global History*, 3, 28, 29. For additional discussion on the globalizing role of World War II and on the periodization of the globalization process, see Anthony G. Hopkins, "Globalization: An Agenda for Historians," in Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London, 2002), 6–11; David Northrup, "Globalization and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World History in the Long Term," *Journal of World History* 16, no. 3 (January 13, 2006): 249–267; and Jerry H. Bentley, "Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History," *American Historical Review* 101, no. 3 (June 1996): 749–770.

[10] Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., *Global/Local: Culture Production and the Transnational Imaginary* (Durham, N.C., 1996), 2. This definition of globalization as the site of interaction between global and local owes much to the definition that emerged in the field of cultural studies, well represented by Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996).

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localization" not only legitimized local political agendas, but also reinforced the global nature of the elements they co-opted. The Chinese appropriation of Pétain had a globalizing effect, as it enhanced his international visibility as a symbol of collaboration and made him relevant outside of the sphere of Nazi occupation and the French colonial empire.[11] At the same time, it assigned Chinese *hanjian* universal significance. In this way, it contributed to the construction of an imagery that collapsed the experience under Japanese and Nazi occupation and consolidated the interpretation of World War II as truly global.

China was not new to this globalizing "spatial dialectical" process, having participated in internationalizing trends since before the war. By the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese political leaders and intellectuals had come to view China as part of a wider world environment and to explain its historical circumstances in terms of global currents.[12] Since then, Chinese political thought, while having "varied roots in the domestic dynamics" of Chinese society, had also become "deeply embedded in the international context of the time," as exemplified by the influence of Woodrow Wilson's political ideas as well as by China's eager cooperation with the League of Nations.[13] The integration of the Sino-Japanese war into World War II after Pearl Harbor, and the feeling that China had participated in a truly global war, strengthened the move toward internationalization that had characterized Chinese politics since the turn of the twentieth century. The Chinese political discourse became increasingly enmeshed with global themes, such as those on human rights, democracy, and liberal economy, which to some extent also influenced the Chinese political debate in the immediate postwar years.

The Chinese focus on Pétain, whose trial attracted much more attention in China than any of the similar trials taking place in other countries, is not surprising. French collaborators were well-known figures in China, since Vichy was, together with Germany, one of the few foreign governments that had retained a presence in occupied

Among historians, this kind of approach is clearly articulated by Anthony G. Hopkins, "Introduction: Interactions between the Universal and the Local," in Hopkins, ed., *Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local* (Basingstoke, 2006), 5–6. For other interpretations of the historical process of globalization focusing on "migration, social development, trade, imperialism, biological exchange, and cultural diffusion" as "profoundly influence[ing] the development of individual societies, including the construction of identities" or focusing on international organizations and international NGOs, see, among others, Jerry H. Bentley, "Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization," *Globalizations* 1, no. 1 (September 1, 2004): 79, and Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

[11] Eric Thomas Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944* (Stanford, Calif., 2001).

[12] Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, N.C., 2002).

[13] Erez Manela, "Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1351; Jürgen Osterhammel, " 'Technical Co-operation' between the League of Nations and China," *Modern Asian Studies* 13, no. 4 (October 1979): 661–680; Margherita Zanasi, "Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 143–169; and Zhang Li, *Guoji hezuo zai Zhongguo: Guoji lianmeng jiaose de kaocha, 1919–1946* [International Cooperation in China: An Examination of the Role of the League of Nations, 1919–1946] (Taibei, 1988). For the League's role in political globalization, see also Iriye, *Global Community*. For an example of institutional global history and of the globalization of the idea of human rights, one of the political ideas most representative of postwar globalization, see Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York, 2001).

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China after Pearl Harbor. The Chinese interest in Pétain was reinforced by the fact that Paris was the first collaborationist trial to be showcased on the world stage and soon became emblematic worldwide of the phenomenon of collaboration, as illustrated by a June 10, 1945, article in the *New York Times*: "The trial of Marshall Pétain . . . has a historic importance surpassing that of any great trials of our time, not excluding the expected trials of war criminals." The importance of this trial, the article continued, rested not on "what one man or group of men did or failed to do" but on "the awareness of national failings which he [Pétain] is regarded as typifying."[14] Pétain thus came to exemplify collaboration as the moral failing of a nation vis-à-vis the nationalist virtue of resistance. This was a characterization that simplified the complex phenomenon of collaboration, ignoring its diverse manifestations.[15] By completely identifying Vichy with Pétain, it also obscured the complex and diverse nature of the French collaborationist regime.[16]

This simplified narrative originated in the Paris trial itself, which constructed a picture of "a uniformly black, totally abject" regime when, in fact, Vichy had "harbored a number of rival tendencies."[17] The trial thus came to play an important role in the development of the French resistentialist discourse, which, while mythologizing resistance and identifying it as the only expression of democracy and nationalism, also constructed an image of its antithesis, collaboration, as a monolithic phenomenon of evil treason and brutal fascism.[18] This simplified narrative and its resistentialist message became prominent in the postwar period and, by virtue of its very simplification, made it possible for Pétain to become a symbol beyond the specificity of the French case. The international visibility of the Pétain trial, and its resistentialist message, attracted the attention of Chinese leaders and media, who used it to justify the punishment of *hanjian*.

[14] "With Pétain, France, Too, Will Stand Trial," *New York Times*, June 10, 1945. The trial of Norwegian collaborator Vidkun Quisling took place soon after, in August and September 1945, but it attracted less international attention and got very little coverage in Chinese newspapers.

[15] As Timothy Brook points out, collaboration is not a monolithic phenomenon; it includes a complex variety of activities in terms of the social and political position of collaborators as well as their motivations, from self-interest to mere attempts at survival. Brook, *Collaboration*, 2, 23.

[16] For a more complete description of the complex political composition of Vichy, see, among many other valuable works, Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York, 1982); H. R. Kedward, *Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance, 1940–1944* (New York, 1985); Philippe Burrin, *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise* (New York, 1996); Pierre Laboire, *L'Opinion française sous Vichy* (Paris, 1990).

[17] Philippe Burrin, "Vichy," in Pierre Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1: *Conflicts and Divisions* (New York, 1998), 183. Burrin especially points out that no distinction was made between Pétain and Pierre Laval (the prime minister of Vichy from 1942 to 1945) at the trial, nor did it address "the various phases in the regime's sinister evolution with Laval's return to power." Laval is generally considered to have been closer politically to the Nazis than Pétain, and therefore more willing to accommodate them. In the prewar years, he had been a staunch anti-communist and fascist sympathizer. His return to power as prime minister (Pétain became merely the symbolic head of state) in April 1942, at the request of the Germans, marked the beginning of the darkest period of the Vichy government. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*.

[18] Although the term "resistentialism" (*résistancialism*) originally reflected a negative interpretation of resisters, Henry Rousso uses it to indicate "the construction of an object of memory, the 'Resistance,' whose significance transcended by far the sum of its active parts," and which came to be identified "with the nation as a whole." Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 10. Other Western European countries developed their own resistentialist discourse, although the French case became the most prominent because of the international visibility of the Pétain trial. For a recent discussion of Italian resistentialism, see De Felice and Chessa, *Rosso e Nero*.

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IN 1945 AND 1946, THE YEARS OF INTENSE "DEALING WITH *HANJIAN*," as the expression went, France's and China's shared experience of occupation and collaboration, and the similarities in the political discourses they created, cemented the feeling of the two countries' common historical destiny, making possible the deployment of Pétain as a resistentialist trope in China. The swift Japanese invasion of China in 1937 led Jiang Jieshi to retreat to the interior, where he eventually established his wartime capital in Chongqing. From there he waged war against the Japanese invading forces, which occupied a large portion of China's territory spanning from Beijing to Canton. Following Jiang's retreat to the interior, two successive collaborationist governments were established in occupied Nanjing, the prewar capital of the Chinese Republic: the Reformed Government (1938–1940) and the RNG (1940–1945).[19] During the war, France experienced very similar circumstances. When the Germans occupied Paris on June 14, 1940, the French government split into two different groups. One favored the government's retreat to France's North African territories; the other insisted that the government should remain in France and work toward an armistice. The latter strategy prevailed, and Pétain became prime minister of the new government. On June 22, 1940, the French government entrusted Pétain with the task of negotiating with the Germans. He ultimately signed a peace agreement with the Third Reich that divided France into two territories. The larger portion, in the north, remained directly under German control. The much smaller southern portion came under the Vichy government led by Pétain.[20]

Both France and China had thus experienced protracted occupations and the formation of governments presenting competing narratives of patriotism and national defense. In both countries, collaborationist ideologies were marked by a "shield" or "collaborationist nationalism" narrative. The leaders of the Reformed Government declared that they had reached a peace agreement with Japan and remained in Nanjing in an attempt to preserve the nation and its people, which Jiang's retreat had left unprotected.[21] Although the RNG's political ideology differed in some important respects from that of the Reformed Government, it shared with the latter a similar discourse on collaboration.[22] Wang Jingwei also claimed that it was his duty to protect the nation abandoned by Jiang by negotiating with the Japanese.[23] This point became central to the line of defense used by Chen Gongbo and the other top RNG leaders who were tried in Suzhou soon after him, including Chen Bijun (Wang Jingwei's wife), Chu Minyi (RNG's vice-chairman of the Executive Yuan and foreign minister), and Zhou Fohai (RNG's chairman of the Executive Yuan). This line of defense was pressed by the pugnacious Chen Bijun, who asked rhetorically: "When large chunks of the Chinese territory were abandoned by the Nationalist

[19] For a discussion of the Reformed Government, see Brook, "Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied China."

[20] In addition, a portion of northern France was incorporated into a new Belgian administrative unit, Alsace-Lorraine was taken over by Germany, and a small area in the south was absorbed by Italy.

[21] As quoted in Brook, "Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied China," 159.

[22] The leaders of the Reformed Government opposed the Nationalist Party's (GMD) rule over China. Wang Jingwei, himself an important leader of the GMD, opposed Jiang's leadership of the GMD and China and claimed that the RNG was the only legitimate representative of the party. Brook, "Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied China."

[23] Chen Gongbo, "Zibaishu."

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Government to the Japanese, where was the nation that Mr. Wang could have to sell to the Japanese?"[24]

An important aspect of the ideology of Chinese collaboration, therefore, rested on the notion that land and people were the foundation of the nation, and that national defense should start by remaining with them and shielding them. This theme had also been central to the ideology of collaboration put forward by Pétain since the early days of Vichy and then sublimated in the shield defense at the Paris trial.[25] On June 20, 1940, Pétain declared his intention "to remain among you [the French] in these dark days."[26] "I have not left French soil and will not place my hopes outside of it, either," he proclaimed a few days later, rejecting the option of resistance from the colonies advocated by de Gaulle. "The land," Pétain declared, "is the *patrie* . . . a field allowed to turn fallow represents a piece of France that dies." It was only from the land and its people that salvation could come, since the state, Pétain lamented, could not accomplish this.[27]

Similarities between the French and Chinese ideologies of collaboration extended to one more issue, which was also to become a central theme at the trials. Pétain, Wang Jingwei, and Chen Gongbo based their decision to collaborate on what Philippe Burrin describes as the "link between acceptance of defeat and national reform."[28] In 1940, they all had come to believe that the war they were fighting was irremediably lost. Pétain, therefore, did not foresee a protracted occupation, and his goal was not collaboration but to put an end to armed hostilities in order to initiate a much-needed process of "national revitalization," a reform process that he viewed as the only effective solution to a national crisis that predated the war. France's crisis generated by the inability, during the initial stage of the war, to stop the German army's occupation of a large portion of the country's northern territory in fact appeared to many French people to have exposed a deep national weakness, leading to a debate on how to strengthen the nation. According to Pétain, this weakness rested in the nation's lack of economic and military preparedness, as well as in a general spiritual degeneration caused by the influence of both socialism and capitalism.[29] The crisis, he declared in March 1942, had caused the French people "to realize the need for reform" in order to save "this sick France." For this reason, he had "placed an ardent desire for rebuilding at the very heart of the defeat."[30] Pétain believed that "a thorough overhaul of the nation took priority over regaining control

[24] Susan H. Marsh, "Chou Fo-hai: The Making of a Collaborator," in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, N.J., 1980), 325.

[25] The notion of cooperation between de Gaulle (the sword) and Pétain (the shield), central to this line of defense, appears quite contrived, since in 1940 Pétain had court-martialed his political opponents who advocated the continuation of fighting and had actually condemned de Gaulle to death in absentia. Kedward, *Occupied France*, 33–34. Benjamin F. Martin, "Political Justice in France: The Dreyfus Affair and After," *European Legacy* 2, no. 5 (1997): 809–826.

[26] Philippe Pétain, "Appel du 20 juin 1940 (jeudi)," in Pétain, *Discours aux français: 17 juin 1940–20 août 1944* (Paris, 1989), 60.

[27] Philippe Pétain, "Appel du 25 juin 1940 (mardi)," ibid., 65, 66.

[28] Burrin, "Vichy," 184.

[29] See, for example, Philippe Pétain, "Appel du 25 juin 1940 (mardi)," "Allocution du 13 août 1940 (mardi)," and "Allocution du 23 juillet 1941 (mercredi)," in Pétain, *Discours aux français*, 63, 73, 162.

[30] Philippe Pétain, "Message du 11 juillet 1940 (jeudi)," "Message du 5 mars 1942 (jeudi)," and "Message du 10 mai 1942 (dimanche)," ibid., 67, 233, 255.

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of French territory and full sovereignty within its borders."[31] He wanted to "rebuild society" and "reconstruct the national soul."[32] He believed such national reconstruction to be "the bedrock of any possible salvation" in the face of France's crisis.[33]

In the same vein, Chen Gongbo declared in Suzhou that he and Wang Jingwei had become convinced that the war was lost and that no European nation or the United States would come to China's aid.[34] For this reason, Wang had tried to reach an agreement with the Japanese that would allow the preservation of "national vitality," a notion very similar to Pétain's "national soul." In 1940 he had declared: "Today it is possible to preserve a little vitality for the nation, as the stepping-stone for future nation-building."[35] Chen went on to say that he had decided to join Wang in Nanjing because he also believed that the war was lost and that the only hope for China was to attempt to reassert control over the foundation of the nation, which he identified as its economic resources. Chen believed that only by controlling those resources and channeling them into the development of an industrial and autarkic national economy could China strengthen itself, regain its "national vitality," and repel Japan.[36] Like Pétain, Wang and Chen were concerned more with nation-building than with the loss of sovereignty and were planning reconstruction in a defeated nation, perceiving national revitalization as the most effective way to eventually shed foreign occupation. As in France, the debate on national revitalization in China preceded the war and dated back to an earlier national crisis, precipitated at the end of the nineteenth century by domestic unrest and increasing pressure from foreign imperialism. This crisis generated a heated debate on nation-building, intensified in the 1930s by the growing threat from Japanese imperialism.

French and Chinese collaborationist ideologies and rhetoric, therefore, were strongly influenced by a globalizing discourse on the nation, which appeared to offer a universal conceptual framework for making sense of war and occupation. This framework led the two countries to focus on protecting and strengthening national essence, the foundational elements of the nation that needed to be preserved if the nation as a whole was to be saved. Although each country defined national essence in accordance with tropes and images specific to its political and cultural discourse—Pétain relying on the notion of an "eternal France" based on a conservative rural and Catholic tradition, Wang and Chen on the development of an industrial and autarkic national economy[37]—both focused on land (including its economic re-

[31] Burrin, "Vichy," 184.

[32] Pétain, "Discours du 8 juillet 1941 (mardi)," in Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, 150–151; also quoted in Burrin, "Vichy," 194.

[33] Burrin, "Vichy," 194. Kedward stresses the fact that "Vichy and the Revolution Nationale were not coterminous" and that Pétain's definition of France's national essence cannot be taken as representative of the opinion of all the groups that formed Vichy. H. Roderick Kedward, "Introduction," in Kedward, *Occupied France*.

[34] Chen Gongbo, "Zibaishu," and unpublished and undated report (*bagaoshu*), probably from early 1938, from the private collection of Chen Kan, 8.

[35] Chen Gongbo, "Zibaishu," 6.

[36] For a discussion of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo's view of nation and national defense, see Zanasi, *Saving the Nation*.

[37] As historian Eric J. Hobsbawm has demonstrated, even if each nation builds on different foundations and constructs its own political identity or national essence around different elements, in its historical narrative it still shares with other nations the same logic and language of nationhood and nationalism. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1992).

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sources, be they agricultural or industrial) and people, denoting a shared localized and "internal" view of nationhood in opposition to de Gaulle's and Jiang Jieshi's "external" approach. De Gaulle and Jiang waged war from outside the occupied territories, a position that made a focus on land and people incongruous, since these were the elements of the nation that they were accused of having deserted at the time of need. They also based their ideologies of resistance on more abstractly statist and internationalist views of nation and national defense. Speaking from exile in London, de Gaulle argued that although the "battle of France" had been lost, the war had not been. The war was not just a confrontation between Germany and France, but a world conflict in which the whole French Empire and France's allies were also involved.[38] De Gaulle, therefore, deployed a nationalist ideology that assigned the war a wider meaning beyond its immediate impact on land and people and set it, instead, in an international context. At the same time, he envisioned a looser connection between the state and the national soil, giving the state a central role in national defense—in direct opposition to Pétain's call to the French to rely on themselves. As a consequence, de Gaulle also redefined the role of the colonies vis-à-vis the metropole/nation and vis-à-vis France's struggle against Germany. The fact that the resistance movement operating within France also deployed the trope of national soil in its ideology suggests that de Gaulle's avoidance of this theme was mostly a result of his "external" positions rather than his political views. Deploying the soil trope did not necessarily require adherence to Pétain's Catholic conservatism, since the French resistance used it within a different political framework.[39]

A similar statist and internationalist view of national salvation can be found in Jiang Jieshi's war ideology and propaganda. Although Jiang still lived on Chinese soil, he took an "external" view of national defense with his tactic of "exchanging territory for time," by which he meant retreating to the interior and leaving large portions of Chinese territory to the Japanese in order to gain time and give the United States the opportunity to come to China's rescue.[40] This strategy made people and land acceptable collateral damage and placed the state at the center of national defense. Jiang also advocated an internationalist approach to national defense, although he was in a more difficult position than de Gaulle in pursuing this option. When de Gaulle denounced Pétain's armistice, he could count on the support of Great Britain in his fight against Germany. When the RNG was established in 1940, China had been alone in its fight against Japan for more than two years, and there was no sign that the Sino-Japanese war would ever evolve into a wider regional or worldwide conflict.[41] Nevertheless, Jiang pursued an internationalist defense strategy, doggedly attempting to internationalize the war. He called for the forma-

[38] See, for example, Charles de Gaulle, "22 juin 1940, Discour pronounce à la radio de Londres," in de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1970–1971), 1: 6.

[39] Ian Higgins, "France, Soil and Language: Some Resistance Poems by Luc Bérimont and Jean Macenac," in Roderick Kedward and Roger Austin, eds., *Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology* (Totowa, N.J., 1985).

[40] Jiang Jieshi, "Fuxing zhongguo zhi dao" [How to Revive China] (1932), in Qin Xiaoyi, ed., *Xianzongtong Jiang Gong sixiang yanlun zhongji* [A Collection of Thoughts, Speeches, and Writings by the Late President Jiang Gong], 40 vols. (Taibei, 1984), 10: 489; Jiang, "Hezuo xiunlian zhi yiyi mubiao" [The Meaning and Goals of Cooperation Training] (December 1, 1932), ibid., 671–676.

[41] Great Britain and France had both declared war on Germany in 1939 following Germany's invasion of Poland.

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tion of "a common front" against Japan, which, he argued, was a threat to Western interests in East Asia and was in violation of "international obligations" as described in "the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Peace Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty."[42] China, he declared, was fighting not just "to protect [its] sovereignty and safeguard [its] own national existence" but to protect "the new world order" established by international consensus after World War I.[43] In his attempt to transform the Sino-Japanese war into a worldwide conflict, Jiang thus borrowed the political language and images of Western internationalist trends developed after World War I, packaging his requests for help in terms that he hoped would resonate with Western powers.[44] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, validated Jiang's war strategy. As the United States joined the war in the Pacific and the globalization of the Sino-Japanese conflict became a reality, Jiang finally saw his hope fulfilled and his strategy for an internationalized national defense suddenly justified.

Similarities between the two countries' narratives of collaboration, therefore, were a result of similar war circumstances, but also of the impact of a globalizing conceptual framework of nationhood that influenced the language and images used by the collaborationist leaders to explain the choices they made in facing the occupation. In this context, in both France and China, the trials of the main leaders of the collaborationist governments were the final acts of a confrontation that had pitched different visions of nation and national defense throughout the years of occupation. The trials became rituals aimed at delegitimizing the collaborationist narrative and erasing it from popular memory while reaffirming the political legitimacy of Jiang's and de Gaulle's leadership during the war. De Gaulle wanted to completely deny Vichy. "Vichy," he declared, "has always been null and void, and it never happened."[45] This interpretation was stressed at the trial, during which André Mornet, the prosecutor, declared that Vichy was "four years to be stricken from our history."[46] In the same vein, Jiang declared that "nothing they [the RNG] do . . . can have any validity whatever."[47] Thus neither trial engaged the shield line of defense brought up by the defendants, for fear of reopening old uncertainties and doubts about the meaning of patriotism and national defense. Instead the proceedings focused almost exclusively on issues of political legitimacy.

The brutality of both occupations, the complicity of the collaborationist regimes in that brutality, and their totalitarian and repressive political nature made it impossible to regard the competing narratives of patriotism and national defense presented at each of these trials as "equally valid" and undermined the legitimacy of

[42] "A Common Front against Aggression" (July 7, 1939), in Chinese Ministry of Information, ed., *The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937–1945* (New York, 1946), 225–257.

[43] Jiang Jieshi, "China and the European War" (September 9, 1939), in Jiang, *Resistance and Reconstruction* (New York, 1943), 132, 134.

[44] Manchurian resistance hero Ma Zhanshan followed a similar strategy. Rana Mitter argues that Ma, glossing over the ambiguous nature of his relationship with the Japanese occupying forces and the specificity of the Manchurian situation, borrowed tropes from the European discourse on war and resistance to package his resistance movement in terms that would appeal to international public opinion in an effort to mobilize it in support of his cause. Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000).

[45] Jean-Marc Varaut, *Le procès Pétain, 1945–1995* (Paris, 1995), 14.

[46] As quoted in Burrin, "Vichy," 196.

[47] Jiang Jieshi, "No Relaxation of Our Effort" (April 1, 1940), in Jiang, *Resistance and Reconstruction*.

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both Vichy and the RNG.[48] The collaborationist narrative was also discredited because neither government succeeded in "shielding" the local population and in resisting the invaders' demands, and because Pétain, Wang, and Chen continued to collaborate even after this failure had become apparent.[49] In their last years, in fact, both Vichy and the RNG had entered a state of "progressive disintegration" in which any notion of reform and national revitalization was lost and both states were "drawn towards highly derivative [Nazi-style or Japanese-style] solutions."[50] In both France and China, therefore, heightened nationalism and popular resentment would certainly have been enough to bring harsh retribution down on collaborators. Instead, the trials focused on treason and legitimacy, eschewing an evaluation of Pétain's and Chen Gongbo's motivations and personal responsibility and any direct inquiry into their specific actions. As a consequence, in both countries, a gap emerged between the trials' political goals and the popular memory of collaboration based on Vichy's and the RNG's participation in war crimes and repression of their citizens.[51]

SIMILARITIES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' WARTIME EXPERIENCES and in their ideologies of collaboration and resistance were sublimated in China in the appropriation of Pétain as a universal symbol of collaboration. Important differences between the circumstances in China and France were overshadowed by the growing feeling that they shared a similar fate and that their collaborators had committed essentially the same crime and were nearly interchangeable. This view was reinforced by an incident in April 1946. France had smuggled a group of Vichy collaborators out of China in order to try them in France. The Nationalist Government remonstrated vehemently, claiming that it had the right to put on trial any collaborators who operated in China. A high-ranking French general soon arrived in Nanjing with the obvious task of repairing relations between China and France. In a public declaration, the general emphasized the two countries' common destiny. Chinese newspapers were quick to expand this narrative of "striking similarity." *Zhongyang Ribao*, a daily paper that was closely linked to the Nationalist Party and had followed Jiang to Chongqing during the war, editorialized that the survival of freedom rested on France in the West and on China in East Asia. These two "similarly occupied countries" had been "at the front line of resistance against totalitarianism." Their shared war experience made them the pillars of world security in the postwar era.[52] Although the French general's rhetoric about the two countries' common destiny only slightly veiled his true po-

[48] Susie Linfield, "War Crimes Trials, Now and Then," *Dissent* 49 (Winter 2002): 125–130.

[49] Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, and Kedward, *Occupied France*. The independence of Vichy from the Nazi government was severely limited, since the peace agreement stipulated that Vichy was to consign to the Germans all Jews in its territory, disband its army (retaining only a small contingent for domestic policing), and order its citizens to cease hostilities against the Germans. In general, the Vichy regime became increasingly repressive under heavy German influence. By 1945, however, it had become clear that Vichy was unable to shield the French population from the increasingly harsh demands of the Germans. Ultimately, the French did not fare any better than the Belgians, who suffered under direct occupation.

[50] I refer here to Kedward's analysis of Vichy, which, however, can easily be extended to the last years of the RNG. See H. Roderick Kedward, "Introduction," in Kedward and Austin, *Vichy France and the Resistance*, 2–3.

[51] On this point see Burrin, "Vichy," 201, and Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 21.

[52] *Zhongyang Ribao*, April 15, 1946.

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litical goals (mitigating the damage caused by France's attempt to repatriate the Vichy collaborators and ensuring China's noninterference in Vietnam), it projected an image of common experience that strongly resonated with the Chinese and was promptly picked up by the media.

The rhetoric generated by this incident underscored the effectiveness of the unification of Jiang Jieshi's and the Allies' wartime propaganda following the United States' entrance into the Pacific War. From this time on, the Allies' propaganda helped cement the view that the Sino-Japanese conflict was part of a global political dynamic of democracy and civilization (the Allies) facing barbarian totalitarianism (the Axis), thus directly extending to East Asia the political propaganda devised for the European war. This black-and-white narrative of war as a struggle between democracy/civilization and fascism/evil, while correctly pointing to the overall totalitarian and repressive nature of the governments of the Axis, obscured the fact that there were many ambiguities and gray areas. Not least was the fact that the Soviet Union shared many political practices with the Axis and that Jiang's regime was hardly democratic.

This unified narrative of war made it possible to transfer intact to Tokyo the principles that had been determined for Nuremberg, without attempting to adapt them to local circumstances. This was not a surprising development, considering that the trial was conceived at the Potsdam Conference (the meeting that consolidated previous discussions among the Allies on how to punish war crimes) and was therefore framed within the unifying wartime political propaganda.[53] Nuremberg and Tokyo, in turn, were instrumental in perpetuating the Allies' propaganda into the postwar period in both Europe and East Asia.[54] By criminalizing the Axis and assuming that Germany and Japan were expressions of the same political phenomenon, the two trials cemented the simplification of the narrative of war and indirectly contributed to the simplification of the narrative of collaboration as a worldwide monolithic phenomenon.

Chinese newspapers were instrumental in propagandizing this simplified and monolithic view of collaboration by linking China's *hanjian* trials to both the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the collaboration trials in Europe. Although the country's attention was focused primarily on the grim prospect of a civil war between the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese newspapers widely reported and debated the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and closely connected them with collaboration. An editorial published in *Minzhu* at the time of the Nuremberg trials, for example, opened by enthusiastically supporting the con-

[53] The Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender) of July 26, 1945, established trials for Japanese war criminals as one of the conditions of Japan's surrender. Philip R. Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951* (Austin, Tex., 1979), 4–5; see also John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999), 453–458. R. John Pritchard commented that the legal principles employed at Tokyo came from "Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence," since "[t]he Anglo-Saxon Powers constituted a block and called the tune" in spite of the international composition of the trial. See Pritchard, *An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial* (Oxford, 1987), 15.

[54] In "Traveling Memories," 58, 59, 60, Yoneyama briefly discusses the influence of U.S. war propaganda depicting World War II as a "good war," a war of "liberation and rehabilitation." She also explores an interesting aspect of the globalization of war crimes and justice by focusing on the issue of "readdressing and adjudicating Japanese war crimes within the U.S. judicial system."

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demnation of war crimes and ended by lamenting the slow pace with which the Chinese government was moving to punish collaborators.[55] *Zhongyang Ribao* declared that upon hearing about "war crimes, one immediately thinks of collaboration."[56] Reports of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials appeared alongside accounts of Chinese collaborations, often under a shared headline or as part of the same discussion.[57]

At the same time, extensive reporting on the Paris trial solidified Pétain as a universal symbol of collaboration. The newspapers alternated detailed reports of his trial—most of them direct translations of wire stories circulated by European news agencies, thus reflecting the Western European resistentialist view of the events—with vitriolic commentary by Chinese editorialists. For example, *Dagongbao*, an influential journal that at the time was sympathetic to the Nationalist Government, accused Pétain of spreading "fascist poison" and of being "decrepit, muddleheaded, and degenerate." Pétain, it declared, had not hesitated to sacrifice the survival of the nation. He had delivered France into the hands of the enemy and acquiesced to every Nazi demand. His case was not just a French domestic political matter; it actually embodied a wider problem of political responsibility that also involved Chinese *hanjian*. "We must know that people such as Pétain, Wang Jingwei, and Chen Gongbo are birds of a feather. They shamelessly sold out the nation. If such men are given latitude, there will be no law and discipline in the nation, the people will have no sense of morality and justice, and there will be no truth in the world." According to *Dagongbao*, Pétain and Vichy exemplified a global phenomenon of evil collaboration: "If everyone could so carelessly sell the nation, there would be millions of Vichys." It concluded by calling for harsh punishments for all collaborators and invoking the French example in support of its stern stand. If collaborators "were to go unpunished, then there would be no justice in the world." "For this reason, France . . . immediately proceeded to investigate and try all criminals charged with selling out the nation . . . If we want to purify the nation, develop moral courage, and promote justice, we need to do the same."[58]

Zhongyang Ribao echoed the argument put forward by *Dagongbao*. Editorialist Luo Jialun characterized French and Chinese collaborators as part of the same phenomenon, arguing that the French term *collaborateur* was the equivalent of the Chinese term for traitor (*jian*). Such traitors, whether French or Chinese, were the worst kind of criminals. They did not merely kill or rob individuals; they endangered the security of the nation as a whole and could hardly "be said to have a human nature." For this reason, he asked that *hanjian* be severely punished following the example of France, which soon after the war had executed collaborators almost every day, dozens at a time. In contrast, according to Luo, China was being unduly hesitant in punishing *hanjian*. Although Luo recognized differences in French and Chinese culture and in the way these differences could influence how each society dealt with

[55] "Niulunbao dashen" [The Great Trial of Nuremberg], *Minzhu*, November 15, 1945.

[56] *Zhongyang Ribao*, August 10, 1946.

[57] See, for example, ibid., where, under the headline "Jujian Chenni Gongbo shoushen" [The Big Traitor Chen Gongbo on Trial], a full page is devoted to pictures of Chen's trial interspersed with others from Nuremberg and Tokyo.

[58] *Dagongbao*, July 27, 1945; ibid., October 3, 1945. For a discussion of *Dagongbao* reporting during the war, see Wang Ke-wen, "Zhang Jiluan, the *Dagonbao*, and Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41," paper presented at the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China Biannual Conference "Chinese Nation, Chinese State," Singapore, June 26–28, 2006, 1–2, 22.

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traitors (he specifically mentioned the French practice of parading women collaborators through the streets with their heads shaved "like Buddhist nuns"—a practice he believed most Chinese would find ridiculous), he still advocated that the Chinese follow France's lead.[59]

The same points were driven home by another *Zhongyang Ribao* editorialist, Chen Hong. Rhetorically asking his readership to look at how European nations had dealt with their collaborators, Chen specifically raised the example of France. In the three months following liberation, France "had sentenced to death four or five thousand collaborators. Even Pétain, previously hailed as a hero, could not avoid a death sentence"—a sentence, the article went on to explain, that was later commuted to life in prison by de Gaulle. "Surely we are not to take pity on them [Chinese collaborators]."[60] The same sentiment was expressed in *Minzhu*: "It was the French who punished collaborators in the most earnest and admirable way . . . Pétain was swiftly sentenced to death . . . The Norwegians also handled collaborators correctly and executed Quisling . . . If we turn our gaze toward our own country, it really makes our people feel ashamed."[61] *Minzhu*'s chief editor, Zheng Zhenduo, echoed the general complaint that the Chinese government had been slow in prosecuting *hanjian*. Like Luo and Chen, Zheng called for China to follow the French example: "France has apprehended more than a hundred thousand collaborators. Belgium has apprehended more than eighty thousand of them . . . Our land and population are much larger than theirs, and consequently we have a larger number of collaborators. We have also suffered occupation for a longer time. How is it that we have arrested fewer collaborators than they have?"[62]

Chinese collaborators themselves perceived their situation as part of a global phenomenon. Chu Minyi compared Wang Jingwei with Pétain, suggesting that both leaders had taken on the difficult task of dealing with the occupying forces in order to shield the population. Rejecting the resistentialist view of Pétain put forward by the newspapers and embracing, quite understandably, the shield narrative, Chu argued that Pétain's position had been much more difficult to sustain than that of de Gaulle but that it was no less patriotic.[63] While in prison waiting to be tried, Zhou Fohai cited collaborators around the world who had been treated with leniency or even celebrated.[64] He particularly emphasized the case of the wartime president of the Philippines, José P. Laurel, stressing that the people in Manila had demonstrated in Laurel's favor and asked that he be set free after his arrest. The people of the Philippines, Zhou argued, had recognized that Laurel's "spirit was patriotic," and that his actions were born of "a painstaking consideration under unavoidable circumstances for the good of the Filipinos in the occupied area." Zhou then asked rhetorically: "Is it possible for the Filipinos not to know of national righteousness?

[59] *Zhongyang Ribao*, November 11, 1946.
[60] Ibid., November 8, 1946.
[61] "Niulunbao dashen."
[62] "Chujian xulun" [Continuing the Discussion on Eliminating *Hanjian*], *Minzhu*, January 19, 1946.
[63] Hwang Dongyoun, "Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the Chinese Collaborators," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no. 1 (2005): 87.
[64] Zhou Fohai, *Zhou Fohai yu zhong riji* [Zhou Fohai's Prison Diary] (Beijing, 1991); Hwang, "Wartime Collaboration in Question."

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Is it possible for the Filipinos . . . not to distinguish loyalty from treachery, and not to discern right from wrong?"[65]

Zhou's remarks highlight the different approach to collaboration and postwar retribution taken in some countries. They especially illustrate how international references could point in different directions. Focusing on the Pétain case—or, more specifically, adopting the resistentialist discourse that had prevailed at the Paris trial—strengthened Chongqing's narrative of the war and the argument in favor of harsh retribution. The examples raised by Zhou, in contrast, made the case for leniency and for validating the "shield" theory. Unfortunately for Zhou, cases such as Laurel's were underreported by Chinese papers. Those cases never gained international visibility and ran contrary to the resistentialist discourse, which was swiftly taking on a global dimension. For these reasons, they failed to coalesce into a counterdiscourse with the power to effectively challenge the Nationalist *hanjian* policies.

The GMD's adoption of the resistentialist discourse on collaboration was not without its critics, as exemplified by the response to the trial of Chen Bijun. Chen, the most vocal and aggressive representative of the Chinese "shield" theory, was cheered by the crowd outside the courthouse. This was embarrassing for Jiang's regime, because it proved that popular sentiment was divided on the issue of collaboration.[66] A careful reading of *Dagongbao* also reveals that in spite of its generally unified political voice, it expressed discomfort with and doubts about the Nationalists' approach to *hanjian*. This newspaper printed letters to the editor demanding that *hanjian* be dealt with swiftly alongside letters criticizing Chongqing's *hanjian* policies. The latter complained that Chongqing officials identified themselves with the resistance only because they happened to live in the unoccupied territories and looked at every Chinese in those areas with suspicion. Other readers called for an end to the prosecution of collaborators. All of the organizations belonging to the collaborationist government, they argued, had already been dismantled. The collaborationist environment no longer existed.[67]

Dissenting voices, however, were hard to come by in the media, which had been brought under close Nationalist control.[68] Most of the newspapers ended up calling for harsh punishment for *hanjian*, invoking European, and predominantly French, collaboration policies in support of their demands. Chinese newspapers thus played a crucial role in the construction of the global imagery of collaboration by embracing the resistentialist black-and-white narrative of moral courage versus evil self-interest, building the French example into a universally valid model, and drawing from it legitimacy for punishing China's *hanjian*. Still, in spite of the fact that the newspapers surrounded Chen Gongbo's trial with this globalizing discourse, the differences between the Paris and Suzhou trials were striking.

[65] As quoted in Hwang, "Wartime Collaboration in Question," 84; Zhou, *Zhou Fohai yu zhong riji*, 79.

[66] Charles D. Musgrove, "Cheering the Traitor: The Post-war Trial of Chen Bijun, April 1946," *Twentieth-Century China* 30, no. 2 (2005): 3–27.

[67] *Dagongbao*, December 21, 1945; ibid., December 11, 1945.

[68] "Guangli shoufuqu baozhi tongxunshe zazhi dinying gaungbo shiye zanshi banfa" [Provisional Regulations for Managing Newspapers, News Agencies, Journals, Films, and Broadcast Enterprises], *Zhongyang Dangwu Gongbao*, October 15, 1945; "Zengding guanli shoufuqu wenhua shiye banfa liangjian" [Two Additional Regulations on How to Manage Cultural Enterprises in Recovered Areas], ibid., November 15, 1945.

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THE SIMILARITIES THAT EMERGED AT THE TRIALS OF PÉTAIN AND CHEN GONGBO cannot obscure the profound differences in their political systems and legal traditions and how these differences shaped issues of political legitimacy as well as the political context and legal foundations of the trials. In Paris, the prosecution focused its attempt to prove the political illegitimacy of Vichy on the argument that Pétain's armistice with the Germans had amounted to an act of treason because Pétain did not have the constitutional legitimacy to act for the government at the time. This argument was ultimately difficult to prove and generated a heated but inconclusive constitutional debate.[69] Pétain had been given full powers by parliamentary majority, and an effort had been made to maintain constitutional integrity in the face of the exceptional crisis of German occupation.[70] Ultimately, Pétain was sentenced to death for "intelligence with the enemy" in accordance with Article 75 of the penal code, a provision adopted in 1939. The fact that that this provision preceded the establishment of Vichy, together with the effort at a constitutional debate, can be seen as an attempt to keep the trial within an objective and legalist framework. The Paris trial, however, like most French collaboration trials, failed to "strike a satisfactory compromise between traditional justice and political goals."[71]

The Suzhou trial proved even more equivocal than the trial in Paris, and its political goals were even less veiled. The Suzhou judges followed legislation that had been created ad hoc by the Jiang government in 1945 and 1946 and approved by the Nationalist Party, rather than referring to a prewar provision that supposedly was not linked to any specific political group. In addition, China had no constitutional procedures for forming a government, because its political system was based on one-party rule (that of the GMD). Both Jiang's regime and the RNG had been established by unilateral authoritarian acts and not by election or any kind of parliamentary procedure, with no pretense of adhering to any constitutional law. From a legal point of view, Wang's establishment of a competing Nationalist Government in 1940 greatly resembled Jiang's own 1927 unilateral assumption of power in the name of the Nationalist Party.[72] The different political systems of the two countries before the war thus came to determine how credible the issue of political legitimacy appeared at each trial. In Suzhou it was greatly undermined by the lack of any constitutional debate, reference to prewar legislation, and a simple *a priori* assumption of the legitimacy of Jiang's government.

Suspicions that the trials in China were strictly a political affair were strengthened by the fact that they fell under Jiang's direct control. The Pétain trials had raised similar suspicions, because the judges and jury were all representative of de Gaulle and of resistance organizations. The problem, however, was more pronounced in

[69] Varaut, *Le procès Pétain*.

[70] Burrin, "Vichy"; Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, 134–135. In addition, many French had been in favor of the armistice and believed that the marshal had saved France from more severe conditions—at least in the first few months, before the harsh reality set in that the armistice would not really shield Vichy from increasing German demands. Kedward, *Occupied France*, 2–3, 17; Burrin, *France under the Germans*; Pierre Laboire, *L'Opinion française sous Vichy*, 228–238.

[71] Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 20, 21.

[72] Jiang had established the Nanjing government in 1927, placing himself at its head against the wishes of the civilian leadership of the Nationalist Party. His maneuver had amounted to no less than a coup. At that time, the recognized headquarters of the Nationalists, under the leadership of Wang Jingwei, was in Wuhan. Jiang's unexpected action caught them by surprise.

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China. The trials were reviewed both by the Ministry of Justice—a common procedure, but marred in this case by the fact that the ministry received direct orders from Jiang—and by the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party. In addition, in the absence of a jury, the final verdict was rendered by the presiding judge. That judge, Sun Honglin, was hardly impartial. He was closely linked to Jiang's regime, and regardless of his political background, in handling the Chen Gongbo trial he worked under Jiang's direct orders.[73]

Deep ambiguities also arose from the fact that the political nature of the RNG and that of the Nationalist Government in Chongqing had their roots in the same political party (the GMD) and shared similar fascist tendencies as well as an anti-Communist agenda. In France, the political split between communism and fascism and the emergence of the postwar resistentialist discourse had lent an important anti-fascist political dimension to the Paris trial and de Gaulle's postwar government.[74] The Suzhou trial, on the other hand, was characterized by an almost complete lack of political debate. During the war, Jiang had halfheartedly cooperated with the Chinese Communists—whom he had fought for ten years before the war—only barely concealing his antagonism. Soon after the war ended, he resumed open military conflict with them (the GMD-CCP Civil War).[75] Chen and other collaboration leaders pointed out that the RNG had pursued what was now Jiang's primary goal: the extermination of communism. Wiping out the Communists had been an official goal of the RNG agreement with Japan, and the RNG had zealously pursued it. In fact, the brutality of the RNG's "Rural Pacification" campaign—which led to the killing and imprisonment of many real and suspected Communists—loomed large in the public memory as the most notorious example of the collaborators' crimes.[76] Jiang, however, could not exploit this RNG campaign at the trial because of his current and similar treatment of the Communists. The trial thus placed no emphasis on the campaign, which remained buried in the long list of accusations lodged against Chen. On the other hand, the RNG leaders on trial were able to ask why they could not be considered patriots now that Jiang had declared that the Communists posed the most serious threat to the Chinese nation.

[73] *Zhongyang Ribao*, March 17, 1946; *Shenbao*, April 2, 1946; *Zhongyang Ribao*, April 6, 1946. During the war, Sun had followed Jiang to Chongqing. After Japan's capitulation, he had been appointed chairman of the Jiangsu Higher Court and was concurrently the chairman of military legal affairs at Army General Headquarters. Ibid., March 17, 1946. For a discussion of the political nature of the Suzhou trials, see Hwang, "Wartime Collaboration in Question."

[74] The postwar resistentialist discourse identified collaborators with the right and the resistance with the left, highlighting the general fascist and authoritarian nature of Vichy while ignoring the political diversity of both the resistance and collaborationist groups. Although historically inaccurate, this resistentialist narrative became widely accepted in the postwar period. Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 6.

[75] Ibid., 10.

[76] This campaign had been launched by the RNG with the support of the Japanese in order to eliminate Communist elements in the countryside. It had turned into a brutal search for Communist sympathizers of all kinds, and many were executed merely for being suspected of anti-RNG activities. At the same time, the Japanese used this campaign to tighten their grip on rural resources. Because the November 1937 Nanjing Massacre occurred before the establishment of the RNG, it was liable to be used more as an indication of the need for a collaborationist "shield" than as proof of RNG complicity in war crimes. For more information on the "Rural Pacification" campaign, see Yu Zidao, Liu Jikui, and Cao Zhenwei, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu "Qingxiang" Yundong* [The Rural Pacification Campaign of Wang Jingwei's Nationalist Government] (Shanghai, 1985); and Zhongyang danganguan, Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan, and Jilin Sheng shehui kexueyuan, eds., *Ri-Wang di Qingxiang* [Japan's and Wang's Rural Pacification] (Beijing, 1995).

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The French resistentialist discourse, therefore, could be applied only selectively in Nationalist China, focusing exclusively on the black-and-white narrative of abject evil versus heroic patriotism but avoiding its political content.[77] Instead, the political anti-fascism theme that characterized French resistentialism was to play an important role in the CCP's discourse on collaboration. The CCP, in fact, was intent on creating a resistentialist myth of its own—as both it and the GMD vied to emerge from the war as the true embodiment of resistance and nationalism.[78] Left-leaning journals such as *Minzhu*, although not directly affiliated with the CCP, also embraced the political anti-fascist implication of resistentialism. But in the highly controlled media of 1945 and 1946, the Nationalist version tended to predominate outside the northeastern areas of China that had remained under Communist control after the war.[79]

With respect to legal principles and procedures, Suzhou also departed greatly from Paris. While the Paris trial was characterized by highly emotional moments, dramatic witness depositions, heated exchanges between prosecutors and defendants, and hyperbolic rhetoric aimed at impressing the members of the jury, Suzhou, in comparison, was a rather uneventful affair. In Suzhou, in fact, there was no jury to be convinced; the verdict was reached by the judges. The Paris trial took twenty-four days (July 23 to August 16), but Chen Gongbo's trial, convened on the afternoon of April 5, 1946, lasted only six hours. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Judge Sun opened the proceedings by asking Chen to identify himself. After this short preliminary, the main prosecutor, Han Dao, read Chen the long list of charges against him. Chen was then invited to respond. He had refused to be represented by a lawyer, and although the court had assigned one to him anyway, he proceeded to read the lengthy self-defense he had prepared while in jail awaiting trial. Since no witnesses were called to testify and no jury was involved, the trial terminated with a brief and uneventful exchange of questions and answers between the prosecutor and Chen Gongbo. By eight o'clock that night, it was all over; the president adjourned the court, announcing that the verdict would be issued seven days later, on April 12.[80]

The trial was largely *pro forma*, and its legal foundations were shaky in spite of the fact that Judge Sun claimed to be "following [legal] international conventions," and even though Chinese newspapers portrayed it as in tune with worldwide legal principles that had emerged at the end of World War II.[81] *Dagongbao*, for example,

[77] The issue of war atrocities, however, which in retrospect played an important legitimizing role for both trials, was downplayed in both cases. At the time of the Paris trials, news of the concentration camps was slow to emerge. The trial gave more relevance to the deportation of the French labor force to Germany. In Suzhou, war atrocities were even less visible, not just for Jiang's reluctance to address the issue of the "Rural Pacification" campaign. In addition, the most notorious case of Japanese atrocities, the December 1937 Nanjing Massacre, immediately followed Jiang's withdrawal from Nanjing, the pre-war capital of the Nationalist Government, and occurred before the Reformed Government or the RNG had been established. It was therefore more liable to be used to assign Jiang's retreat a certain amount of responsibility for Japanese war crimes, rather than for condemning collaborators.

[78] For a discussion of Communist propaganda and the construction of the Communists' distinctive resistentialist myth, see Parks Coble, "China at War, 1937–1945: Remembering and Re-remembering China's War of Resistance," paper presented at the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China Biannual Conference "Chinese Nation, Chinese State," Singapore, June 26–28, 2006.

[79] "Guangli shoufuqu baozhi tongxunshe zazhi dinying gaungbo shiye zanshi banfa"; "Zengding guanli shoufuqu wenhua shiye banfa liangjian."

[80] *Shenbao*, April 6, 1946; ibid., April 2 and 6, 1946.

[81] *Zhongyang Ribao*, April 6, 1946.

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traced the origins of the Nationalist legislation on *hanjian* to the Potsdam Agreement, but that agreement merely decreed that war crimes were to be prosecuted; it did not discuss punishment for collaboration. In an editorial titled "Upholding International Legal Principles," *Shenbao*—a longtime Shanghai paper that had been taken over by the RNG, but which aligned with the Nationalists on most issues after Japan's defeat—connected the Suzhou trial to the legal principles that informed Nuremberg and Tokyo.[82] The comparison with Nuremberg was, however, problematic because it focused on the criminalization of entire political organizations, presenting it as an internationally accepted idea. Before Nuremberg, in fact, this notion had been at the center of a heated legal debate on whether to criminalize the entire Nazi government, and thus to determine guilt by virtue of mere affiliation with it. This provision had ultimately not been included in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (August 8, 1945), which attempted to shift the focus to individual responsibility for specific crimes.[83] The notion of criminalizing entire political organizations, however, plagued most European collaboration trials, which often "punished in the name of collective responsibility" rather than individual accountability. In this respect, the French collaboration trials constitute a notable exception by avoiding a reliance on the notion of collective guilt.[84]

The Chinese newspapers' presentation of the idea of collective responsibility as internationally established lent much legitimacy to the Nationalist "Regulations for Dealing with *Hanjian* Cases" (November 23, 1945) and "Guidelines for Sentencing *Hanjian*" (December 6, 1945). These regulations decreed that all collaborationist formations were criminal. The list of people to be prosecuted included everyone who had held a position in a collaborationist organization. Not only were all public officials to stand trial, but so were school principals, members of the judiciary system, journalists, members of economic and financial circles, movie and radio personnel, and members of cultural, social, and political groups, as well as anyone who had relied on the power of the collaborationist government to harm or control the people.[85] The regulations did take personal behavior into consideration as a mitigating circumstance, but one that could lead only to a reduced punishment, not to exculpation. Reduction of sentences was, in fact, provided for those officials of the col-

[82] *Dagongbao*, December 8, 1945; *Shenbao*, May 28, 1946.

[83] Michael R. Marrus, *The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–46: A Documentary History* (Boston, 1997). The charter, however, had included the principle of "Common Plan or Conspiracy," which presented some of the same problems embedded in the original notion of criminalizing an entire political organization, since it was based on the assumption that all the defendants shared the same political goals and had known since the early years of the Third Reich in the early 1930s that Germany would be entangled in such a devastating war and would perpetrate the Holocaust. The provision of a "Common Plan or Conspiracy" clause proved problematic at both Nuremberg and Tokyo, creating a heated controversy both at the time of the trials and in subsequent debates. For a discussion of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials with special reference to the problem created by the "Common Plan or Conspiracy" clause, see Michael Biddis, "The Nuremberg Trial: Two Exercises in Judgement," *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 3 (1981): 597–615; Marrus, *The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial*; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 457–458; C. Hosoya et al., eds., *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium* (Tokyo, 1986), especially the preface and B. V. A. Röling's introduction; Pritchard, *An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial*; Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial*; and Richard H. Minear, *Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton, N.J., 1971).

[84] Deák, "Introduction," 6.

[85] "Chuli hanjian anjian tiaoli" [Regulations for Dealing with *Hanjian* Cases] (November 23, 1945), in Nanjing Municipal Archives, *Shenxun Wangwei Hanjian bilu*, 1490–1491; "Chengzhi hanjian anjian" [Guidelines for Sentencing *Hanjian*] (December 6, 1945), ibid., 1941–1944.

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laborationist government who had helped to protect the Chinese people from Japanese brutalities, supported the war of resistance, or surrendered before August 10, 1945, the day of Japan's capitulation.[86] Even defendants who were recognized as falling into one of these categories would still be considered guilty because of their affiliation with criminal collaborationist organizations. Moreover, even after serving their full sentences, collaborators were to be deprived of all civic rights for life and were thus forever excluded from the new postwar Chinese nation.[87]

These regulations ensured that none of the top RNG leaders who stood trial in Suzhou was found innocent. All were sentenced to death, with the exception of Chen Bijun, who received life in prison. Jiang personally signed off on all the sentences and intervened in favor only of Zhou Fohai, commuting his sentence from death to life in prison. The leniency that Jiang showed to Zhou, which many speculated was motivated by their good relationship before the war, inevitably raises suspicions that Jiang was eager to eliminate Chen Gongbo not just because he was a collaborator, but also because he had joined with Wang Jingwei in staunch political opposition to Jiang in the prewar years.[88]

Because of these differences, the Paris trial was in fact not a good fit for legitimizing the judicial procedure in Suzhou. Only a simplified narrative of the European "politics of retribution" and the increasingly global visibility of Pétain could allow the Chinese to overlook political and legal discrepancies between Paris and Suzhou and continue to uphold Paris as a relevant example.[89] Ultimately, this simplified narrative of Vichy and Pétain, the deployment of French collaboration and of the Pétain trial as universal resistentialist tropes of collaboration, and a distorted interpretation of the legal principles of Nuremberg and Tokyo came to compensate for Suzhou's shaky legal foundations and lack of political context, lending it most of its legitimacy.

CHEN GONGBO AND THE OTHER TOP LEADERS of the RNG who stood trial in Suzhou soon after him would certainly have met with harsh retribution after the collapse of the Japanese Empire even without the example of France and Pétain. Although public opinion appeared to be somewhat divided on the *hanjian* issue, deeply rooted resentment of the occupation would inevitably have led to their punishment. Indeed, today in China, the legitimacy of Chen's trial rests on the memory of Japanese war crimes, the RNG's association with them, and the RNG's repressive nature. After all, the Suzhou and Paris trials were both political rituals that had different meanings for different audiences and could thus work at different levels. Politically, they ended the credibility of a view of national defense that Jiang and de Gaulle wanted to erase from public memory. At the popular level, the spectacle of the trials, regardless of the propriety of their legal procedure, fulfilled a deeply felt need for retribution.

[86] *Dagongbao*, December 8, 1945.

[87] "Chengzhi hanjian anjian."

[88] For a discussion of Jiang Jieshi's decision in regard to Zhou Fohai's sentence and the political goals of the Suzhou trials, see Hwang, "Wartime Collaboration in Question." For a discussion of the confrontational relationship between Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, see So, *The Kuomintang Left*, and Zanasi, *Saving the Nation*.

[89] I borrow the expression "politics of retribution" from Deák, Gross, and Judt, *The Politics of Retribution in Europe*.

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Above all, they celebrated nationalist feelings in countries that had just regained their sovereignty.

There is no question that Jiang Jieshi consciously manipulated global trends, skillfully adopting new international trends that could work in his favor. However, he also genuinely embraced them. In his wartime appeal to the Western powers, for example, he used the language of post–World War I internationalism, both because he had come to believe in it and because it was an effective way to make his appeal compelling to the Western powers. In other words, Chinese leaders, including those on trial in Suzhou such as Zhou Fohai, had a relationship to globalization that was marked by both genuine participation and manipulation. The newspapers that supported the Nationalist narrative of collaboration also sincerely embraced a global view of China's wartime experience, although to some degree they were at the same time subject to Nationalist censorship and thus helped Jiang's agenda. The fact that the left-leaning *Minzhu*, which was not always hesitant to criticize Jiang, also helped to establish a resistentialist narrative of collaboration in Nationalist China illustrates that these newspapers expressed the emergence of a discourse on collaboration that went beyond Jiang and engaged China's public opinion at large. The complex "spatial dialectic" at the core of global political discourses is often complicated by such a combination of genuine participation and manipulation in the local process of appropriating worldwide unifying trends. This combination is a crucial aspect of the construction of the imagery of global political discourses. In a circular self-endorsing process, the language and tropes of global discourses become sources of legitimacy for local agendas. In turn, their global status is reinforced by this very process of local redeployment. This process thus changed both the Chinese local political debate and the resistentialist discourse on Pétain, which in the process of being constructed as a global symbol became increasingly simplified and detached from its original historical context.

When Chen Gongbo stood before the judges in Suzhou, his defense depended on explaining his motivations for joining Wang Jingwei's collaborationist government in Nanjing and, as Pétain had attempted in Paris, turning back the clock. In 1940, the war appeared to be lost, and many regarded collaboration as a valid option for negotiating with the Japanese (or in Pétain's case the Germans). Chen's trial, however, occurred in 1946. The Allies had won the war, and collaboration had proved to be an ineffective means of protecting national interests, revealing the weakness of that choice. Chen's defense thus seemed anachronistic in the new postwar political atmosphere. The war had changed the political environment not only because of Japan's defeat and Jiang's victory, but also because the Allies' war propaganda, the discourse on war crimes surrounding Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the European resistentialist discourse had substantially altered the political discourse in China.

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The Myth of the "Weak" American State

WILLIAM J. NOVAK

THE AMERICAN PRESENT IS AT ODDS with representations of the American past. The American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers as contemporary commentators such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Giorgio Agamben contemplate the contours of American hegemony and superpower in a new era of empire.[1] The global impact of present American politics, political economy, and foreign policy is obvious to any casual observer of current affairs. The story of the American past, on the other hand, continues to be told in narratives that seem to be heading off somewhere else. In place of the growth of power, the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of relative powerlessness—a usually benign tale of legal-political self-abnegation, emphasizing constitutional restraints such as federalism, checks and balances, the separation of powers, limited government, the rule of law, and laissez-faire. When presented more positively, American history is usually framed as a quest for freedom—the struggle for political liberty, emancipation from bondage, the rise of civil, economic, and social rights. Property, contract, and freedom of speech, press, and association form the constitutional backbone of a free market, a vigorous civil society, and a democratic polity—hallmarks of a free people. Oddly, key elements of this tale are kept alive in both older political histories of the liberal tradition in America and newer histories highlighting the rights and agency of particular cultural communities. Coming to terms with the historical rise of the mechanisms of legal, political, economic, corporate, and technological power that currently shape so much of the globe is thus a more difficult task than it should be. A true philosophical and political history of the American present continues to elude historians.[2]

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[1] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000); Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago, 2005).

[2] For some diverse examples of American history as a freedom narrative, see Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York, 1999); Sara M. Evans, *Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America* (New York, 1997); Melvin I. Urofsky and Paul Finkelman, *A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York, 2001); David Hackett Fischer, *Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America's Founding Ideas* (New York, 2004); James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, 2003); David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and*

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This disjunction between historical perception and political reality is not an entirely new phenomenon in the United States. As early as 1887, in a penetrating essay titled "The American State and the American Man," Albert Shaw chided Americans for their laissez-faire fantasy: "The average American has an unequaled capacity for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred delusions. He lives in one world of theory and in another world of practice . . . Never for a moment relinquishing their theory [of laissez-faire], the people of the United States have assiduously pursued and cherished a practical policy utterly inconsistent with that theory, and have not perceived the discrepancy." Surveying thousands of regulatory laws passed by state legislatures in the late nineteenth century, Shaw concluded that "the one common and striking characteristic of this huge collection of new statutes is its utter disregard of the laissez-faire principle . . . They deal with the citizen in every conceivable relation. They seem to have left nothing for future Legislatures to regulate." One hundred years later, in the middle of Ronald Reagan's America, Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings (D-SC) similarly observed the powerful role of government in the construction of modern life and its renunciation in the American historical self-conception. Seeking the 1984 Democratic nomination for president, Hollings delivered a stump speech deploying several different versions of a story about "a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of the GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made sure his parents' farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and irrigated with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get subsidized school lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a National Science Foundation grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and one day, took AMTRAK to Washington to complain to his congressman about getting big government off people's backs." Like many Americans, "the guy" never saw the role of collective power in the creation of his individual declaration of independence.[3]

Shaw and Hollings reveal a disconnect at the heart of the American experi-

War, 1929–1945 (New York, 2001). Historians who have advocated an analytical history of the present include James Harvey Robinson, *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York, 1912); Richard Hofstadter, "History and the Social Sciences," in Fritz Stern, ed., *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present* (New York, 1956), 359–370; Thomas Bender, "In Retrospect: The New History—Then and Now," *Reviews in American History* 12 (1984): 612–622; and Bender, "Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American History," *Journal of American History* 73 (1986): 120–136. Such a perspective also animates the work of James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (New York, 1998); David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society* (Chicago, 2001); and Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democracy Past and Future*, ed. Samuel Moyn (New York, 2007).

[3] Albert Shaw, "The American State and the American Man," *Contemporary Review* 51 (1887): 696; E. J. Dionne, Jr., *Why Americans Hate Politics*, reprint ed. (New York, 2004), back cover. I am grateful to my colleague Jim Sparrow for bringing the Hollings story to my attention. It echoes the rhetorical point made by Sidney Webb in "Socialism in England," *Publications of the American Economic Association* 4 (April 1889): 7–73, 65: "The Individualist City Councillor will walk along the municipal pavement, lit by municipal gas and cleansed by municipal brooms with municipal water, and seeing by the municipal clock in the municipal market, that he is too early to meet his children coming from the municipal school hard by the county lunatic asylum and municipal hospital, will use the national telegraph system to tell them not to walk through the municipal park but to come by the municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading room, by the municipal art gallery, museum and library, where he intends to consult some of the national publications in order to prepare his next speech in the municipal town-hall in favor of the nationalization of canals and the increase of the government control over the railway system. 'Socialism, sir,' he will say, 'don't waste the time of a practical man by your fantastic absurdities. Self help, sir, individual self-help, that's what's made our city what it is.' "

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ence—a tension between the story that Americans themselves like to tell themselves about individualism, self-reliance, voluntarism, associationalism, free labor, and the free market and the actual history of the "concrete national institutions," as Shaw put it, that have been capable of wielding such broad interventionist, coercive, and regulatory power at home as well as abroad. Samuel Huntington once dubbed this yawning gap between facts and norms "cognitive dissonance"—an almost pathological tendency to confuse a fictional American ideal with historical political reality. From Thomas Jefferson's elision of slavery in the Declaration of Independence to Ronald Reagan's anachronistic invocation of John Winthrop's shining "city upon a hill," examples are obvious and legion and not always merely rhetorical. At the turn of the last century, Roscoe Pound surveyed the damage done when the United States Supreme Court took a "long step into the past" and imposed the fallacy of "liberty of contract" on modern industrial labor relations, as if the parties were still individual "farmers haggling over the sale of a horse." As Pound's example suggests, the problem is one not so much of psychology as of political economy. Shaw and Hollings foreground a particular American version of the tension at the center of social and political thought—the relationship between liberty and power, freedom and authority, contract and coercion, and law and violence.[4]

A crucial aspect of this fraught American self-presentation concerns the nature, power, and reach of the American state. While much of modern history deals with the actions of powerful nation-states and the consequences of their rise, expansion, and sometimes fall, discussion of the American state (arguably one of the more influential in recent times) remains trapped in a different past and a peculiar idiom. The phrase "the American state" is seen as something of an oxymoron in a land of alleged "anti-statism" and "statelessness." When acknowledged at all, the American version of a state is viewed as something not quite fully formed—something less, something laggard, something underdeveloped compared to the mature governmental regimes that dominate modern European history. An enduring and exceptional tendency to view the American state throughout its history as distinctively "weak" continues to frustrate a reckoning with American power in the twenty-first century. The making and unmaking of this historical anachronism—the myth of the "weak" American state—requires further explanation.

THE TIRED MYTH OF THE "WEAK" AMERICAN STATE is to the history of American politics what the *Lochner* court is to American constitutional law and what laissez-faire is to American political economy. Like the myths of *Lochner* and laissez-faire, the idea of a weak American state is the product of a larger tendency to read American history as exceptional—as the history of the making of a "new world" specially outside the historical currents and corruptions of "old" Europe. It is part of the myth of America as a place of rebirth—of American Adam emerging fresh from a veritable state of nature. As John Locke mused with almost biblical cadence, "Thus in the beginning all the World was *America*."[5] The myth overemphasizes the so-called "natural" de-

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 3, 62; Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract," *Yale Law Journal* 18 (May 1909): 454–487, 454.

[5] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), 301. Or as J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur unpacked the image in Letter III of his *Letters from an American Farmer*, "What

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velopment of individualism, private rights, civil society, free labor, and a free economy in American history. And consequently, it downplays the more historical and "artificial" role of collective decision-making, public law, government, and regulation in American political-economic development. In this mythical narrative, the state itself is seen as something of a menacing European contrivance that never really finds a place in a free, unregulated, and stateless America.

The idea of a weak American state originated in some classic sources and analyses. Alexis de Tocqueville's comparative emphasis on individualism, associationalism, localism, and administrative decentralization led him to underestimate the power of the state in America. Although many of Tocqueville's prophecies concerning democratic and despotic trends have relevance today, his forecast concerning American state development was largely inaccurate. "Unless I am strangely mistaken," he hedged in 1835, "the federal government of the United States is tending to get daily weaker; stage by stage it withdraws from public affairs, continually narrowing its sphere of action. Being naturally weak, it gives up even the appearance of strength." G. W. F. Hegel continued the comparative European tradition of seeing in the American state something not wholly realized. Reflecting on what he perceived to be an "entire immunity from public burdens," Hegel questioned whether the United States was a "real State" at all: "The general object of the existence of this State is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity for a firm combination does not yet exist; for a real State and a real Government arise only after a distinction of classes has arisen." But even after the socioeconomic transformations of the late nineteenth century—when class distinctions and public burdens were clearly accelerating—a wide variety of commentators continued to find the answer to Werner Sombart's classic question "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" in an exceptional American political culture displaying a characteristic anti-statism.[6]

But ironically, the heyday for the popular expansion of the notion of the weak American state was the mid-twentieth century—in the heart of Henry Luce's "American Century." In the midst of brutal conflicts with totalitarian states, American scholars hesitated to draw direct comparisons between American politics and European statist regimes. On the contrary, a proliferation of "American studies" placed

then is the American, this new man? . . . He is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds." Crevecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America* (1782; repr., New York, 1982), 38. For more contemporary commentaries on this theme, see R. W. B. Lewis, *The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1955); and Arthur M. Schlesinger, "What Then Is the American, This New Man?" in Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present* (Boston, 1964), 3–23.

[6] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York, 1988), 394–395. Like any aspiring prophet, Tocqueville tried to have it both ways. After making the case for the weak state, he forecasted the possibility of an opposite development: "When men come to notice that the weakness of the federal government hazards the Union's existence, I have no doubt that one will see a reaction spring up in favor of strength . . . A change of opinion, an internal crisis, or a war could all at once restore the vigor it needs." Which way would it turn out? Tocqueville wisely concluded, "That is hidden in the future, and I cannot pretend to be able to lift the veil." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York, 1956), 85–86; Werner Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* trans. Patricia M. Hocking and C. T. Husbands (White Plains, N.Y., 1976). For the most current presentation of this recurring theme, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York, 2001); and Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York, 1997).

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renewed emphasis on an exceptional national historical trajectory—an alternative American *Sonderweg*—rooted in negative liberty, voluntarism, self-interested liberalism, and a self-regulating market, all limiting the role of the state in America's social and economic progress. In intense political times, historians such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., Daniel J. Boorstin, and, to a lesser extent, Louis Hartz fashioned a compelling and remarkably consistent national narrative that explained America's special path as the product of a persistent preference for society over polity, individual initiative over collective action, and private competition and voluntarism over public regulation and state direction. Within this ideologically charged interpretive template, the history of the American state (and its public policies and purposes) almost disappeared. Even radical governmental and regulatory interventions dissolved in the unbearably light miasma of national cultural mythology. Schlesinger's defanging of progressive reform was typical: "After the American fashion it was a doctrineless conviction, the product of an adjustment to new times for the sake of preserving the traditional spirit of self-reliance and free competition."[7]

But perhaps the most remarkable testament to the resilience of the myth of the weak American state is the degree to which this Cold War fiction has only been reinvigorated by post–Cold War fascination with neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization. Despite an impressive social scientific effort in the 1980s and 1990s "to bring the state back in" to the study of American history, led by pioneering historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol and political scientists such as Stephen Skowronek, the myth of the weak American state persists. The overarching tendency to characterize the American state as something of a false pretender to Hegel's notion of a "real State" continues unabated despite the proliferation of state-centered analyses of American political development. As Skowronek characteristically concluded, "One anomaly begets another. American exceptionalism has not been transcended by twentieth-century state-building, it has only taken on a new form." That new form has generated a series of odd adjectives that dot the bibliographic landscape as scholars strain to measure and gauge American state power with instruments and models seemingly devised for another time and place. The modern American state is still routinely described as "exceptional," "laggard," "incomplete," "backward," "uneasy," "maternalist," "reluctant," and "divided," reflecting the hold of historical typologies and teleologies first devised by European social theorists in the second half of the nineteenth century.[8] The tendency to talk about the American state using the explicit terminology of "weak" vs. "strong" has never been more prevalent. And for

[7] Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present*, 22; Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1958); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York, 1955); John Higham, "Changing Paradigms: The Collapse of Consensus History," *Journal of American History* 76 (September 1989): 460–466.

[8] Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York, 1985); Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Skocpol, *Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, N.J., 1995); Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (New York, 1982). These adjectives are taken from Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 5, 288; Skocpol, *Social Policy*, 12; as well as Barry D. Karl, *The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945* (Chicago, 1983); Bruce S. Jansson, *The Reluctant Welfare State: A History of American Social Welfare Policies* (Belmont, Calif., 1988); Jacob S. Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States* (Cambridge, 2002); and Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of the Welfare State* (New York, 1993).

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most commentators, the feeble side of that polarity (in an improbable tortoise-and-hare kind of twist) still appears to be winning. The American state remains in some of the most influential historical and theoretical accounts "a patchwork," "a hapless giant," "a weakened spring," "an incomplete conquest," and "a Tudor polity"—in a word, an anachronism.[9]

But of course, the modern American state is anything but an anachronism, and its special force in the twenty-first century has already sparked a burgeoning historical revision. This revision builds directly on the contributions of an impressive number of senior scholars—Morton Keller, Harry Scheiber, Samuel Hays, Ellis Hawley, Barry Karl, Louis Galambos, Theodore Lowi, David Mayhew, Otis Graham, Thomas McCraw, Martha Derthick, William Brock, and Elliot Brownlee, among others—who resisted the trend and investigated the actual power and policies of the American state in some detail.[10] Moreover, this reconsideration would have been unimaginable but for the new energy and insight thrust into state studies by Theda Skocpol, Stephen Skowronek, Karen Orren, their collaborators, and early contributors to such influential journals as *Studies in American Political Development* and the *Journal of Policy History*. But this revision has really taken on a life and agenda of its own among a somewhat more junior group of scholars—historians and political scientists who have come of age in an era when European state regimes have appeared comparatively less threatening and more contained, while the American form of legal and economic order is being aggressively extended across the globe. The obvious present reality of American state power in the early twenty-first century is

[9] Frank Dobbin and John R. Sutton, "The Strength of the Weak State: The Employment Rights Revolution and the Rise of Human Resource Management Divisions," *American Journal of Sociology* 104 (1998): 441–476; Gary G. Hamilton and John R. Sutton, "The Problem of Control in the Weak State: Domination in the United States, 1880–1920," *Theory and Society* 18 (1989): 1–46; Robert C. Lieberman, "Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race Policy in the United States, Great Britain, and France," *Studies in American Political Development* 16 (2002): 138–161. As J. P. Nettl summed up this stateless tradition in American social thought, "The relative 'statelessness' of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States, with the long period during which the egalitarian and pluralistic society predicted with sensitive fingertips by Tocqueville was becoming institutionalized over a vast continent. One has only to read [Seymour Martin] Lipset or [William C.] Mitchell to see that an American sociopolitical self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of the state." Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968): 559–592, 561; Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 37, 290; Wallace D. Farnham, " 'The Weakened Spring of Government': A Study in Nineteenth-Century American History," *American Historical Review* 68, no. 3 (April 1963): 662–680; Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago, 1983), 130; Theodore J. Lowi, *American Government: Incomplete Conquest* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1976); Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics* 18 (1966): 378–414, 382.

[10] For a sampling from these prolific authors, see Morton Keller, *Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Harry N. Scheiber, *Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820–1861* (Athens, Ohio, 1969); Samuel P. Hays, *American Political History as Social Analysis* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1980); Ellis Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton, N.J., 1966); Barry Karl, *The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945* (Chicago, 1983); Louis Galambos, ed., *The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War II* (Baltimore, Md., 1987); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York, 1969); David R. Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–1990* (New Haven, Conn., 1991); Otis L. Graham, *Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York, 1976); Thomas K. McCraw, *Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); Martha Derthick, ed., *Dilemmas of Scale in America's Federal Democracy* (New York, 1999); William R. Brock, *Investigation and Responsibility: Public Responsibility in the United States, 1865–1900* (New York, 1984); W. Elliot Brownlee, ed., *Funding the Modern American State, 1941–1995: The Rise and Fall of the Era of Easy Finance* (New York, 1993).

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forcing a much-needed reconsideration of the history of the rise of a global leviathan.[11]

The most significant and lasting tenet of this revisionism is that the American state is and always has been more powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and redistributive than was recognized in earlier accounts of U.S. history. New histories of the American state strive to grasp one of the fundamental facts about modern American history—the development of a legal-economic and geopolitical hegemon. That is what contemporary American historians need to explain. Amid the torrent of exceptionalist analyses of the limits, weakness, and backwardness of the American state, American history has overlooked the elephant in the room—the steadily aggrandizing authority of one of the most powerful nation-states in world history.

Reoriented toward explaining that forceful reality, American history reveals ample evidence of the construction of American state power from the earliest days of the republic to the very recent past. Max Edling, for example, has recently re-centered the history of the American founding around the creation of a strong "fiscal-military" state, corroborating Hannah Arendt's observation that "the true objective of the American Constitution was not to limit but to create more power, actually to establish and duly constitute an entirely new power center." If there ever was a weak state in the United States, it might have been under the Articles of Confederation—a government quickly overturned in a most conspicuous act of state-building. Jerry Mashaw has similarly traced the origins of a powerful and centralizing national administrative law to the first days of the republic, challenging the historical fiction that a national bureaucracy and administrative regulatory authority awaited the invention of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Richard John has almost single-handedly revised notions of the lack of central government direction in the nineteenth century through his meticulous reconstructions of the ubiquitous role of the state in the promotion and regulation of communications infrastructure, from the post office to the telegraph and telephone. Richard White has placed federal government power at the center of the new western history of Indian removal, military and commercial development, and westward expansion. As the work of a generation of social and cultural historians makes clear, Indian removal, slavery, immigration restriction, and racial, ethnic, religious, and gender-based forms of segregation and discrimination were not the products of laissez-faire or a hesitancy to draw on the powers of the state or a public preference for leaving people alone. The trail of the state is over all.[12]

[11] The bibliography in Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, *The Search for American Political Development* (New York, 2004), offers an excellent guide to the first wave of political science studies. For recent assessments in line with the direction of this article, see Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, "Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State" (forthcoming, 2008); Peter Baldwin, "Beyond Weak and Strong: Rethinking the State in Comparative Policy History," *Journal of Policy History* 17 (November 2005): 12–33; and Richard R. John, ed., *Ruling Passions: Political Economy in Nineteenth Century America* (University Park, Pa., 2006).

[12] Max M. Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State* (New York, 2003); Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1963), 152; Jerry L. Mashaw, "Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801," *Yale Law Journal* 115 (2006): 1256–1344; Richard R. John, *Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); John, "Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835," *Studies in American Political Development* 11 (Fall 1997): 347–380; John Lauritz Larson, *Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States* (Chapel Hill,

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The powerful role of the American state in policing labor has been the dominant theme of a cottage industry of work on "the state and the unions." Richard Bensel, among others, has refocused attention on the role of economic policymaking in the creation of a truly national (and later international) commercial marketplace in the United States. And police power regulation was no less present in the social arena, from temporary experiments such as Prohibition to more sustained developments in criminal justice and penal policy. It is worth remembering in this context that John Stuart Mill's classic examples of governmental overreaching in *On Liberty* came from the United States, not Europe: Sunday laws, liquor regulation, and the persecution of the Mormons.[13]

The formative powers of American fiscal, tax, price, and monetary policies are also attracting new attention. David Moss has documented the long history of active American state regulation of risk. Michele Landis Dauber has charted the equally long history of national emergency and disaster relief. And a host of new histories from Christopher Howard, Jacob Hacker, Jennifer Klein, John Witt, and James Wooten have begun to reevaluate the powerful redistributive effects of America's "hidden" social welfare and social insurance state. The explosive growth of federal administration and bureaucracy in the twentieth century has taken on new significance in the histories of Sidney Milkis, Daniel Carpenter, and Brian Balogh. One can hardly explain the rise of American military might or national and international commercial development—let alone the role of the prison or the death penalty or racial segregation or executive emergency and war-making powers in American public life—by continued reference to a weak state tradition. The idea of American state weakness, statelessness, or anti-statism is quickly being abandoned. Such formulations no longer explain the past, and they certainly cannot account for the present.[14]

N.C., 2000); Mark R. Wilson, *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865* (Baltimore, Md., 2006); Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A New History of the American West* (Norman, Okla., 1991); Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's Relations to Slavery* (New York, 2001); Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 2002); Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001); Sarah Barringer Gordon, *The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); Barbara Young Welke, *Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad Revolution* (New York, 2001).

[13] Christopher L. Tomlins, *The State and the Unions: Law and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960* (New York, 1985); Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris, eds., *Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise* (New York, 1993); William E. Forbath, *Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Daniel R. Ernst, *Lawyers against Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism* (Urbana, Ill., 1995); Ernst, "Law and American Political Development, 1877–1938," *Reviews in American History* 26 (March 1998): 205–219; Richard Franklin Bensel, *The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900* (New York, 2000); Colleen A. Dunlavy, *Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); Richard Sylla, "The Progressive Era and the Political Economy of Big Government," *Critical Review* 5 (1992): 531–557; Richard F. Hamm, *Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity, 1880–1920* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995); Michael Willrich, *City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago* (New York, 2003); David S. Tanenhaus, *Juvenile Justice in the Making* (New York, 2005); Rebecca McLennan, *The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American Penal State* (New York, 2008); Markus Dirk Dubber and Mariana Valverde, eds., *The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance* (Palo Alto, Calif., 2006); John Stuart Mill, *"On Liberty" and Other Writings* (Cambridge, 1989), 89–91.

[14] Julian E. Zelizer, *Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945–1975* (New York,

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Especially in our present neoliberal moment, we should not be lulled into thinking that the American state is somehow retreating (after the New Deal and World War II, after the Great Society and Vietnam) to a more familiar pattern of privatization, deregulation, and laissez-faire. Despite the rising rhetoric, the power of the U.S. government to regulate, study, order, discipline, and punish its citizens—as well as other nations' citizens—has never been greater. As we confront contemporary neoliberalism, we should be attuned to what Sheldon Wolin calls the "paradox of power" in late modernity—that "power is simultaneously concentrated and disaggregated."[15]

In contrast to the myth of the weak American state, the historical revision already well under way attempts to document the conscious and continuous construction of new forms of state power throughout American history. This story of state development does not fit into established categories such as classical liberalism vs. modern social democracy or Gilded Age conservatism vs. Progressive Era reform. And it bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissez-faire, voluntarism, or anti-statism. Instead, it is the story of the creation of extraordinarily powerful modern mechanisms of American governance. Liberalism and the rule of law were crucial parts of this new state regime. But as Frankfurt School social theorist Franz Neumann warned, one should not "fall victim to a historical fallacy" of associating liberal and legal elements with weakness: "The liberal state has always been as strong as the political and social situation and the interests of society demanded. It has conducted warfare and crushed strikes; with the help of strong navies it has protected its investment, with the help of strong armies it has defended and extended its boundaries, with the help of the police it has restored 'peace and order.' It . . .

2000); Ajay K. Mehrotra, "Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax," *UCLA Law Review* 52 (August 2005): 1793–1866; Meg Jacobs, *Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton, N.J., 2005); David A. Moss, *When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Michele Landis Dauber, "Fate, Responsibility, and 'Natural' Disaster Relief: Narrating the American Welfare State," *Law and Society Review* 33 (1999): 257–318; Christopher Howard, *The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, N.J., 1997); Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State*; Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State* (Princeton, N.J., 2003); John Fabian Witt, *The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); James A. Wooten, *The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Political History* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004); Michael B. Katz, *The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State* (New York, 2001); Edward D. Berkowitz, *America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan* (Baltimore, Md., 1991); Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York, 1993); Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928* (Princeton, N.J., 2001); Brian Balogh, *Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975* (New York, 1991); Joanna Lynn Grisinger, "Reforming the State: Reorganization and the Federal Government, 1937–1964" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2005); David Garland, "Capital Punishment and American Culture," *Punishment & Society* 7 (2005): 347–376; Bartholomew H. Sparrow, *From the Outside In: World War II and the American State* (Princeton, N.J., 1996); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York, 2000); James T. Sparrow, "Americanism and Entitlement: Authorizing Big Government in an Age of Total War" (unpublished ms.); Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, eds., *Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development* (Princeton, N.J., 2002).

[15] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, expanded ed. (Princeton, N.J., 2004), xxi; David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York, 2005); John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, eds., *Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism* (Durham, N.C., 2001).

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has rested upon force and law, upon sovereignty and freedom." This complex character of the American liberal state—embracing both force and law, sovereignty and freedom, contract and compulsion—demands new methods of historical evaluation.[16]

IN A PROVOCATIVE REVIEW OF A RECENT SURVEY of historical sociology and political development, sociologist Andrew Abbott drew attention to the overwhelming bibliographical dominance of "the mainline European tradition" of classic social theory (Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and their progeny) in thinking about the social and political conditions of modernity and the almost total neglect of American social theory (James, Peirce, Ward, Dewey, Cooley, Mead, and Thomas). Abbott's observation is even more apposite when we consider models of modern state development. The major problem plaguing historical investigations of the American state is the tendency to force American experience into a theoretical frame designed around the emergence of modern European nation-states more than a century ago. In particular, the ideal types of Max Weber thoroughly dominate these assessments. Governmental organization and policymaking are routinely measured against Weber's chief characteristics of modern statecraft: (1) a rationalized and generalized legal and administrative order amenable to legislative change; (2) a bureaucratic apparatus of officers conducting official business with reference to an impersonal order of administrative regulations; (3) the power to bind—to rule and regulate—all persons (national citizens) and all actions within the state's official jurisdiction via its laws; and (4) the legitimate authority to use force, violence, and coercion within the prescribed territory as prescribed by the duly constituted government. Unification, centralization, rationalization, organization, administration, and bureaucratization have become the theoretical hallmarks of fully developed, essentially modern states. Any departures or anomalies from this European model come to be seen as signs of underdevelopment—of backwardness or lag—usually chalked up to the peculiarities of the English or the Americans. In the social-theoretic teleology emanating from continental Europe, the American state is almost predetermined to fall short—predestined for perpetual weak state status.[17]

But is there an alternative model of state development? Is there a way of looking at the American state differently—anew—from within rather than from without? Are there other methods of assessing the special techniques, functions, and processes

[16] Franz L. Neumann, "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society," in William E. Scheuerman, ed., *The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer* (Berkeley, Calif., 1996), 101–141, 101. See also Paul Starr, *Freedom's Power: The True Force of Liberalism* (New York, 2007).

[17] Andrew Abbott, "A Brief Note on Pasturization," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 47 (2006): 343–348. Abbott attributed this dominance of European over American social theory to "the long, long shadow of Talcott Parsons." Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*, 2 vols. (New York, 1937); Charles Camic, "Reputation and Predecessor Selection: Parsons and the Institutionalists," *American Sociological Review* 57 (August 1992): 421–445. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), 154–156; Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1978), 1: 217–220; Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge, 1971); Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge, 1990).

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of American government without reducing differences to defects or shortcomings? Are there other explanatory tools that better account for the distinctive power of the American machinery of governance? Can we make more interpretive room for the American state?

The historical revision under way makes some progress in this direction of seeing and demystifying the American state. Indeed, in the interstices of these new histories, we can begin to detect the outlines of an American model of state development. Five themes are particularly salient: first, a simple growing appreciation of the historic strength of some theoretically designated "weak" states; second, a pragmatic approach to the problem of power; third, a recognition of the significance of distribution in American state-building; fourth, a realistic account of the power of the American rule of law; and fifth, a critical interrogation of the public-private distinction.

Weak states as strong states. There certainly was a time when it made perfect sense to celebrate the European and Weberian attributes of centralization, rationalization, and bureaucratization as models of state strength and the epitome of political modernity. In the early twentieth century, such states dominated the world stage, and the future seemed to be unfolding along lines anticipated by classic social theory. But things look remarkably different from the perspective of the early twenty-first century. Highly centralized and bureaucratized state apparatuses now appear antiquated rather than modern, reflecting a bricks-and-mortar conception of the political rendered increasingly obsolete by globalization, flexible specialization, outsourcing, networking, and open-source modes of organization and governance. Given the changing scale and social geography of the twenty-first century, the ideal-typical state of classic social theory looks more like a remnant of the past than a harbinger of the future. Moreover, the degree to which some highly centralized and bureaucratized authoritarian states have proved short-lived and surprisingly fragile when compared to their English and American counterparts suggests that "strong" and "weak" might not map particularly well onto the classic typologies. Indeed, recently a number of scholars have begun exploring the extraordinary "strength" of historically designated "weak" states—especially the United States.[18]

But in the end, the topsy-turvy exercise of showing weak states to be strong and vice versa only further demonstrates the limits of the existing theoretical framework and the imprecision of the interpretive language. After all, what do we mean when we talk about a state as weak or strong? Are we talking about the organization of officialdom or the reach of public authority? Are we talking structure or function, process or substance, inputs or outputs, scale or scope, law-making or law enforcement, people or policies? At precisely the point where an interesting substantive discussion of the multifaceted nature of governance should begin, the weak vs. strong state debate usually devolves into a rather vapid (and endless) discussion of the proper unit of measurement.

[18] On the interrelationship of issues of scale, social geography, and statecraft, see Benjamin Constant, *Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1988); Craig Calhoun, "The Infrastructure of Modernity: Indirect Social Relationships, Information Technology, and Social Integration," in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser, eds., *Social Change and Modernity* (Berkeley, Calif., 1992), 205–236; and Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford, 2000). Dobbin and Sutton, "The Strength of the Weak State"; Lieberman, "Weak State, Strong Policy."

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The sociologist Michael Mann offers a way out here with his helpful distinction between two different meanings of state power—*despotic* power and *infrastructural* power. By despotic power, Mann refers to the organizational capacity of state elites to rule unchecked by other centers of power or by civil society. Infrastructural power, in contrast, refers to the positive capacity of the state to "penetrate civil society" and implement policies throughout a given territory. Mann's distinction nicely accounts for some of the confusion surrounding the power of the American state. The American state (like the American Revolution that produced it) is organized against despotic power. It is obsessive about separating and distributing powers and creating checks, balances, and offsets within the formal constitutional organization of government: federal vs. state vs. local; executive vs. legislative vs. judicial; popularly elected vs. appointed officials; short terms vs. life tenures; big states vs. small states; the creation of a fourth branch of government (administrative agencies) and an independent fourth estate (the press). It is no doubt this divided and dispersed organization of governance that most have in mind when they talk too loosely about American anti-statism or statelessness. Legal historian Willard Hurst defined American constitutionalism precisely by this anti-despotic penchant for balancing power and for reining in the autonomous authority of state elites: "Any kind of organized power ought to be measured against criteria of ends and means which are not defined or enforced by the immediate power holders themselves. It is as simple as that: We don't want to trust any group of power holders to be their own judges upon the ends for which they use the power or the ways in which they use it."[19]

But while the *despotic* power of the American state (until recent times) might have been limited, the scale and scope of its *infrastructural* power is and always has been extensive. From the founding of the first national governing institutions to the conquest of western lands; from the creation of a vast public infrastructure for the promotion of commerce to the construction of a powerful defense and military establishment; from the expansion of governmental powers of police, regulation, administration, and redistribution to the invention of new ways of policing citizens, aliens, races, morals, and gender relations in the production of national culture, the infrastructural power of the American state seems at times boundless, even borderless, as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural forms spread across the globe. It is this power—infrastructural power—that renders commentary about American state weakness or statelessness unintelligible. And it raises the intriguing interpretive possibility that the very anti-despotic organization of the American state might actually increase its infrastructural capacity.

It is hard to imagine better models to measure and compare despotic state power than the ones developed by classic European social theory. After all, despotism was the chief problem of European political thought for most of its history. But for understanding infrastructural power—the actual power of state policies in action to have real effects on population—American social theory offers some advantages.

[19] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford, 1986), 109–136; James Willard Hurst, "Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order," *Oklahoma Law Review* 24 (1971): 224–238, 225; Hurst, *Justice Holmes on Legal History* (New York, 1964), 29, 31. For further discussion of this point, see William J. Novak, "Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst," *Law and History Review* 18 (2000): 97–145.

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The problem of a distinctly new kind of coercive power emerging within popular sovereignties, democratic societies, and modern economies—a power more diffuse, less visible, less clearly identified with a single individual (i.e., the king) or institution (i.e., the church), sometimes private as well as public, woven into the everyday substructure of modern social and economic organization—was exactly the problem of early American social science. The pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, the institutional economics of Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, the sociology of Lester Frank Ward and Charles Horton Cooley, and the functional jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound and Robert Lee Hale provide an alternative template for examining modern state development.[20]

Pragmatism. One of the great achievements of the pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and their followers was to forge a workaday skepticism about the ability of abstract theories, formal definitions, ideal typologies, and metaphysical generalities of all sorts (what legal realist Felix Cohen would later deride as "transcendental nonsense") to accurately reflect the real world. In place of evaluating the practical world according to ideal theoretical models, pragmatism advocated a more bottom-up approach—examining how ideas and institutions actually functioned in the real world. Pragmatism endorsed an anti-formalist, realistic, pluralistic, and instrumental approach to knowledge and investigation. It measured truth claims by studying outcomes—the actual effects and consequences of ideas and institutions in practice. As James so provocatively put it, truth was something that "happens to an idea"—its "cash-value"—its ability to carry us usefully from one place to another and to make common sense out of human and historical experience. In place of endless metaphysical debates about definitions, essences, norms, formulas, models, and first principles, pragmatism promoted the actual social investigation of an idea's real-world consequences for living human beings.[21]

The influence of the pragmatic method resounded well beyond philosophy. In law, economics, sociology, political science, and history, pragmatic approaches defined American social theory and social science in the early twentieth century. In law, governance, and statecraft, pragmatism yielded an impatience with technical discussions of the formal attributes of "the state" or the essence of the "rule of law" or the definition of "sovereignty," and a quest for a more sociological investigation of state policies and practices in action. John R. Commons, for example, dismissed the intellectual surplusage spent debating the nature of the state or sovereignty in favor of a more realistic examination of the everyday activities of governance. Commons approached the state simply as a "going concern," best grasped by looking at

[20] For a sampling, see William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York, 1907); John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York, 1935); Richard T. Ely, *Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth*, 2 vols. (New York, 1914); John R. Commons, *Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy* (New York, 1934); Lester Frank Ward, *Dynamic Sociology; or, Applied Social Science* (New York, 1898); Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York, 1909); Roscoe Pound, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 3 pts., *Harvard Law Review* 24 (1911): 591–619; 25 (1912): 140–168, 489–516; Robert Lee Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State," *Political Science Quarterly* 38 (1923): 470–494.

[21] Felix Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," *Columbia Law Review* 35 (1935): 809–849; James, *Pragmatism*, 74, 201. For the best treatment of American pragmatism, see James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Social Thought* (New York, 1986).

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what it actually did in the real world. For Commons, "the state in reality" was no more than its "officials in action." In law, legal realist Karl Llewellyn charted a similar detour around the "myth, folderol, and claptrap" of normative debate about law's nature and toward the direct examination of law-in-action rather than law-in-theory. He echoed Commons's realistic, matter-of-fact, action-oriented approach: "The doing of something about disputes is the business of law. And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. *What these officials do about disputes is to my mind, the law itself.* And rules through all of this are important so far as they help you see or predict what officials will do. That is all their importance, except as pretty playthings."[22]

The American pragmatic and realist approach to the state, in other words, eschewed the kind of abstract, formal definitions and typologies that dominate state theory—the "pretty playthings" that routinely underestimate American state power. It recommended instead that one look in detail at what state officials of all kinds (not just state elites, but mayors, councilors, clerks, regulators, tax collectors, administrative court judges, police, jailers, grand juries, etc.) actually did. The pragmatic perspective aimed at action-oriented "how" questions—how officials acted, how policy was made, how government functioned—as opposed to more essentialist questions about the nature or essence of law or the state. Pragmatists viewed the state through the "technologies of public action" that affected the day-to-day conduct and practices of real people in the real world. This active, sociological conception of public power—power is as power does—stands a much better chance of taking the full measure of the American state.[23]

The distribution of power. A primary reason that American state power remains so hidden is that it is so widely distributed among an exceedingly complex welter of institutions, jurisdictions, branches, offices, programs, rules, customs, laws, and regulations. There are more than 89,000 separate governmental units operating in the United States. Beneath the national government and 50 state governments, 3,033 counties, 19,492 municipal governments, 16,519 town or township governments, 37,381 special district governments, and 13,051 school districts all function with differing self-governing powers and further official subdivisions. Within the national government itself, the division, separation, and distribution of power can be overwhelming. The legislative branch includes 2 houses, 435 congressional districts, and more than 200 committees and subcommittees. The judicial branch encompasses 94 separate federal judicial districts as well as a host of special courts. The executive bureaucracy reaches across 15 separate departments and more than 137 federal agencies and commissions that in 2006 alone printed almost 80,000 pages of proposed rules, regulations, and orders in the Federal Register.

One gets an even better sense of the extraordinary breadth and diversity of American state organization by looking at a single area of policymaking such as criminal law enforcement. In 2004, almost 18,000 local and state police agencies employed

[22] John R. Commons, *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (Madison, Wis., 1957), 367; Commons, *A Sociological View of Sovereignty, 1899–1900* (New York, 1965); Karl N. Llewellyn, *The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study* (New York, 1930), 3–5.

[23] Hendrik Hartog, *Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Public Law, 1730–1870* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983), 66.

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731,903 full-time law enforcement officers. Another 106,000 officers were employed by federal agencies such as the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and U.S. Customs and Immigration. The 1995 and 1999 censuses of corrections and jails document a vast carceral network that continues to grow: 3,365 local jails housing 605,943 inmates, 1,375 state correctional facilities with 941,642 inmates, and 125 federal prisons with 81,930 inmates. The American corrections system employs more than half a million people. The State's Attorney's Office in Cook County, Illinois, alone employs more than 900 prosecutors. And this hulking criminal justice system is dwarfed by the vast American military and national security apparatus. This extraordinary distribution of officialdom is certainly not the product of a weak state. Nor is it a wholly recent invention. Looked at pragmatically, this vast proliferation of American governmental offices and official activities is something of a behemoth.[24]

The characteristic sprawl of the American state is key to both its distinctive strength and its elusive nature. In classic European social theory, the state is integrated vertically through an organized hierarchy of offices with clear lines of rationalized authority, supervision, and appeal. The American state, in contrast, is organized more horizontally. Power is separated and divided rather than integrated. Jurisdictions frequently overlap, and authority is routinely delegated downward to relatively autonomous sub-units of government. Examples include the historic power of local school boards in the United States as well as the self-governing powers of home-rule municipalities. The police power—the open-ended power of government to regulate in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare—remains formally in the hands of states rather than the national government. Under the dual federalist terms of the U.S. Constitution, the national government has only specifically delegated powers. The 10th Amendment reserves all non-delegated power for the states or (more problematic for classic state theory) for the people. Thus, to try to gauge the power of the American state or the reach of American public policy by looking simply at the national center or the federal bureaucracy is to miss where much of the action is—at the local and state levels—on the periphery. As Jack Greene noted, American government started on the periphery, developing powers of self-rule far removed from the imperial metropole. This American state grew by developing effective mechanisms for policing an ever-expanding and diverse territory. Coming to terms with the American state requires a better understanding of this power on the periphery.[25]

[24] United States Department of Commerce, *Census of Governments* (Washington, D.C., 2007); United States Department of Justice, *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies* (Washington, D.C., 2004); United States Department of Justice, *Census of Federal Law Enforcement Officers* (Washington, D.C., 2004); United States Department of Justice, *Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities* (Washington, D.C., 1995); United States Department of Justice, *Census of Jails* (Washington, D.C., 1999).

[25] Thomas J. Sugrue, "All Politics Is Local: The Persistence of Localism in Twentieth-Century America," in Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History* (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 301–326; David Barron, "Reclaiming Home Rule," *Harvard Law Review* 116 (2003): 2255–2386; William J. Novak, *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996); Edward S. Corwin, "The Passing of Dual Federalism," *Virginia Law Review* 36 (1950): 1–24; Harry N. Scheiber, "Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System," *Law & Society Review* 14 (1980): 663–722; Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788* (Athens, Ohio, 1986).

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While classic state theory concentrates on assessing state power at the center, it is not so effective at measuring the extension of power to the borderlands. Peripheral power is by definition infrastructural power—the reach of the state to the furthest limits of the realm. The techniques of effective infrastructural and peripheral government are different from the tactics of central despotisms of old—as different as the task of defending the majesty of the crown at the center is from policing the everyday practices of the people on the frontier. Indeed, anti-despotic governmental structures are frequently prerequisites for effective infrastructural governance and peripheral expansion. Techniques of diffusion, distribution, delegation, incorporation, shared power, open and democratic processes, popular oversight, and local self-government, therefore, are not necessarily signs of state weakness. On the contrary, in many cases they are the foundation of infrastructural governmental strength. The American system of government, with its peculiar array of distributive technologies of state action—divided sovereignty, separation of powers, federalism, delegation, incorporation, and the rule of law—allows for an extraordinary penetration of the state through civil society to the periphery. It also allows for a popular and legal legitimation of rule that has evaded some of the most centralized despotisms.

The rule of law. A pragmatic approach to American state power thus requires an examination of the state in action rather than in theory, from the bottom up rather than the top down, taking account of the periphery as much as the center, horizontal organization as much as vertical consolidation, and the distribution, separation, and delegation of power as much as its centralization, rationalization, and integration. There is another element without which it is impossible to fully account for state power in the United States, and that is the rule of law. One of the distinctive attributes of American governance is the central place of law in state formation and policy development. From the pivotal role of the Constitution in the creation of the nation to the pervasiveness of law, courts, judges, lawyers, and legal standards in everyday policymaking, the United States is distinctly a legal or jural state.

But as with the distribution and separation of powers, the legality of the American state has also been a constant source of confusion and misinterpretation. Emphasizing primarily the naysaying function of constitutional judicial review, the rule of law is too often portrayed simply as a limit or check on American state power—an obstacle to the development of modern administrative or regulatory authority. From the progressive histories of Charles Beard to the enduring mythology surrounding the *Lochner* court, law has been continually represented as something of a conservative roadblock to liberal reform—part of a reactionary and exceptional American juridical tradition that continually frustrates the development of a proper American welfare state.[26]

But as sociological jurists, legal realists, and legal historians have been pointing

[26] See, for example, Charles A. Beard, *Contemporary American History, 1877–1913* (New York, 1914); J. Allen Smith, *The Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government* (New York, 1930); Frank J. Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution* (New York, 1911); Benjamin R. Twiss, *Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court* (Princeton, N.J., 1942); Arnold M. Paul, *Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887–1895* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960). For a critical discussion of this literature, see William J. Novak, "The Legal Origins of the Modern American State," in Bryant Garth, Robert Kagan, and Austin Sarat, eds., *Looking Back at Law's Century: Time, Memory, Change* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2002), 249–283.

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out for some time now, American law has functioned as far more than a constitutional limitation on state development. Rather, law has long been an indispensable and creative source of expanding political and economic power, playing a uniquely positive rather than negative role in the creation of the modern American state. Willard Hurst has been the foremost exponent of such a realistic and positivist view of law's power, noting that in place of a "series of Thou Shalt Nots addressed to power holders," law should be understood as "the application of politically organized compulsion upon men's wills." Hurst's pioneering histories documented the constant involvement of law in state policymaking, from the instrumental transformation of contract, property, and tort, giving legally protected scope to market action in the nineteenth century, to the no less radical expansion of the police power and administrative and regulatory law in the twentieth century.[27] One can hardly begin to account for the rise of a modern state in the United States without examining crucial changes in police and criminal law; tort and contract law; labor and immigration law; corporation law; tax, finance, and securities law; regulation and administration; transportation and the law of public utilities; and laws involving health, education, and welfare. American state power is a product of legal processes of extraordinary depth, diversity, and durability. The output of those processes—whether as executive order, federal statute, judicial interpretation, statutory interpretation, administrative rulemaking, state legislation, municipal ordinance, or even everyday police action—must be taken into account. Without a thorough examination of state action through law, courts, judges, and other legal officials, the power of the American state will remain elusive.

Recently scholars such as John Skrentny, Robert Lieberman, Desmond King, Paul Frymer, and Sean Farhang have been reexamining law as an important source of American state power.[28] Even private litigation is coming to be seen as but another distinctive American technology for achieving state objectives through alternative means. Indeed, four of the most far-reaching policy initiatives in recent American history—civil rights, environmental protection, workplace and consumer safety, and the Americans with Disabilities Act—have all relied on private litigation as a strategy of public law enforcement. And the radical reach and relative effectiveness of such policies should quickly dispel the suggestion that law, courts, and litigation are somewhat "lesser" or "weaker" forms of state action. On the contrary, such examples demonstrate the extraordinary infrastructural power of law: litigation's ability to generate a citizen enforcement mechanism (so-called private attorneys general) extending deep into civil society and all the way to the periphery—well beyond the capabilities of the largest central bureaucracy. When we add to this extensive reach law's unique ability to generate its own internal standards of normative legitimacy, we have an effective tool of American state power indeed.

[27] Hurst, "Problems of Legitimacy," 228; James Willard Hurst, *Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836–1915* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 109.

[28] John D. Skrentny, "Law and the American State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 32 (2006): 213–244; Lieberman, "Weak State, Strong Policy"; Desmond King, "The American State and Social Engineering: Policy Instruments in Affirmative Action," *Governance* 20 (2007): 109–126; Paul Frymer, "Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 483–499; Sean Farhang, "The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2005).

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Public and private. The private attorneys general concept suggests a final crucial component in an American model of state development: the public-private distinction. The degree to which American state power penetrates the boundaries of civil society is perhaps best reflected in the way in which it defines and utilizes the private sphere. This cuts two ways. First, the American state historically has consistently used the private sector to accomplish public objectives. The private enforcement of public law through private prosecution, nuisance law, the *posse comitatus*, and privately collected fines and fees is but one example. The use of the state's powers of incorporation to promote the development of a national infrastructure through the delegation of special powers such as eminent domain to bridge companies, canals, and railroads is another. Private associations, including New York City's Committee of Fifteen, the American Social Hygiene Association, and the American Protective League, continued to play a role in criminal law enforcement, social and moral vigilance, and collective self-defense into the twentieth century. Rather than monopolize power, property, and policy in the hands of a central public sovereign, the American state less visibly distributed public goods and powers widely through the private sector—enforcing its public capabilities, expanding its jurisdiction, and enhancing its legitimacy in the process.[29]

While the history of private policing, government subsidies, and other delegations of public power to the private sphere is fairly well documented, the other side of the public-private distinction—the role of the American state in the very creation of the private sphere—is less routinely acknowledged. From the role of state charters in the establishment of associations and corporations to the role of law in the policing of property, the family, the market, and cultural life, the public powers of the jural state were crucial to the formation and sustenance of American civil society. As Karl Polanyi observed about the market, "Economic history reveals that the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government." More recently, social and cultural historians have been making a similar case about the public construction of family, gender, and race relations.[30]

The most compelling analyses of American power have always refused to split the

[29] See, for example, Allen Steinberg, *The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800–1880* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989); Gautham Rao, "The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century America," *Law and History Review* 26 (Spring 2008): 1–56; Scheiber, *Ohio Canal Era*; Paul Wallace Gates, *History of Public Land Law Development* (Washington, D.C., 1968); Committee of Fifteen, *The Social Evil* (New York, 1900); Allan M. Brandt, *No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880* (New York, 1985); Christopher Capozzola, "The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fervor: Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America," *Journal of American History* 88 (March 2002): 1354–1382; William J. Novak, "Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction," in Jody Freeman and Martha L. Minow, eds., *Government by Contract* (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming).

[30] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, 1944), 258; James Willard Hurst, *The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780–1970* (Charlottesville, Va., 1970); Pauline Maier, "The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 50 (1993): 51–84; William J. Novak, "The American Law of Association: The Legal-Political Construction of Civil Society," *Studies in American Political Development* 15 (2001): 163–188; Hendrik Hartog, *Man and Wife in America: A History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000); George Chauncey, *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940* (New York, 1994); Welke, *Recasting American Liberty*.

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problem along a single either-or, public-private binary (e.g., the people vs. the interests; public good vs. private right; the state vs. the individual; regulation vs. the market). Instead, realistic and pragmatic approaches to American state development emphasize the interpenetration of public and private spheres—the convergence of public and private authority in everyday policymaking. Central to this perspective is the recognition that American power has long been distributed among a series of individuals, groups, parties, associations, organizations, and institutions not readily designated as wholly *either* public *or* private. Think, for instance, of the hybrid public-private roles of the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, Fannie Mae, the American Stock Exchange, the American Farm Bureau, the Federal Reserve, Underwriters Laboratories, the Ad Council, the American Legion, the American Red Cross, the YMCA, the East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the National Rifle Association. The ambiguous public-private power at the core of these institutions is emblematic of the larger distribution of public and private authority in the United States. By emphasizing the everyday intersection of the legal-political and the socioeconomic, the realist perspective reveals the continuous public-private interplay of forces too often separated out in more polemical arguments: right and power, contract and coercion, autonomy and solidarity.[31]

The critical potential of such a perspective is suggested by the original projects of American socio-legal theorists such as Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Morris Cohen, Walton Hale Hamilton, and Robert Lee Hale. The work of these scholars was focused directly on deconstructing the naturalistic pretensions of rights talk, property, contract, and the market to belong to the higher plane of exclusively private freedom. In a series of influential articles and treatises, these theorists catalogued the role of law and the state in establishing and enforcing property and contract rights. Exploding the fiction of the invisible hand, they implicated the visible state directly in the legal-political structuring of the market. In the revealingly entitled "Property and Sovereignty," Cohen explored the fusion of private right and public power that generated "the character of property as sovereign power compelling service and obedience." He reminded students of property that the ideal of "*laissez-faire* has never in fact been completely operative." In *Freedom through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power*, Hale further unmasked the public powers behind seemingly private organizations and action. He contended that the public-private distinction obscured the role of the state in constructing the exchanges that determined so much of the distribution of wealth and power in American history.[32]

[31] See, for example, Gail Radford, "From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise," *Journal of American History* 90 (December 2003): 862–890; Elisabeth S. Clemens, "Lineages of the Rube Goldberg State: Building and Blurring Public Programs, 1900–1940," in Ian Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek, and Daniel Galvin, eds., *Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State* (New York, 2006), 380–443; Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1968); V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1942); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York, 1966); Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*; Keller, *Affairs of State*.

[32] Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," *Yale Law Journal* 26 (June 1917): 710–770; Morris R. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," *Cornell Law Quarterly* 13 (1927): 8–30, 12, 22; Walton Hale Hamilton, *The Politics of Industry* (New York, 1957); Robert Lee Hale, *Freedom through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power* (New York, 1952). For incisive analysis, see Joseph William Singer, "Legal Realism Now," *California Law Review* 76 (March 1988): 465–544.

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Focusing on the convergence of public and private power in the actual output of the American state has two interpretive implications. First, it draws attention to the strong side of so-called weak state technologies, exposing the public delegation to private groups of the state's monopoly power over the legitimate use of force (to use Max Weber's terminology). Second, the realist perspective calls attention to the normative implications of such redistributions of power. As Cohen and Hale argued, the distribution of wealth in the United States cannot be viewed as the innocent by-product of supposedly natural, essentially private market forces. Indeed, that market was itself the product of public law and historic political choices. Distributive claims are notoriously difficult to make from the perspective of "private" economics alone. But by exposing the "public" underwriting of property, contract, and enterprise in law and politics, the realist critique relates the distribution of wealth directly to the allocation of power in a democratic republic. When we are simultaneously talking about the public as well as the private—democracy as well as economy—distributional concerns must be taken more seriously. As Morris Cohen concluded, "It would be as absurd to argue that the distribution of property must never be modified by law as it would be to argue that the distribution of political power must never be changed."[33]

IN HIS ESSAY "OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT," David Hume famously reflected on the ever-present role of fictions and opinion in the support of governmental power, despotic as well as democratic. "Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye," he noted, "than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion."[34] From the divine right of kings to popular sovereignty to the idea of a government of laws rather than men, opiate fictions, national mythologies, and historical fables of origins, promise, and destiny have continually kept the great mass of public opinion from inquiring too closely into the changing nature and extent of modern governing power.

The myth of the "weak" American state is such a fiction—a product of both reason and interest, perhaps even need. In an era dominated by both European states and European state theory, the story of an exceptional and weaker version of that state in the United States was predictable, perhaps even necessary. But given the dramatic changes in history, politics, and global statecraft during the last generation, the idea of the American state as weak is no longer reasonable or even interesting. It should be rejected. The extraordinary aggrandizement of power within the American regime demands critical attention and historical explanation, as do old as well as new patterns of international policymaking and legal-economic influence. Classic

[33] Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 16. For a compelling recent statement of this theme, see Larry M. Bartels, *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* (Princeton, N.J., 2008).

[34] David Hume, "Of the First Principles of Government," in Hume, *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* (1742; repr., Indianapolis, 1985), 32.

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models of state theory forged amid the constant threat of centralized despotism might not be the best templates for apprehending the new forms of distended power that predominate in twenty-first-century global political economy.

There is an alternative. In the early twentieth century, amid a first wave of nation-state and economic consolidation and assertiveness, American social science generated some fresh ways of looking at power in all its guises—social, economic, political, and legal. Overshadowed to some extent by exuberant bursts of American exceptionalism that greeted confrontations with totalitarianism and then terrorism, the pragmatic, critical, and realistic appraisal of American power is worth recovering. From Lester Frank Ward and John Dewey to Ernst Freund and John Commons to Morris Cohen and Robert Lee Hale, early American socioeconomic theorists developed a critique of a thin, private, and individualistic conception of American liberalism and interrogated the location, organization, and distribution of power in a modernizing United States. All understood the problem of power in America as complex and multifaceted, not simple or one-dimensional, especially as it concerned the relationship of state and civil society. Rather than spend endless time debating the proper definition of law or the correct empirical measure of the state, they concentrated instead on detailed investigations of power in action in the everyday practices and policies that constituted American public life. Rather than confine the examination of power to the abstract realm of political theory or the official political acts of elites, electorates, interest groups, or social movements, these analysts instead embraced a more capacious conception of governance as "an activity which is apt to appear whenever men are associated together."[35] More significantly, these political and legal realists never forgot, amid the rhetoric of law and the pious platitudes that routinely flow from American political life, the very real, concrete consequences of the deployment of legal and political power. They never forgot the brutal fact that Robert Cover would later state so provocatively at the start of his article "Violence and the Word" that legal and political interpretation take place "in a field of pain and death."[36] The real consequences of American state power are all around us. In a democratic republic, where force should always be on the side of the governed, writing the history of that power has never been more urgent.

[35] Michael Oakeshott, *Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: The Harvard Lectures* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), 7. For different but equally capacious conceptions of governance, see Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago, 1991); Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (New York, 1999).

[36] Robert M. Cover, "Violence and the Word," *Yale Law Journal* 95 (1986): 1601–1629.

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Featured Reviews

BEN KIERNAN. *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 724. $40.00.

Ben Kiernan is the founder and director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University and the preeminent historian of the Cambodian genocide. In this ambitious, stimulating, and learned new book, he takes on the entire history of genocide, from the ancient Greeks to Al-Qaeda, although his major focus is on the period from 1400 to the mid-1990s (Bosnia and Rwanda). The volume has an encyclopedic quality to it as Kiernan ranges deftly back and forth from the modern and contemporary period into ancient and early modern history. Unlike the vast majority of recent authors of books on comparative genocide, Kiernan thinks that the phenomenon was widespread before the twentieth century. Kiernan also takes a global approach to genocide, including cases equally from the Americas, Asia, Europe, Africa, and Australia. Some of the cases most readers will not know about, such as the widespread genocidal episodes that characterized early modern Southeast Asian history, the English conquest of Ireland, 1565–1603, or Japan's murderous invasion of Korea in the late sixteenth century. Others, like the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, and the Stalinist mass killing of the 1930s, have an entrenched historiography and well-developed scholarly literature. The inclusion of more than thirty maps is especially helpful in locating oneself in this geographically diverse world history of genocide.

It is not at all easy to link up episodes of genocide with each other, placing them in the historical context of the march of civilizations. Kiernan manages this complicated task by carefully focusing on issues of continuity over time between cases of mass killing. "Past genocides," he writes, "provided both precedent and excuse for current ones" (p. 387). The narrative flow of the book is also aided by Kiernan's analysis of four aspects of genocide that he finds prevalent in almost every episode: ethnic enmity (racism and race hatred); "cults of antiquity"; the "fetish for agriculture" (and its accompanying antipathy for urban dwellers and pastoralists); and territorial and imperial conquests (pp. 2–3). Whether or not one agrees that these characteristics can be considered essential elements of the history of genocide, the book reads very well as a protracted argument, rather than merely a recitation of awful cases of mass killing over three millennia of human history. The recent proliferation of literature on genocide and mass killing tends to examine discrete episodes based on new archival evidence or, more often, especially in the work of political scientists and sociologists, compares selected cases from the twentieth century for the purpose of identifying the most important causes of genocide as a whole. Against the background of the existing literature, Kiernan's narrative history of genocide, from its ancient beginnings to the present, stands out as a welcome and significant addition to the burgeoning field of "genocide studies."

Kiernan wisely spares the reader a long disquisition about the definition of genocide. Instead, he takes the pragmatic and uncomplicated view that the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948 and the subsequent legal history of the prosecution of genocide by international tribunals should form the backbone of our contemporary understanding of the term. His willingness to apply the 1948 Genocide Convention retroactively is matched by his readiness to use closely related terms of mass killing that have slightly different normative connotations: "genocidal massacres," "genocidal violence," "genocidal attacks," "extermination," and "partial genocide." Sometimes, he states, "the result was genocidal" or there was a "threat of genocide," formulations that also have somewhat different implications (pp. 252, 322). This approach has the advantage of inclusiveness; scholars of genocide too easily exclude horrific episodes of mass killing as "not genocide" by splitting hairs about the 1948 definition of genocide or developing highly technical criteria for applying the term. But it also has the disadvantage of introducing a lack of clarity about what, exactly, constitutes genocide, and what should be classified instead as a massacre or as a genocidal massacre. One could argue that Kiernan's language regarding the "Serb genocide of Muslims in Bosnia" inaccurately represents what happened

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in Bosnia; perhaps it would be wiser to speak about Serb "genocidal actions" in the region or specify, as did the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), that the massacre in Srebrenica was a case of genocide (p. 572). How the author uses these and other terms makes a big difference to the reader's perception of the character of the action involved.

Another problem with Kiernan's analysis is the way he deals with the four aspects mentioned above as critical to the history of genocide. At the beginning of the book, he calls them "themes" of genocide (pp. 2, 3); in the epilogue he calls them "telltale characteristics," while noting that they are both "causes and symptoms," which analytically, one would think, should be kept distinct (pp. 605, 606). Elsewhere he calls these "recurring" [sometimes "shared"] ideological preoccupations of the perpetrators." Kiernan's fundamental thesis is that "The presence of these four obsessions often seems sufficient for genocidal violence, though not all four are necessary conditions" (pp. 38, 539). But rather more strongly he insists at a different point that, for the most part, genocide "requires" these factors (p. 27). In the case of the Spanish conquest of sixteenth-century Mexico, they simply helped "legitimize extraordinary colonial cruelty, contributing to the genocidal outcome" (p. 99). Agricultural preoccupations, in Kiernan's narrative, often provide little more than accessible metaphors for the gruesome killing: "So we harvested their heads" (Cambodia, p. 603); "They organized the population 'to clear the brush [the Tutsis]' " (Rwanda, p. 566); Indians were being "improved off the face of the earth" (United States, p. 355).

It is easy enough to understand how ethnic enmity and race hatred can be identified as causal factors in the making of genocide, and should be countered as a way to prevent further episodes of genocide, an explicit purpose of Kiernan's work. One could say the same about territorial expansion and imperial conquests, which almost always involve war and mass killing and carry with them the potential seeds for genocide. But agricultural fetishes and populist ideologies do not necessarily function historically as instigators of genocidal situations (think about American or Russian populism of the last half of the nineteenth century). Cults of antiquity are present in many subsequent political situations that evoke Roman law or Greek learning without ipso facto emulating Spartan militarism or the baleful destruction of Carthage, two of the more powerful "cults of antiquity" that Kiernan believes infuse the history of genocide. Kiernan notes that these four factors work together in the making of genocide. That may be the case, but two appear to be causal and two derive from the circumstances of genocide or are employed to justify genocidal actions. This methodological issue is complicated further by the fact that he purposely excludes from his study those "catastrophes lacking more than one of the four major features of genocide" (p. 38).

The book is divided into four coherent and readable parts. The first, "Early Imperial Expansion," sets up the categories of analysis by looking in particular at Sparta, "a precursor of genocidal regimes" and at the Roman destruction of Carthage, which "set a precedent for genocide" (pp. 45, 58). Kiernan includes a brilliant chapter on the horrendous Spanish depredations in the New World and, for historians of genocide, fresh and evocative material on genocides in East Asia and Southeast Asia in the early modern period, 1400–1700. The second part of the book—in my view the richest and most thought provoking—examines settler genocides. After an unusually detailed treatment of British genocide in Ireland, Kiernan comprehensively examines settler mass killing in nineteenth-century Australia, and in North America, both in the colonial period and after the establishment of the United States. These chapters are particularly well researched, and the retroactive indictments of genocide, with all their nuances and differences, seem completely deserved. The nineteenth-century settler genocides in French Algeria and German Southwest Africa are also cogently and empathetically, if depressingly, presented. The author makes it clear that our focus on the history of violence in the period of decolonization should not let us forget the terrible instances of mass killing and genocide that were part and parcel of conquest and domination.

The section on mass killing in the twentieth century is more uneven in its contribution to the historiography of genocide than the others. Given the extensive literature, it is hard in a comprehensive study of mass killing like this to say anything new about the Armenian genocide (the weakest chapter of the book, in my view), the Holocaust, or Soviet mass murder without doing original research or engaging in extensive and rigorous comparative analysis. Still, Kiernan's consistent emphasis on the four themes serves him well here in configuring an interesting argument about these cases. His exploration of ancient and agriculturalist obsessions, in particular, leads to some important observations. While these factors weigh little in the evaluation of Stalinist mass killing, as Kiernan readily admits, both the Holocaust and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the Armenian genocide can be thought of as being influenced by these now familiar themes in his history of genocide.

The chapter on Japanese genocidal actions in China during the war is expertly contextualized in the long-term objectives of Japanese militarism in East Asia. The following chapter on the peasant communism of Mao provides a good summary of the murderous character of the Chinese regime; Mao is responsible, in Kiernan's view, for "the world's greatest ever famines," which cost close to thirty million lives, and for the Cultural Revolution ("China's holocaust," using Lynn White's term) that took perhaps another million lives (pp. 530–537.) The final chapter comparing the genocide in Cambodia and in Rwanda does a beautiful job of tying the book together, since both cases, Kiernan demonstrates, shared preoccupations with antiquity, "virulent racism," "inchoate cults of agriculture," and "ambitions of territorial expansion" (pp. 539, 569).

The superbly crafted epilogue on "racial and religious slaughter" in our day should not be overlooked.

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Not only does it consider mass killing in Bangladesh, Indonesia, East Timor, Guatemala, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Bosnia, and Sudan, but it includes a thoughtful and convincing short essay on the genocidal characteristics of al-Qaeda and of the political thinking of its guiding spirits, Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zargawi. Continuing the argument that permeates the book, Kiernan makes the case that in al-Qaeda, as in the episodes of mass killing of the past 600 years that he examines in his book, we are dealing with a genocidal combination of "ethnoreligious hatred," "territorial expansionism," a "politicized cult of Islamic antiquity," and a "muted" form of "agrarianism" (p. 600). We can perhaps do something about genocide, he concludes, if we understand better how it happens. We can only hope he is right.

In sum, Kiernan's book is an important and unique contribution to the growing literature on genocide. Kiernan writes about the unthinkable in human history with just the right mixture of compassion for the victims, understanding of the perpetrators, and commitment to preventing genocide in the future. Students, scholars, policy makers, and the public at large have a great deal to learn from this readable, well-informed, and excruciatingly painful narrative of mass killing.

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GREGORY CLARK. *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*. (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 420pp. $29.95.

NOTE: The *AHR* does not permit footnotes in its reviews, but the existence of multiple studies providing evidence contrary to key points in this book is important to the discussion below. Consequently, a slightly different version of the review, including some extended notes, is available online at http://www.humanities.uci.edu/history/pomeranz/AHRreviewofFarewelltoAlms.)

There is plenty to argue about in Gregory Clark's ambitious book. Clark first asserts that the one overwhelmingly significant event in economic history (and perhaps all of history) is what is usually called the industrial revolution: the beginnings of a thus-far continuing increase in the per capita incomes of various societies, beginning in England circa 1800 (pp. 1–16). He then claims that the timing and location of that transition is best explained by the accumulation of "bourgeois" traits in certain populations via natural selection. Nonacademic reviewers have focused on this quasi-Darwinian explanation of the distribution of global riches, which is the most politically provocative point in the book: but it is also the least convincing. (They seem to take Clark's first point for granted, although most historians will see that it is also controversial.) It takes several steps to see how Clark gets from current debates about the origins of modern economies to suggesting that these breakthroughs occur when and where people become "*biologically* better adapted to the modern economic world" (p. 187, emphasis in original).

A key problem in understanding modern economic growth is that whatever explains most of it is invisible to the conventional growth accounting of economics. Increases in per capita incomes clearly cannot be explained by increases in population; increases in how much the average person works do matter, but can only explain a small portion of the soaring incomes in modern economies. Capital accumulation—as measured by increases in the market value of capital stock per person in wealthy societies—explains only a quarter of their per capita growth; increases in land values explain only a trivial amount. So unless one questions the assumption that market value accurately measures the contribution of each factor of production (economists insist that if, say, capital were undervalued, people would simply use more of it until the error was corrected), most of the growth of the last 200 years is left as an unexplained residual. This residual is usually labeled "efficiency" (since it represents the amount of increased output that doesn't seem to depend on increased inputs), and then explained by concepts like "innovation," "improved institutions," "technology," "the quality of labor," and other factors that also cannot be measured directly. Formal education—once again measured by market returns, in the form of the increase in earnings it provides to the educated—explains perhaps a third of the residual, but no more (pp. 201–202). Predictably, this logic leads to explanations that are not directly visible in documents in the way that longer hours, more equipment, or a more literate workforce are. Institutional explanations of changes in the residual—the impact of new laws, for instance—are hard to measure quantitatively, but they are at least visible in documents, and one can construct narratives about why they might have had a large influence. We can also sub-

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ject those narratives to some basic tests of plausibility: for instance, do the institutional changes occur at the right times and places to explain the pattern of outcomes? Did people at the time say that they were influenced by these changes? But Clark prefers an explanation that is invisible to both economic and historical analysis.

Clark rejects all explanations of post-1800 growth that are based on institutional change over the preceding centuries. Instead he claims, based mostly on English evidence, that the basic institutions that economists believe promote growth—relatively free markets, enough security of life and property to encourage investment, and enough social mobility so that wealth could be used to achieve other personal goals—were already in place by 1200. Thus, if institutions that rewarded economically productive activities were enough to induce sustained growth, it would have begun by then. What was missing, Clark says, was enough people who would respond properly to these incentives. But over the next few centuries that kind of person gradually became predominant: first in England, then elsewhere in Europe, and later in East Asia. That person had essentially modern "bourgeois" characteristics, and pioneered an endless stream of productivity-enhancing innovations.

Here, Clark's argument overlaps with a number of scholars, from at least Max Weber onward, who have seen a fundamental cultural break, or "disciplinary revolution," in early modern times. (The term "disciplinary revolution" is from Philip Gorski, who detaches the idea from Protestantism in particular; Yu Ying-shih and Robert Bellah are among those who have claimed to find its equivalent in societies outside of Europe.) But while those scholars emphasize the efforts of people who sought to change the world around them—preachers, teachers, political reformers, and so on—and so left a trail of documents, Clark's agents of change were focused solely on their own success and perhaps that of their offspring. So while his work may seem to resonate with a long line of cultural analysis, it is actually radically different and requires that we take much more on faith.

The new "bourgeois" personality became dominant, Clark says, because rich people enjoyed greater reproductive success than the poor, at least in England. Consequently, the traits that made them rich got passed on, and became ever more common as the descendants of the rich made up an ever-larger share of a fiercely competitive society (p. 8). Over time "Thrift, prudence, negotiation, and hard work were becoming values for communities that previously had been spendthrift, impulsive, violent, and leisure loving" (p. 166). Clark hedges on whether these traits were passed on culturally or genetically (pp. 8, 167), and, as noted above, "cultural" transmission for him seems to mean propagation through the environmental influence of parents on their children. But he seems most inclined toward a genetic explanation, since he provides some of the information one would use to pursue that line of explanation (e.g., pointing to experiments with foxes showing that traits can evolve in surprisingly few generations if selective pressures are strong enough [p. 167]), while never discussing how one would look for the influence of home environments. At any rate, it is Clark's focus on individuals' traits transmitted within families that seems to have excited the most attention from non-academics. (*The New York Times* of August 7, 2007, is a prime example.)

That is too bad, because explaining the rise of today's rich societies—and the still-growing gap between them and the world's have-nots (pp. 328–370)—as the result of reproductive selection in favor of economically fit individuals is politically potent but intellectually weak. In studies that try to measure the inheritance of personality traits, the correlation between parents and children on particular traits (which measures the effects of genes and home environment combined) averages 0.13. This means that such effects virtually disappear in two generations: having a grandparent who scores high on a given trait raises the expected score of a grandchild by only 1.7 percent as much. (This point is developed at greater length in Samuel Bowles's review of Clark: *Science* 318: 394–395 [October 19, 2007].) His co-edited volume *Unequal Chances* [2005] contains some of the supporting evidence.) And while Clark suggests that the reason the industrial revolution happened first in England is that the reproductive advantage of the rich (and their positive traits) was greatest there (pp. 270–271), his only evidence for this is one study each of the Qing nobility and of Japanese samurai (pp. 238–241)—particularly unfortunate since English nobles (as opposed to wealthy commoners) also failed to conform to his model of exceptional reproductive success. (The relevant demographic studies, too numerous to list here, are included in the web-based version of this review.)

Even the seemingly commonsensical statement that the rich routinely out-bred the poor requires important qualifications. Clark's English evidence comes mostly from 1585–1638 (pp. 113–124), when real wages for both skilled craftsmen and common laborers reached their lowest levels in the entire period from the Black Death to the present, and unemployment was high as well. (On wages, see for instance Robert Allen, "The Great Divergence in European Wages" www.economs.ox.ac.uk/members/robert.allen/WagesFiles/wagesnew2.pdf, pp. 49–50.) Since much of whatever demographic advantage the rich had came from marrying younger (which in the absence of contraception means more children), while the poor had to save before they could start a new family, data from this period is likely to overstate Clark's case significantly. Moreover, "the poor" were not an undifferentiated group with unchanging demographic patterns. In medieval and early modern times, a great many were live-in servants, who could not marry until their terms were up. Many others were tenants, very small landowners, or artisans; the sons of these people often could not marry until their fathers bestowed on them their lease, tools, or other means of production. But with time, an increasing per-

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centage of the poor became proletarians: men and women who lived on wages, and could marry without waiting to inherit whatever scant means of production their parents might own. There is considerable, though not definitive, evidence (in the work of David Levine and Charles Tilly, among others) that poor people of this kind married younger and reproduced faster than the national average. So Clark's proposed mechanism for the dissemination of "bourgeois" traits was not only weak to begin with, but quite likely operating in reverse for a century or more immediately before England's escape from a Malthusian world.

Moreover, we know very little about the extent to which personality traits determine economic success in any particular society, past or present: it is a big leap to assume that Clark's favored characteristics consistently trumped connections, luck, and other factors. (Christopher Jencks, *Who Gets Ahead?* [1979], is a good example of work suggesting that in the modern United States, those personality traits we can measure have had only a tiny influence on income.) One good feature of Clark's book is that he effectively attacks old myths of medieval Europe as socially stagnant, intellectually benighted, desperately impoverished, and completely dominated by specialists in violence (see especially pp. 145–166). This may be not surprise academic historians, but it is apparently needed for some other audiences. But Clark replaces that stereotype with an equally unfounded and monochromatic image of a medieval world considerably more open and meritocratic than today's (pp. 151, 157, 162, 163).

One reason for this lack of nuance is that Clark fits every society into either a "Malthusian" or a "modern" model, dominated by a few key contrasts. Related to this, he has little interest in tracing processes that unfold over the kinds of time spans historians typically deal with, or with gradual or partial changes. Until growing efficiency transformed the world, Clark argues, relatively little changed that mattered. He builds a Malthusian model to describe economies over the long haul from Neolithic times to 1800. Since annual population growth over that very long period was close to zero, his model assumes that per capita incomes always return to the point at which a society's birth and death rates (each treated as a function of income) balance out; it also assumes that the supply of land was fixed (since it is in the very long term), and so on. That none of this was true for Europe, East Asia, or South Asia—home to most of the world's people—in the last few centuries before 1800 does not matter. Clark does produce a table (p. 21) showing that many Western European populations grew only slowly from 1300 to 1800, most increasing thirty to seventy percent over that long span. But given the number of scholars who think that profound changes began some time after the Black Death, surely it would make more sense to focus on the roughly 200 percent population growth in England ca. 1500–1800, or the 100 plus-percent growth in France—not to mention the almost 200 percent growth in eighteenth-century China. Nor were land supplies fixed in most of the early modern world.

Clark likewise argues that the standard of living of most people, which he measures almost exclusively in terms of nutrition, often using heights as a proxy (pp. 61, 111), was essentially unchanged from pre-Neolithic times to 1800 (pp. 40–70). It is true that material living standards changed very slowly over the long haul, and could go down as well as up over shorter periods. However making stasis the description for all of human history before the industrial revolution ignores the work of many scholars showing that people's material possessions were increasing (even if their diet was not improving) in various parts of the world from, say, 1500 to 1800: a period that is certainly long enough to count as a "sustained" development from most points of view. Moreover, since some of this work argues that the apparent increase in hours worked per person in the early modern period (Clark's evidence that people were becoming less "leisure-loving") was either linked to a greater availability of consumer goods (Jan DeVries, Akira Hayami) or to the pressures of growing family sizes among the poor in a period of stagnant real wages (David Levine, Friedrich Mendels), it is troubling to have Clark pass over what seem to be medium-term trends in precisely the variables he cares about. (Please see the online version of this essay for a few of the many relevant citations.) In short, the "early modern" period that the scholarship of the last several decades has carved out is largely erased here, and explanations of the origins of modernity based on trends in that period largely ignored. Perhaps Clark would argue that early modern trends can be ignored as an "aberration" in the long history of *homo sapiens*, which they are; but since they immediately precede the even more aberrant modern period he wants to explain, they need to be investigated, not drowned by constructing an undifferentiated sweep of millennia prior to a sudden "modernity." Given how much scholarly effort has gone into undermining old ideas that nothing changed before the onset of industrialization and modernity, it is sobering to see how much life those ideas still seems to have among other educated people. Almost all differences among different "stable agricultural societies" are also elided. While this reviewer is hardly one to complain about scholars looking at basic similarities between Europe and East Asia, rather than always focusing on differences, Clark's treatment takes that recent tendency too far.

To leap to very large time scales can, of course, be illuminating. Alfred Crosby's *Ecological Imperialism* (2nd ed., 2004), for instance, argues convincingly that certain key features of what would happen when Eurasians met Native Americans and Australians were predetermined by biological developments that accompanied the early domestications of animals and plants; thus he explains post-1500 events with relatively little reference to trends (except in navigation) of the immediately preceding few centuries. But in that case, biology provides a basis for sharp either/or distinctions:

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a population has been previously exposed to smallpox or it hasn't, a species introduced to a new environment has natural predators there or it does not. Clark has less reason for arguing that societies either select for the right human qualities or do not, and indeed his own treatment of East Asia as a society evolving more slowly but in the same direction as Europe suggests the need to look at things by degree, and at path-dependent processes unfolding over medium-length time spans. Once we do that, many of the institutional and cultural changes, geographical quirks, political events, and so on—also known as "history"—that Clark banishes from the picture come right back in. Indeed, he ends by noting that economies often alternate between "relatively energetic phases and periods of somnolence" (p. 371) for no apparent reason; that seems like an invitation to turn back to precisely the kinds of factors he casts aside here.

One could list many more such problems, and perhaps one should, given the likelihood that the book will be deployed in hot-button contemporary debates. Clark argues, for instance, that neither internal institutional reform nor development aid is likely to help poor countries much (pp. 328, 352, 373). Nor do international institutions figure in his explanation for persistent poverty (pp. 329–336, 347–351), though he does advocate liberalizing immigration (p. 373). The fundamental problem, as he sees it, is the "low quality of labor" in poor countries (pp. 14–15, 353–354, 359–365), which is more a matter of character traits than teachable skills; he says there is "no satisfactory theory" (p. 370) explaining this, but given his argument that the traits allegedly missing in poorer countries were bred into richer populations through generations of Darwinian struggle (p. 259), it is not hard to guess how his argument will be used.

But it would be unfair to overlook some aspects of the book that can be quite useful to scholars. Clark offers brief, compelling critiques of various explanations of the origins of modern growth, such as those based on "human capital" (p. 225). The book is also full of interesting estimates of how much (or little) certain things changed over time: Clark's treatment of the speed at which information traveled (pp. 305–307) is one good example.

For historians in particular, it is salutary to follow the logic of somebody devoted to explaining a given phenomenon with the smallest possible number of factors, and eliminating any factors that cannot be shown to have an influence that is separable from the others. Most historians do not proceed this way, though many other social scientists do. Since probably few historians today would claim that we are telling the story of the past exactly as it happened, it is worth reflecting on why we nonetheless generally prefer more complex stories, and what the reasons for that preference might tell us about how much complexity we want in any given case.

Perhaps the best part of the book is chapter twelve, where Clark tries to explain what appears to be a sudden break from the economic past circa 1800. First he uses an economist's technique many historians shun—the explicit counterfactual—to question the idea that what defined the industrial revolution was a large increase in the amount of innovation in production processes. Clark points to technological changes that greatly increased the efficiency of certain industries prior to 1600 (e.g., the making of iron nails and the printing and binding of books). He notes that these appear to be of little economic weight because the products involved made up such a tiny percentage of the medieval economy but claims that such a measure of economic significance is not necessarily a good way to assess how much successful innovative activity was going on. He then asks how much people's real incomes would have improved between the 1480s and 1800 if they had consumed a mix of goods typical of upper-middle-class Americans today (with high proportions of spending on travel, entertainment, etc.), rather than spending most of their income on grain (pp. 254–255). This hypothetical yields much faster improvements in early modern living standards. That does not eliminate the acceleration of technical change and income growth in the nineteenth and especially twentieth centuries (or the problems of explaining it), but it does reframe the question, substantially reducing discontinuities.

A complicated problem, for Clark and others, is to understand how a gradual process—and change by natural selection (or its cultural analogue) must be gradual—can account for the sudden acceleration of per capita growth rates observed sometime after 1800. Having argued that the pick-up in rates of innovation began long before 1800, Clark suggests that a basically continuous process suddenly produced much higher growth rates because a larger portion of the English economy came to be affected by these processes of improvement. The key, he suggests was the combination of a rapid increase in England's population, a fixed supply of land at home, and a large increase in the availability of farmland in Britain's trading partners (particularly, but not exclusively, due to westward expansion in North America). This combination of factors led Britain to concentrate more on industry and services while trading for farm goods; and it was much easier to raise productivity in industry than farming (p. 256). (Among other things, productivity in industry remains constant if humans make no innovations; in farming it declines, since pests keep evolving.) As farming became less of the economy, even a constant rate of innovation would produce a faster rate of productivity growth; then, as income rose, food became a smaller portion of what people bought, spurring further productivity improvements in a virtuous circle (pp. 247–249). The rise of British military power, furthered both by population growth and prosperity, reinforced this further by making sure maritime trade was secure (pp. 315–316); the turn to coal, which eliminated the need to get fuel from plant growth, pushed in the same direction (p. 285). Thus, having earlier disparaged arguments about resource availability and political changes, Clark winds up quietly embracing them to help explain "Why Britain? Why then?" This is much less iconoclastic than the parts of his argument

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that have received the most attention; instead it speaks to how existing arguments about technology and about resources might complement rather than compete with each other.

In doing so, Clark's argument also becomes a more typically historical one, in which multiple changes occurring together in time shape a pattern of change that is explicable, but also unique. That kind of argument, which focuses on how trends interacted with each other rather than trying to isolate them, may even be truer to the Darwinism Clark invokes than is his approach elsewhere. After all, individuals and their environment (which for humans include available resources, institutions, and culture) both undergo changes. Since humans make so much of the settings of our lives, an argument that asks us to hold those settings constant for many, many generations and focus exclusively on the evolution of individuals' traits is asking so much that it would require overwhelming evidence to be convincing. And here, on the contrary, most available evidence cuts the other way.

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JOHN CARSON. *The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American Republics, 1750–1940*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 401. $39.50.

Among the several battles currently being waged in America's so-called "culture wars," none is more divisive than the conflict over affirmative action. Proponents of affirmative action argue that in the interests of diversity institutions such as colleges and universities can make allowances for racial minorities when it comes to admissions. These advocates of preferential selection contend that there are ways of determining a candidate's overall merit other than relying simply on grade averages and standard test scores. The mere presence of minority students, so this argument goes, can enrich campus life and thus calls for a different way of understanding personal merit.

Opponents of affirmative action disagree, contending that merit and talent should be based chiefly on past academic performance and inherent skills. Grades and the results of tests such as the SAT and LSAT, they argue, do in fact measure intelligence. Efforts to achieve equality of opportunity, affirmative action's opponents maintain, run the risk of mistaking it for equality of outcome. In the words of President Andrew Jackson: "Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth cannot be produced by human institutions."

The historical background to this spirited and often acrimonious debate is the topic of John Carson's book. Carson deftly shows that while opponents may disagree profoundly over the principle of affirmative action, they tend to agree that the debate is all about how to define merit. At least at the level of legal argument, even affirmative action's backers admit that demands for social justice should not trump the question of individual merit. They might refer to women, the poor, or certain minorities with their distinctive histories of oppression as reasons for preferential treatment, but in the end their justifications boil down to criticisms of specific merit-based systems of selection, notably IQ tests. In other words, to Carson the debate over affirmative action is less a dispute than a "conversation" about the nature of democracy and equality (p. xii). The media like to hype the differences on either side of the debate; what is lost amid the perfervid rhetoric is the rudimentary consensus that makes such a debate possible in the first place.

The consensus is that there is such a thing as individual merit—or, as they used to say in earlier times, virtue. The disagreement begins when people try to establish what constitutes merit: can it include athleticism, musical talent, mathematical skill, an excellent memory, a poetic nature, or a bent for social activism? The story of this disagreement reveals that intelligence—and its relation to merit—is more a product of history than of nature.

Carson arrives at this conclusion at the end of a narrative that takes the reader from the eighteenth century up to World War II. His focus is not exclusively American; among the many virtues of this book is the comparison he draws between American and French attempts to come to terms with the issues of intelligence, merit, and talent. Carson's choice to compare France and the United States of America makes a lot of sense. In the eighteenth century both countries underwent momentous revolutions, political upheavals that sought to establish societies that were far more meritocratic than either colonial America or *ancien régime* France. The French and American revolutions, in the name of popular sovereignty, aimed to sweep away institutions that bred inequality and injustice. Revolutionaries in both countries maintained that the future looked brighter than ever before; people whose skills and talents might have been buried beneath the arbitrary privileges of earlier eras could now realistically expect many more opportunities for individual advancement and social usefulness.

Yet, what looked straightforward to eighteenth-century reformers proved to be vexing for the American republic and French *nation*. In the words of Madame de Staël in 1800, "the principle of a republic where political equality is sacred, must be to establish the more

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marked distinctions among men, according to their talents and virtues" (p. 68). Doing so involved a delicate balancing act for citizens of both nations: how did they provide equal opportunity and at the same time ensure that talent thrives? How did each nation reconcile the ideal of equality and the realities of difference? Or, as Carson himself puts it, what is the "boundary demarcating where universal rights ended and the privileges of talent began?" (p. 36). The ways in which France and America answered these questions form the core of Carson's book.

Once the American and French revolutions had run their courses, both nations settled down to the difficult task of establishing meritocracy. Initially, there was little philosophic support for using intelligence as a scientific barometer to measure talent. Thanks to Scottish Common Sense philosophy and the eclecticism of France's Victor Cousin, the notion that intelligence was a single, measurable entity with a biological foundation had trouble gaining acceptance. Cousin, a university professor, was virtual ruler of the French philosophical world from 1830 to 1848. He imagined the mind was composed of numerous, diverse faculties and admitted that people were more or less endowed by their Creator with these faculties. But Cousin was mainly interested in the mental similarities among human beings, not their differences. He believed in a universal moral sense, present in every human being regardless of age, gender, or race: "There is not a man, ignorant or instructed, civilized or savage, provided he be a rational and moral being, who does not exercise the same judgment" (p. 70). Phrenologists, who enjoyed great support in radical political circles, might preach that specific intellectual talents were localized in certain organic parts of the brain, but Cousin's eclecticism held sway in France's schools between the 1820s and the end of the July Monarchy in 1848.

The search for discernible intellectual differences among individuals and human groups did not begin in earnest until after the mid-nineteenth century. This turning point coincided with the rise of what historians call "race science," the study of biological differences among human beings. Race science benefited from the Victorian-era advances in experimental medicine, physical anthropology, and evolutionary biology. Phrenology, Darwinism, and degeneracy theory encouraged scientists to naturalize ever more aspects of human nature, including psychology.

As a result, Cousin's eclecticism rapidly took a nose dive in popularity. So did Common Sense philosophy. The editor of *Popular Science Monthly* criticized it in 1867 as an approach in which "living reality, as a subject of study, disappeared from view," and rendered mind an "abstraction, to be considered as literally out of all true relations as if the material universe had never existed" (p. 162). Fair or not, this comment mirrored the fact that as the nineteenth century wore on more and more psychologists viewed the mind as a biological phenomenon. Often borrowing from the language of positivism and Darwinist evolution, psychologists argued that the mind's various "faculties" and "powers" were fictions. What scientists needed to do was subject mental phenomena to rigorous observation, experiment, and analysis. Psychologists interpreted the mind's functions less as separate properties and more as features of a single entity. As for memory, judgment, imagination, taste, perception, and the like, by the end of the nineteenth century psychologists increasingly lumped them together under the broad heading of "intelligence."

Thus, intelligence was discovered—or at least "remade" into "a differential, quantifiable, unilinear entity that determined an individual's or group's overall mental power." By the end of the nineteenth century many scientists had concluded that intelligence was "measurable, statistically distributed, hereditary . . . [and] biological in origin." If someone was poor, committed a crime, or lapsed into vice it was "less from personal moral failure than congenital mental inadequacy" (pp. 159–160).

This physicalist explanation for individual and group behavior gained credence thanks to the immense transformations experienced by Americans in the late nineteenth century. Industrialization, urbanization, mass immigration, expanded schooling, labor unrest, African American emancipation, and women's suffrage raised sharp concerns about how the many groups within U.S. society could co-exist. Intelligence testing seemingly offered a way to categorize individuals and groups whose ultimate niches in society were not immediately obvious. The possibility of labeling with the authority of science consoled countless Americans baffled by the challenges involved in the transition to mass society.

Within a few short years intelligence testing became "something of an industry" in American psychology (p. 178). As scientists viewed the mind as an integrated whole rather than an entity made up of several different faculties, interest in "intelligence" soared. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, it had to cope with mass mobilization for the first time in its history and resorted to intelligence testing of about two million recruits. After the war, intelligence testing increased in popularity among educators as more and more young Americans attended the nation's schools. In 1926 the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was invented, a college-entrance intelligence test valid anywhere in the United States. The business world also seemed to value IQ testing, seeing it as a way of screening applicants and employees, as well as separating those fit for office work and sales. By World War II intelligence as a concept and intelligence testing as a means of measuring it, though far from uncontested, had gained a firm foothold in American society. The IQ test was gradually becoming a part of everyday experience for millions of American schoolchildren, job applicants, and armed services personnel. For a nation increasingly preoccupied with "gray matter" or "brains," intelligence testing was a practice whose time had come.

This new, cutting-edge "metric version" of intelli-

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gence, however, did not catch on in France nearly as tenaciously as in the United States. For example, the French military largely ignored intelligence testing during World War I. This comparative lack of French interest in intelligence testing is surprising given that the founders of the first real intelligence test were two Frenchmen: Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon. To account for this historical curiosity, Carson relies on Theodore Porter's thesis that French elite culture privileged the judgments of experts rather than the reduction of social problems to simple quantitative benchmarks (pp. 152, 231). He also correctly cites the French tradition in psychiatry and psychology that emphasized the compilation of exhaustive case histories and the study of individual patients in all their uniqueness rather than standard measurements of vast numbers of people.

But the distinctive, highly centralized French system of schooling was probably the key difference. Established by Napoleon I, the Paris-dominated French educational system was designed to produce a technocratic elite to serve the nation. By contrast, America's school system was decentralized, with many private academies and sectarian colleges. In theory, rigorous exams identified at early ages those best equipped to teach in France's secondary and post-secondary institutions and those with the aptitudes best suited for technical occupations. This process of nationwide selection through education made the determination of talent through intelligence testing much less urgent. French psychology was buffeted by many of the same trends that affected America—Darwinism, degeneration, eugenics, and imperialism—but its historical path into the twentieth century differed from that followed by U.S. psychology.

Carson's book challenges several customary interpretations of the history of science and medicine. The comparison with France suggests that while attitudes toward the status of African Americans exerted a significant influence over U.S. race science, anxieties about race may not have been the dominant factor after all. Race science was a complex phenomenon caused by all sorts of considerations, including concerns over the emancipation of African American slaves before and after the U.S. civil war. In France, by contrast, the rise of racial science was shaped by other concerns, notably the urgency of transforming millions of rural peasants into citizens of the republic that emerged from the defeat of 1870–1871. In other words, race science may not have been identical to scientific racism (pp. 78–79).

Additionally, Carson demonstrates that the "turn to nature as a way of justifying inequality," a common complaint about today's defenders of IQ, actually has deep roots, going back to the [U.S.] republic's very founding," in his own words (p. 277). "The turn to nature" can be discovered in the writings of Enlightenment thinkers such as Condillac, David Hartley, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, most of whom were radical critics of their societies' institutions and ideas. It was also a belief of gilt-edged American republicans such as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. What they all meant by nature varied widely. Some meant heredity, some meant simply native endowment, and some meant physiology. Some felt natural differences only applied to the comparison between men and women. That these reformers believed in nature is hardly surprising. They were united in the belief that the "accidents" of birth, wealth, and social class should be subordinate to the hierarchy of natural talents found throughout the population. Others, including William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet, argued that education and environment could mold human abilities to a degree never attained before in history. But even Condorcet granted that in his ideal republic a natural elite would surface and take charge.

The important point is that historically the appeal to nature as a means of explaining the distinctions that exist among human beings crisscrossed political boundaries. As Carson shows, it was only in the late nineteenth century when France and America began to really grapple with the problems of mass democracy that naturalistic explanations found favor in the eyes of defenders of the status quo. And even then, as in the case of phrenology and eugenics, biological explanations of social issues often attracted progressives and radical reformers. As Carson notes about nineteenth-century French anthropology, this new "science of man was, at its origins, a science of the left" (p. 108). Feminists, too, borrowed the language of biology to advance their claims to equal rights in education and other walks of life.

If there is a drawback to Carson's book it is that, with the exception of the last few pages, he ends his story in 1940. Readers who follow his subtle and searching discussion to that point will be disappointed that he did not continue it up to the present in more detail. After all, as he notes in passing, the history of IQ has been heated in recent years. The work of psychologists Arthur R. Jensen, Richard J. Herrnstein, and Hans J. Eysenck; the introduction of "sociobiology" in the 1970s; the publication of Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve* (1994); and the ways groups like the Pioneer Fund support research have sparked countless protests since World War II. Critics insist that such research attempts to reinstate the hereditarianism of earlier eras and legitimize natural differences in mental abilities among ethnic groups, with the aim of undermining public support for government programs that, for example, try to improve poor children's academic futures. Accusations that this body of research penalizes the poor, women, and minorities have fostered the perception that it attracts the support of "mostly conservative scientists and social critics" (p. 278). It is true that those who emphasize nature over nurture do view certain government efforts to rectify inequalities in school performance with a deep dose of skepticism. Yet, as Carson notes, their standpoint has a long pedigree that stretches back to the dawn of the new republic and has straddled various political camps since then.

In the end, Carson's historically based advice to tone down the rhetoric and stake out the common ground

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shared by the debate's participants is worth following. Less inflammatory language would go a long way toward revealing the merits of both arguments in the debate. The greater likelihood, however, is that the debate will unfold as it has in the past with Americans "worr[ying] the problem" and leaving the issue of intelligence in "flux" (p. 279). The limitations of science when it comes to defining intelligence and establishing firm natural distinctions among groups, whether biological or social, mean that its proponents will not conclusively win the debate anytime soon.

On the other hand, as Carson acknowledges, the possibility that nature can simply be dismissed out of hand when assessing individual mental ability is equally farfetched. No matter how much money is spent on education, it will not transform every classroom into a bunch of Beethovens, Einsteins, or Jane Austens. Everyone concedes that money must be spent; the only question is how much. As long as uncertainty in America over what is inborn and what is learned persists, the "conversation" over how much is enough is bound to continue:

This may be a messy compromise. But, in Carson's eyes, it is probably better than the alternatives.

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Allan M. Brandt. *The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America*. New York: Basic Books. 2007. Pp. vii, 600. $36.00.

Pamela E. Pennock. *Advertising Sin and Sickness: The Politics of Alcohol and Tobacco Marketing, 1950–1990*. (Drugs and Alcohol: Contested Histories.) DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 282. $36.00.

The history of drugs in the United States has taken major steps forward over the last few years. For decades, alcohol and its control dominated American discussion in the field. In the 1960s to the 1980s scholars began to respond to the widening concerns over drug addiction in American society by studying the history of narcotics, particularly heroin or other opiates. More recently they have turned their attention to the impact of pharmaceuticals, but important continuities in approach remain. Some recent exceptions aside, historians have continued to focus on individual drugs rather than the interrelations between them, and the majority of historians interested in tracing the rise, impact, and control of psychoactive substances in the United States still concentrated on the alcohol issue. Concern over drug addiction remained subordinate to the study of social movements in American life, especially the case of alcohol prohibition. Only recently has a move begun to bring work on various addictions together, and to include alcohol as a drug. Pamela E. Pennock's book is an example of latter-day ecumenism on this subject, but it remains a rare example.

Another trend in earlier historiography was the continuing neglect of one of the most serious of all drug problems, tobacco. Until the 1970s, tobacco smoking was one of the most ubiquitous social habits in the United States, as in many other Western countries. Unlike the history of alcohol, however, the story of tobacco received scant historical attention. Apart from notable forays into the subject by business historians, tobacco's impact seemed as ephemeral as the individual act of smoking itself. But that neglect began to change when the modern health-based attacks provoked reassessment of both the marketing of the dreaded weed, and of the cigarette's destructive effects upon American society and public health.

In the study of smoking, historiographical concern has centered almost exclusively on the rise of the cigarette, a story retraced and amplified in Allan M. Brandt's book. Brandt's interest is public health's intersection with legal battles and scientific research. He tells how smoking came to be seen as a major public health killer, and how the tobacco industry worked to blur the progress of science from the time of the early findings in the 1950s associating tobacco with lung cancer. The gist of this story has been told before in other equally impressively sized tomes, notably from the perspective of a journalist-historian (Richard Kluger, *Ashes to Ashes: America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris* [1996]); and from within the community of medical anti-tobacco activists (Stanton E. Glantz et al., *The Cigarette Papers* [1996]). Yet no one has told the story so authoritatively, comprehensively, and judiciously as Brandt. Many years in the making, Brandt's book is forcefully argued and compellingly documented and will long stand as an authoritative text in its field.

Courtesy of its snappy title, the book is billed as being about the one-hundred year rise, fall, and persistence of the cigarette, yet it gives the greater part of its attention to struggles over tobacco smoking since the landmark 1964 Surgeon General's Report. Just over a fifth concerns the years before 1945. After a brief nod to the earlier history of tobacco, the turn-of-the-century anti-tobacco movement, and the role of World War I in increasing use of cigarettes (stories already well told by authors such as John Burnham, *Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior,*

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and Swearing in American History [1993], and Cassandra Tate, *Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of the "Little White Slaver"* [1999]), Brandt depicts the tobacco industry as "engineering consent" over increased cigarette use. In the 1920s, "manipulation of public opinion, values, and beliefs" became "a dominant aspect of the consumer culture" (p. 81). Advertising is a large part of this story, but Brandt recognizes that "Effective marketing required the deployment of a wide range of complementary techniques, from public relations to corporate design" (p. 80). These campaigns were "artfully constructed by powerful corporations" (p. 67). Against this onslaught, anti-tobacco campaigns that produced restrictions on the sale of cigarettes in sixteen states by 1922 could "not long survive in the modern consumer culture" (p. 61). Brandt claims that the Victorian moralists' assaults on cigarettes faded in part because those very attacks "paradoxically made it a powerful symbol of modernity and burnished its appeal." Activists "could not stop the cigarette from becoming phenomenally popular, [and] deeply embedded in social interactions" (p. 67).

While the world was kinder to the cigarette industry in the years 1920 to 1950 than immediately before, doubts over the safety of its product lingered, as Brandt concedes. Clinical observations and some pioneering epidemiological studies (especially one in Nazi Germany) suggested that ill health and higher mortality, including the specific case of lung cancer, were connected to smoking. It was not until key American and British epidemiological studies of 1950–1954, however, that the tables began to turn. Why earlier studies took so long to be followed up is not fully resolved here. Nevertheless it is true that tobacco companies hindered the exposure with misleading advertising on health claims ("More doctors smoke Camels," and so on). This practice they continued after 1950.

Brandt's study focuses on big tobacco's responses to the bad news of the 1950s' medical literature showing that smoking and lung cancer were connected. Brandt documents how public relations campaigns to improve the companies' image drove their response, framed within the specific judicial and regulatory environment of the United States. In 1954 the industry banded together to form the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) to show concern with getting to the bottom of the smoking "controversy," as the industry insisted on putting it. In reality the funding muddied the waters and was aimed at delaying legislative action and presenting the industry as a responsible one. The TIRC pursued research director Clarence Little's pet hereditarian approach and spurned epidemiological studies. Tobacco executives took advantage of the inbuilt capacity for skepticism within the scientific community, where empirical findings were always subject to revision and testing. All the time, as evidence later unearthed in the litigation process of the 1990s revealed, the companies were aware of the dangers of smoking to consumers. Brandt goes on to document how tobacco companies denied the addictiveness of their products in the 1960s, though he concedes that the panel authoring the Surgeon General's damning report in 1964 itself could not come to agreement that a product so commonly used by average Americans was addictive rather than a habituation. The slur of addiction was only gradually overcome by the 1980s as pharmacological research became combined with the terminological change to "substance abuse," allowing tobacco to be seen as one of a range of drug uses requiring stricter regulation.

With legal challenges under product liability law beginning as early as the mid-1950s, the industry framed a multipronged defense that boiled down to the assertion that bracketing smoking and lung cancer was only an "association," not a proven causative link. Moreover, if there was danger, the danger was one, particularly from the time of the 1965 introduction of government health warnings on cigarette packets, about which the public was suitably informed. Thus people who continued to smoke did so at their own risk. The centerpiece of Brandt's argument shows the flaws in the tobacco industry's case on risk. It was inappropriate to treat risk as individual choice, given the level of manipulation of data by the industry, its systemic policy of concealment of vital records, its political tactics in regard to Congress, and the group pressure and addiction that brought whole generations under the sway of tobacco. Brandt shows that scientific discoveries concerning the prevalence of nicotine addiction in the 1970s began to undermine free choice arguments. Tobacco litigation began to become prominent in the 1980s, when the landmark Rose Cippolone case witnessed a serious though unsuccessful legal assault against the industry. Brandt treats this and other litigation down to the successful class action suits of the late 1990s that went beyond individual choice; then he covers the story of the so-called Global Tobacco Agreement, which failed, and its pared down and teeth-pulled successor, the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 that brought a halt to the litigation. In many eyes, the latter let the industry off the hook of further potential suits and enthroned effectively a high license regime in which the states became economically dependent upon tobacco revenues. Brandt does not compare this government-industry symbiosis with that in other developed countries but notes the supreme irony that this settlement left the industry able to market freely outside the United States. Thus a growing global tobacco problem subsumed the defeats of the domestic market. Brandt aptly describes the political negotiations of the settlements and the machinations of the industry in safeguarding its export markets. However this argument says nothing about the longer history of the world tobacco industry. The latter was hardly new to the 1990s and beyond, and was one in which American marketeers were prominent in purloining their product as far back as the nineteenth century. As in so much else, globalization is not as new as it seems.

Brandt makes an important contribution to the field of public history as well as to medical and scientific debates. He shows how historical argument can be mar-

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shaled to expose corporate wrongdoing and as a result to promote the case for public health measures. His work has implications for the study of other product liability cases and also comments on the use of public historians by the industry itself. Brandt discusses in a very interesting section how the industry employed expert historical witnesses to research the smoking "controversy" in such a way as blurred stark alternatives, omitted powerful and condemning evidence, and emphasized the individual freedom of risk-taking smokers. Brandt's case itself also shows how difficult it is to separate moral, ethical and indeed political judgment from the practices of history.

Pennock approaches the topic from an ostensibly narrower perspective. Her discussion of tobacco obfuscation parallels that of Brandt, but with a difference. While Brandt discusses advertising controls, his concern is purely with smoking. He does not discuss how closely connected the arguments against smoking and those against alcohol were in the decades after 1950. Pennock is unusual in that she brings the history of alcohol and tobacco together. She argues that 1950s attempts to control alcohol advertising constituted the last gasp of the old temperance movement, but that when the anti-tobacco advertising campaigns began in the 1960s, anti-alcohol sentiment was able to revive, and to take inspiration from the more successful anti-smoking movement. The leading sponsor of alcohol advertising warnings (first proposed 1967, and passed by Congress in 1988) was Strom Thurmond, a long-time teetotaler, yet he embraced the new medical campaigns and disavowed any claims for prohibition. The new anti-alcohol movement was associated with the consumer movement rather than temperance and featured very few church-based reformers. An organization such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving even accepted money from an alcohol industry keen to be portrayed as moderate and responsible. The new anti-alcohol movement paralleled the anti-smoking one in focusing not on Protestant morality but on the findings of science. Its labeling and anti-advertising campaigns mimicked ideas derived from the cigarette warnings debates. Another more ironic link should be noted. Some of the anti-alcohol advertising push came from representatives of tobacco-growing districts (Thurmond was one of these), and arguments for regulation of alcohol were often used in the press to show the possible extremist policy interventions that might flow by analogy from regulating the marketing of cigarettes. Nevertheless, Pennock concedes that ethical concerns remained at the heart of both anti-smoking and anti-drink campaigns, a characteristic providing links to the older movement. Pennock's study is really about the regulation of marketing dubious products, not the advertising itself, on which there is nothing new here. Within this framework, she offers a study that complements Brandt, but provides also a subtle account of epistemic changes in the social movements underpinning modern campaigns centered on drug control.

Neither of these authors should be faulted because of the topic upon which they have chosen to write. However, their own choices have to varying degrees continued a preoccupation in the history of smoking with health effects and with the industry's impacts upon American consumers. This chimes with histories of American advertising that link the latter to the rise of consumer culture and the triumph of modernity. These two studies, Pennock overtly and Brandt by inference, show how the anti-smoking movement was important in the development of modern consumer advocacy and for environmentalism. Histories revolving around litigation, advertising, consumer choice, product regulation, and the like also echo older concerns about excesses of corporate power, concerns shared in the larger American culture. The attack on (bad) corporate citizens in the case of tobacco history, continued in Brandt's book, maintains an American-style response to corporate power that goes back to anti-business and moralistic rhetoric of the Progressive era. Modern American scholarship in this sense bears the marks of its forebears in the exposure of corporate malfeasance. This is a trope with a distinguished pedigree.

When history is cast as a tale of corporations versus public health, it emphasizes important truths, but at the same time this approach downgrades another aspect of the story, the role of smokers. The historical profession has produced since the 1960s a genre of social histories emphasizing the agency of historical actors "from the bottom up." In this tradition, the history of alcohol and temperance has been prominent. However studies of smoking rarely examine smokers in depth that is equivalent to the work on drinking as a social custom or set of social institutions. Existing work neglects smoking behavior and belief—as fashion, style, and ritual—thus failing to bring to the story the history of manners, including how manners shift over time. It marginalizes anthropological insights about the boundaries between the clean and the unclean, and the fashionable and the unfashionable, thereby neglecting also sociological theories deriving from Norbert Elias's notion of the "civilizing process." It misses, too, the spatial history of tobacco use, as zones of smoking emerged and then receded when public attitudes and laws changed.

As with most other studies of American tobacco, Brandt's history of twentieth-century smoking is almost entirely coeval with that of the cigarette. As a result, no deviation from accepted wisdom receives encouragement in his work, even though until 1940, cigars and chewing tobacco continued to be important in American tobacco consumption. Leslie Hannah criticizes a Whig history of the advance of the modern, organized sector of the tobacco industry in "The Whig Fable of American Tobacco" (*Journal of Economic History* 66 [2006]: 42–73). Any such Whig view would be an oversimplification that needs to be complemented with regional histories and histories of subcultures such as pipe smokers and, especially for the American case, tobacco chewers. Patterns of resistance to the modernity of the cigarette have to be acknowledged, if not for the United States, where cigarettes reputedly "defined America,"

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then most certainly for other countries where the modern manufactured cigarette's triumph took longer. Even within the United States, tobacco chewing remained an important part of the cultural heritage of the American South, and of the nation's sporting culture in baseball. How were products such as pipe and chewing tobacco marketed, what did their use signify, and what were their health consequences? Were smoking practices around these other tobacco products aspects of cultural lag, or the reproduction of the local in the world of global capitalism? Instead of such questions, we have a field dominated by impressive accounts of corporate wrongdoing and public health tragedy.

What is true of smokers can also be said of modern non-smokers (and non-drinkers). Each of these tends in the literature to be treated as the product of a modern public health discourse, yet the dimensions of the discourse are rarely analyzed in drug histories. Brandt notes that "American society had become far more health-conscious . . . and more risk averse" (p. 295), but it is Pennock's work that provides greater historical context. People were living longer, and this fact opened up the search for the sources of diseases of degeneration rather than infection. "Lifestyle factors" became more important and formed, along with consumerism, "a supportive environment for antismoking sentiment" (p. 94). This new movement could have a moral tone. Pennock describes the alternating of "a scientific-health and a social-moral approach" (p. 220) in policy contests over warning labels and advertising modification. She notes the differences in the coalition of reformers between the scientifically oriented public health movement and the "personal health movement." The latter was "a popular trend emphasizing individual responsibility for health and lifestyle modification" with "an undeniable moral dimension" (p. 172). Growing demands for positive health outcomes matched new concerns with environmental amenity, middle-class lifestyle, and improved education portrayed in the work of Samuel Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985* (1987). Historians rarely acknowledge that environmentalism and anti-smoking were somehow parallel and interconnected movements, but Pennock does (p. 95).

To explore the implications for the historiographical field of these two studies entails reflecting upon absences in the literature as well as the influence that these present studies are likely to exert. Future work might well seek to complement the approaches exemplified in these two books by framing the questions surrounding smoking and drinking cross-culturally, and by developing cultural histories of the diversity of smoking habits and their accompanying addictions.

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FRANK DIKÖTTER. *Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 382. $35.00.

Students of modern consumerism in China may suffer from predictable myopia: the subject is the most important under the sun! But we have abundant evidence. Every visitor to China sees signs of a radical transformation underway. In a few short decades, we have come to think of China as the "the world's workshop," making affordable the very consumerism central to our contemporary lifestyles. And now China itself is becoming a leading consumer of, well, everything. The ever-escalating statistics are jaw-dropping. China is already the world's largest consumer of beer, meat, and cell phones, to select a random few from a growing list of consumer goods. It also has taken to consumer lifestyles, building new mega-mega-malls twice as big as the Mall of America and the Mall of Canada. A mere five years ago Chinese bought only one percent of the world's luxury handbags, jewelry, shoes, and perfume. Now the country is the third largest consumer of luxury brands and should surpass the United States and Japan in under a decade. It already has in the sale of Bentleys, the world's most expensive car.

How China decides to consume will shape the lives of its 1.3 billion inhabitants. The future shape of consumerism in China is not automatic or natural. As with any other critical subject, political policies, cultural practices, and history matter. Take Beijing's decision to promote private automobiles and a car culture of expressways, drive-in dining, and sprawling suburban and exurban developments. Tax policies and infrastructure investment easily could have led to very different outcomes. Indeed, this particular policy decision may determine not only how Chinese commuters spend their time (on bicycles or crowded trains and buses versus in cars stuck in traffic jams). It may also determine the health of the planet; smog doesn't recognize political borders.

We need to know much more about every aspect of consumption and consumerism in China, and historians of America and Europe should be enlisted (even drafted) to help shape the research agenda. Frank Trentmann's massive, multiyear, interdisciplinary, and international "Cultures of Consumption" project (http://www.consume.bbk.ac.uk/index.html), which ran from 2000–2007, was an excellent start. He and his collaborators published many important volumes. One might start with John Brewer and Trentmann, editors, *Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives: Historical Trajectories, Transnational Exchanges* (2006). But we need

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Lizabeth Cohen–like studies, of the sort found in her *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (2003), of domestic consumer politics as well as Victoria de Grazia–like histories, such as her *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (2005), on the introduction to and transformation of American-style consumerism in China.

Fifteen years ago, researching twentieth-century Chinese consumerism was almost unthinkable. I was routinely asked why studying consumerism in China was historically significant. One common formulation of the surprise: "Urban consumer culture? Before the Communist Revolution of 1949, wasn't China a country of peasants and landlords?" The Cold War focus on the rural revolutionary origins of the Communist Revolution may have been waning as the central problematic, but its replacement wasn't clear. Pre-twentieth-century historians have led the way with books such as Craig Clunas's *Superfluous Things: Material Culture and Social Status in Early Modern China* (1991) and *Empire of Great Brightness: Visual and Material Cultures of Ming China, 1368–1644* (2007). Likewise, Timothy Brook's *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (1999) and Kenneth Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2001) have begun to map key socioeconomic issues. For the twentieth century, business historian Sherman Cochran and urban social and cultural historians like Wen-hsin Yeh and their students have led the charge. But their books are more specialized.

Frank Dikötter's latest comprehensive survey of another critical subject in modern Chinese history provides a place to start the investigation. He exhaustively catalogs the transformation of Chinese material culture in the decades preceding 1949, demonstrating through sheer volume of examples that the material basis of consumerism in China is not a post–Mao Zedong (d. 1976) phenomenon. Five or ten years ago this alone would have been a worthy contribution. Topics covered include virtually everything imaginable in the material culture of a modern society. The first half of the book, "Dissemination: Networks and Materials," focuses on how this new culture was physically transported across China as well as how Chinese learned about it through new forms of commodity display. Readers are treated to brief histories of things new: from retailing, exhibition halls, and advertising; to modes of transportation such as rickshaws, automobiles, bicycles, and airplanes; to public environments created within modern schools and workplaces; to the energy sources undergirding it all. The second half, "Appropriation: People and Objects," attempts to scrutinize how "ordinary people," one of several critical but undefined terms, interacted with this abundance of new objects in their homes, leisure activities, and on their persons. One could easily imagine a graduate advisor randomly flipping open a page to find a worthy dissertation topic for a directionless graduate student. (I just tried this experiment, yielding page 211, a photograph of orphans brushing their teeth. Send my way any students interested in building on Ruth Rogaski's *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* [2004] by studying the introduction of the toothbrush and the marketing of hygiene-related consumer goods in China.)

The book's primary strength is its identification and classification of the vast changes in material culture. Thanks to Dikötter we now know bits more about the transformation of interior spaces, drinking cultures, and the popularization of electric fans. At the same time, the author makes bold claims about his arguments: "This book argues that dominant groups, by virtue of their closer familiarity with the foreign, most conspicuously started to appropriate foreign objects by the end of the Qing, but ultimately ordinary people, thanks to their distance from centres of power, were the least inhibited about acquiring goods which were perceived as useful. . . . When more and more people make small adjustments to material culture, from the acquisition of a kerosene lamp to the use of cheap cement, the cumulative effect over the course of a century (1842–1949) is great. These changes are charted here for the very first time" (p. 3). And Dikötter does a fine job identifying the creative ways Chinese utilize the new things around them. We learn, for instance, how women confidently mixed and matched traditional and recently imported clothing articles to create their own original styles and how urban slum dwellers built shacks out of iron Standard Oil cans.

Non-China scholars searching for larger arguments to compare with their own findings may be underwhelmed. It probably will not astonish readers that those least likely to have access to information about or contact with foreigners and how they used their material artifacts would "appropriate" or "subvert" these good for their own ends. Likewise, one probably would expect those farthest away from Chinese central government controls and activist elite discourse and social movements to completely miss or ignore the intended use of new goods. Take the case of economic nationalism in the National Products Movement, a multifaceted "Buy Chinese" campaign conducted in cities across the country during the first half of the twentieth century. Advocates developed countless ways, including skillfully co-opting foreign commodity spectacles like product exhibitions, to browbeat fellow Chinese to consume China-made goods. "Ordinary people," particularly those outside of major treaty ports, were, of course, either ignorant of weak efforts or they ignored them. Predictably, they were the least likely or willing to adhere to nationalistic admonitions and pay more for poorly made Chinese copies—unless that was all they could afford. Dikötter's book unintentionally confirms why the state, once powerfully reconstituted after 1949, wanted to counteract the ease with which "ordinary people" adopted, adapted, and, most alarmingly, enjoyed imports.

The way Dikötter makes "ordinary people" the he-

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roes of the book illustrates notions of consumption that overemphasize local agency. In late twentieth-century cultural studies circles, the use of products for anything other than their intended purpose became refreshing proof that the little guy and gal could stand up to imperialists and multinationals after all. But things are always appropriated for local, specific, even individual purposes. By way of illustration, my grandmother insisted that Coca-Cola was not only a refreshing beverage (presumably, its intended purpose) but also was an effective disinfectant, useful for cleaning toilets. Is the latter use a counterintuitive sign of her "creative appropriation" of a ubiquitous international product? By focusing on such personalized uses and by doing so largely via anecdotes, mostly made by foreign observers, Dikötter misses opportunities to offer a broader, integrated contextualization. We get, for instance, only passing reference to this as a "Golden Age" for the introduction of new material culture without much explanation, leaving us wondering what makes the "Golden Age" glitter.

The thorny issue of reception lies at the heart of works on consumption and consumerism. How did people use and think about the products and services they consumed? This is even more of a problem than in the American and Western European cases because we do not have the quality of sources such as probate records to determine exactly what households owned. Oddly, after criticizing distinguished (and deceased) early Sinologists and missionaries, the "romantic traveler and nostalgic historian alike," for their "refusal to engage with the presence of the modern" and attempts to "preserve the fiction of a more 'authentic' China" (pp. 4, 26), Dikötter proceeds to rely heavily on exactly such literature. This is understandable. Such sources, for whatever their "Orientalist" liabilities, contain observations about everyday life that few locals thought to record. Again, the uses of such sources is reasonable and his command of them commendable. But the claim that this gets historians—purportedly for the very first time—deeper into everyday life, much less far beyond the treaty ports, is unsustainable. Figuring out what households actually had (less what they thought about such things) will have to wait for scholars with new methodologies and materials.

A final disappointing side effect of the catalog-like presentation of the book is the author's weak use of visual materials. That is not to say absence. The book includes nearly a hundred beautifully produced photos and illustrations, many rare. Historians of other parts of the world will gain much from simply reviewing these photographs. But Dikötter leaves readers on their own to draw conclusions about their significance. Photographs are rarely explicated in the text and include only the tersest of captions (e.g., "Two ladies in a rickshaw, 1926"). As with the litany of descriptions in the text itself, the reader encounters the same frustrating lack of analysis.

This encyclopedic treatment of Chinese material culture will be a boon to all scholars of this period, particularly comparativists without Chinese language skills and those without ready access to the similarly descriptive works published in Chinese in recent years (see, for instance, the wildly popular series of historical photographs, *Lao zhaopian*). Collectively, the vast array of mini-histories assembled here overwhelmingly demonstrates how the introduction of countless new things dramatically affected daily life, at least in the major treaty ports. But readers may find that the arguments are not as compelling as the comprehensive and very useful cataloging of the fascinating and dramatic transformation of Chinese material culture. This book should, like others by the author, serve as a helpful springboard for further investigations.

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Reviews of Books

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

AHMET T. KARAMUSTAFA. *Sufism: The Formative Period*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 202. Cloth $60.00, paper $24.95.

In this work, Ahmet T. Karamustafa renders a fine service to students and scholars who want a readable summary and introductory interpretation of the development of early (roughly the late second to late sixth Islamic centuries) Sufi traditions of Muslim piety. He attempts at various points to relate this to other strands of religious life developing in the same period, including theology, law, exegesis, and religio-historical self-understanding. He also rightly tries, for the most part successfully, not to reify "Sufism" as something unitary or uniform, but to recognize its varied components.

The book is organized roughly chronologically into chapters on the early Sufis of Baghdad; the mystics in lower Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia; the spread of Baghdadi trends to Arabia, Iran, Central Asia, and Spain; the development of specialized Sufi writings (which became "classical" sources on the early Sufis); the formation of organized Sufi communities (and of Sufi teaching lineages and saints' cults); and "Sainthood Triumphant" (social and political contexts and nonconformist trends). In this reviewer's judgment, the book's strongest elements, especially in light of previous scholarship, are the laudable attempt to summarize and synthesize previous studies of the formative development of Sufi piety and mysticism; the overview of specialized Sufi texts (and the useful table of major works, pp. 84–87); and the descriptions of linkages and divisions in the later part of the period treated between the growing cult of saints and the growing traditions of Sufi masters and teaching lineages. In good part because of the sources available, but also because of the constraint of only 177 pages (text and notes), the book cannot offer a deep historical narrative of fissiparous and locally diverse developments in Muslim piety and thinking over several centuries. However, Karamustafa does make an admirable effort in this overview to present his own interpretive viewpoint on a vast subject—one based solidly on previous and current work in the field, to which his notes and bibliography give ample attestation.

The bibliography is in general carefully done and comprehensive; there are a few classic or relevant older studies missing, including those by Georges C. Anawati and Louis Gardet, and Richard Hartmann. There are also several articles missing, including two by Hartmann (*ZDMG* 1918; *Der Islam* 1918), Ignác Goldziher (*WZKM* 1899); and Johannes Pedersen (1923). Also, one might note the odd absence of reference to Michael Cook's major monograph, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (2001), or its brief epitome, *Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction* (2003), since Cook has multiple references to Sufis in both.

While it may seem petty in a short review to treat formal matters despite the overall quality of the work, one could ask for better editorial work from a distinguished university press than is evident here. Aside from some minor typographic errors (e.g., "milieu" should be plural [p. 93]), there are a few places where a cross-reference to another discussion of a person or text would be helpful, especially to the reader without background in the field. There are also a number of instances of awkward syntactic or idiomatic formulations and even a few typographical errors that thorough editorial scrutiny should have eliminated, such as dropped definite articles (e.g., Maturîdiyya, p. 69; Ash'ariyya, p. 75; "nature," p. 105, line 2; madrasa, p. 120; and *Musnad*, p. 128) and wrong word choices (e.g., "contemplated," not "contemplated about," p. 14; "audition *of* [not *to*] poetry and music," p. 20; "contemplation *of* [not *on*] the Qur'an," p. 39; "fasting" not "systematic hunger," p. 39; "suspicion *of* [not *against*]," p. 48; "scriptural" not "scriptuary," 57; "corpus" not "output," 63; "*latter* [not *first*] two groups," p. 68; "ushered in" not "ushered," p. 106; "*divert* [not *avert*] . . . from," p. 163; "outrageous behaviour . . . *from* [not *about*]," p. 164; "patterns . . . *in* [not *among*] many Sufi circles," p. 174; "primacy . . . *among* [not *to*]," p. 175; and "occurred *concurrent with* [not *against*] the formation of the cults of saints," p. 176).

The book may promise slightly more than it gives in the way of historical contextualization of Sufi strands of Islamic life both intellectually among other Islamic religious and intellectual traditions and sociopolitically in relation to ruling authorities and societal conditions. However, as an introduction and handy reference to major developments in the growth and spread into the twelfth/sixth century of Sufi piety and thought (and also

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the institutionalization and popularization of Sufi ideas and practice and the veneration of saints more generally), this small volume is the best overview available and deserves wide use.

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DANIEL CASTRO. *Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism*. (Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 233. Cloth $74.95, paper $21.95.

I took Daniel Castro's book on Bartolomé de Las Casas to the commemoration of the tenth-year anniversary of the massacre of forty-five members of the Tzotzil Roman Catholic pacifist organization Las Abejas (The Bees) with the expectation that the volume would be a suitable companion for reflecting on Las Casas's legacy in Chiapas, Mexico. I soon learned that Castro's objective was to expose Las Casas's "ecclesiastical imperialism," which led me to put it down. The last thing I wanted was to "deconstruct" the remembrance of the martyrs of Acteal. Castro's book is more about what Las Casas did not do than about his brilliant career as a pamphleteer, historian, philosopher, and theologian. Following the lead of Fray Toribio Benavente, known as Motolinia (meaning "he is poor" in Nahuatl, not, as Castro claims, "the barefoot one"), Castro unmasks the titles of "father," "apostle," and "protector" that historians have given Las Casas over the centuries. Castro revisits Motolinia's denunciation, in the famous 1555 Letter to Emperor Charles V, of Las Casas's disregard for the Indian's spiritual health, his purported ignorance of indigenous languages, and his hypocrisy manifest in using Indian carriers to transport massive files documenting abuses.

The Abejas practice a version of liberation theology known as *teología india* (Indian Theology), which under the leadership of Samuel Ruiz García, the former bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas, drew its inspiration from Las Casas's *Apologética historia sumaria* (1550). Castro only mentions this masterpiece in passing with the exception of a disparaging comment reminiscent of the critiques of anthropology that flourished in the 1980s: "the natives are viewed more from the perspective of a social scientist analyzing an inert subject to prove a thesis than from that of a loving, empathetic person trying to come close to his subject" (p. 15). This is not the place to discuss Las Casas's recognition of anthropophagy and human sacrifice as manifestations of deep religiosity among the Amerindians, but his openness has inspired the practitioners of *teología india* to incorporate Mesoamerican narratives and rites into Christian practices. Under one breath the Abejas cite the Popol Vuh and celebrate mass in Tzotzil.

Castro argues that Las Casas sought to evangelize Amerindians, but what else would one expect from a bishop? However, he offers no evidence for claiming that "the liberation he advocated for them was conditioned by the natives' agreement to renounce their own cultural and religious practices and embrace Christianity" (p. 182). If we are to take the maxim in *De unico vocationis modo* (ca. 1533) that the only legitimate way to call forth people into the church is by means of the understanding, the process could take several generations and ultimately the decision not to baptize would have to be respected. The disputes over baptism in the first half of the sixteenth century, most prominently with Motolinia, were not inconsequential events given the theologico-political regime of the sacraments, of which the most detrimental was the required selection of one spouse in matrimony. There is a radical difference between those who advocated massive, if not forced, baptisms and those who argued the need for a thorough catechization that would lead Indians to understand the meaning and social implications of baptism. In chapter seven of *De unico vocationis modo*, Las Casas lays out the criteria for demanding the restoration of sovereignty and exacting reparations for damages. It seems that Castro missed the discussion of reparation and restoration of sovereignty in this early treatise. I agree with Castro that the radical (indeed, unique) call for Spain to renounce its possessions in the Indies came late in Las Casas's life (p. 11), but the call for restoration and reparation from the crown dates back to the 1530s. For the most part, Castro bases his argument on ecclesiastical imperialism on the first *Memorial de remedios para las Indias* that Las Casas wrote in 1516. Las Casas's work extends to his death in 1566.

Reading Castro outside the open-air auditorium in Acteal, where the commemoration of the massacre was held, I soon learned that his objective was to subject Las Casas "to the same unsparing examination that less celebrated personages receive" (p. 13). By this logic one could argue the need to "dissect" and "deconstruct" (p. 6) the work of Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, Garcilaso de la Vega, Hernando Alvarado Tezozomoc, or Domingo De San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin, since these Indian and mestizo writers also express their Christian beliefs and willingness to work in the context of Spanish dominion.

Not only am I unsympathetic with Castro's ideological position, but I also regret to say that his scholarship is lacking. His bibliography is limited to publications before 1995 and provides no new archival evidence to prove his arguments. It is as if in the last ten years nothing significant had been written on Las Casas. This book will be welcomed by readers inclined to unmask Las Casas's motives as imperialist and will be ignored by readers expecting a thoughtful reading of Las Casas's theoretical, historical, and polemical writings.

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ERIC ROBERT TAYLOR. *If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade*. (Antislavery, Abolition, and the Atlantic World.) Baton

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Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 266. $45.00.

Though far less original and revisionary than it claims to be, Eric Robert Taylor's study provides a painstakingly detailed and vivid review of slaves' resistance in the Middle Passages between Africa and the New World and between slave areas in the Americas, coming up with some useful generalizations and a few refining conclusions.

Contrary to the impression given by the book's cover material and introduction that these subjects have been previously neglected or underplayed, it is surely a commonplace that slaves' shipboard resistance was a constant threat, recognized by slave traders and scholars of slavery alike. For example, Taylor quotes one historian as saying general uprisings were "no more than occasional episodes," omitting the essential following rider in the original that "perhaps no more than one slaving voyage in ten experienced an actual outbreak. But few voyages were ever completed without the discovery or threat of slave conspiracy, and no slaving captain throughout the history of the Atlantic trade ever sailed without a whole armory of guns and chains plus as many white crewmen as he could recruit and keep alive to act as seaborne jailers" (Michael Craton, *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* [1982], p. 24). Surely it is also true to say that no aspect of slave resistance is fully understood without regarding shipboard revolts as (in the words of the historian already quoted) as part of "a continuum of active slave resistance, which connected the Amerindians' defense of their heritage and the Africans' resistance in Africa, to shipboard 'mutinies' on the Middle Passage, resistance in the plantations short of rebellion, maroon activity, African-type rebellions and the more sophisticated late Afro-Caribbean revolts" (Craton, p. 17). To be fair, Taylor's purpose was explicitly more focused (and large enough in all conscience): to examine all he could find in the archival sources and secondary literature concerning the resistance of slaves during their transference by the carriers of all nations from the shores of Africa to and between all destinations in the Americas over the whole four centuries of the trade, and to come up with summary, authoritative, and if possible revisionary conclusions. How has he gone about this worthy enterprise, and how well has he succeeded?

From his citations and quotations Taylor has clearly trawled the wealth of contemporary descriptions; the invaluable collections of documents, particularly the four volumes edited by Elizabeth Donnan (1930–1935); the numerous secondary works wholly or partly describing the Middle Passage, including pioneering books and articles by Gaston Martin (1931), Harvey Wish (1937), Lorenzo Greene (1944), Darold Wax (1966), and Daniel Mannix and Malcolm Cowley (1978); and more specialized studies, among them those by Jay Caughtry (1981), Joseph Miller (1981), Michael Craton (1982), David Eltis (1984), Winston McGowan (1991), Johannes Postma (1992), Joseph Inikori (1982, 1996), and David Richardson (2001)—all of which were eclipsed by the catalogue of slave trading from Nantes collected and edited by Jean Mettas and Serge Daget (1978–1994) and the colossal CD-ROM database collated by David Eltis, David Richardson, Stephen Behrendt, and Herbert Klein (1999).

By far Taylor's most impressive and valuable new research has been in archival sources, particularly the shipping records, court cases, and newspaper reports lodged in public record offices and libraries in England and Rhode Island. Combining these resources with those previously published, Taylor was able to draw up (as an appendix) a thirty-four-page "Chronology of Shipboard Slave Revolts, 1509–1865," which, using somewhat broadly defined criteria, annotates no fewer than 493 instances over the 456-year period cited. Taylor might have made a stronger argument had he pointed out that just over 400 of the listed cases dated from the eighteenth century alone, indicating an annual average of some four rather than one, although skeptics might point out that even 500 instances of slave revolt (failed more often than successful) are dwarfed by the recorded total of at least 27,000 slave trading voyages identified in the 1999 database. The fact that the proportion of slave revolts recorded for each country engaged more or less reflects the proportions of the total trade engaged by each suggests that the causal conditions were general; again, however, skeptics might point to the likelihood that the apparent figures are damagingly skewed by the number of cases that for one reason or another went unrecorded. Taylor's new database is also weakened by a failure to distinguish between information that was simply neutral reportage (often of the sketchiest) and that derived from pro- and anti-slave trade sources.

While Taylor's listed material provides ample substance for his description and analysis of shipboard revolts, what it actually discloses tends to reinforce rather than to challenge or redefine the already received impression of the traffic. His book is nonetheless well planned and presented, and provides a valuable outline and details for newcomers to the subject. Successive chapters, most of which are artfully introduced by specially detailed examples, describe the historical and geographic lineaments of the trade, the conditions generally favorable for revolt (notably including time detained on the African coast and the depletion of white crew members through disease), the precautions routinely taken against uprisings (shackling; vigilance; the separation of male, female, and child slaves and different ethnic groups; and the employment of African "fifth columnists"), and the varied forms of revolt, both "successful" and "unsuccessful." An interesting seventh chapter distinguishes the revolts on voyages between areas of America in slavery's last decades (most famously the cases of the *Amistad* and *Creole* in 1839 and 1841). Beside its extensive chronology, the book is well provided with endnotes and a useful bibliography for further study (although the present reviewer might be

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excused for noting the absence of his own *Sinews of Empire: A Short History of British Slavery* [1974]).

In his main text, Taylor sheds some new light on shipboard revolts in general. This includes a fresh analysis of the African locations most subject to slave uprisings (illustrated by a map) and tables indicating the times of day most favored by rebels, the wide range of weapons used, and estimates of the average numbers of slaves recorded killed. Taylor also emphasizes the previous understatement of the role of slave women in rebellions and the effects of the prevalence of sexual relations between white crewmen and black slave women. This is offset, however, by his apparent reluctance to acknowledge fully the undoubtedly essential role of Africans themselves in the trade: as slave catchers in the African interior, as traders of slaves for arms, metals, and other trade goods at the coast, and as coffle guards, canoemen, "linguists," "gromettas," or spies in the transfer of slaves from shore to ship.

Although he makes more than a token acknowledgment of the way that shipboard revolts foreshadowed forms of resistance (largely short of overt rebellion) in the American plantations, Taylor's attempt to summarize and validate his findings makes the conclusion the most disappointing—or at least the most contentious—section of his book. His most exaggerated claim is that the costs of guarding and insuring against shipboard insurrections and of the loss of slave and white crewmen's lives (not to mention ships) contributed substantially to the slave trade's ending. A more balanced view is that the history of shipboard revolts shows that they actually decreased as the trade became more efficient in respect of more custom built ships, economies of scale in the selection of African trading locations, quicker turnarounds on the African coast, more speedy transatlantic voyages and efficient methods of distribution in the New World, and probably some improvements in medical conditions and treatment.

An extreme view is that the slave trade continued as long as it was needed and that its abolition was as much determined by economic factors as by the rising tide of liberal sentiments in the European metropoles and more enlightened American colonies. If shipboard revolts had an impact in this process (and it can be argued that slave revolts in the American plantations actually had a countervailing influence), it was mainly through the increasing publicity they were given by abolitionist campaigners.

A concluding theme has at least rhetorical plausibility. By their implacable resistance, African and African American slaves were simply demonstrating the obduracy of the human spirit. At its most extreme, death, even if tantamount to suicide, was preferable to dishonor. This was the sentiment invoked long after formal slavery ended in the sonnet by Claude McKay that Taylor quotes as the title of his book.

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SUSAN HARDMAN MOORE. *Pilgrims: New World Settlers and the Call of Home*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 316. $35.00.

Migration in the 1630s carried disgruntled, hopeful, or desperate English men, women, and children to North America and the Caribbean, peopling relatively new colonies at a time of rising economic and religious tensions in their native land. Although the phrase "Great Migration" was once associated only with New England, we now know that settlers and servants moved in sizeable numbers to every colony at this time. The fates of these people were mixed: a few made a success of their new lives, many barely eked out a living, some soon died, others returned home. Migration continued after the 1630s, but never again would England lose so many people to the colonizing venture in so short a time. After 1640, revolutionary events in Scotland, England, and Ireland slowed voluntary migration (while giving a boost to prisoner transportations) and reduced the attractiveness of seeking out a new home on distant shores. A notable number of colonial residents returned in the decades after 1640, pushed by disillusionment with life in the plantations and drawn by opportunities at home.

Susan Harman Moore explores the experiences of those who returned from New England in the two decades following 1640. Moore considers the decision to go to North America in the first place. The idea of Providence—that God's hand could be seen in unfolding events and read for an indication of the proper course—structured decisions about whether and when to go, for those who made their homes permanently across the Atlantic as well as for those who ultimately returned. Once in New England, Moore's subjects eventually used a similar process to determine that they ought to return to their natal land. Returning they brought knowledge of the religious practices put in place in most New England colonies, and occasionally adapted these insights to the fluid religious situation that greeted them. Moore finds that, while the "New England way" as promoted in pamphlet literature helped polarize the conversation about the reform of England's churches, the actions of returnees showed more flexibility in applying the practices of covenanted churches.

Among Moore's most interesting contributions is a discussion of opportunities in the new government that returning male emigrants found. A few returnees—such as regicide Hugh Peter and turncoat George Downing—rode the positive reputation of New England to prominence. But most who returned to participate in the revolutionary regime went to the margins, such as Ireland or Scotland, and occupied mid-level positions. Absent as the struggle initially unfolded, they lacked the connections and local power base that catapulted some otherwise comparable men into positions of authority.

The book, handsomely produced by Yale University Press, is full of stories of people. Moore located information about 250 individuals. While many are ministers

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whose return has frequently been studied, Moore has also ferreted out biographical writings of others. Together these tales provide rich detail that helps to bring alive the experiences of ordinary men and women. Moore writes well, and she has peppered her prose with British colloquialisms that American readers will notice with pleasure. An altercation on the Exchange between two ex-residents of New England is referred to as "a punch up." The research for the volume is prodigious, and the mere 147 pages of text are supported by another 142 in appendixes, bibliography, and notes.

Looming over this book is the older idea that New England was founded on a sacred mission. Moore's use of the term "Pilgrims" in the title refers to the religious wanderings of her subjects; but it is also intended to catch readers in the exceptionalist assumption that seventeenth-century "Pilgrims" founded the United States. Perhaps overly conscious of this discredited if still popular view, Moore makes much of those leaders who tried to prevent the departure of their fellow colonists. When she repeatedly describes departees as "abandoning" the colony, she seems to channel John Winthrop. She presents parents who tried to use inheritance to force their adult offspring back to the colony in this vein too. Aged parents often attempt to manipulate their children into living near by or taking up the family abode, without being guided by a wish to promote a region's mission. This effort to overturn a no longer widely held view of New England slightly mars the opening sections of the book. This criticism aside, readers will find that the work is "spot on." Recounting wonderful stories, its elegant writing and prodigious research make it a worthwhile addition to the literature on mid-seventeenth-century England and New England.

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David Armitage. *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. vi, 300. $23.95.

David Armitage's book is a fascinating account of the international implications and reception of this most American of political documents whose central message, he argues, was "the assertion of sovereignty as independence" (p. 22). He also stresses the fact that sovereignty as independence was declared for an international audience. In 1776, this was certainly an innovative idea and, in turn, an act of defiance that eventually would lead to war against the British crown. Armitage reminds the reader: "No document in world history before 1776 had made such an announcement of statehood in the language of independence" (pp. 22–23). What Armitage emphasizes again and again in his instructive reading and perceptive interpretation of the Declaration of Independence are its "outward-looking" rather than "inward-looking" characteristics and features. Far more than eloquently articulating what would become a defining national statement of political freedom, Armitage astutely pays attention to the profound global implications of the document. In this nicely produced book by Harvard University Press, there is a helpful table that lists numerous other declarations of independence and includes a good many of these in their entirety. Thus the volume, while serving interpretive purposes of internationalizing and globalizing the intellectual history of the document, serves an important pedagogical purpose as well.

Armitage downplays the role of nationalism or national identity in theDeclaration of Independence. This is not to say that Thomas Jefferson was unaware of the emotional and political importance of such evolving ideas and allegiances. But, as Armitage reminds us, Jefferson had little control over how theDeclaration of Independence was interpreted then or now. Furthermore, Armitage insists on shifting our attention to the geopolitical dynamics that the Declaration of Independence exposes rather than underscoring its role in forging a sense of an "American" identity. In declaring independence, Jefferson and his fellow signatories were making a very important declaration about the relationship between the United States as an autonomous state and the international community. Armitage, in fact, rather intentionally shifts attention away from questions and theories about national identity and nations to questions about the relationships between nations and states. He reminds us that some states have emerged without the nation (p. 20). Twenty years' worth of scholarship on rethinking nationalism and the making and unmaking of nations in modern European and world history has not answered some fundamental questions about the sovereignty of states and their relationships to the world outside their borders. Attention to the cultural making of the nation has often underestimated the changing role and understanding of the state or states within the nation.

By including the other declarations of independence that were influenced by that of the United States, this book will help students to appreciate the ways in which the language of rights and the sovereignty of the people came to be embraced as political and philosophical ideals and practices. Moreover, the influences were wide, ranging from the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence of July 5, 1811, and the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand of October 28, 1835, to the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence of October 18, 1918, and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia on November 11, 1965, all of which are reprinted.

Armitage divides the book into three essays. First, he examines the ways in which the international community or world was an integral aspect of the Declaration itself; second, he explores the interpretive and geopolitical work that the Declaration inspired in the world of the later eighteenth century; third, he expands outward still farther to introduce the fundamental idea of freedom and sovereignty underlined in a world where peoples, nations, and regions began to declare themselves independent states. These essays explain how the

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ideals embedded in the Declaration were interdependent. They relied to a large extent on the opinions of others outside the British Empire in North America, for example. In his first essay, Armitage unravels a story about the transnational nature and dynamic of the Declaration that has gone largely overlooked in the historiography. He also reminds us here that, in declaring independence and sovereignty, a state or region or country or nation does not simply sever ties with its colonial origins so much as declare its new political and diplomatic place in the world for the world to hear and see.

The Declaration of Independence became headline news, debated and analyzed in the periodical literature of Western Europe as well as in newspapers and pamphlet literature. Here again the ideals and philosophical principles that reinforced the American founders' political manifesto were hardly circumscribed by the narrow parameters of the thirteen British colonies in North America. Instead, the act of declaring independence to the world and in the world helped to create the new nation before it was forged in war and revolution. Armitage's point is that the world mattered. The Declaration introduced the new United States to the world.

Finally, the Declaration ushered in a world of declarations, a world of justifications and treatises breathing new political energy and sovereignty into regions and geographies that did not view their territories as independent before. Sovereignty no longer resided in the body of the king or in parliament or in both; sovereignty resided in words uttered by a certain meritocracy of white men. While this turned out to be, in hindsight, a limited vision and version of democracy, it was democracy nevertheless. The French Revolution would push debates about representation, sovereignty, and ideas and practices of democracy even further. But the Declaration of Independence in and of the world opened up these questions, concerns, and ideas in ways that were unprecedented historically and intellectually. Sovereignty demanded the words and actions of people. It is to his credit that Armitage manages to make us rethink and reframe some of our assumptions about the Declaration of Independence. By showing us the dialectical tensions between the Declaration and the many worlds that it inhabited and inspired, Armitage helps us to see how the local and the global were inextricably linked in 1776.

MAURA O'CONNOR
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ROBERTO BREÑA. *El primer liberalismo español y los procesos de emancipación de América, 1808–1824: Una revisión historiográfica del liberalismo hispánico*. México, D.F.: El Colegio de México. 2006. Pp. 580.

In this book, Roberto Breña analyzes the relations between early Spanish liberalism and the Spanish American independence process. In line with the most recent developments in the field (by authors such as François-Xavier Guerra, Jaime E. Rodríguez O., and Jeremy Adelman), he argues that the process of Spanish American independence was highly influenced by liberalism. Yet, while liberalism was shared on both sides of the ocean, it produced different results in Europe and the Americas. In Europe, it served to fight against absolutism, perhaps even despotism. In the Americas, it explained the need to break away from Spain. This could happen because conditions on each side of the Atlantic were different. In the Americas, liberalism became a rallying point in a series of autonomous movements that depended on local conditions and that were progressively radicalized by a great diversity of ideas, interests, and war experiences. Thus, if initially the proponents of change ("liberals") in both hemispheres seemed to identify similar goals, soon after, their paths diverged; what began as political affinity ended in political rivalry and separation. And, although liberalism was crushed in Spain (1814), it continued to reign—at least to some degree—in the Americas.

In order to demonstrate the above, Breña examines (as well as criticizes) existing literature on early Spanish liberalism and Spanish American independence. Covering the period 1808–1823, he describes the political history of the region, as well as the ideas (and ideologies) that circulated within it. He concludes by affirming that the period of Spanish American independence should be read within a larger context that integrates Spain into the story. Breña also suggests that we understand Spanish liberalism not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete. If liberals could agree on many ideas, their agreement often dissipated as soon as action had to be taken—which was part of the reason that liberalism ended up taking such divergent paths in Spain and Spanish America. Yet liberalism itself was not born in vacuum: it developed the way it did partly as a result of the existence of the colonies and the growing confrontation between colonies and the metropole.

The study of the period of Spanish American independence has undergone massive shifts in recent decades. Having been once interpreted as the result of the action of few exceptional individuals who were inspired by foreign ideas (mainly French and North American) and who were fighting against oppression, it is now generally agreed that the process of independence began because of a crisis at the center (the Napoleonic invasion of Spain) and that it involved not only foreign inspiration but also the use of Hispanic contractual theories that, in the absence of the king (captive in Bayonne), located the sovereignty in the "people." Current scholarship also insists that independence was not inevitable. On the contrary, it was a surprising result.

The struggle for independence did not so much pit Europeans against Americans as it did monarchists against republicans and reformers against traditionalists. At least in the early period, none of these wanted, or even envisioned, a separation from Spain. At stake was the demand for greater local autonomy, and the issue was how best to achieve it. Some historians have even gone so far as to argue that we cannot legitimately speak about "an independence period." After all, the

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period saw the same tensions and conflicts that had existed before and would continue after. Independence, in short, was not an earth-shaking moment. It was a casual moment that ended perhaps in disaster (for Spain) and glory (for Americans).

Breña's book is a welcome addition to this growing literature. It is likely to interest not only historians but also social scientists and people interested in the relationship between ideas and action. It brings together a disparate literature, making it (relatively) accessible. It allows us to reflect on what the historiography has achieved and where it has failed. Breña's greatest contribution is perhaps his endorsement of an already growing dialogue between historians of Spain and historians of Spanish America. Criticizing both Spanish and Spanish American historians who fail to engage in this dialogue, Breña advocates a global history in which the Hispanic world would be the only viable unit of analysis.

TAMAR HERZOG
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CHRISTOPHER SCHMIDT-NOWARA. *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century*. (Pitt Latin American Series.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 278. $39.95.

During the course of the "long nineteenth century," the modern nation-state came into existence, patriots constructed national histories, archives became depositories of a common past, and the studying and teaching of history as a scholarly discipline served the political expediency of the present. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara's elegantly written and thoroughly researched book makes an important contribution to historiographical studies and intellectual history more broadly by focusing on the writing, celebration, and commemoration of history in Spain and what remained of its once vast empire in the nineteenth century. The major historical question the book asks is this: How did writing imperial histories and commemorations of the Spanish Conquest of the sixteenth century provide the primary sources for new national histories in the nineteenth century?

To answer this question, Schmidt-Nowara privileges neither Spanish citizens on the Iberian peninsula nor colonial subjects in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Rather, he analyzes historians in all four nations/colonies to examine the cooperation, conflicts, and controversies over constructing a national past where the theme of conquest dominated the writing of history. In so doing, his book makes important contributions to Spanish, Filipino, and Spanish Caribbean historiographies, which are often recognized as linked through imperial ties but are all too frequently separated by historians to correspond with the modern historical disciplinary divisions of "European," "Latin American," and "Asian" history. One only needs to look at how the *AHR* organizes its book review section to see the importance of these divisions and the challenges in overcoming them.

The central argument of the book is that between losing its continental Latin American colonies in the 1820s and the War of 1898, the Spanish state crafted a broadly based national project with colonialism at its core. Resurrecting the glories of sixteenth-century conquest and colonization served to rehabilitate Spain's national image as it positioned itself against European powers and its own struggle to retain its remaining colonies. For colonial subjects, the imperial emphasis on conquest and colonization enveloped their historical experiences into the nation and granted them space in the pages of Spanish history. The major contribution of the book is Schmidt-Nowara's argument that as Spain emphasized its sixteenth-century imperial past to craft a unified national history, it armed the colonies with historical examples to challenge their subordinated role in the Spanish empire of the nineteenth century.

Schmidt-Nowara carefully uses sources at three levels of analysis to examine the debate over history in the nineteenth century. First, he analyzes what sources were available in the 1800s and how recently established historical institutions and archives, such as the Royal Academy of Spanish History and the General Archive of the Indies, established research agendas. Second, he examines in detail the texts produced by Spaniards, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Filipinos in the nineteenth century, as well as pamphlets, proceedings from international conferences, introductions to published sources on the sixteenth century, and journals, and subjects them to discourse analysis. Third, he digs through published and unpublished papers of prominent historians such as José Antonio Saco, Agustín Stahal, José Rizal, Cesáreo Fernández Duro, and others to paint detailed portraits of the leading figures in the historical profession. In total, these three different approaches to sources result in a thoroughly documented intellectual history of nineteenth-century Spanish colonial historiography.

In examining how Spain constructed its national history through emphasizing its empire, Schmidt-Nowara focuses on occasions of commemorating the conquest, memorialization of legendary figures such as Christopher Columbus, the meetings of the International Association of Americanists, and the publication/reissuing of Bartolomé de Las Casas's writings. He shows how Spanish historians replaced the widely held sixteenth-century image of Columbus returned in chains to Spain as an inept administrator with the iconic, pioneering figure of their great Latin American empire. Colonial subjects, however, sympathized with the tragic Columbus, who, despite having served the Spanish crown, was stripped of his title and imprisoned. They used this Columbus to critique their own subordinate role in the empire of the nineteenth century. In a similar fashion, Las Casas's writings, which provided the material used by the British and other colonial latecomers to construct the Black Legend, had to be confronted. Spanish historians continued to criticize Las Casas for exaggera-

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tions but now celebrated his "humane" approach to colonization as a strategy to champion the benefits of imperial "protection." In contrast, creole patriot historians latched onto Las Casas's writings to emphasize the annihilation of the indigenous past and the cruelty of Spanish colonialism. On each topic, Schmidt-Nowara illustrates a dynamic debate between historical "points" made by metropolitan intellectuals and "counterpoints" from the colonies.

This book fills a historiographical gap in Latin American intellectual history, which remains a poorly developed field. It connects European, Asian, and Latin American history, which are all too often separated by geographic designations, and provides an important intervention for studies dealing with nineteenth-century nationalism and empire, which have privileged Britain and other European powers to the marginalization of Spain.

MATT D. CHILDS
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JANET GREENLEES. *Female Labour Power: Women Workers' Influence on Business Practices in the British and American Cotton Industries, 1780–1860.* (Studies in Labour History.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate. 2007. Pp. xx, 244. $99.95.

In this remarkable book, Janet Greenlees first undermines historians' generalizations about the pre-1860 industrial development of cotton manufacturing in New England and Lancashire. She diminishes the historiography that contrasts cotton manufacturing policies based on mule spinning in England. Greenlees's argument insists that the most important factors in early cotton industrialization were decisions made in local contexts, not national trends found in aggregate data or based on the larger firms. Contrasts and comparisons fade as transnational commonalities emerge. One of those commonalities was the gender composition of the local workforce and its influence on early textile industrialization.

In building her case, Greenlees pries open spaces for variability, flexibility, local conditions, customs, informal networks, decisions *not* to expand, and—stretching evolution theory—industrial policies that were worked out in the workplace based on the relationships between manufacturers and groups of workers, both men and women. These, she argues, represent the majority of transatlantic cotton operations prior to 1860. In these spaces, where best practice was negotiated for the workers on the mill floor, local circumstances, including the nature of the workforce, individual business goals, and financial assets, prevailed. Indeed, the most frequently overlooked factors in industrial development prior to 1860 are the conditions that the workforce, both in the American Northeast and in Lancashire, was willing to accept. The workforce's responses and agency thus become crucial to industrial policy. For Greenlees, this constitutes a "new story" of early textile industrialization, more complex and diverse "than previous historiography has allowed" (p. 14).

The "fragmentary and limited nature of all the sources" (p. 8) contributes to the themes of variability and complexity. Business records chosen for microanalysis reflect various firm sizes. Lack of consistent data on hours, wages, productivity, worker age, and even on many operations themselves has led to historians' overemphasis on large firms and national aggregate data in government reports both in the American Northeast (largely Massachusetts) and in Lancashire. Greenlees's intent is to offset this emphasis with micro-data to reveal the complications of early managerial negotiations with male and female workers as factory production began. The author's daring strategy privileges the smaller but more commonplace firms over the more profitable, but less numerous, larger firms.

One of Greenlees's most persuasive points is the impact of gender on wages. In the Lancashire firms, microanalysis reveals that the wage gap between men and women was in fact far smaller than that observed by contemporaries and cited by historians. Payment patterns reflected the conditions of the local labor market and the importance of factors such as age and skill rather than the centrality of managerial ideology about appropriate wages. Female workers were not simply cheap labor; gender discrimination in mule spinning developed gradually. In Massachusetts, micro-data indicate that some women weavers earned the highest wages in several small firms, while in Lowell, Massachusetts, a few women even held the privileged job of overseer. Prior to 1860, many New England firms negotiated a flexible rather than gendered wage rate for job categories.

For the same reasons, the standardization of worktime rhythms and the socialization to factory time proceeded slowly in accordance with the priorities of urban and rural workers, especially women with domestic responsibilities. By 1860, "irregular hours remained both a structural and an integral part of cotton manufacturing" (p. 143). Provocatively, Greenlees argues that immigrant workers from rural societies followed similar patterns of negotiating their entrance into factory life.

Women workers built on the influence they wielded in local situations to join in collective action, but in ways different from and more flexible than male workers. In Lancashire, class and family relations underlay emerging unions; New England's shortage of labor muted these issues. Adding a class dimension to resistance in republican America, Greenlees ignores the political ideology of the daughters of freemen that legitimized public action by women against oppression. Both industrial systems accepted patriarchy, but not at the expense of profit or best practice. Conflict and cooperation shaped labor/management relations and could result in more fluid gender roles. Acts of resistance ending in cooperation meant influence. Women in cotton mills gained a collective public identity as workers and activists. A glance at conditions in Fall River, Massachusetts, however, reveals the complicated struggle of

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Yankee work traditions and Lancashire class customs within New England mills.

The freshness of Greenlees's approach and scholarship breathes new life into the historiography of early textile industrialization, turning our attention away from deindustrialization and globalization. She strives for a balance between gender and class analysis, an intersection of business and labor history, and a reassessment of the assumptions about early industrial processes. Still, it is a stretch to accept Tamara K. Hareven's work as applicable to pre-1860 analysis. The challenge to historians is Greenlees's transnational vision of the wickedly complicated, local nature of the early industrial process: inconsistent, erratic, and nonlinear. This process turns gender into one of the variables of economic change embedded in the cultural/social context of the localities that shaped the new industrial world.

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OZ FRANKEL. *States of Inquiry: Social Investigations and Print Culture in Nineteenth-Century Britain and the United States*. (New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 370. $48.00.

Oz Frankel has written a strenuously empirical, theoretically informed study that reaches across a wide range of subjects, geographies, and politics to examine how official knowledge was created in the nineteenth century. It argues that this knowledge project was vitally important to liberal democracies that were replacing older, hierarchal structures of rule with civil societies capable of governing themselves.

Frankel's eight chapters explore various efforts to organize the categories of life and so make life more governable. These include the birth of parliamentary commissions in Great Britain (assigned with investigating the plight of the poor, or the use of child labor, or factory conditions, or the system of education), American Congressional reports (including, of course, land surveys), narrative accounts of expeditions of discovery and exploration (that were inseparable from American continental expansion and railroad building), the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission (seeking to discover a "black subjectivity" that would then become the basis for integrating the former slaves into the body politic), and a burgeoning anthropological interest in Indian life, under the partial aegis of the new Smithsonian Institution and invariably invested in questions of the nation's manifest destiny. These investigations were related to the formal apparatus of government in different ways, but all contributed to the state's redefinition of itself for a liberal age. As such, they addressed political and ontological issues concerning government and population, the "culture of the social fact," the market's role in the production and dissemination of information, the construction of national memory, the creation of a reading public, and the relationship between authorship and authority, and between publicity and the public.

All this respective talk about knowledge and the public raises the specters of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault, who nevertheless fill a modest role in this work. Frankel seems determined to keep his discussion from becoming bogged down in clichés about public spheres and panopticons. This does not mean, however, that he has nothing to say about such matters. He argues, for instance, that the state is a vigorous agent of the "free circulation of ideas" and, therefore, a dominant influence in a putatively autonomous public discourse. This role is further complicated by the fact that the state simultaneously functions as subject and object of its own inquiries, acting as both investigator and investigated. This resulted in a dynamic better described as "panoramic" rather than "panoptic," according to Frankel. That is to say, social facts were generated by a diverse roster of interested agents—legislators, bureaucrats, field agents, local representatives, experts, inspectors, witnesses (representing all sides of the question), and even counter-investigations (initiated by such quasi-state institutions as trade unions)—who pursued the truth by means of a no less politicized repertoire of questionnaires, interviews, instructions, transcriptions, and publications. And so, while facts eventually "speak for themselves," this only happens at the end of a contested process by which they first have to be discovered and defined.

Another name for this process is democracy, manifested in the liberal state's ideological—and practical—need to make some kind of place in civic life for the heretofore marginalized. Official inquiries prove essential to a form of governance that no longer rested on the naked coercion and secrecy long preferred by the absolutist state. As such, the new culture of fact did not just usher in novel investigatory techniques. It also signaled a far-reaching reinvention of the very nature of authority and the politics of truth. This, as Frankel shows, is how the state came to represent the people.

Frankel engages a great many subjects and scholarly debates, often crossing disciplinary boundaries to do so. This is the source of considerable satisfaction for the reader, as is Frankel's palpable investment in good writing. Indeed, he leaves us wanting to know more. The book almost entirely avoids the subject of statistics, for instance, another new form of knowledge invented to organize the unprecedented movement and chaos of mass society. One also wants Frankel to expand his discussion of the political nature of the liberal state, including a comparison of its British and American incarnations. A survey of investigatory practices should also include such other knowledge industries as museums and such knowledge-driven phenomena as expertise. But these complaints are not indicative of any fundamental shortcomings. Indeed, they testify to Frankel's outstanding achievement in revealing the im-

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portance of another site of production in the industrial age, namely, the production of social knowledge.

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MICHAEL C. COLEMAN. *American Indians, the Irish, and Government Schooling: A Comparative Study*. (Indigenous Education.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 367. $49.95.

Michael C. Coleman's book provides a superb history of U.S. government Indian schools (mainly boarding schools run by whites) and British government Irish schools (day schools administered by the Irish) from the 1820s to the 1920s. Coleman makes a compelling case for comparative history. He offers more than a history of education in a narrow sense because what Indian and Irish students experienced was a comprehensive, yet never total, process that "extended influences into every area of Irish [and Indian] life" (p. 266). Reading it I was reminded of Ann Laura Stoler's provocative comparative histories and also Katherine Ellinghaus's fascinating *Taking Assimilation to Heart: Marriages of White Women to Indian Men in the United States and Australia, 1887–1937* (2006). Coleman studies how schools functioned as a "weapon of state" (p. 38) designed to assimilate what the ruling groups viewed as a "'problem population'" (p. 57).

Coleman combats the framework of both American and Irish exceptionalism by analyzing the similar—as well as distinct—patterns of institutionalized "deculturation" and "enculturation" (p. 64) in "hegemonic systems of domination" (p. 240). The comparison of attempted Americanization and Anglicization casts light on institutional strategies, the mixed attitudes of tribes and local communities in this process, and the issue of native language loss. By comparing the two systems, Coleman can better highlight aspects of conditions and patterns that might not otherwise have been visible. He shows that American Indian history can illuminate European history and vice versa.

Coleman also focuses on why some Indian and Irish students and parents favored such schooling even though it meant negotiating an attempted detribalization of Indian students and an Anglicization of Irish students. Some Indian and Irish students strategically embraced "education" because it equipped them with self-defensive weapons. However, if schooling was attempted assimilation, it was not only that. Government Indian schools never fully attained top-down power over students. Some students took intellectual joy in learning varied ways of contemplating themselves and their world. Dr. Charles Eastman, a Santee Sioux who attended Indian schools before matriculating at Dartmouth College and Boston University Medical School, wrote, "The more [education] I got, the larger my capacity grew, and my appetite increased in proportion" (p. 153). Considering ways in which government education has advanced Indian political, economic, and cultural struggles for self-determination and pan-Indian organizing, Coleman goes so far as to suggest "that schooling played a crucial role in the very physical survival of Indians" (p. 262). Similarly, he speculates that Irish schooling "may actually have stimulated Irish nationalism" (p. 241). Never forgetting the unequal power relations, Coleman also makes the case that students and teachers influenced and indeed "needed each other" (p. 265). Coleman prizes "complexity" and he is sensitive to conflicting evidence and "messy" "reality" (pp. 269–270).

Coleman's work generated several questions in my mind. He, like some other historians, characterizes what most Indian and Irish students underwent as "proletarianization" (p. 268). The reproduction of class is clear in the Irish history. Coleman notes that the category of class might not apply to Indians because they were classified as "culturally different" (p. 268). But might historians revisit how class formation related to Indians? Indian boarding school students were trained vocationally to be skilled and semi-skilled laborers. The Society of American Indians founded in 1911—mostly made up of boarding school students, some of whom made it to college—tactically considered their opportunities in the class structure. If Indians thought about themselves in terms of class, should not historians do so? As noted, Coleman frames school as a weapon of state. Might capitalism, not just the state, play a greater causal role in Coleman's explanations? At times U.S. federal policies were formed on the premise that predatory land grabbing was unstoppable.

This impressively researched and argued comparative history inspires as well as instructs the historical imagination.

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NIALL FERGUSON. *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*. New York: Penguin. 2006. Pp. lxxi, 808. Cloth $35.00, paper $18.00.

The big question motivating this lengthy book is nothing less than that which troubled Oswald Spengler in his analysis of the decline of the West. But in his magisterial overview of twentieth-century conflict, Niall Ferguson's responses differ substantially from those articulated by Spengler. In this treatment, Ferguson identifies three main sources of the endemic conflict that ultimately precipitated the decline of the West: empires in decline (e.g., Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian), economic volatility, and ethnic conflict, the last of these verging on race war.

Throughout this work, Ferguson is careful to marshal considerable evidence in support of his propositions. In contrast to many diplomatic historians, he makes much use of economic data, especially in support of the volatility conjecture. Indeed, the book is filled with bar graphs and other summary measures, not only of economic trends, but demographic as well. Some of the information is startling, such as the high rate of intermarriage between European Jews and non-Jews right

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up to the start of the Hitler era. Not only were Jews intermarrying at a high rate, but so were Bosnians until their time of troubles in the 1990s. In southern Rwanda, intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi was becoming the norm before the genocide of 1994. Sigmund Freud's "tyranny of small differences" may well be operating here.

In addition to the three overarching themes that guide the inquiry, two additional foci stand out. The first is the enactment of revenge, principally on the battlefield, but also among ethnic groups. The shooting of prisoners during the two world wars was quite common, especially after the death of a well-liked comrade or in an ambush in which several mates (or "buddies," depending on English-language provenance) were killed. In one important sense, ethnic conflict and battlefields in war share at least one important property: the absence of clear "rules of engagement" among contending protagonists. Only those wearing one's own uniform, or belonging to one's ethnic group, fall within the universe of moral obligation. All others are excluded. Even economic volatility was found on the battlefield, for soldiers always were in the hunt for food and drink, never more content than when they were able to purloin a goose or bottles of fine wine from an abandoned cellar.

Revenge has its geopolitical counterpart in revanche, the desire to reverse the consequences of earlier defeat. And here Ferguson demonstrates quite clearly the futility of Adolf Hitler's revanchism. No matter how one constructs the counterfactuals of strategic choice that Ferguson allows, and they are many, he nevertheless concludes, correctly, that there was no way the Axis powers could overcome the vastly greater material resources available to the Allies. In this, Ferguson is right on the mark, as he is in his arguments against Neville Chamberlain's foolish appeasement at Munich in 1938 and against those who minimize the value of Allied strategic bombing during the war. Ferguson is acutely aware of the balance of forces that would have favored Britain and France had they made war in 1938, but not later when German rearmament had escalated substantially. In the matter of Allied strategic bombing, the bombing had the consequence of diverting sorely needed fighter aircraft from the Eastern front, which allowed for crucial Soviet victories such as that at Kursk in 1943, the real turning point of the war in the East. Later, the loss of these aircraft in the air war over Germany was to be felt keenly by a Wehrmacht defending Normandy on D-Day virtually without Luftwaffe protection.

The second theme that emerges is the pre-eminence of the military in facilitating the onset of World War I, and its importance in the origins and conduct of World War II, especially in East Asia. One also cannot understand the genocide of the Armenians in Anatolia by the Ottoman military without appreciating the military difficulties of that period.

Inevitably, errors will appear in a work of this magnitude. Ferguson appears to have some difficulty with Polish names and origins. The extreme nationalist leader of interwar Poland was Roman Dmowski, not Dwomski, as spelled in one instance (and in the index); the Polish successor to Józef Piłsudski was Edward Rydz-Śmigły, not Śmigły-Rydz; and Felix Dzerzhinsky, the notorious first leader of the Cheka, the Soviet secret police, was not a Jew as Ferguson describes him. Although Dzerzhinsky's wife was Jewish and he himself spoke Yiddish as the result of his birth in the Vilna (Vilnius) region, then home to many Jews, Dzerzhinsky himself was the son of Polish nobility. Unfortunately, Ferguson also is mistaken in his discussion of the young "Adolf Schicklgruber" (Hitler) in comparison with the young Iosif Dzhugashvili (Stalin). Schicklgruber was the maiden name of Hitler's grandmother. He himself was indeed named Adolf Hitler. Although many Old Bolsheviks assumed noms de guerre in order to evade the tsarist secret police, this was unnecessary in the Weimar democracy. Some of the economic bar graphs also are not as clearly labeled as they should be.

Nevertheless, in his introduction to the 1977 edition of Nobelist Ivo Andrić's *The Bridge on the Drina* (cited several times by Ferguson), William H. McNeill states that "no better introduction to the study of Balkan and Ottoman history exists." Paraphrasing McNeill, I conclude that no better overarching analysis of twentieth-century conflict exists outside the broad confines of Ferguson's book.

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Sadao Asada. *Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 290. $44.95.

This book is a collection of scholarly works on U.S.-Japanese relations published between the 1960s and 1990s by Sadao Asada, a Japanese diplomatic historian. Topics for analysis include the Yellow Peril, Alfred T. Mahan, the Washington and London naval conferences, Pearl Harbor, and the atomic bombs. Asada explains that the theme of culture shock brings together these diverse topics and shows how both Japan and the United States dealt with such shocks in their relations, with successes and failures.

One chapter demonstrates how in the 1920s America developed for Japan the paradoxical images of cherry blossoms and the Yellow Peril. Another chapter shows how the Japanese Navy learned the Mahanian strategic doctrine and pursued a collision course with the United States, suggesting that the extensive intellectual and cultural contacts between the two nations did not necessarily ensure peace. The chapter on the Washington Naval Conference illustrates how both the Japanese and American delegates, representing the Old Diplomacy of imperialism and the New Diplomacy of Wilsonianism, respectively, learned to accommodate each other's style and created rapprochement. The chapter on Japanese surrender in World War II regards the atomic bombs as a kind of culture shock that forced

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Japan to "adjust to an unfamiliar socio-political situation where previous learning no longer applies" (p. ix). The final chapter on American-Japanese perceptions of the atomic bombs presents Asada's message that the younger generations in both countries should continue to narrow the perception gap and to build a common ground in understanding the event (although not in the school of Cold War revisionism, according to Asada).

What is the contribution of this book to the historiography of U.S.-Japanese relations? During the Cold War era, when the Marxist approach was still dominant in Japanese academia, scholars of U.S.-Japanese relations were inclined toward cultural studies and studies of decision-making processes, all in search of bureaucratic and subliminal prerequisites for the "right" relationship between the two countries. Friendship between the two was a preconceived idea: the Pacific War, a consequence of failures and mistakes made by the leadership, could and should have been avoided. The essays in this book, published before the 1990s, sit well along that line.

But it is also important to know that these scholars, supporters of "solid" U.S.-Japanese relations, often faced a dilemma because of the military nature of such an alliance. Asada, who spent nine youthful years at U.S. educational institutions between 1954 and 1963, calls his early American experiences "happy and pleasant culture shock" because America treated "a lad from a former enemy country" so kindly. In contrast, he confesses that he suffered from "reverse culture shock" after he returned to Japan because he was too Americanized. The decade Asada spent in America marked a turning point in postwar U.S.-Japanese relations. The year he left Japan (1954) witnessed both the Bikini Incident and the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the signing of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1960) took place during his second year of graduate study at Yale University. These events aroused violent protests in Japanese society. The forced passage of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty led 580,000 demonstrators to march in a massive student protest, in which one female Tokyo University student was killed in a clash with police. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had to cancel a scheduled visit to Japan, followed by the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. By the time Asada returned to Japan, the violent anti-American, anti–Vietnam War (and also anti–U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) demonstrations were already erupting across the nation. Student revolts began at his university shortly thereafter and continued into the 1970s. In spite of material Americanization, postwar U.S.-Japanese relations hardly meant a honeymoon for the Japanese people.

How Asada regarded postwar Japanese culture as he wrote of past U.S.-Japan relations is the question to which an answer is difficult to find in this book. The author writes that he became "patriotic" and defended Japan when someone asked him about Japan's anti-Americanism in the wake of the nuclear fallout in the Bikini Incident (p. 5). Other than this comment, however, Asada says very little. What kind of America did he want the Japanese to know during the Vietnam War? From his writings in the 1960s and 1970s, with what image of contemporary Japan did he hope to inspire the Americans? He presents clearly his view about how contemporary American and Japanese youths should understand the use of atomic bombs in the twenty-first century. But the Cold War period is absent from his scholarly focus. This is unfortunate, since the two nations continued to experience mutual culture shock, in real-time, transpacific settings. When Asada writes about the two countries' relations during the Cold War, then a fuller story of transpacific culture shock throughout the twentieth century will have been achieved.

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TONY BALLANTYNE. *Between Colonialism and Diaspora: Sikh Cultural Formations in an Imperial World*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2006. Pp. xvii, 229. Cloth $74.95, paper $21.95.

This book is an important addition to the growing literature on the construction of Sikh identity during the past two centuries. Unlike many writers, Tony Ballantyne does not confine his analysis to either the colonial or the contemporary era but rather sees common threads running between them, most notably with respect to the impact of migration on the shifting visions of Sikh identity. The result is a broader and more innovative understanding of Sikh cultural formations than is present in many standard accounts. Formal institutions, the Khalistan movement, and sacred texts are all given less importance in Ballantyne's account than the cultural interactions arising from the "webs of empire," the virtual world of the internet, and the diasporic cultural exchanges epitomized by the shifting performative traditions of *bhangra* (a form of music and dance).

Ballantyne's work is highly controversial for those "internalist" community approaches to the Sikh past, which emphasize scripture and faith and reject a constructionist understanding and the Western critical scholarship that underpins it. Ballantyne points out the drawbacks of these approaches, which disempower non-Khalsa Sikhs and reduce the possibility for both religious and academic dialogue. He is equally dismissive of reductionist understandings of the colonialist transformation of Sikh identity based on the construction of Sikhs as a martial race. Such accounts deny Sikhs agency by effacing the role of indigenous reformers. Ballantyne acknowledges this and points to the shared ideas held by reformers and British administrators of Sikhism as "reformation" and of "Sikhism in danger" from absorption by popular Hinduism. He examines the precolonial history of British understandings of Sikh identity and persuasively explains why Britons privileged "religion" over other ways of identifying Indian social groupings and how Protestant values framed understandings of Sikhism. The British position saw

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Sikhism as an attempt to reform a degenerate Hinduism, which was characterized by the same traits of priestly power, ritualism, and superstition condemned in Catholicism.

Ballantyne in fact goes beyond a "dialogic" approach to British understandings of Indian identity to posit a "polylogic" (p. 28) approach to the construction of Sikh identity. This approach affords space for cultural encounters, not only between colonizer and colonized but also between Sikhs themselves and with Hindu reformers. Most importantly, he attempts to set the late nineteenth-century Singh Sabha reform movement within the wider context of colonial overseas Sikh migration. These contemporaneous developments have been compartmentalized by most historical writing. Yet Ballantyne argues that Sikh identity was formed within a colonial context of mobility and cross-cultural contact. His call is thus for a turn to "a mobile and transnational history of Sikhism" (p. 33).

He illustrates its possibilities with two innovative chapters on the role of Dalip Singh in constructions of a British Sikh identity and on the cultural exchange between Sikhs and other diasporas as evidenced by the emergence of a hybrid "black *bhangra*." Ballantyne brings out the contested English and British Sikh imaginaries arising from Dalip Singh's exile as a landed gentleman in Suffolk following British annexation of the Punjab. He also uses the life of the deposed ruler of Punjab to illustrate both the complex place of religion in Sikh diasporic cultural formations and the differential impact of global processes of cultural exchange. While Dalip Singh has an important role in British Sikh collective memory, he is much less relevant for Sikhs domiciled in Chicago or New Jersey (p. 169).

Ballantyne writes with passion and considerable knowledge on *bhangra*. He utilizes this knowledge to reveal that understandings of Sikh identity framed around religion are only partial in explaining boundary definition and cultural values, just as notions of "homeland" do not exhaust their formation. He also sees *bhangra* as providing insights into the complex processes of encounter between Sikhs and a variety of ethnic communities (in this instance Afro-Caribbean), which is a hallmark of diasporic existence. Yet this dimension has been neglected in numerous studies that focus on the relationships between diasporas and the host state but otherwise regard diasporas as "hermetically sealed" (p. 158).

Ballantyne's work is both provocative for conventional scholars and suggestive of further areas of scholarly reflection. Its thematic approach is innovative, but rather schematic. His case studies are highly original, but by no means exhaust the new historiographical approach he propounds. There is nothing here, for example, on sports in terms of cultural exchanges and encounters, yet the tours of British Sikh *Kabbadi* teams to the Punjab and Sikh sports in Britain are no less important social phenomena in community definition than *bhangra*. The question is whether they provide such a rigid generational gap and division between Sikh "religious" and "secular" identity as *bhangra* does. Nevertheless, this is a bold and lively work that represents a breath of fresh air for the all too often inward-looking and sterile field of Sikh studies.

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TONY A. FREYER. *Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930–2004*. (Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 437. $80.00.

This book, which is a sequel to and a significant expansion of Tony A. Freyer's earlier comparative work, *Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880–1990* (1992), focuses on the development of antitrust policies in Western Europe, Japan, and Australia in the years since World War II. Freyer's starting point is the "crusade against international cartels" that emerged within the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in the late 1930s under Robert H. Jackson and Thurman Arnold: initially an outgrowth of the Antitrust Division's efforts to fashion a role for itself in domestic economic policy making in the latter part of the New Deal era, it took on renewed vitality following Pearl Harbor, when Arnold asserted that cartel arrangements between U.S. and foreign businesses (especially in Germany) had critically hampered American preparedness for war. The crusade reached its apogee in the immediate postwar years, when the Justice Department successfully prosecuted a number of major companies, including DuPont, Alcoa, and General Electric, that were alleged to have sought to control markets through cartel agreements and patent exchanges with foreign competitors. In addition, American antitrust enthusiasts introduced "decartelization" measures in occupied Germany and Japan and incorporated an antitrust code into the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO).

In most accounts, these events are treated as examples of excessive postwar New Deal–ish triumphalism that faded rapidly once the Cold War took hold: antitrust laws in Germany and Japan became effectively moribund, and the ITO was defeated in Congress in 1949. Other accounts have portrayed these ventures in antitrust expansion as part of an American effort to impose its ideas about free markets in the postwar environment.

Freyer's interpretation is more nuanced, and, by exploring the history of antitrust ideas and policies throughout the ensuing half century, he demonstrates that the antitrust initiatives of the 1940s did have a lasting impact on regulatory laws in the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan. In a chapter covering prewar attitudes toward business regulation, Freyer acknowledges that economists and policy makers in Great Britain, continental Europe, and Japan generally preferred a system of "regulated cartels" over the American preoccupation with trust-busting, and that these views conditioned their response to U.S.

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postwar efforts to impose antitrust measures on them. But he also notes that, even in Japan and Germany, there were advocates of antitrust who were able to play a role in fashioning legislation in the postwar era, and the institutions established to enforce these laws survived years of neglect and antagonism to reemerge by the 1990s as vehicles through which free market ideas could be resurrected. In Japan, for example, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) set up to enforce antimonopoly laws faced hostility not only from Japanese business leaders but also from the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and for a time faced the prospect of termination; however, partly because of the collapse of Japan's "bubble economy," in the 1990s the FTC experienced a renaissance with widespread public support. Similarly, in Western Europe, although the German decartelization policy introduced by the Americans was a failure, free market advocates in Germany and elsewhere ensured that antimonopoly measures were incorporated in the organization of the European Economic Union, and by the 1980s "competition policies" were part of the regulatory environment, even if in practice (as in all jurisdictions, including the United States) the vigor with which such policies was pursued varied with political circumstances.

This synopsis only touches on the complex and sophisticated analysis Freyer provides of trends in antitrust ideas and practices in the U.S. as well as abroad since the 1940s. It is fair to say that the title may be somewhat misleading, since the emphasis here is placed on the evolution of antitrust approaches rather than on the impact of antitrust on the growth of multinational enterprise over the past half century. The chapter on Australian antitrust, while interesting, seems less integral to the focus of the book: why not include a chapter on Canada, whose business environment was critically shaped by American antitrust decisions involving companies such as Alcoa, DuPont, and AT&T? These caveats aside, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a complex aspect of the history of international business in the late twentieth century.

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GERD-RAINER HORN. *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 254. $65.00.

This book has many merits. First of all, it considers the movements of 1968 in a medium and longue durée perspective, not only by taking into account their antecedents (in the first ten years of the book's periodization) but also by giving attention to the new social movements in the decade 1966–1976 and by discussing the implications of 1968 for the future. Thus, "1968" is considered as a period of roughly ten years, and the preparatory period, which was "intellectually vibrant," is also extensively studied. Secondly, Gerd-Rainer Horn has chosen as his focus not only the most obvious countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, but also countries that have been relatively understudied, such as Belgium. In fact, the pages on the Belgian student movements are among the most interesting of the whole book. Some important developments in Spain, such as the 1962 strike of the Mieres miners and the creation of the *comisiones obreras*, as well as in Portugal, such as the Revolution of the Carnations in 1974, are also taken into consideration. Altogether, the book covers an amazing range not only of countries and dates, but also of social subjects, from students to workers to women. No wonder that some aspects are necessarily left aside; for example, the decision of the Italian student movement to mount political demonstrations in front of factories is presented here as taken for granted, while it was a painstaking and conflictual process. But so much information is conveyed in the book that it largely reaches its goal of drawing a convincing picture of the spirit of 1968.

In a well-documented survey of groups and movements, the antecedents of 1968 include the Situationists and even their predecessors, the Lettristes (so that the group appears to have originated in Bucharest in 1942, with Isidore Isou), as well as beatniks, hipsters, existentialists, and the Dutch Provos. But the author also explores the history of the U.S. civil rights movement and the Berkeley free speech movement and reconstructs the vicissitudes of the old left, the new left, and the far left in order to understand the background and the consequences of 1968. This reconstruction is achieved through a procedure of coming and going between different periods within the two decades of his study that is suggestive and produces an intriguing narrative.

A most interesting position is articulated in the conclusion, according to which the story of 1968 is really a tale of two Europes. In the northern European tier of states, including the United States, the new left remained mostly a student-based and thus a middle-class affair, whereas in southern Europe the new left included students in central positions but also other social strata in significant ways. This difference is acknowledged in order to recognize both the legacy of 1968 (i.e., the change of mentalities and attitudes) and the limits of such legacy (i.e., the perverse developments in some fields of society, such as communication and education).

I agree with the main thesis of the book, that the meaning of 1968 largely resides in the experiments of participatory democracy, and the judgement of failure or success must be measured on this achievement. These experiments had a high political value, so that 1968 cannot be reduced to a cultural revolution as many interpreters have claimed, a claim that would have been against the very identification between politics and culture that most participants believed in. Moreover, the author also underlines the fact that there were, for Europe's industrial and white-collar workers, material improvements of importance. However, most of the immediate results of 1968, such as the creation of free schools and universities or the forms and organs of par-

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ticipatory democracy in the factories, did not last for very long.

Although I agree that all these elements must not be the basis for pronouncing a judgment of failure, and I particularly appreciate the spirit of this book in our time of widespread pessimism, I would have liked Horn to take into consideration some of the different conclusions reached by other authors. It is true that Horn states in the introduction that his book is not intended to dissect the reasons for the failure of that period of popular unrest to give free rein to utopian longings, but I regret that a confrontation with the hypotheses presented in the book by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (1999), which claims that the recent development of capitalism has learned from the spirit of 1968, is missing. This confrontation would not necessarily disclaim the concluding passage of Horn's work, which projects onto the future—perhaps the longue-durée one—the hope that 1968 can happen again and that the dream of a non-alienating society is not bound to remain a dream.

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DAVID REYNOLDS. *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century*. New York: Basic Books. 2007. Pp. xi, 544. $35.00.

The words "summit conference" conjure up images of powerful leaders emerging from airplanes in foreign capitals, being greeted by heads of governments with much handshaking and embracing, all to the delight of the ubiquitous media. Then come the days of cloistered talks, public toasts, and anodyne communiqués. In the end, more often than not, nothing much really happens. This is the world of twentieth-century diplomacy that David Reynolds explores.

The roots of this book lie in a successful BBC series featuring three summits: Munich (1938), Vienna (1961), and Geneva (1985). Each merits a chapter here, as do Yalta (1945), Moscow (1972), and Camp David (1978), augmented by introductory and concluding essays.

Reynolds deals quickly with proto-summitry in earlier times (from the humiliation of the Emperor Henry IV by Pope Gregory VII through the Lloyd George–inspired conferences of the 1920s), but, he indicates, they do not fall within his remit as identified by Winston Churchill in 1950. Modern summits for Reynolds require airplanes to bring leaders great distances in a short time to meet their peer-antagonists. Second, there must be modern weapons to make the stakes monstrously high. Also necessary are modern media to make such affairs the center of world attention.

True summitry began at Munich in 1938. Neville Chamberlain—a tough-minded, over-optimistic, and hopelessly underprepared Birmingham burgher—was the pioneer, flying off to convince Adolf Hitler to save world peace. He achieved his short-term goal, and there was no war in 1938. Although Chamberlain thought he had saved the day, he learned that he was tragically wrong.

Reynolds argues persuasively that Yalta, cursed for years as a "sell-out" of postwar Eastern Europe by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill to Joseph Stalin, was similarly complicated. The Red Army already held much of what "Uncle Joe" wanted, although the Western leaders managed to prevent the compete dismemberment of Germany and dragged the USSR into the Pacific War and into the infant United Nations. Yet the two democrats erred badly in thinking the conference gave them insights into what made Stalin tick. Such assumptions taken away after personal contact were misleading and dangerous—and played their part in creating the Cold War.

Vienna in 1961 witnessed the rivals John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, both seeking concrete goals: the Soviet leader wanted Western acceptance of his empire, and the American (after the Bay of Pigs fiasco) sought a stage on which to oppose communist expansionism. Again, both leaders were poorly prepared for their tasks: Kennedy (ill and over-medicated with painkillers) assumed that he could reason with the Soviet boss, while Khrushchev was certain that the young U.S. president could be bullied. "Once again, a summit had turned to an extent on bluff" (p. 221). The result was another failure, which played its part in bringing about the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War.

The 1972 Richard Nixon–Leonid Brezhnev Moscow summit was more successful and encouraged belief that "detente" (limited cooperation) might just work. The first SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) was signed, and the president predicted regular conferences and the damping down of Cold War tensions. Yet behind it was the odd competition between Nixon and Henry Kissinger for center stage in the American political drama, and soon there was intensified war in Southeast Asia, as well as the domestic horror show that was Watergate. This was not the New Era—not by a long shot.

Camp David seems not to fit the mold exactly, as the United States (represented by Jimmy Carter) was the only superpower present, along with Israel's Menachem Begin and Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat. The drama-loving Egyptian was the gambler, the American took the part of broker, and the tough-minded and savvy Israeli came away the winner of "peace with Egypt and minimal concession to the larger Arab agenda" (p. 340). Yet, as we know, the big questions remained unsettled.

Reynolds convincingly argues that the Ronald Reagan-Mikhail Gorbachev talks in Geneva in 1985 struck the high note for twentieth-century summitry. Ably seconded by George P. Schultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, the two summiteers laid their cards on the table and agreed that the greater goal of mutual survival for their nations (and the world) was more important than scoring points on their chief opponents. This, Reynolds concludes, showed "that summitry can make a difference

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when properly managed" (p. 400). Thus the Cold War began to pass into history.

Reynolds, after a once-over of the more recent near-summits, particularly the George W. Bush–Tony Blair meeting in April 2002 (which he finds troubling), leaves the reader agreeing that most of these parleys did not solve much but yet that "summitry still has the power to shape the course of history" (p. 435). This attractive book does a good job of making that point.

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ASIA

Chun-shu Chang. *The Rise of the Chinese Empire: Nation, State, and Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.–A.D. 8*. Volume 1. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2007. Pp. xxxi, 461. $90.00.

Chun-shu Chang. *The Rise of the Chinese Empire: Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.–A.D. 157*. Volume 2. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2007. Pp. xl, 301. $85.00.

The complex interplay between center and periphery has shaped much of Chinese history. The first historical conquest, that of the Zhou (ca. 1045 B.C.), came from the western periphery. These conquerors of the north China plain eventually weakened and were in turn supplanted by an intruder from the west, the Qin (221 B.C.). Later incursions, such as those of the Toba Wei (386 A.D.), the Jurchen (1126), the Mongols (1279), and the Manchus (1644), also pushed in from frontier regions. One reason for this dynamic, as Owen Lattimore explained long ago in his *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (1940), was the tendency for Chinese civilization to project outward and put pressure on those living on the periphery. During the long duration of Chinese history, no period of outward expansion was more dramatic than that of the Western Han (206 B.C.–8 A.D.). We must therefore celebrate the publication of the first detailed English-language study of this critical period of Chinese imperialism.

Chun-shu Chang's two-volume work, despite the sweep promised in the subtitles of volume one (1600 B.C.–8 A.D.) and two (130 B.C.–157 A.D.), centers primarily upon the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–8 A.D.), and even more particularly upon the reign of Emperor Wu (r. 141–187 B.C.). The somewhat expansive dates of his subtitles result from the fact that volume one traces the long road from "Tribes to Empire," which is how Chang characterizes China before Emperor Wu's imperialist ventures, while volume two is a meticulous study of the Han frontier system based largely upon the tens of thousands of wood and bamboo texts found at such sites as Juyan in 1930–1931 and 1972–1976 and Xuanquan in 1990–1992. All of these recovered documents date roughly from the reign of Emperor Wu up to the middle of the second century of the Eastern Han.

Emperor Wu, who is the dominant historical figure of this study, enjoyed one of the longest reigns in Chinese history and, if Chang's argument is correct, this reign might also properly be designated the most important in Chinese history. The imperial expansion of the Chinese domain under Emperor Wu, which led to the colonization of new regions, most significantly in the northwest, was to establish the "proper boundary" of China down to the present time. It also gave China a national identity, designated by the very term "Han," which is used to this day in China as the most common label for the Chinese people. Chang places the ideal of this new identity very high indeed: "The specific boundary lines of culture and race all disappeared within this new, informal definition of the dynastic unity of nation, culture, and state" (vol. 1, p. 254).

The Han expansion brought whole new regions under central control: twenty-five prefectures (*jun*) and approximately 1.6 million square miles were added to the empire (vol. 1, p. 67). The need to assimilate these far-flung territories led to a complex system of colonization, which involved, among other procedures, the forced and voluntary migration of people to the new regions and the organization of populations under a military system that only gradually gave way to a more regular administrative system (vol. 2, p. 15). Furthermore, this colonial empire, to use Chang's words, "was structured with the ideological framework of universal kingship, which had been fully developed under Emperor Wu." The goal was to provide "the 'barbarian' world with the same high spiritual and material civilization" enjoyed in the inner domain (vol. 1, p. 260). The ramifications of this bold move outward were far-reaching and touched upon almost every aspect of the Han government, culture, and economy. Among other noteworthy changes, the Chinese political system "moved in the direction of high authoritarianism for good in Emperor Wu's hands" (vol. 1, p. 250); Confucianism was established "as the state ideology" (vol. 1, p. 251); and the improvement in the status of farmers meant that "restricting commercial activities and oppressing merchants became entrenched in the legal system" (vol. 1, p. 252).

Some of these claims need qualification. Emperor Wu was a complex figure. What we know of him comes in large measure from his contemporaries, the father and son historians Sima Tan (d. 110) and Sima Qian (145–186?), both of whom served in the emperor's bureaucracy and suffered at his hand. The former, if we are to believe his son, exercised little influence at court and died in frustration when he was excluded from Emperor Wu's imperial sacrifices on Mount Tai in 110 B.C.; the latter fell afoul of the emperor and suffered the punishment of castration. According to the account in their *Records of the Historian* (*Shiji*), Emperor Wu apparently was as interested in his own pursuit of physical immortality as he was with imperial expansion, and it may be that these two interests were related, as such

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scholars as Yu Ying-shih and Mark Edward Lewis have suggested, for the major geographical focus of the search for immortality during the Western Han was the Kunlun Mountains to the west. Moreover, despite the emperor's widely acknowledged capacity to terrorize his officials, some historians have asked just how much sovereignty Emperor Wu really exercised and to what extent he was the pawn of forces both inside and outside of the palace. One of the West's leading authorities on Han China, Michael Loewe, has wondered "for which decisions of policy he was personally responsible" (*A Biographical Dictionary of the Qin, Former Han and Xin Periods* [2000], p. 273). The claim that Confucianism became a state ideology under Emperor Wu has also been challenged. While one might still choose to speak of the ideological hodgepodge that prevailed during the time of Emperor Wu as "Confucianism," such a label must be carefully qualified. To be fair, Chang does trace the rise and development of what he calls "the new Confucianism" (pp. 118–127), which imports the best from other schools, but the degree to which this ideology defined and narrowed political thought during the Western Han remains problematic. Moreover, so much of this "victory of Confucianism," as it has been called, derives from the account of the Eastern Han historian Ban Gu (32–92 A.D.), and his portrayal of such key Confucian figures as Dong Zhongshu (179?–104? B.C.) is somewhat different from that found in the earlier *Records of the Historian*.

Although some of Chang's claims about the political and cultural world of Emperor Wu might be questioned, they are at least defensible. In contrast, some of his long prologue on the period preceding the Han dynasty, entitled "From Tribes to Empire," is less so. Too much of this section is a recapitulation of legends and misconceptions that have plagued the study of this earliest period of Chinese history. While a good deal could be said on this, I will limit my comments to only a few issues. First, the documents that make up *Shang shu* (*The Book of History*) are a very unreliable guide to events surrounding the founding of the Shang state (dated ca. 1600–1100). Even most traditionalist scholars would date the *Shang shu* documents concerning such figures as the Shang founder Tang to the earliest decades of the Zhou dynasty, nearly five hundred years after the events they supposedly record. These documents are almost certainly fashioned to justify the Zhou conquest and should not be used as an accurate historical description of events for which we have no contemporary records. As Robert Bagley says in his excellent article on Shang archaeology in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China* (1999), "To discover how the Zhou remade history, we must explore the discrepancy between history as the Zhou reported it and history as recovered by archaeology" (p. 231). Furthermore, it is fashionable in some traditionalist circles to jump from the fact that the excavation of the oracle bones in the early part of the last century largely verified Sima Qian's chronology of Shang kings to the conclusion that whatever else Sima Qian says about early history is similarly reliable. This is a very large leap. When Sima Qian, for example, describes the virtues of King Wen (ca. 1100 B.C.), which Chang reproduces (vol. 1, p. 30), he is doing little more than voicing a stereotype of the model ruler that had almost surely been transmitted as a part of Zhou propaganda. To differentiate this type of political myth from the hard facts of history, and we have precious few of these for the earliest period, is the first task of a historian. Later in his account, Chang rightfully describes much of the work of the First Qin Emperor (r. 221–210) and his great advisor Li Si as "creating and reinventing traditions" (vol. 2, p. 45). This is surely accurate, but the creating and reinventing of traditions did not begin with them; it has been a major occupation of the state in China from the earliest times and continues to the present day.

These problems notwithstanding, Chang's study will remain for many decades a standard source for the study of Han colonial expansion. His sweep of the available sources, reflected in a vast array of detailed notes, is sometimes stunning. All of us who work on early China owe him a debt of gratitude and will surely give his study a prominent place on our bookshelves.

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WILLIAM T. ROWE. *Crimson Rain: Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 437. $60.00.

William T. Rowe has established himself as one of the most creative and innovative historians of China currently working in the field. His monumental two-volume study of the city of Hankow was a pioneering work in modern Chinese urban history. His career biography of the eighteenth-century scholar-official Chen Hongmou made great strides in advancing our understanding of the intricacies of early modern political thought and practice under the Qing dynasty. In the preface to his new book, Rowe presents himself as something of a contrarian, who studied urban China at a moment when the field was largely concerned with the rural world. Now, as more and more scholars have taken up engagements with urban modernity, Rowe has turned his attention to a remote corner of the countryside.

In this new work, Rowe embarks upon a study of violence in Chinese society. The theme has been explored in works such as James W. Tong's *Disorder under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty* (1991) and David M. Robinson's *Bandits, Eunuchs and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence in Mid-Ming China* (2001). Both of these books are, however, limited to a specific period in Chinese history: the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Rowe's work is broader in its chronology, a long-term study of a single locality more in the vein of R. Keith Schoppa's *Xiang Lake: Nine Centuries of Chinese Life* (1989). Rowe's study examines the history of Macheng County, a rugged area in the northeast corner of Hubei province at the conjunction of the borders of Hubei, Anhui, and Henan, the kind of area

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where government authority has traditionally been weakest in China and where local society has often been vulnerable to disruptive forces from within and without.

In his introduction and first chapter, Rowe sets out his theoretical overview, which is developed and refined throughout the succeeding chapters. As suggested by the book's subtitle, Rowe presents a portrait of what he calls the "intrinsically violent local culture of Macheng and the Dongshan" (p. 275). He argues that this violent culture, often horrific and comprehensive in its extent, persisted throughout the seven hundred years covered in this study, from the Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth century through at least the late twentieth century. Indeed, Rowe uses the term genocide to refer to the recurring violence of this area, although it is unclear exactly how this term might be applied in any technical sense to this particular communal setting.

Rowe's portrayal of Macheng is based on the extensive and often brilliant usage of a wide range of source materials, from local gazetteers and government documents to private memoirs and modern journalistic accounts. He has a masterful command of this material and uses it to draw out the fine detail of personal and community experiences. Many of the accounts he presents are truly chilling.

Nonetheless, the book is less than convincing on one of its major premises, which is the historically pervasive and continuous nature of social violence in the locality under study. Rowe notes early on that traditional Confucian discourse has sought to minimize the record of violence in Chinese history. Confucius commented that "the gentleman avoids the kitchen" in order not to have to witness the suffering of animals being slaughtered for food, and, by implication, the gentleman did not concern himself with violence as part of the normal process of maintaining social order. In contrast to this is Mao Zedong's aphorism that a revolution is not a dinner party, embracing the cathartic necessity of violence in the process of social transformation. These ideas help illuminate some aspects of traditional and modern Chinese notions about violence and its place in society, but Rowe asserts that, at least in places like Macheng, violence was in fact part of daily life in an unrelenting culture of conflict and cruelty.

In reading the actual narrative, however, it seems as though the violence Rowe describes is in fact largely episodic, erupting in times of dynastic/political transition, when forces from outside the area intrude and exacerbate indigenous tensions beyond normal bounds of restraint. Rowe acknowledges that long periods of relative tranquility occurred, sometimes for more than a century at a time. The "seven centuries of violence" denominated in the subtitle prove to be substantially fewer in historical time.

Clearly there is much to be learned about conflict and violence in Chinese local societies and the articulations between local events and larger historical arenas, and Rowe's latest book makes profoundly valuable contributions to this process. The drama of violence can be entrancing, and in Rowe's presentation its horror has perhaps made it seem more ubiquitous than it has actually been.

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MICHAEL G. CHANG. *A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring and the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680–1785.* (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 287.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. xxii, 550. $49.95.

When the founder of the Han dynasty asked why he should heed the lessons of the ancient classics now that he had conquered the world on horseback, Lu Jia answered, "You may have got it on horseback, but can you rule it on horseback?" Thus began the argument that civil officials, not military, should govern the empire in China. Another tradition, tracing its origins to those ancient classics themselves, was that of tours of inspection by which a benevolent ruler might ensure that his policies were being implemented. In the seventeenth century, the Manchus conquered China on horseback. Between 1751 and 1784 the Qing Emperor Qianlong, heir to the Manchu conquest, made six formal "southern tours," visiting the heartland of commercial wealth and literati culture at the height of Qing power. In a world where commemoration of imperial military achievements flourished, memories of the southern tours were also inscribed in stone and retold in local lore. Yet until now there has been no detailed study of the tours. With this book Michael G. Chang seeks to fill that lacuna, and by any standard of judgment he has certainly succeeded.

The book begins with an informative review of the history of debates about imperial tours. It then probes the tradition established by Qianlong's grandfather Kangxi, explaining how the grandson justified his own tours as honoring his grandfather's will to uphold the traditions of the "conquest elite." Chang argues that these two emperors revived tours of inspection to balance their accommodation of Chinese political culture with "a clear sense of ethno-dynastic (patrimonial) dominance" (p. 71). In subsequent chapters he examines the logistics of the tours, including the management of popular perceptions, the political context, problems of extravagance, imperial patronage of southern scholars, Qianlong's poetics, and problems of negative popular perception.

Rejecting the argument that the primary purpose of the southern tours was to inspect hydraulic works or assimilate to Chinese classical traditions, Chang makes brilliant use of Qianlong's poetry, "perhaps the closest thing we have to a personal narrative of his southern tours" (p. 322), enabling us to see how the ambiguities associated with imperial touring influenced the emperor's thoughts and actions. For example, analyzing the emperor's poetic appreciation of the southern landscape, Chang detects "a persistent anxiety, masked by the steady drumbeat of disavowal" (p. 348). Spurring this anxiety were the revelation that officials and priv-

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ileged salt merchants were "squeezing" lesser merchants to make donations for the tours and the resistance of prominent Suzhou literati to the demands of an unpopular governor-general who expected them to donate as well. The emperor responded to criticisms of such corruption and extravagance both by preaching a return to the purity and simplicity of the old "Manchu Way" and by co-opting the literati with special examinations and honorary titles. In other examples, Qianlong's poetry reveals his personal insistence on disembarking from the imperial barge to enter the cities on horseback, echoing other poems in which he extols the merits of "ruling from horseback" and denigrates those who object—presumably Chinese literati—"because they are incapable" of doing so (p. 360). This personal narrative, then, defines the role of the emperor's southern tours in constructing Qing rule.

Chang succeeds in showing how the tours enabled Qianlong to engage the best scholars of Han Learning by making a cultural broker of the locally respected poet and imperial favorite Shen Deqian. He relates the emperor's anxieties and the timing of the six tours to the perception of various crises within the regime. He demonstrates how the emperor's understanding of history, of the Manchu heritage, and of Chinese culture bore on his ideas about the connection between military campaigns, imperial hunts, and the northern and southern tours. And he attempts to explain the timing of the tours with special reference to the mysterious hiatus between the fourth in 1765 and the fifth in 1780, when Qianlong was already seventy years old, feeling betrayed by Shen Deqian and challenged by popular questioning of the "Manchu Way." The chronology, which is important, is often hard to follow as the argument moves from topic to topic, and scholars will surely argue about the reasons for the emperor's decisions, but Chang's groundwork in tying the tours to political crises and concerns for legitimation has clearly set the agenda for future research.

Do the southern tours shed light on the construction of Qing ideology? Chang ties his analysis to nearly every thread of what has been called "the new Qing history," protesting the notion of Manchu assimilation to Confucian values and Chinese bureaucratic political culture. But the new history has already thoroughly discredited this notion. Chang's analysis locates Qianlong's southern tours clearly in the larger picture of multi-stranded traditions and militarization of culture drawn by the new history. The overworked argument concerning "ethno-dynastic patrimonial rule" should not be allowed to distract us from this significant scholarly contribution.

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MARGHERITA ZANASI. *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 320. $55.00.

Condemned to "modernize," how did the Chinese deal with the problems of nation building and economic development? How could the country fight foreign imperialism and domestic division? What role should the state and private entrepreneurs play in the industrialization of the country? This book traces the debate over these issues from the Self-Strengthening Movement through the Republican period, World War II, and the communist era, focusing especially on the economic policies advocated by different factions of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) during the Nanking decade from 1927 to 1937.

Inspired by the works of Benedict Anderson and other postcolonial theorists on nationalism and modernity, Margherita Zanasi's analysis begins with China's late nineteenth-century mercantilism. The country had to win the war of commerce (*shangzhan*) against the influx of foreign goods. Yet, the rhetoric of free trade and "unequal treaties" imposed by the world powers meant that China could not protect itself from foreign imports, nor could Chinese capitalists compete on their own without state support. As a solution, the Qing state invested heavily in industries crucial to national defense. Joint state-private enterprises such as the China Merchants Steamship Navigation Company, which was run by officially appointed managers with private capital, served both business and anti-imperialist goals.

The 1911 Revolution ushered in a modified vision of nation building. Sun Yat-sen's "Principle of People's Livelihood" championed a "productivist" approach: the need to mobilize the nation's productive forces while controlling the growth of private capital. Industries that could not be entrusted to private enterprise or that were of a monopolistic nature should be placed under state control. In practice, however, what belonged to the private sector and what should be run by the state remained unclear.

Sun's ambiguous formulation left a mixed legacy for his successors. Wang Jingwei, leader of the party's civilian wing, and his colleagues such as Chen Gongbo continued to advocate autarkic policies. Only with the economic development of the country under the direction of a unified government could China resist foreign imperialism. They also found theoretical inspiration from abroad. During World War I and the interwar years, especially in the aftermath of the Great Depression, the crisis of global capitalism prompted changes. The Keynesian-inspired "New Deal" in the United States, the controlled economy in Europe (including fascism), and the planned economy in the Soviet Union set new standards of economic "modernity." Wang forged a "corporativist" strategy by bringing the state and the private sectors together through the National Economic Council, the central economic planning agency of the country, which was supported by leading bankers and industrialists in the coastal provinces (the so-called Jiangnan elites). Through the Cotton Control Commission and the Silk Improvement Commission, rural and urban would be connected to help unify and

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strengthen the country. The author argues that, given time, Wang and Chen's strategy might have worked.

Unfortunately, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) offered an alternative approach. Drawing similarly on Sun's legacy, Jiang envisioned an "authoritarian-utopian" regime. Influenced by the German fascist model, he emphasized state-controlled development of defense-related heavy industries located in the interior through his Natural Resource Commission. Due to his control of the military and mounting Japanese aggression, Jiang's "realistic" vision prevailed. Wang went into exile until 1937, when he broke with Jiang by collaborating with the Japanese to preserve what he could of China's national economy. Branded as a "traitor," Wang's corporativist vision was consigned to historical amnesia. Yet Jiang's policy of an authoritarian state-controlled economy was also forgotten in the rhetoric of the Cold War. He was refashioned as a supporter of liberal capitalism, while Chinese Communists continued to search for a proper balance between fostering social and economic development and maintaining their authority.

A broad, sweeping book such as this inevitably will have lapses. In a Nationalist Party rife with factionalism, the difference between Wang's and Jiang's policies might be overdrawn. Rhetoric was often exaggerated, with policies as well as political alliances temporary and shifting in practice. Chen Gongbo, for instance, was instrumental in awarding a contract to build an ammonia sulfate plant for manufacturing chemical fertilizer (easily convertible to manufacturing explosives) to Fan Xudong, a private entrepreneur. Fan, of course, also served as a charter member of Jiang's National Defense Design Commission (*Guofang sheji huiyuanhui*; the precursor to the National Resource Commission), which was founded in 1932 together with an assortment of the so-called Jiangnan elites. Jiang's policy, therefore, could also be described as "corporativist."

Such minor problems aside, this book makes several contributions. It joins the growing literature that traces the origins of post-1949 Chinese Communist Party policies back to the Republican period, reassesses the relationship between economy and society during the Nanking decade, and revises the view of Wang Jingwei's collaborative nationalism. In addition, the book highlights the fluidity of "modernity" as a guiding concept for late developing countries in their search for a balance among state, society, and the economy.

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MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN. *A History of Modern Tibet*. Volume 2, *The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1955*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xxx, 639. $60.00.

The history of modern Tibet is one of the more contentious fields of contemporary historiography. According to the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Tibet has been an integral part of China since at least the thirteenth century, but most non-Chinese commentators contend that Tibet was at least *de facto* an independent state prior to the PRC's invasion in 1949. The PRC characterizes its takeover as a "peaceful liberation," but Tibetans and Western supporters portray it as a war of aggression against a defenseless country that had minimal military resources and a commitment to nonviolent relations with its neighbors.

This book is the second installment of a planned three-volume study and follows Melvyn C. Goldstein's monumental *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State* (1989), which explored the period immediately preceding China's military incursion into Tibet and its subsequent moves to exert control over the Tibetan plateau. In the present volume, he focuses on the four years from 1951–1955, when the Chinese occupiers strove to solidify their control and to win over a skeptical Tibetan populace.

Most studies of this period by Western scholars display a pro-Tibet stance; they portray the Chinese as aggressors and the Tibetans as victims who tried in vain to develop a peaceful arrangement with China, only to be brutalized and enslaved. Chinese historians contend that prior to the "peaceful liberation" Tibet was a feudal "hell on earth," in which the peasantry was exploited by lamas and aristocrats. In the Chinese view, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was welcomed by Tibetans, who recognized that the soldiers had come not as invaders but as liberators who would free them from their shackles.

Most contemporary Western historians dismiss these self-serving and historically inaccurate notions, which gloss over the fact that large numbers of Tibetans were killed by Chinese troops or died of starvation as a direct result of Chinese policies. Goldstein, however, is much closer to the Chinese position than most of his Western contemporaries. His word choice throughout the book shows a sympathy with the Chinese position, and he consistently adopts the terminology of "peaceful liberation" even while admitting that military force was used to occupy and take control of the country. The Chinese are associated with "reform" and "progress," and Tibetans who wanted to maintain their independence and traditions are foolish reactionaries. In addition, Goldstein often accuses Tibetans of lying and obfuscation in their recollections of the period, but no Chinese figure is ever portrayed as being less than truthful, nor are their motives questioned (pp. 57, 380, 464).

Goldstein's portrayal of Mao Zedong is also notable: Mao is often viewed by contemporary Sinologists as a failed dictator, whose bungled policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution resulted in untold misery for his country and over thirty-three million deaths, but Goldstein construes him as a patient, brilliant strategist who pursued a "gradualist policy" toward Tibet and its people. Instead of using his troops simply to compel obedience, Mao decided to work with Tibetan leaders in order to win them over and avoid unnecessary violence. Toward the end of the book,

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Goldstein briefly acknowledges that the PRC was in a precarious position militarily, but he maintains that subtle strategizing, not weakness, was at the heart of Mao's gradualism. He characterizes changes made by the Chinese as "democratic reforms" (p. 423), despite the fact that China is a one-party state and all its policies were imposed on Tibetans from Beijing without any real consultation.

Goldstein's description of the young fourteenth Dalai Lama will surprise many readers. Tenzin Gyatso is commonly portrayed in Western media as a paragon of wisdom, but Goldstein characterizes him as naïve and poorly equipped to understand his country's situation. While Mao and his subordinates are "shrewd" and follow a coherent strategy, the Dalai Lama and his fellow Tibetan leaders "dither" and try vainly to stall the Chinese. One of the few exceptions to this negative portrayal is Ngabö Ngawang Jigme, an aristocrat who was in charge of Tibet's forward defenses in the east and surrendered without a fight to the PLA. He is regarded by Tibetan exiles as a traitor and collaborator, but in Goldstein's history he is a "progressive" visionary who recognized his country's backwardness and saw the Chinese as potential saviors who could bring Tibet into the modern world and abolish the exploitive feudal system.

Goldstein uses masses of textual evidence to back up his claims. He conducted extensive interviews with many of the protagonists and also translates a plethora of documents from Tibetan and Chinese, often at considerable length. Some of these passages go on for five pages or more and will be read only by specialists who have a strong interest in this short period of Tibetan history. Many of the sources are highly repetitive, and readers can get the gist of several pages of text from the comments that precede or follow them.

Most studies of modern Tibetan history to date have focused on the invasion or the depredations of the Cultural Revolution. Goldstein's study of the short period separating them is notable for a lack of drama or oppression. It hints that, had Tibetan leaders been more competent, the goodwill of Mao and his subordinates might have prevailed and the transition to Chinese rule would have been smoother and less painful (p. 547). The author indicates that in volume three he will explore the period leading up to widespread riots in 1959, when thousands of Tibetans took to the streets to demand an end to Chinese rule. This prompted Chinese authorities to begin a brutal crackdown and set the stage for future relations between the PRC and the people of Tibet, events that continue to reverberate today. Goldstein's work is a notable contribution to the study of modern Tibet, but like most others it suffers from a clear bias on the part of the author. It will be essential reading for students of contemporary Tibetan history, at least those with the patience to wade through the lengthy quotations.

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ELYSSA FAISON. *Managing Women: Disciplining Labor in Modern Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 227. $39.95.

Elyssa Faison focuses on female workers in the textile industries of Japan during the first half of the twentieth century, but her analysis of the ambivalence of managers, the state, and social reformers toward women in waged labor resonates with attitudes and practices in other societies both present and past. Among historians of modern Japan, recognition of women's dominant role in the textile industry workforce came late. Early studies in the 1980s focused on exploitative conditions during the late nineteenth century, and studies of interwar industrial workers have mostly examined male workers. Faison's book therefore fills a gap in our knowledge of labor management attitudes and practices. Significantly, the book reveals the ways in which factory managers' and the state's construction of female factory workers more as "women" than as "workers" went hand in hand with a gendered construction of imperial subjects. But her study also demonstrates the significance of ethnicity in constructions of identity through the examination of Korean and Okinawan female workers.

The first four chapters examine Japanese female workers. We see why companies adopted paternalistic recruitment policies and welfare institutions during the 1920s. Facing a labor shortage, textile factories sought to recruit more women workers, but, to counter criticism of exploitation and maltreatment, they promised educational facilities that would prepare workers to become the model "good wives and wise mothers" that both the state and social norms favored. At the same time, companies' treatment of female workers as temporary justified paying them lower wages than male workers. Keeping female workers restricted to factory dormitories to "protect" their chastity served also to contain their involvement in the growing labor union movement.

In chapter two we see that the debates over the Factory Law have a significance that extends beyond labor and political history. As Faison argues, the debates were important for the process of "reifying and universalizing newly established middle-class values" (p. 24) centered on gender and sexual norms. The prohibition of night work for women in 1929 prompted company programs to manage workers' free time, to prevent both sexual depravity and labor organization. The anxiety about female workers' sexuality had parallels in Western societies. As Faison points out, in the U.S. and Europe as well as Japan "industrial modernity was continually haunted by the specter of the fallen woman, and women involved in wage work were seen as most likely to fall" (p. 39). The female textile workers in Japan were considered to be especially vulnerable to the decadent influences of urban culture because they were poor rural women who lacked education and presumably came from homes that neglected training in middle-class values.

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Chapter three reveals the involvement of social reformers in these ideological efforts. Companies invited semi-government "cultivation (*shūyō*)" groups to run educational programs in the factories that would occupy workers' free time and provide disciplinary training in "proper" feminine arts. These compulsory cultivation training activities for women workers therefore differed from those for men, as exemplified by the "dust-rag dance" that replicated scrubbing floors of their presumed future homes (p. 74).

That women were not passive receptacles of these ideological and disciplinary training efforts is made clear in chapter four. This chapter examines in detail the Tōyō Muslin strike in 1930 and the influences of the Marxist Takewaki Sadayo's Workers' School for Women and proletarian writer Nakamoto Takako. Although the strike ended in failure, its violence and duration demonstrated women workers' opposition to establishment constructions of them as dutiful and cooperative future housewives.

But while the strike radicalized and united the women at Tōyō Muslin as fighting workers, the study of Korean and Okinawan female workers in chapter five reveals that neither managers, unions, nor female Japanese workers viewed them as the same as Japanese workers. Although Okinawa was a prefecture, Okinawan women suffered discriminatory abuse from fellow Japanese workers. Unlike Japanese women workers, management treated both Okinawan and Korean female workers not as future housewives but as potential strikemakers and strikebreakers. And although the Sōaikai, an assimilationist organization, was used to try to control Korean workers, physical segregation in the factory and the use of Korean male supervisors weakened the effectiveness of assimilation efforts.

The epilogue returns to the theme of the gendered nature of labor-management relations and state policies as evident during the wartime and postwar periods. Demonstrating that gender played a greater role than class is certainly one of this book's most important contributions, not only for labor history but also for understanding the challenges to middle-class values that women in waged labor posed. Yet while gender was salient in the case of Japanese workers, ethnicity was more important when Japanese interacted with others. With this integrated analysis we thus see the complexity and contradictions that modern social change and imperialist expansion entailed in early twentieth-century Japan.

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Prathama Banerjee. *Politics of Time: "Primitives" and History-Writing in a Colonial Society*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. ix, 273. $35.00.

The title of this book does not reveal its narrow focus on Bengal during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The complex subject of "modernity" is dissected in the context of European imperialism, colonialism, and racism on the one hand, and the position of *bhadralok* (Bengali middle-class) nationalists on the other. Prathama Banerjee contends that there was very little difference between the ideas and attitudes of British imperialists and Bengali nationalists toward Santal forest people, whom both viewed as "primitive."

However, the situation was a bit more complex. The European colonizers looked at the people of India on the whole as backward, infantile, inanimate, primitive, barbaric, savage, sensual and body-centered, non-cerebral, extravagant, lacking in discipline, irrational, immoral, and uncivilized vis-à-vis themselves as progressive, thrifty, disciplined, rational and mind-centered, young, dynamic, animate, advanced, moral, civilized, and modern. Taking their cue from the colonizers, the Bengali nationalists applied the same attitude toward the Santals vis-à-vis themselves.

The author notes that European modernity did not develop by itself, as most Eurocentric thinkers and scholars have maintained from the time of G. W. F. Hegel. It came into existence and developed only in relation to the colonized non-European other. In other words, the birth of Western modernity is directly related to imperial conquest, and is therefore inseparable from the European imperialist project of colonial subjugation and domination over other lands and people.

The primitive then becomes static, timeless, lacking self-consciousness, and in possession of a mind that was incapable of abstract thought. The primitive also then is deemed to lack history, and hence is inferior to the superior modern, i.e., European. Bengali nationalists applied the same colonial knowledge system against Santals to show the latter as also outside of history and, hence, not modern. So this Santal-Bengali difference was the creation of colonial modernity, which had not really existed before the coming of the Western colonizer.

Nevertheless, the Bengali *bhadralok* declared itself modern, while designating non-modern status not just to the Santals but also to peasants, women, Muslims, and the people of lower classes and castes, contends the author. This attitude was held even by the most prominent Bengali nationalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, R. C. Dutt, Rabindranath Tagore, H. C. Chakladar, and later filmmakers like Satyajit Ray and Mrinal Sen.

These nationalists argued that history and nation had existed in India much earlier than in Europe. Elements of modernity were always present in India's ancient past, and Hindu civilization was older than Western civilization. Colonial historiography was accused of deliberately making Indians appear superstitious and unscientific, which mistakenly denied the existence of history among the colonized.

The author details the contest between Bengali nationalists and their British colonial masters. Nationalists tried to integrate the "primitives" by civilizing them into the idea of a nation. Colonizers, by contrast, tried to preserve the "primitives" to justify their imperial

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rule. However, the colonialist approach was contradictory, because it promoted the ideas of the "civilizing mission" and the "white man's burden" while it simultaneously tried to preserve the tradition of the colonized under the prejudicial assumption that the colonized did not know the value of their own past. Nevertheless, there was no disagreement over the existence of the difference between the modern and the primitive, or "us" versus "them." And both Bengali nationalists and British colonialists justified displacing the body-centered Santals and freely using them in mines and plantations as a way of spreading the light of progress, civilization, and modernity among them—in other words, the full exploitation of "primitive" labor for profit.

So money, credit, commerce, and profits were the signs of the modern vis-à-vis the primitive, who accordingly did not understand the operations of the modern economy. Thus Scottish Enlightenment ideas about money drawn from Adam Smith, David Hume, and others informed early colonialism in India. In fact, the roots of Western imperialism, colonialism, and racism can be traced to the European Enlightenment and the scientific and industrial revolutions. This fact has not yet been accepted by Western historiography, which is criticized for hiding its own colonial and imperial past.

What is never registered by either colonialists or their compatriot nationalists is that the extension of the colonial modern economy not only brought indebtedness to the Santals but also destroyed indigenous textile manufacturing by dumping cheap mass-produced machine goods from England. Further, "The forced extension of agriculture to areas beyond the protected, naturally watered, and fertile stretches made the Santal land more vulnerable to natural disasters" (p. 128). This behavior was far from "civilizing the savage." It was more about unscrupulously exploiting the land and labor of the colonized in the name of modernity.

Unable to bear this exploitation, the Santals rebelled in 1855 against the cohort alliance of the colonial state, merchants, moneylenders, government officials, law courts, and colonial police. The program of the Santals was to share land and forest resources equally and to expel colonial officials, *mahajuns* (moneylenders), *zamindars* (landlords), liquor sellers, forest contractors, and Christian missionaries as agents of the colonial state and exploiters of the poor under the authority of *lal-lathi* (white man's stick soaked in blood).

Not surprisingly, both the colonialists and Bengali *bhadralok* nationalists depicted the Santal *hul* (rebellion) as a sporadic and violent outburst of irrational, emotional, and primitive reaction to modernity. Both expressed the need to "civilize" and discipline the Santals. When the *sahibs* (white colonial masters) killed the Santals, the Bengalis followed the colonial troops, burning and recovering indebted property from Santal villages.

This book is a postmodern critique of the "colonial" and the "colonial-modern" that was constructed on the "primitive" other. Although sympathetic to the plight of the oppressed Santals, nevertheless and not surprisingly, the text is loaded with the jargon of postmodernism and the Subaltern School of South Asian historiography. The narrow focus on Bengal completely obliterates all other regions of South Asia, and no effort is made to engage in any kind of comparison, which would have greatly enriched the thesis of the book. In one sense, this is an exercise in Bengali narcissism. Sadly, this type of approach is also found in works by other leading scholars of the Subaltern School, such as Partha Chatterjee and Dipesh Chakrabarty, whose scholarship seems to have inspired this book and its author.

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Laura Bear. *Lines of the Nation: Indian Railway Workers, Bureaucracy, and the Intimate Historical Self.* (Cultures of History.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 346. $47.50.

Anglo-Indians (a term approximately equal in meaning to Eurasian, although limited to those with British and Indian ancestors) numbered roughly 143,000 in India in 1931. The community came to have a special, albeit enclaved, role in colonial India because of its disproportionately large presence in the railroad workforce. Approximately one-half of all Anglo-Indians came to be railroad employees or dependants thereof, most of whom lived in or near company towns, the "railroad colonies." They became, in Laura Bear's view, a "railway caste," whose formation and current predicaments form the main subject matter of her ethnographic history. The close connection to the colonial railroads, a preferential connection ended in 1960, made postcolonial India a difficult transition for the Anglo-Indians.

Bear gives us a sensitive account of a subset of this community: those associated with the railroads of Eastern India. Central to this stimulating work is an examination of the intimate and public psycho-social world the Anglo-Indians made through their lives as railroad families: lives subjected to an authoritarian bureaucracy (itself an adjunct of the colonial state); enclaved lives situated in, but not fully of, India and the emerging national aspirations of many Indians. In particular, the author reveals the tension Anglo-Indians experienced from the fact that their *jati* (caste used in a very extended sense) and *desh* (roughly a homeland) identities were different from those of most Bengalis—and perhaps most Indians.

The book tells us much that is fascinating and fresh about the "biomoral" dimensions of colonial and postcolonial India as revealed in the past and present of these Anglo-Indians. As ethnographic history, Bear's book fulfills the promise of an anthropologically informed study: rich, compelling description and reconstruction based on interviews, observation, and participant observation. However, this ethnographic success nestles somewhat uneasily within a more labored, nec-

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essarily selective historical overview anchored in written, archival sources.

Indeed, the book becomes more substantively novel starting in chapter five, when the author uses a type of written record—personal petitions of complaint and supplication from Anglo-Indian employees to high officials in the colonial railroad bureaucracy—that provides individualized, even intimate, information more akin to that available through interviews and observation than from the massive, often bureaucratically routinized and statistical information contained in much of India's voluminous railroad records. Clearly, the author became engaged by the petitions: they appealed to her ethnographic orientation and offered a way (along with oral history) into the personal dimensions of the lives of Anglo-Indian railroad workers in the late colonial period, which her ethnographic fieldwork, focused particularly on the railroad town of Kharagpur, could extend into the postcolonial era.

The history/ethnography division finds expression in the structure of the book. Part one (chapters one through six) provides a selective retelling of aspects of India's railroad history designed to support the author's general goal: a reinterpretation of Indian railroad history to demonstrate that the forms of egalitarian modernity promised by the introduction of the railroads never occurred. Instead, India received additional, distorting distinctions of "community, nation, caste, respectability, and race" that turned "Indian society into a new kind of target for state policies" (p. 3). I doubt the railroads offered India an egalitarian modernity, except as rhetorical flourish. In any case, egalitarian modernity was never a reality, as Bear illustrates when she argues that English notions of pedigree, race, nation, and community influenced the practices of the railway bureaucracy/colonial state. I must add, however, that the practices and structures of Britain's railroads also influenced colonial railways. Authoritarian structures, tight discipline, and enclaved railroad workers were a pronounced part of British railroading from which most of the British elite of India's railroad officers came, and to which most eventually returned.

The absence of Sumit Sarkar's writings (among others, "The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy: Bengal from Swadeshi to Non-Co-operation, c. 1905–22" in *Subaltern Studies III: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, ed. Ranajit Guha [1984]) from the bibliography and notes (notably those to chapter four on industrial unrest) surprised me. Reference to Kumkum Chatterjee's "Discovering India: Travel, History and Identity in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century India" in *Invoking the Past: The Uses of History in South Asia*, ed. Daud Ali (1999) is also absent, although relevant to Bear's chapter two, "An Indian Traveling Public, 1850–1900."

Part two (chapters seven through ten) is a splendid, engaging ethnography of contemporary Anglo-Indian railroad families, with some comparative material on the quite different lives of Bengali railroad families. Bear describes well the predicaments and socio-moral practices of the Anglo-Indians, which were shaped so profoundly by their formation as a "railway caste" in the colonial period.

Scholars in many disciplines should find this book a most worthwhile read, the more so if read in conjunction with a recent study of the Anglo-Indians set in a different part of India (Madras-Chennai) and based, in considerable measure, on interviews and observation: Lionel Caplan's *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a Postcolonial World* (2001).

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Sunil S. Amrith. *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–1965*. (Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2006. Pp. xiii, 261. $74.95.

Sunil S. Amrith begins by referring to the utopia of an illness-free paradise in the decolonized world after World War II that was founded on certain realities, which included the "retreat" of colonialism. This retreat made the internal ruling classes of the ex-colonial world, the inheritors of the legacy of the anti-imperialist struggle, dream of "independent" health initiatives. After all, beyond the idea of protecting the ruling race and the upper crust of indigenous society, colonial health policies had been designed primarily to respond to immediate problems like epidemics. Decolonization implied the rise of new ways of thinking, which included the perception that the state was supposed to play a major role. Alongside these perceptions, public health emerged as a vital feature, closely tied up with citizenship. As the title of the book suggests, the author locates decolonization as a "given" fact during the 1940s and in 1965. The problem Amrith wishes to investigate is the way the transition to independence impacted health policies in the decolonized world of India and Southeast Asia. In the process, he also attempts to understand why the utopia failed by the 1960s. The author uses the rather contested term "colonial medicine" for biomedicine.

Amrith focuses on the "internationalisation of health" as a fallout of the "Great Depression." Since the colonial world of India and Southeast Asia was under the imperial yoke in this phase, one needs perhaps to qualify the effect that this process actually generated. The author refers to the debates and discussions created by the nationalists and the "Left" in the case of India. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the basic policy paradigms remained unaltered. Amrith continues by exploring the interwar years, which were marked by scientific and technological transformation. These changes included the discovery of the insecticide DDT and a range of effective pharmaceutical technologies that marked a significant break when it came to disease control. Amrith is critical of the hollow declarations that had been made (before World War II) regarding international responsibility for health and cites the example of the Bengal Famine (1943) to prove his

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argument. As colonial interests were delineated, they obliterated possibilities concerning the health and welfare of the colonized people. The author also mentions how the famine showed the shallowness of the technological advances made before World War II. This latter formulation is difficult to accept because the famine was intimately linked with colonial policies. Consequently, existing conditions in colonial South and Southeast Asia posed serious problems with regard to technological advancements, often making them meaningless.

Amrith seems to suggest that the problem of colonialism ended with the process of decolonization. The World Health Organization (WHO), which was established over 1946–1948, took over the responsibility of establishing a disease-free world. Amrith's study explores the WHO's history in India and Southeast Asia. Various projects of the WHO during the 1950s and 1960s, its negotiations with diseases ranging from malaria and tuberculosis to venereal diseases and smallpox, and immunization programs are discussed in great detail. The author has consulted an impressive range of sources to tell his story.

A few points need to be mentioned about some of the problems of this book. The most important of these relates to a rather simplistic understanding of the transition from colonialism to decolonization. Thus, this study leaves no space to consider the shadow cast by neo-colonialism on India and Southeast Asia, the results of which include inequalities and poverty that have been reinforced through the process of globalization. The author's method of seeing bodies such as the WHO or the Rockefeller Foundation as independent from the neo-colonial interests of the United States is rather unfortunate. For example, there is no discussion of the CIA's involvement in initiatives to contain malaria in India. In addition, the study is silent about the way that ruling classes in former colonial countries have prioritized vital sectors like health, which demonstrates a striking level of postcolonial continuity. These problems influence the author's conclusion. After all, attributing the decline of disease control in the 1960s to the lack of medical and administrative control of the WHO and the national governments, or to drug resistant mosquitoes and the absence of medical infrastructure, touches only the tip of the iceberg.

I am also somewhat cynical of Amrith's arguments regarding "health's internationalisation" in the 1930s, late colonial "welfarism," the discontinuities brought about by the process of decolonization, and the important role he expects the WHO to play in the emerging, acute struggles for the right to health in poorer countries and the "imperious" demands of the multinational pharmaceutical industry. Perhaps the author should have interrogated his sources and taken the critical secondary material on the subject more seriously.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Sharon A. Roger Hepburn. *Crossing the Border: A Free Black Community in Canada*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 252. $40.00.

Apart from Nova Scotia's Africville, obliterated by Halifax City in the 1960s, Buxton, Ontario, must be the best-known and most-studied black community in Canada. Unlike Africville, Buxton still exists as a predominantly black settlement, with an annual Labor Day reunion and celebration of its history, a local museum with archival holdings, and a population actively engaged in preserving its heritage. Sharon A. Roger Hepburn recounts the story of Buxton's founding and development as, according to her and to virtually all the literature, "the most successful" of the free black communal experiments prior to the Civil War.

The Buxton story necessarily begins with Reverend William King, a Presbyterian minister and schoolmaster who married the daughter of a Louisiana planter and thus became a slaveholder himself by marriage and inheritance. Upon the death of his wife King freed the fifteen people he held as slaves and in 1849 brought them to southwestern Ontario, where with the help of the Presbyterian Church and the Elgin Association, a philanthropic body formed for the purpose, he purchased a tract of land for resale on easy terms to African Americans fleeing from slavery. The settlement quickly grew to several hundred, and by the Civil War as many as 1,000 people were living there. Initially opposed by many of its neighbors, Buxton eventually won the approval of most residents of the region through its economic prosperity and educational excellence. Buxton's successful formula began with its selection process, for only the industrious among the formerly enslaved, with good moral character, were admitted as settlers. They were granted fifty-acre farms and were prohibited from selling them to white farmers for a minimum of ten years. King and his white colleagues on the Elgin Association's board set some very strict rules and conditions, establishing, for example, the size, location, and design of the settlers' houses. Within this protective, all-black environment, inhabitants developed a dynamic community with a viable infrastructure of mills, crafts, schools, and churches. Buxton sent black ministers, teachers, doctors, and lawyers into Canadian society, and to the United States: many of its young men served in the northern forces during the Civil War, and postwar southern black society was enriched by the return of educated individuals whose training started in Buxton.

This outline has been followed by most writers in the past, including King in his unpublished autobiography, and in published accounts dating from the mid-1850s into the twenty-first century. What has changed over time has been the apprehended role of King and his external board of directors. Annie Straith Jamieson's 1925 book, *William King: Friend and Champion of Slaves*, was typical of the early literature in attributing Buxton's achievements to its white founder and leader,

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whose meticulous management kept the project in line. Some more recent interpretations have considered King something of a dictator, imposing bourgeois values and styles inappropriately. Both views, of course, grant center stage to William King. Hepburn fully acknowledges King's contribution, and that of the donors on the board of directors, but determines to examine Buxton "from the dual perspective of white control and black empowerment." And so, although she is retelling a well-known story, Hepburn's analysis of the settlement's record is refreshing.

The book's structure illustrates its author's emphasis. Early chapters deal with King, but once the settlement is established her attention shifts to the settlers and the community they built, with descriptions of their family and social life, their churches, their pursuit of education, and how they earned their living. There are several anecdotes of how some of the fugitives escaped from enslavement and managed to arrive safely in Buxton. In a word, Hepburn recognizes black agency, and her focus is on the lives and the community the settlers made for themselves, sometimes despite and sometimes because of the interventions of outsiders. Self-reliance, as both the fugitives and their supporters understood, was essential in achieving their broader purpose of proving to the world that African-descended people could survive and thrive in freedom. Through analyses of Canadian census returns and archival documents, Hepburn is able to provide considerable detail for her profile of the Buxton community and its members' relationships in work, marriage, church, and school. In doing so, Hepburn draws an impression of nineteenth-century Canadian governmental and public attitudes toward the presence of the American fugitives that challenges recent conventional wisdom. Without ignoring the difficulties and hostilities they faced, Hepburn concludes that the settlers were enabled to succeed because of opportunities uniquely available in Canada at that time. Perhaps her picture is too rosy, but it deserves consideration by those hoping to understand the free black experience in Canada and the United States in the pre– and post–Civil War decades.

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Cynthia R. Comacchio. *The Dominion of Youth: Adolescence and the Making of a Modern Canada, 1920–1950.* (Studies in Childhood and Family in Canada.) Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 2006. Pp. ix, 298. $65.00.

Cynthia R. Comacchio examines how conceptions of adolescence in English Canada were shaped by the young nation's hopes and fears about modern society. Comacchio argues that discussions about generational conflict "became a sort of probe for exploring the tensions between the traditional and the modern and for examining evolving notions about national identity" (p. 12). Rather than focusing on "delinquent" children, who were the targets of social reformers' anxieties, Comacchio turns her attention to "ordinary" youth. While acknowledging that "ordinary" is itself a social construction, this approach allows her to explore how generations differed from each other, and in turn, what child-watchers' concerns about each generation reveal about the development of modern Canadian citizenship.

Generation is the central theoretical and organizational category of the book. Chapter one explores the evolution of theories about the youth problem. Adolescence was not a new concept in the early twentieth century, but the theorization of the generational divide in the writing of G. S. Hall, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Erik Erikson was new and modern. Between 1920 and 1950, youth were shaped by three major world crises that produced a distinct generational consciousness and concomitant generational conflicts. The "flaming youth" of the 1920s were the first modern generation, and adult outrage at youthful sexuality and leisure spoke to broader concerns about the dangers of modernity and mass culture. The Great Depression, which some commentators believed was an antidote to the immorality of the 1920s, increased tensions between the generations. Young people were frustrated that they were forced to delay passage into adulthood because they could not find work, while some adults accused them of taking advantage of the economic depression to delay their adult responsibilities. World War II demanded even more sacrifices from youth, who, some feared, were already handicapped by the hardships of the depression. To address young people's sense of hopelessness after years of economic and political instability, the federal government established the Canadian Youth Commission in 1940 in an attempt to integrate young men and women into models of postwar citizenship. The commission was one example of the modern development of policies and programs to monitor adolescents' transition into adulthood.

Subsequent chapters examine the places where adolescents lived, worked, and played and explain their role in citizenship projects. Comacchio begins in the home, a key site of reconstruction plans and social welfare programs. Theories about the youth problem were riddled with contradictions that blamed decreasing parental authority, the growing influence of the peer group, prolonged dependency, and youth autonomy for intergenerational conflict and family breakdown. Experts advised parents to develop egalitarian relationships with their children so that they could guide them through the dangerous teenage years to become responsible adults. Comacchio uses demographic data and memoirs to demonstrate that these fears about the family crisis were exaggerated. Chapter three explores dating, a modern phenomenon that emerged from changing gender roles, sexual mores, and courtship practices. Although young people had relatively more autonomy than previous generations, dating shared with more traditional courtship practices the goal of preventing sexual experimentation before marriage and ensuring that young people chose their spouses wisely.

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Marriage remained an important marker of adult citizenship, but the connection between adolescent sexuality and idealized citizenship was new. Chapters four and five discuss adolescents at school and on the job and examine the connections between training young people to become efficient, productive workers. Comacchio pays attention to how class, ethnicity, race, and gender affected school attendance, yet one of the most important changes in adolescent life was the increasing amount of time that young people spent in school. Schools became a site of training, rather than jobs, and by the 1920s, a key goal of education was to give children alternatives to "blind-alley jobs." High school reinforced generational consciousness, but adult-organized extracurricular events also made the schools an effective means of regulation. The final chapters discuss young people's involvement in commercial leisure activities and adult attempts to steer teenagers into supervised clubs. Rather than dismissing adult outrage at youth culture, Comacchio examines why these moral panics may have been appropriate responses to economic and social change. The popularity of these clubs illustrates that, despite adult control of the agenda, they were another place where young people could forge a unique culture.

This book provides rich detail about adolescent life during a formative period. Comacchio's use of diaries, memoirs, yearbooks, and oral sources to recreate the everyday experiences of youth distinguish this study from other fine works on teen culture that focus on the discursive construction of normal adolescence. Comacchio includes immigrant, francophone, and First Nations voices, but admits that she has not thoroughly examined what was unique to these communities. She does raise important questions that should inspire future studies of how diverse Canadian communities understood the connections among adolescence, modernity, and citizenship.

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E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD. *God's Ambassadors: A History of the Christian Clergy in America*. (Pulpit & Pew.) Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 2007. Pp. x, 356. $30.00.

Recent American religious historians have focused less on the clergy and more on the people they lead. But leaders matter, and we now have in E. Brooks Holifield's work the first general history of the clergy in America, a rich and complex book on an important and complex subject.

Amid the complexity, Holifield identifies authority as his central organizing concept, noting that "the history of any profession must be, at least in part, a story about authority, or the legitimate use of power" (p. 2). Citing Max Weber, he distinguishes three forms of authority based on ordination, call, and education. Clerical ordination, for example, has defined the Catholic priesthood, while authority grounded in a ministerial call has shaped evangelical and Pentecostal clergy. Still other Protestants have claimed authority based on formal education. Although distinctive in theory, these forms of authority frequently blurred in practice and were often challenged. Tracing the interplay of both claims and challenges to authority constitutes much of this important book. But competing notions of authority coexisted with an underlying consensus about pastoral tasks, including preaching, administering the sacraments, and visitation. Catholic and Orthodox priests emphasized the sacraments, while Protestant pastors emphasized preaching. Moreover, according to Holifield, virtually all disliked administration.

Closely related to the issue of authority, is the question of professional status. Holifield notes that professions are distinguished by educational requirements, service to clients, and an ethical code (p. 6). By that definition, American clergy and their parishioners "have collectively decided—by virtue of their practices and their theologies—that the ministry is only partially a profession" (p. 6). The question is both sociological—pastors serve parishioners not clients—and theological—ministry is not a helping profession but a "form of discipleship" (p. 328). In the end, the ministry has remained more vocation than profession. The argument over professional status involves a related argument over the comparative worth of formal theological education and a call to ministry. Even in the 1980s, for example, "only 45 percent of Southern Baptist pastors had graduated from a seminary" (p. 331), and a lack of seminary education remains typical for African American clergy. Nonetheless, although some evangelicals considered (and consider) a seminary education to be optional, many others emphasized its value, and by 1993 evangelical seminaries enrolled more than half of all Protestant seminarians (p. 329).

Although no quantitative historian, Holifield deftly employs statistical evidence related to many aspects of clergy life during the last three centuries, including the numbers of congregations and ministers, the numbers of members or adherents, and clergy finances. For example, clergy often complained of poor pay. By 1890 the average clerical "salary of $574 left most ministers at the lower end of the scale," and by 1928 "the average salary of $1,407 placed ministers below postal employees, factory workers, and railway conductors" (p. 179). Compared to other professions, late twentieth-century clergy salaries remained modest, "averaging less than a third of the salaries of physicians and only half that of lawyers," and varied widely by denomination and congregational size (p. 343).

Do modest compensation levels suggest that the status of the ministry has declined? Probably not, at least not in terms of the central task of building and tending communities of faith. Holifield reminds us that although a sense of crisis has dogged the ministry since at least the 1930s, recent surveys show that clergy remain happy with ministry and committed to it (p. 344). Acknowledging that clergy exercise less authority in some areas than they once did, he also reminds us that

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those areas are not the center of pastoral practice. Rather most clergy "have understood themselves as the leaders of local congregations that attempt to practice the Christian life" (p. 348).

Even at 350 pages, this book cannot tell the whole story of Christian ministry. Focusing on white Protestant clergy, for example, means less attention to Catholic priests and less still to African Americans and Eastern Orthodox. The absence of a bibliography is unfortunate, but I applaud the use of documentary footnotes rather than endnotes.

Even as he wrote, Holifield observed that "priests and ministers oversaw the fortunes of more than 300,000 local churches, which week after week drew more participants than any other American voluntary or cultural organization. . . . Priests and ministers have continued to exert significant influence on national institutions, local cultures, and individual lives" (p. 345). In order to understand that enduring influence of this important vocational group, there is no better guide than Holifield's book.

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GARY SCOTT SMITH. *Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 665. $35.00.

From the subtitle, one might conclude that this large book is a sweep of all the U.S. presidents from the first George Washington to the current George W. Bush. But that would be a mistake. Gary Scott Smith focuses on only eleven presidents, just three of whom governed before the twentieth century. Those three—George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln—are certainly to be expected in any treatment of American politics and religion. And the same is true of most of the remaining eight.

But if the choices are predictable, the treatment is not. "Thorough" is the word that first comes to mind, as Smith provides over 200 pages of detailed notes that constitute a kind of running bibliography for the subject at hand. In addition to being bibliographic, the notes are also often explanatory, at whatever length the author deems appropriate. It would be difficult to imagine greater help being given to the reader than these extensive notes regularly provide.

On the other hand, the author is so careful to present all the major viewpoints (with ample quotations) concerning his eleven subjects that he scarcely leaves time for his own analysis. The reader, moreover, may feel that he is being offered a sumptuous buffet, but that ultimately the choice of which food to accept and which to reject is up to him. On the first president, for example, the author writes: "Washington's religious views were shaped by parents, his half-brother Lawrence, the teachings and practices of the Episcopal Church, the ideas of the Enlightenment, the tenets of Freemasonry, his wife, Martha, and his military and political experiences" (p. 26). This explains everything and nothing. The author needs to guide, not merely report.

Similarly, with respect to Jefferson, the author recreates the third president's social and intellectual milieu, but leaves many choices for the reader. "Examining Jefferson's religious socialization," Smith writes, "pattern of church attendance, approach toward worship and prayer, the thinkers who shaped his worldview, and his views of God, Jesus, human nature, morality, education, life after death, and the Bible provides insight into his life and his presidency" (p. 55). Now, admittedly, these all-inclusive generalities are followed by much more specific data—in Jefferson's case, for example, by a reference to the "metaphysical insanities" of Athanasius (p. 59) or to the "unlettered and ignorant men" who had turned the simple teachings of Jesus into unintelligible mishmash (p. 65). In these and other instances, however, concerning the author's exposition, less would have been more.

In the twentieth century, Smith elaborates the religious views of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. At this point, George W. Bush has the twenty-first century all to himself. Many gems are offered along the way: for example, Eisenhower's first name owes something to the popularity when he was born of the revivalist Dwight L. Moody. Kennedy, having fought off Protestant attacks and slanders, only to be put through the wringer by fellow Catholics, observed that he now understood why Henry VIII decided to create his own church. (Incidentally, Kennedy appears to have been motivated less by a personal faith than the others, but as the first Catholic president of a heretofore "Protestant nation," he could hardly be left out.) Carter's piety was rejected because it called for "sacrifice and self-denial"; Reagan's piety, on the other hand, was embraced because of its sunny optimism—Reagan (in Garry Wills's words) offering a"more marketable God" (p. 361).

Smith has given us much to ponder and much to be grateful for. In the future, historians of America will not be able to tackle the subject of "faith and the presidency" without first tackling this imposing and informative volume.

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HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF. *Children at Play: An American History*. New York: New York University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 269. $27.95.

Howard P. Chudacoff has written an absorbing and engaging book. He attempts, with a high degree of success, to trace the development of children's play in America from 1600 to the present. He takes the position that all children, in all times, have pursued play, and that play is an assertion of a child's autonomy. Al-

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though adults often had fairly strict ideas about how and when children should play, children often subverted adult intentions, and found their own ways to entertain themselves.

Throughout the book, Chudacoff tries to maintain a child-centered approach to his topic. He focuses on four different components of children's play: the environment in which it takes place, the materials of play, the youngsters involved, and the issue of control. After presenting this framework, he divides his topic chronologically, first addressing the two hundred years from 1600 to 1800, and then dividing the years into units of fifty years as he moves closer to the present. Given the rather static landscape of the earlier years, as compared to the period since 1800, this arrangement makes sense.

Chudacoff is careful to write, as much as possible, about a wide variety of children. Native American and slave children appear in the narrative. He deals with the differences between urban and rural childhood, as well as the differing experiences of children based on socioeconomic divisions. One criticism, albeit a small one, is that he places the eclipse of rural America, and therefore rural childhood, fairly early in his narrative, earlier than this reviewer would place it. He also underestimates the degree to which rural children's play was anarchic and largely unsupervised by parents. He argues for more control than many farm parents had the time or energy to exercise. The experiences of children of moderate to better means predominate, because of the availability of published materials about their childhoods and information about consumer goods produced for them. They, also, were the children with the greatest time available for play.

This book details the proliferation of the stuff of childhood from the very modest toys of the early republic to the much more elaborate offerings of the post–World War II period. As in Gary Cross's *Kids' Stuff: Toys and the Changing World of American Childhood* (1997), Chudacoff spends more time discussing the evolution of the toys than the ways in which children actually played with them. This, however, is understandable, given the difficulty of discovering just how children actually played with the toys that they owned.

Chudacoff tracks the many ways in which children's play has changed over time. From the point of view of this reviewer, some of his most interesting observations are about the wealth of opportunities that children found for new and improved play in urban environments. In the transition from rural to urban childhood, youngsters' access to certain features of the natural world was radically diminished. They had far less opportunity, for example, to play in large open spaces, climb trees and observe wildlife. For some children, this would have been a significant loss. Chudacoff, however, details the many ways in which urban children flourished in this new environment. Balls bounced higher, vacant lots offered a wide variety of amusements, and children remade sidewalks and streets as their playgrounds. In fact, they were so successful at this that they intimidated and disturbed adults who were competing for the same spaces. And so the playground was born.

The book waxes appropriately philosophical as Chudacoff deals with the immense changes in children's play since the 1970s. Parents' fears of the world beyond the home, combined with revolutionary changes in the technology of children's leisure, have more and more confined children's play to the home. Children who, thirty or forty years ago, would have been allowed to roam more or less free are now confined to their houses and their backyards, only venturing into public places to play in the company of their parents. There is every possibility that this development has had and will continue to have a stifling affect on children's creativity and imagination. Chudacoff remains hopeful, however, that the children will win out, shaping the resources available to them to their own purposes.

This is an engaging and readable book that should find a wide audience. Although historians of childhood and the family will find it a particularly interesting read, many others will want to examine and use the book as well. I look forward to its printing in paperback so that I can assign it in my courses on family history. Students should find Chudacoff's comments about play in their generation particularly provocative. This book is a model work of synthesis and a truly enjoyable piece of scholarship.

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WILLIAM J. BAKER. *Playing with God: Religion and Modern Sport*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. 322. $29.95.

In terms of training, experience, and temperament, no contemporary historian is better suited to analyze the historical relationship between religion and modern sport than William J. Baker. As the author of books ranging from *If Christ Came to the Olympics* (2000) to *Sports in the Western World* (1988), Baker brings a lifetime of study and teaching to his exceptional rendering of both sport and religious history in the work under review.

This book surveys the major developments and eras in American sports history in light of the institutional, theological, and doctrinal developments that reshaped American religions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Because of the book's sweeping coverage, Baker deftly employs secondary sources to establish an historical framework that will be familiar to historians of sport and historians of religion. It does little injury to the book to note that it includes only limited new material. The synthetic nature of the volume is its greatest strength and evidences Baker's decades-long engagement with a wide-ranging literature. Itdoes contain new and convincing interpretations, but the book will long be remembered for Baker's analysis of the major issues and characters from Greece to Barry Bonds within a compelling one-volume narrative.

The book's scope is remarkable, even if the terrain is

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largely familiar. Baker follows the story from premodern rituals combining sports and religion through the birth of modern sport in Britain and its transplantation to American soil in the mid-nineteenth century. From a pariah outside of the social mainstream, sport steadily gained respect as it became more "civilized" and churches took a liberal turn in their attempts to maintain the interest of male parishioners. Muscular Christianity, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and the social gospel slowly Americanized the British import by widening the availability of gymnasiums and rational recreational programs. The growing connection between sports and churches was always rife with conflict, as Baker shows. Conservative evangelicals in the South successfully kept sports at arm's length until after World War I.

By the 1920s, sports had assumed a central place in the reform efforts and the social outreach programs of most American sects. Social activities and sporting leagues kept many young men inside the fold, while groups like Mormons, Jews, and urban Catholics used sports to prove their "American-ness." According to Baker, these religious outsiders "quickly learned that prizefights and ball games were godsends, tickets into the American mainstream" (p. 172). For example, Notre Dame's football success in the 1920s opened new avenues of integration for American Catholics and provided a symbol of unity for Catholics throughout the United States. Knute Rockne's use of "a religious heritage of vast mythic and ritualistic resources" illustrates how sports changed Catholicism while Catholicism in turn changed sports. Just imagine Rockne (a Norwegian Lutheran until his conversion to Catholicism in 1925) surrounded by "priests eager to call down thunder from the sky for the creation of gridiron prowess" (p. 138). Notre Dame chaplain Father John Francis O'Hara "happily sprinkled holy water on the gridiron" and "genuinely believed that . . . Notre Dame football 'stimulates faith' " (p. 138).

Although southern evangelicals were slow to invite sports into their midst, sports and evangelical religion became inextricably entwined during the Cold War. During the 1950s, led by revivalist Billy Graham, Americans "added sport to religious faith and patriotism to create an idealized American 'way of life' as an antidote to 'godless Communism' " (p. 193). Graham harnessed the appeal of athletic stars and used them to stir up interest in his revivals. Olympic pole vault champion Bob Richards played on his athletic fame to become the spokesperson for Wheaties breakfast cereal and the exemplary Christian life. This type of muscular evangelism became institutionalized with the incorporation of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) in the 1950s. As Baker trenchantly observes, groups like the FCA represent "a grand tradition artfully blend[ing] American athleticism, religious zeal, and big business" (p. 201).

Baker's argument is most artful and enlightening when he turns his attention to twentieth-century evangelicals and sport. He asserts that "evangelical religion and sport reinforce each other. The one sustains the other. They are more than teammates; they are soul mates" (p. 240). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, sport and religion seemed incompatible. In the pages of Baker's book, the two become one. Baker explains clearly how we got here.

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MATTHEW P. BROWN. *The Pilgrim and the Bee: Reading Rituals and Book Culture in Early New England*. (Material Texts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 265. $65.00.

One immediately begins to wonder, upon picking up Matthew P. Brown's book, how its obscure title ever passed through the marketing department of a modern academic press. Then one opens the book, and the tropes of pilgrimage and honey gathering that Brown masterfully weaves through his narrative make it unlikely that the reader will ever forget exactly what reading practices in early New England have to do with pilgrims and bees. Brown tells a story of two prominent (and intertwined) strands of reading practice to be found in the early American colonies: the pilgrimage, wherein readers treat texts as continuous narratives and follow a redemptive journey, a progressive *telos* or "growth in grace," and "the alvearial, wherein readers, like bees, extract and deposit information discontinuously, treating texts as spatial objects, as flowers or hives which keep readers active but anchored" (p. xii).

Brown is particularly interested in the telling the story of how the codex format of books fostered various rituals of reading for early New Englanders. He divides his book into five chapters, and he devotes the first chapter to one of his most foundational insights: namely the understudied reality that important and defined economies of "steady-selling devotional literature" functioned throughout the early northeastern colonies (p. xi). Brown explores how readers' encounters with these steady sellers influenced how they read more generally, adding his own gloss to the traditional dichotomy of intensive vs. extensive reading practices long used to characterize early American literacy. Brown convincingly argues that it is vitally important to view reading habits in this period "in terms of continuous and discontinuous styles" because the terms "intensive" and "extensive" fail to capture how reading actually happened, whether a book had been read once or twenty times (p. 14).

In his second chapter, Brown takes his reader through an examination of the popular literature of the period and how readers encountered this literature. Central to his study is a notion of performance, that is heavily indebted to the work of scholars such as Jay Fliegelman and Sandra A. Gustafson. Brown skillfully shows that one cannot really understand the power of reading in this period without first placing it in a complex web of practices such as rituals of private prayer and oral communication that were of untold impor-

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tance in determining how readers approached and understood books.

In chapters three and four, Brown broadens his study to include examination of a "second-generation of colonial imprints," genres and particular works by writers born in the colonies that began to move away from (and replace) the earlier steady-selling devotional literature of New England (p. 10). In these works, one sees the emergence of a true American literary tradition, separate yet deeply indebted to its English counterpart.

Brown's final chapter offers a fascinating and rewarding study of John Eliot's mission to convert Native Americans. Out of this mission emerged perhaps the most impressive book to ever be printed in the United States, the Eliot Indian Bible. Eliot first had to translate and then to muster the printing supplies and expertise to produce two editions of the entire Bible, a feat still unparalleled for sheer ambition and tireless perseverance in the annals of American book production. Eliot's Bible—and the numerous other material he translated and printed—stand as a testimony to just how important literacy was to New England notions of conversion. In this chapter, Brown gives the single best analysis currently available of the role of the Bible and of literacy more generally in helping to understand both the Puritan missionary ethic and the Native Americans who encountered its practitioners.

In broad strokes, Brown's study stands as both an illumination of the power of early New England reading practices and as an apologetic "for book history as an especially rich analytical tool for humanities scholarship" (p. 13). The book has slight weaknesses; for example, it might pay more attention to the role of gender in the reading practices of the period, although the lack of primary source material does much to explain this lacuna. All in all, this work will be of immense value not only to book historians but to historians more generally, as well as to literary critics, cultural anthropologists, scholars of communication, and anyone interested in the development of early American literacy. To put it most simply: Brown has given us a beautifully argued book about books, and it will become a standard for all those interested in early New England books and reading practices.

Paul Gutjahr
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John Ferling. *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 679. $29.95.

John Ferling's book is a masterful synthesis of a generation of scholarship and his own forty years of research on the military history of the American Revolution. Ferling's narrative now stands at the head of the comprehensive studies of the Revolutionary War that include Christopher Ward's two-volume classic *The War of the Revolution* (1952), John R. Alden's *A History of the American Revolution* (1969), and Don Higginbotham's *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789* (1971). The book focuses on the Continental Army and is divided into four parts: "Going to War, 1775–1776"; "The War in the North, 1776–1779"; "The War in the South, 1780–1781"; and "American Victory, 1781–1783."

There is much more to this book than a sweeping history of American and British campaigns, naval engagements, logistics, ordinance, tactics, and diplomacy. Ferling's narrative pays particular attention to contingency and human agency. This approach contributes to one of the great strengths of the book. By blending events with insightful portraits of leaders and ordinary people on both sides of the conflict, Ferling has created a military history that is both monumental and human in scale. For example, Ferling draws on the most recent scholarship as well as archival sources to portray George Washington's complex personality, his strengths and weaknesses as a general, and the commander's ruthless protection of his reputation and power; Washington appears both as an icon and as a blemished human being.

By examining the choices leaders and ordinary people made within the context of murky military and political circumstances, Ferling "seeks to explain why America won the war, and why the British, despite their many advantages, lost it" (p. xii). He uses Washington's ironic remark as the title of his book to remind readers that the British nearly won the war. Like David Hackett Fischer in *Washington's Crossing* (2004), Ferling focuses on "turning points" (p. xii). At critical junctures leaders had to choose among multiple courses of action. Ferling highlights the range of possible choices and then examines the effects of personalities, ambitions, rivalries, misperceptions, and chance on decisions that affected the course of the war. To underscore the importance of context, contingency, and personality in understanding the conflict each major section of the book contains chapters entitled "Choices" to assess decisions and to preview options facing leaders as events unfolded.

Ferling's narrative examines the conflict from both sides of the Atlantic. Lord North's government entered the war without a plan for victory because it expected the rebels to crumble under the first sharp blow of British arms. Throughout the war, British defeats meant gains for North's political opponents who sought to undermine the government's war efforts. General Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, the failure of the British to negotiate an armistice, and the entry of France as an ally of the Americans emboldened parliamentary opponents of the war. Ferling pays particular attention to the political, diplomatic, and military decisions that produced the profound change of strategy in 1778 to abandon a military solution to the rebellion in order to defend British possessions in the Caribbean against France and to establish British control in the southern provinces.

In writing this book Ferling states that he acquired a deeper appreciation of "the crucial importance of war in the South in determining the outcome of the Rev-

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olutionary War" (p. xiii). The goal of North's southern strategy was to isolate an independent and truncated America through British control of Canada, the trans-Appalachian west, and the provinces south of the Potomac. "Though reduced in size, Britain's sturdy and strapping American empire would encircle the tiny, feeble United States, making its survival problematic" (p. 269). This strategy nearly worked. Between 1779 and 1782, Ferling writes, the American cause nearly self-destructed from a combination of inflation, failure to sustain the army, mutinies, and civilian apathy.

Ferling argues that not only were the Americans close to losing the war, especially in 1780 and 1781, but also that the British had opportunities to achieve their strategic goals. Thus, the battle at King's Mountain and the role of Nathaniel Greene take on special importance in Ferling's account because they thwarted North's grand plan. Lord Cornwallis's defeat at Yorktown ended North's southern strategy, broke Britain's will to continue the war, and brought Lord Rockingham to power in 1782 to negotiate an end to the conflict. Within this larger context, Ferling reinforces the view, supported by most scholars, that credits the Continental Army, the French, and British ineptness, rather than Congress and the citizenry, with securing independence.

Students, faculty who teach courses on the American Revolution, and the general public will welcome Ferling's readable, thoughtful, and engaging history of the War for Independence.

JOHN RESCH
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PHILLIP PAPAS. *That Ever Loyal Island: Staten Island and the American Revolution*. New York: New York University Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 185. $45.00.

Staten Island does not always spring to mind when thinking about New York City. Although today it is one of Gotham's five boroughs, its geography sets it apart in our minds. The island is closer to New Jersey (at places less than 500 feet apart) than it is to Manhattan. Scholars of the American Revolution seem to have overlooked it as well. They have provided local studies on counties in and around New York but not until publication of Phillip Papas's fine book on Staten Island could we begin to appreciate the island's importance in the New York theater of war. Although modern scholars have largely ignored this locale, the major actors of the revolutionary war were constantly concerned with the goings-on at Staten Island, occupied by the British but yet perilously close to the Whig forces and to brigands who wanted to capitalize on its instability.

Papas couches his work in the field of loyalism studies and joins the latest wave of historians who glean motivation and behavior from the complicated web of social, political, and economic relationships at play in a particular community. The author joins the general chorus of scholars who remind us that the American Revolution was a civil war and not just a war for independence, an insight that cannot be repeated enough as the general perception of the revolution pits the forces of Good (the Americans) against the Evil Empire (the British). Papas sees more complexity in this community as the island's inhabitants shifted from glowing support of the British to disgruntlement and even active opposition to the occupiers' strong-arm tactics and callous disregard for loyalists' rights.

Papas's study begins with a description of Staten Island that features middle-class yeomen, whose positive experience with Britain during the French and Indian War, along with a lucrative transatlantic trade and a marked preference for the Church of England, predisposed them to trust the mother country. Thus, when the counties of New York felt impelled to set up congresses and watchdog committees, Staten Islanders dragged their feet or abstained from joining the Whig movement altogether.

Any joy or satisfaction in seeing the British forces land on and occupy their island was short-lived as raiding parties and mercenaries from New Jersey caused "widespread destruction." More surprising to loyal Staten Islanders were the depredations caused by the British army and retaliatory strikes provoked by loyalist freebooters who operated from their shores. By war's end, Staten Island's civilians had endured so much "plunder, property destruction, rape and murder" at the hands of those who should have protected them, that "many of the island's residents had embraced the Whig cause."

Papas's Staten Island features many of the same characteristics noted elsewhere in studies of the New York theater of war: the civil war aspect of the conflict; porous boundaries; ongoing attacks by the occupying army, frustrated by its inability to respond to guerilla fighters; and growing disillusionment with the occupying army. Although none of these findings are new, their appearance in Papas's book supports a more nuanced view of the revolution.

Although well researched, there are places where the author's assertions could stand more development and evidentiary support. One of the first issues on Papas's agenda pertains to loyalism's similarities with the Whig cause. It is not a surprise that both were "logical and self-interested" choices, but that loyalism was as "progressive" as the Whig cause demands further explanation. On the subject of Staten Island's civil war, Papas notes political divisions within families but gives no examples of familial discord and so misses the opportunity to examine how they played out on Staten Island. Similarly, Papas notes how loyalists soured on the British occupiers but devotes less than one page to the reactions of the islanders. On the whole, however, the book benefits from Papas's exhaustive research in American and Canadian archives.

Finally, there is a small problem with respect to language. For the most part, Papas's study provides an even-handed view of loyalists and patriots, but at places, the book's language subtly nudges us toward the

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Whigs. For instance, Papas finds that joining the British army was an "odious" move. Later on, Staten Islanders are caught between "Loyalist freebooters" and "Whig partisans,"—the more pejorative descriptor applying to the loyalists. And finally, in an important summary at the end of the book, Papas explains that the island was laid waste "by internecine warfare and the wanton cruelty and destruction committed by British occupation forces." Gone from this assessment are the Whig forces who earlier in the book "tortured victims" and caused "widespread destruction."

The book's contributions, however, far outweigh its shortcomings. Papas has done us a service by revealing the anguish and monumental stresses of the American Revolution.

JUDITH L. VAN BUSKIRK
State University of New York, Cortland

PAUL B. MOYER. *Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Frontier.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 216. $39.95.

It seems that historians are filling up the postrevolutionary American frontier almost as rapidly as the people over two centuries ago who were no longer blocked by the British army and their Indian allies from obtaining land. Along with land, as Paul B. Moyer points out in this excellent book, they could obtain personal independence from fathers, landlords, and employers, which they proceeded to exert at the expense of Native Americans, women and children, and each other. Thanks to Moyer, those wanting to learn the whole story about the conflict in what became northeastern Pennsylvania between the Susquehannah Company of Connecticut and the Pennamites (Pennsylvanians) who battled them, frequently literally, for nearly four decades do not have to turn to the superb ten-volume *Susquehannah Company Papers*, edited by Julian F. Boyd and Robert J. Taylor (1951–1972). Northeastern Pennsylvania also turned out to be a land of opportunity for historians, as Boyd and Taylor exemplified such merit on this project that they went on to edit the papers of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, respectively.

It is fitting that Cornell University Press, which took over publishing the *Susquehannah Papers* from the heroic Wyoming Historical and Genealogical Society in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, published Moyer's book as well. What a pleasure to find footnotes at the bottom of the page, where Moyer's extensive research in those papers, the contending states' archives, and personal and local sources can be easily appreciated. But this is a minor among major virtues. Moyer not only tells the story but links it skillfully to recent literature on other places such as Maine, New York, and the Carolinas where western settlers struggled against land speculators and government officials to shape what kind of west would be won. Whereas elite landowners and speculators—George Washington was one—wanted orderly, measured settlement to prevent Indian wars, promote government by well-to-do citizens with eastern roots, and increase land values, the migrating masses wanted their own land and community control—immediately.

The situation in Pennsylvania was especially complicated because it was more than a struggle between those who came from the Keystone and Nutmeg states; Native Americans, Pennsylvania and Connecticut occupiers of the land, speculators from both states, and a transplanted group of the 1764 Paxton boys all contented for the fertile land Peter C. Mancall has written about in *The Valley of Opportunity: Economic Culture Along the Upper Susquehanna, 1700–1800* (1991). The Iroquois Indians, the British, and the Continental Congress also became involved. Moyer points out that here, as in other newly occupied regions, the American Revolution was best perceived as an incident in a struggle for personal and community independence on the frontier that began earlier and continued longer. Because Connecticut was staunchly prorevolutionary, its people sought to play this card to persuade Congress to favor its claims; but Pennsylvania was a much larger and more powerful state in the postrevolutionary years, leading to a solution whereby in 1786 it obtained the region, although the Connecticut settlers could keep their personal claims.

Yet in that year, who owned or controlled what land was unclear in northeastern Pennsylvania (an artificial construct after competing claims of Maryland, Virginia, and Connecticut were settled), much as it was when the United States and North Vietnam agreed to their ill-fated truce based on *uti possedetis* in 1973. Fighting, lawsuits, and tax resistance continued on and off for another twenty-odd years, the highlight being the kidnapping of Luzerne County clerk Timothy Pickering—no wonder he so disliked the masses when he became a Federalist statesman. What finally put an end to the violence was the rise of political parties along with an established local elite of Connecticut inhabitants: they could compete for political office on the local and state levels and had an economic interest in keeping things quiet. In keeping with their Connecticut roots, the formerly "Wild Yankees" voted Federalist long after few people did outside New England, thereby making common cause with what remained a strong party in Philadelphia until the early 1820s.

Moyer can hold his head high, having written for the northeastern Pennsylvania frontier a history comparable to Alan Taylor's *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820* (1990), and Reeve Huston's *Land and Freedom: Rural Society, Popular Protest, and Political Parties in Antebellum New York* (2000) for upstate New York.

WILLIAM PENCAK
Pennsylvania State University

TERRY BOUTON. *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 332. $29.95.

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Terry Bouton's book is an engaging account of the long-term American Revolution in Pennsylvania that shows a continuity of struggle for and against democracy from the 1760s through 1800. The book focuses on the promise of democratic revolution among ordinary men and its betrayal by an upper-class counter-revolution. Bouton argues that "most ordinary white men were disappointed by the version of democracy that emerged from the Revolution" (p. 4). Relative equality of wealth and power within the state and empire were the heart of their revolutionary aspirations. Bouton shows that average Pennsylvanians continuously supported policies of progressive taxation, public land banks, and access to paper money. Many elites joined in making these demands during the constitutional crisis with Britain. A critique of British attempts to centralize power and wealth in the empire united Pennsylvanians on the road to revolution. This consensus helps explain adoption of the 1776 Pennsylvania constitution, which expanded franchise, and created a responsive government. Ordinary Pennsylvanians viewed enhanced political rights as a tool to create a more equal distribution of wealth and power within the state. Bouton analyzes a powerful reaction among the state's elite against this goal. He discusses the development of a "gospel of moneyed men" among the wealthy (p. 70). This ideology focused on concentrating wealth and power among the upper sorts. As elite-sponsored policies of private corporate banking, regressive taxation, rewarding land and war debt speculation, and restriction on paper money emerged, the reaction of most Pennsylvanians was one of anger and resistance. Bouton vividly describes how ordinary people effectively hindered the enforcement of these policies during the 1780s. The gentry responded by limiting responsive democratic government that made such resistance possible. The governments created by the 1787 U.S. and 1790 new Pennsylvania constitutions codified the retreat from democracy and economic equality. In turn, Pennsylvanians retreated to desperate means of extralegal resistance such as road closings to hinder foreclosures and armed regulation. Bouton convincingly shows how the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion and 1799 Fries Rebellion can be better understood as traditional attempts to make government policies more amenable to the people's interests. Bouton concludes that by 1800, however, democracy had indeed been tamed.

This is an impressive synthetic account of the long American Revolution. Coupling periods that are usually treated as distinctive, Bouton persuasively shows a core of socio-economic concerns among ordinary Pennsylvanians that linked to their concepts of democracy. Equally important, he elucidates an ideology of wealth and power centralization among counter-revolutionaries. Bouton makes a strong case for historians to reexamine what appeared to be local conflicts in the broader context of class struggle. He shows that road closures, no-bid auctions, and regulations were part of a pattern of resistance to the elite's attempts to control the revolution, even if they occurred in different regions and times, and in response to specific policies. Also, the book's rural focus deeply enhances our understanding of revolution in largely agrarian early America and offers a vital rural counterpoint to the literature on revolutionary cities.

While the state-wide focus is useful, it would have been helpful to explore more deeply the reasons for the ultimate failure of ordinary rural men to unite. Bouton states that a lack of communication networks among such people coupled with a cultural divide between "the English-speaking central and western counties from the German-speaking east" explains this failure (p. 256). This is plausible. However, given that there were ethnic Germans and English-speaking peoples living in both regions, other community-based issues may help explain why ordinary people in a given region opposed certain policies. Moreover, enduring cross-class interests may have played a role. Bouton notes the hostility of ordinary rural Pennsylvanians toward Native Americans. A further exploration of these attitudes might reveal desire for territorial expansion as an enduring tie between farmers and elites.

Also, additional analysis of the gentry's "complete about-face" on equalizing wealth and power would be enlightening (p. 60). Given the rapidity of this reversal, one wonders how committed to principles of relative equality they ever were. Certainly, loyalists raised this issue by portraying the revolution as led by self-interested elites who manipulated the people.

The book's most striking implication is that revolutionary Pennsylvania may never have been as egalitarian as historians assume. The counter-revolution was evident before the shift to more hierarchal government in 1787–1790. Bouton shows how politicians who pledged to defend popular views of equality in the state in the 1780s were usually co-opted by the gospel of moneyed men. Ordinary people were largely left to defend their own interests outside of formal government even before the federal constitution. Indeed, this important book forces us to face a grim reality of how the revolution and its aftermath were characterized by a renunciation of the democratic hopes of the many.

GREGORY T. KNOUFF
Keene State College

PATRICK GRIFFIN. *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2007. Pp. 368. $30.00.

Patrick Griffin brackets this arresting narrative with the tale of two monuments. The first is a small stone obelisk in Pike County, Pennsylvania, erected in 1889 to a frontiersman from the area named Tom Quick, who made a vow in 1763 to kill a hundred Indians. He almost did, dying in 1796 with the count at ninety-nine. The monument to Quick's memory, Griffin notes, reflects the nineteenth-century notion that Indian-killers like Quick were essential to the new nation in securing "the triumph of civilization and democratic values over savagery" (p. 6). By the end of the twentieth century, how-

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ever, the vicious racism of Quick's actions seemed more an embarrassing blemish, and in 1997, "unknown assailants destroyed the monument with sledgehammers," thus trying to purge Quick and his ilk from the more reassuring master narrative of the Revolutionary era. The other monument, a bigger bronze statue erected in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1921, commemorates the adventures and achievements of George Rogers Clark, the "Conqueror of the Northwest." Clark also killed Indians, sometimes as viciously as Quick, but he did so as an officer of—and in the name of—the new United States. Still standing, the Clark statue celebrates elite leadership in a more sanitized and socially acceptable version of the frontier roots of the nation's origin. In the pages that connect these two accounts, Griffin tells an often complicated and disturbing story about the relationship between racial attitudes and class antagonism in the era of the American Revolution.

Part of the story seems fairly familiar. Like other scholars of the period, Griffin deals with the many manifestations of Indian-European diplomacy effectively, never trying to oversimplify what can scarcely even be simplified. He notes that policy makers at the top of society, both British officials and their American counterparts, tended at times to take a surprisingly benign view of Indians in the trans-Appalachian West. He offers, for instance, a useful discussion of the stadial theory that emerged from the Scottish Enlightenment and helped provide a reasonable rationale for the Proclamation Line of 1763: the "savage" native people might indeed be prospects for improvement if they could be protected and allowed to become subjects of "civilized" society. American (and especially Virginian) leaders were less inclined to such an optimistic approach, but they too understood that peace beyond the Proclamation Line would further their own interests in land speculation and the profit that stemmed from social stability. When the two Anglo-American antagonists came into armed conflict in the 1770s, they both sought Indians as allies in what they considered a western sideshow to the "real" war in the East. "As long as the region bubbled at acceptable levels of violence," Griffin writes, "it would not divert attention from where it was due" (p. 133).

But what may have seemed an acceptable level of violence for people sitting at conference tables in London or Philadelphia took on a very different cast for people killing each other on the frontier. From the bloody butchery of the Paxton Boys in 1763 on through the bigger battles at the end of the eighteenth century, Griffin gives a recurring (and often horrific) account of the violent encounters, both large and small, that pitted Indian and whites against each other with such destructive ferocity. Any enlightened theories of stadial advance developed by elite leaders easily gave way to unabashed race hatred among white settlers. Indeed, over the course of the Revolutionary era, as Lockean notions gained currency in the East, people in the West found themselves gripped by the Leviathan of a Hobbesian hell. "Racist violence, in other words, was becoming the new basis of society in the West," Griffin grimly concludes, and those leaders who sought to govern the region would have to come to terms with that in their attempts at creating an acceptable social order (p. 154).

More to the point, though, Griffin argues that it was the settlers themselves who began to devise their own notions of social order and, equally important, sovereignty. The more they saw themselves beset on all sides, whether by the violence of Indians or the impotence and indifference of their own officials, the more they developed popular notions of a frontier commonwealth to fill the void left by the absence of effective and supportive authority. During the era of the revolution, "in this world of failed sovereignty," Griffin explains, "the actions of common men and women suggested that they were beginning to claim that any new order established . . . would have to be achieved along the lines that they laid out." There are times, to be sure, when a reader might wish that the claims those actions suggested could be bolstered by a clear declaration in words, and one wonders about the coherence of the commonwealth ideology that Griffin posits among the people of the West. But it does seem to get its best expression in his account of the events commonly known as the Whiskey Rebellion, when the legacies of Indian-hating, anti-authoritarianism, and regional independence came together to create, at least for some common people, "the basis for a western vision, eventually a western society, and now a western nation." That they did not gain independent nationhood is hardly the point. They did gain the attention of the nation's leaders, and with that, a modicum of regional redress.

In the end, Griffin's picture of these common folk on the western frontier may be a bit troubling to those of us—and I do include myself—who still seek to understand the American Revolution as a social movement and, in general, look at history from the bottom up. From that perspective, he notes, "frontier setters matter insofar as they remain victims of elites, resist new class-based forms of domination, contest the market economy, or embody radical principles in the face of conservative backlash." But, he adds, "race hatred places them outside the bounds of the story" (p. 10). Griffin forces us to put them back into the story, and in doing so, to confront the reality—or realities—of the American Revolution as a social movement in which people do not have to be altogether admirable to be meaningful.

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ROBERT M. OWENS. *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2007. Pp. xxx, 311. $34.95.

Thomas Jefferson comes to the twenty-first century as the paragon of liberty—with his image emblazoned on paper money, coinage, and Mount Rushmore, and with

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a Greek revival monument extolling his commitment to freedom and equality in the nation's capital—yet recently scholars have acknowledged that the revered Sage of Monticello also had a dark and unsavory side. He orchestrated a policy of hegemonic territorial aggrandizement willing to go to almost any length to secure Spanish-held territory along the Gulf of Mexico for his empire of liberty. And, as Anthony F. C. Wallace and Bernard W. Sheehan have described, Jefferson's philosophical altruism toward Native Americans did not truly strive for philanthropy and assimilation but rather worked to divest the Indians of their lands. Robert M. Owens's cultural biography vividly demonstrates how William Henry Harrison successfully accomplished Jefferson's ruthless campaign of territorial expansion at the expense of the Native Americans in the region.

Born a Virginian and the son of a signer of the Declaration, Harrison's cultural milieu accepted unquestioningly the superiority of Anglo-American society and the eventual Indian acquiescence to the white man's way of life. Such a transformation would open long coveted and "unused" western lands for American settlement and development and provide Harrison the opportunity to fulfill his social, economic, and political ambitions. While serving as secretary of the Northwest Territory, territorial delegate to Congress, governor of the Indiana Territory, and military leader during the War of 1812, Harrison used dogged and determined negotiation to secure legal title to Indian lands. As territorial governor, he courted, coerced, bribed, and threatened Indians, as well as cultivated jealousy among competing tribes. His use of annual tribute rewarded friendly tribes and chiefs and punished recalcitrant ones. He also tried to limit the introduction of alcohol because it destabilized the frontier, and he attempted to regulate traders operating in the territory. Often traders tempted Indians with trade goods, driving them deeply into debt, and then they demanded large land cessions as payment. Harrison saw no contradiction with the government acquiring land for a mere pittance, but he worried that unsavory traders and speculators attempting to acquire land would destabilize the frontier and foment an Indian war. By tracing the Jeffersonian agent through his federal service, Owens reveals the decisions that Harrison and the Jefferson administration made during the decade prior to the War of 1812 undoubtedly shaped the history of the Midwest, contributed to the beginning of the war, and ultimately laid the groundwork for American expansion into the Far West.

One of the most interesting contributions of this biography is the author's discussion of Harrison's attitude toward slavery in the Indiana Territory. A literal reading of Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude in the lands north of the Ohio River. Yet Northwest Territory Governor Arthur St. Clair, among others, had creatively interpreted this article to prohibit only future importations; slaves in the territory prior to the act remained in bondage as did their progeny. While governor of Indiana, Harrison worked unsuccessfully to secure a ten-year suspension of Article VI, with the idea that the slaves and their progeny from the period in question would remain enslaved. Owens insists that Harrison tried to undermine Article VI because he needed to display his material and social standing, as well as openly display his power over others; for a Virginian "the greatest and most direct demonstration of that power was being a master to slaves" (p. 68). Undoubtedly, Harrison straddled the world of the Virginia planter and that of the frontier entrepreneur striving to improve his quality of life, and in both instances success depended on the profits derived from land worked by slaves. Harrison's voracious personal appetite for western lands and for land speculation unquestionably opened him to harsh public criticism from opponents.

Those seeking a full-length biography of William Henry Harrison will be disappointed. The conclusion offers a sweeping and cursory statement of his War of 1812 and post war career, yet Owens insists that he focused on Harrison's years in Indiana, where he had a much greater impact on American history. Although this assertion is debatable, Harrison's negotiation did carve out most of the present-day state of Indiana. Moreover, this cultural biography ably follows Harrison and the first generation of post-revolutionary Americans as they attempted to realize their vision of progress and expansionism in the lands of the Northwest Territory. In doing so, it places Harrison within the context of his times and offers valuable lessons for understanding American sentiments during the early republic.

GENE ALLEN SMITH
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CARL J. EKBERG. *Stealing Indian Women: Native Slavery in the Illinois Country*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 236. $38.00.

Carl J. Ekberg makes clear in the early pages of this book that he prefers researching civil and religious documents of village inhabitants over those of empire builders, movers and shakers. Building on many years of close research into eighteenth-century Mississippi river towns such as Kaskaskia, Ste. Genevieve, and St. Louis, his study of Indian slavery adds to his considerable scholarship on this sliver of the French colonial world. Ekberg effectively transports the reader into a relatively obscure but important place, where for a time the edges of French, Spanish, and British empires met and overlapped with Native American worlds. He takes us into individual peoples' lives and households and brings out of the shadows the most shadowy of all, Indian slaves. This is a welcome achievement and a compelling read. The book's contribution to the broader issues at stake in the burgeoning and robust scholarship regarding Indian slavery, however, is less clear.

Based on exhaustive research in Illinois and Missouri county courthouses and diocesan records, Ekberg's book has two parts. The first provides a descriptive overview of Indian slavery in the middle Mississippi

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River area. He maintains that although Indians introduced slavery to the French in Canada, the source of Indian slaves in this region came primarily from west of that river. Taken captive in the context of war and raiding, the vast majority of Native Americans who toiled in the Illinois country's French (and eventually Spanish) towns were women and children. Most men either died or fled and thus avoided captivity. Pawnee, Wichita, and other Caddoan-speaking peoples were among those who ended up as slaves, with an occasional Sioux or Chickasaw cropping up in the census records. If the French did not initiate slavery, however, their trade goods probably accelerated the exchange of human beings. Further, French people, including missionaries, demonstrated few scruples about incorporating slave labor into their economies. In fact, the Jesuits at Kaskaskia owned the largest number of Indian and African slaves at mid-century.

The region's rich soil made agriculture the dominant economic activity around Kaskaskia and Ste. Genevieve. As crops moved down the river, black slaves moved up. African slaves soon outnumbered Indian slaves in some places. Ekberg believes most Indian slaves, since they were women, worked primarily in houses, stables, and kitchen gardens and only occasionally labored in the fields. Their other role was as sexual partners for their owners. Sexual relations between French or French Canadian men and Indian women were routine, and a clear relationship existed between slavery and métissage or concubinage. The author found some examples of these relationships sanctified by marriage, once the woman had been manumitted. He discovered far fewer examples of marriage between Indian slaves or between Indian and black slaves. Finally, he concludes that there was considerable freedom of movement on the part of both Indian and black slaves. In spite of this relative freedom, rarely did a slave attempt to flee.

The second part of the book focuses on an intriguing criminal case that involves several Indian slave women (including one named Marianne), a métis or mixed blood hunter named Celadon, and a Spanish corporal posted to Ste. Genevieve. As Ekberg explains, this 1773–1774 episode "provides a striking vignette of just how amorphous structures of class, status, and race were in the colonial community and how frequently and casually red, white, and black persons, some free and some slave, associated with one another in the villages, fields, and wooded hills of the Illinois Country" (p. 113). What began as a cross–Mississippi River party ended in the death (possible murder) of one Indian slave woman and the theft of another. The latter, Marianne, evidently chose to leave the household where she lived and labored, opting for freedom and a life with the hunter, Celadon. But the price was high: she left behind two children. Ekberg unravels the complexities of this case and in the process presents perhaps the most complete portrait of any Indian slave woman in eighteenth-century America. The documents reveal, in fact, "the depths of Marianne's soul, riddled with tragedy . . . and with the paradox that freedom in the wilderness did not assuage her pains but simply bartered old ones for new ones" (p. 183).

The two thick stacks of depositions Ekberg plumbed here do indeed put a human face on Indian slavery. But what more do we learn from this story? Where does this compelling tale, and the detailed research of part one, take us regarding Indian slavery? On this the author disappoints. He ends the book with a nod to John Mack Faragher's thesis about frontiers as places of ethnic and racial inclusion rather than an engagement with the important and pathbreaking literature on Indian slavery. Notable in its absence is the work of scholars such as James F. Brooks and Juliana Barr who write about Indian slavery, and women's roles and experiences, in the southwestern borderlands. Connecting with that work would have given the fascinating story Ekberg tells here greater ballast and significance.

SHERRY L. SMITH
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CYNTHIA CUMFER. *Separate Peoples, One Land: The Minds of Cherokees, Blacks, and Whites on the Tennessee Frontier*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 324. Cloth $59.95, paper $22.50.

Cynthia Cumfer reconstructs the history of three interactive populations on the borderland terrain of Cherokee territory (Tennessee) in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. She points out that while U.S. historians have prominently figured the Rocky Mountain West as a locale where American identity was fashioned, the first West for American settlers, the trans-Appalachian frontier, has been overlooked. Cumfer describes her book as intellectual history and aims to explain the "cognitive" and "ideological" worlds of Euro-Americans, Cherokees, and African Americans. What did the members of these groups think about their lives? What were their core beliefs and values? What were the theoretical and intellectual underpinnings of these beliefs? And how did these mental apparatuses shape interactions among the groups? To answer these ambitious questions across three populations, Cumfer organizes the book into two parts: the first is a description and analysis of white and Cherokee thought processes concerning nationalism and diplomacy, and the second is a chapter-by-chapter discussion of each group's internal values and norms.

Cumfer's overarching argument is that whites, Cherokees, and blacks in this region met one another across a divide of fundamentally different mental orientations. She finds that while Cherokees acted out of a community ethos grounded in the desire for balance and harmony in human relations, Euro-Americans acted out of a community ethos that valued the concept of civilization (intrinsically tied to agriculture and private property ownership) as a means to happiness in life. This difference shaped the proceedings and outcomes of treaty negotiations, and both groups were pushed, although to varying degrees, to accommodate the other.

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When Cherokees realized that whites did not comprehend or respect their practice of holding large swaths of uncultivated land for hunting, they adjusted their treaty negotiation style and retrenched through the formation of a defensive national government. When whites at the federal level perceived that Cherokees understood political relationships through the organizing principle of kinship ties and reciprocal obligations, they adjusted their diplomatic language to include kinship titles and the relational expectations that came along with them, such as the expectation of protection for a weaker family member. Cumfer's analysis of Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall's decisions in the 1831 and 1832 Cherokee Nation cases through this lens is especially enlightening.

At first glance, Cumfer's argument that whites, Cherokees, and blacks held different views of the world rooted in European, indigenous American, and African philosophies seems less than novel. But the real strengths of this book are painstaking research and an incredible eye for detail that lead Cumfer to a host of specific, edifying insights embedded within the chapters. For instance, Cumfer reads not only the text of Cherokee-U.S. treaties but also the surrounding ephemera of notes and minutes. Through this scrupulous approach, she is able to paint a rich picture of the social and cultural contexts of such events, and she also reaches conclusions about the changing state of Cherokee national power, modes of Cherokee self-assertion, and regional town factionalism, which scholars of Cherokee history will find productive for a critical re-thinking of accepted narratives. Cumfer's voracious appetite for drawing together and closely scrutinizing an array of complementary primary documents is a hallmark of the book and places her work in methodological sisterhood with Nancy Shoemaker's *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (2004).

In addition, Cumfer's conclusions about women in the Cherokee nation and frontier settler communities are illuminating. In the Cherokee case, she shows that women acted as diplomats more intensively and for a longer period than has often been realized. She shows, in a similar vein, that white women on the frontier viewed themselves as partners with their husbands, played an important role in family decision making and commercial ventures, and were central to the key aspect of social life in the settlements: weaving a thick web of relational ties.

Cumfer's discussion of the African American community is rather truncated, consisting of only one dedicated chapter in addition to interspersed comments about Cherokee and white attitudes toward slaveholding. Applying Ira Berlin's notion of the pursuit of patronage by the first generation of slaves, Cumfer demonstrates that blacks in Tennessee carefully forged and maintained ties with whites that afforded blacks degrees of autonomy within slavery. The glimpse she gives of black men and women socializing in their masters' kitchens at night, operating taverns, buying silk, and traveling the state as musicians is fascinating, suggestive not only of the ingenuity of enslaved and free blacks but also of the diversity of slavery regimes. Given Cumfer's demonstration of deft and elongated analyses of the Cherokee and white communities, the lack of the same regarding black life is a missed opportunity for the reader.

Often, Cumfer's probing analysis of this dynamic time and place seems more like a behavioral history than the ideational history she set out to write, but the book has much to offer scholars of southern and Native American history. It impressively explores the motivational and ideological back-story of ethno-racial interaction on the early American southwestern frontier and contributes valuable new insights to the inner workings of diverse communities.

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GARY ZELLAR. *African Creeks: Estelvste and the Creek Nation*. (Race and Culture in the American West, number 1.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 343. $34.95.

Gary Zellar's book makes a significant contribution to the growing historiography on black Indians. Zellar gives compelling evidence that African Creeks played prominent roles in economics, politics, and the formation of Creek cultural identity. One of the greatest strengths of the book is Zellar's ability to demonstrate the agency that African Creeks enjoyed in shaping not only their own lives but the history of the Creek Nation. In the colonial period, African Creek slaves helped to clear lands and worked alongside their Indian masters to ensure that the tribe maintained an adequate agricultural base. African Creeks also provided invaluable service as interpreters when white traders and land-hungry settlers began to penetrate Creek lands in the American southeast. As African Creeks began to embrace Christianity, they built churches and spread the Gospel not only among their own communities but within the Creek tribe as a whole. After the forced removal of the Creeks to Indian Territory, African Creeks played an important role in re-establishing a viable Creek economy in the West. When the Civil War broke out, African Creeks became the first black troops to take up arms against the Confederacy as hundreds fled north to Kansas and joined the 1st Indian Home Guard regiment. During the process of Reconstruction in Indian Territory, African Creeks fought in the courts and the Creek legislature to maintain their access to tribal lands, educational opportunities, and political empowerment. As Zellar carefully details, until the massive intrusion of white settlers onto Creek lands and the subsequent formation of the state of Oklahoma, African Creeks were able to enjoy the forty acres and a mule denied blacks elsewhere in the South.

A further strength is the book's careful avoidance of treating whites, blacks, and Indians as homogenous communities with common goals and strategies. What

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is forcefully demonstrated in this book is how deeply divided these groups were along class, cultural, and gender lines. The detailed and nuanced intersection of race, identity, and class presented in this book is a model of historical scholarship. For instance, Zellar demonstrates the tensions that emerged between African Creeks and "state negroes." Far from welcoming African American emigrants from the surrounding southern states, African Creeks saw them as unwanted intruders and sought to maintain their distance from them. For their part, African American emigrants viewed the African Creeks with a mixture of jealousy and contempt. They were dismayed that African Creeks were reluctant to share their "privileged" position within Creek society with the recent arrivals. At times, tensions between the two groups escalated into violence.

Creek Indians were no more united than the black residents of the Creek Nation. In the colonial era, the Creek Nation was ripped apart by civil war during the Red Stick revolt. Factionalism reappeared during the debate over removal. Members of the Treaty Party who negotiated the terms of removal with the United States government were assassinated by opponents of removal. In the Creek Nation in the West, factionalism dissipated for a time, only to reappear during the Civil War as the conflict divided the tribe into groups who supported the Union and those who sought to align themselves with the Confederacy. By the eve of statehood, divisions over the issue of freedmen's rights within the tribe threatened to once again tear the nation asunder. According to Zellar's analysis, the group that maintained the greatest amount of cohesion and ideological consistency was white Americans. Both the United States government and its citizens regarded Indian communal landholding as an impediment to white settlement and an indicator of cultural backwardness. In the late nineteenth century, the Dawes Commission enrolled Creek tribal members and allocated individual plots of land to tribal citizens. "Surplus lands" were then opened up for white settlement. The result was a massive intrusion of white settlers onto former Indian lands, which paved the way for Oklahoma statehood and ended the Creek Nation's tribal government. The white majority that dominated the first state legislature made racial segregation its first order of business to ensure that Oklahoma would be a "white man's country." As a result, the privileged position African Creeks had enjoyed within the Creek Nation disappeared.

Zellar's book gives such a wonderfully detailed history that it is sure to become the definitive account of the African Creek experience. It is also an invaluable contribution to the study of the ambiguities of race in the American West.

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JANE KAMENSKY. *The Exchange Artist: A Tale of High-Flying Speculation and America's First Banking Collapse*. New York: Viking. 2008. Pp. xvii, 442. $29.95.

Early U.S. entrepreneur Andrew Dexter, Jr., and his world spring to life in this riveting tale of speculation and peculation, of creation and destruction, of success and failure. Jane Kamensky's verbal artistry renders the reader barely conscious of the act of reading, creating a flow of images as rich as any high definition movie or television broadcast. Kamensky knows how to turn a phrase, build dramatic suspense, and paint a shimmering word portrait based on painstakingly detailed archival work and careful interpretations of visual sources. The final product, however, is more translucent than transparent, a good yarn rather than a compelling vision of the early republic's economy.

The book is at its best in its depiction of the rise and fall of Dexter and the monstrous edifice he built, the Boston Exchange Coffee House. Eager to make his mark in the world, the young Dexter sought to provide Boston's financial and mercantile elite with a grand space in which to meet, greet, deal, and trade. Of means much too slim to erect the architectural monstrosity of which he dreamed, Dexter took de facto control of several banks, the dubious notes of which he lavished on his suppliers and workers. The neophyte entrepreneur's ambitious project devolved into an outright scam when construction cost overruns and the economic downturn precipitated by Thomas Jefferson's embargo flummoxed Dexter's not-so-carefully laid plans.

Dexter and his fledgling family fled creditors and disgruntled artisans who held reams of his worthless bank notes. From Nova Scotia to upstate New York, Alabama, and Texas, the ne'er-do-well managed to botch every project he touched. He died almost penniless and a widower, his wife an early victim of the family's stint on Alabama's plague-infested frontier. Dexter's Exchange Coffee House was also ill fated, burning to the ground in November 1818 after a decade of largely profitless operation. Both man and edifice lingered for decades in a sort of netherworld between fame and infamy, subjects of remembrances both fond and angry.

Kamensky juxtaposes Dexter's failures against the business and personal successes of Nathan Appleton, his erstwhile friend–turned-foe, yet ultimately considers both men "remarkably similar creatures, their different fates as much the result of chance as of character" (p. 12). Here begins the unraveling of the interpretation underlying Kamensky's nearly perfect prose and learned allusions to Shakespeare (Prospero of *The Tempest*) and the Bible (Tower of Babel in Genesis). Appleton and Dexter were, in fact, vastly different. The former understood business principles like net present value, leverage, cost accounting, and contingency funds while the latter did not. Chance always plays some role in human affairs but over the long haul both men essentially made their own "luck." To miss that point is to misunderstand the nature of economic

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progress, which more often than not rewards the good Appletons and punishes the not-so-dexterous Dexters.

Important technical details also escape Kamensky's grasp, though on balance her words generally evince greater understanding of economic matters than those of most historians of the early national and antebellum periods. She claims, for example, that "Revolutionary-era currencies lingered on as ghosts in Americans' psyches, if not often in their pocketbooks" (p. 17). In fact, what lingered were late colonial coin ratings (e.g., rating the silver dollar at seven shillings sixpence in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, at eight shillings in New York and North Carolina, at five shillings in South Carolina and Georgia, and at six shillings in New England and Virginia), not paper monies. What survived the 1780s and 1790s, in other words, were currencies as units of account or means of reckoning value, not physical exchange media. Kamensky too glibly compares bank-issued notes and government-issued bills of credit instead of contrasting what most contemporaries rightly considered very different forms of money. She also overgeneralizes from Dexter's experience, portraying all financial instruments as ephemeral paper of shaky value when in actuality most were rooted in sound business practices. She says, for example, that money brokers priced "different notes according to secret formulas based on rumors filtered over distance" (p. 53), but economist historians have long since shown that bank notes were usually priced as they should have been, according to prevailing interest rates, transportation costs, and the prevalence of asymmetric information. Overall, Kamensky tends to deprecate markets where her wrath would have been better directed at a political system so weak that it allowed the likes of Dexter to control several banks and other enterprises.

Historians eager to write quality narratives should turn to this book for inspiration, but scholars interested in understanding how early U.S. financial and economic systems functioned should look elsewhere for information.

ROBERT E. WRIGHT
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MARTHA TOMHAVE BLAUVELT. *The Work of the Heart: Young Women and Emotion, 1780–1830.* (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 275. $39.50.

This readable study by Martha Tomhave Blauvelt blends insights derived from the history of emotion and social-constructivist theory with a careful and nuanced reading of the diaries of mostly middle-class white women in the early republic. The material is fascinating, and even though Blauvelt at times cannot resist the temptation to overquote from the rich texts, she manages a crisp, focused narrative that complicates and refines our understanding of how women fashioned selves in the half century after the American Revolution. Her contributions are on two related fronts: emotions history and gender history. She invites the reader to engage her book largely as a foray into the former which has implications for the latter.

Blauvelt maps out the emotional lives of her informants in four social spaces: their situatedness in the middle class, their residency at the Litchfield Female Academy, the terrain of courtship, and their changing "agescape." For girls seeking to establish reputations as refined and sentimental, the middle-class home served as a laboratory to experiment with feeling. Here young women learned to cultivate feelings that would make them suitably female and bring respectability and social approval to themselves and their families. Diary-writing, in this setting as in others, was an exercise that advanced that project on several fronts. It served as a means for analytically and critically reflecting on past social performances of emotion—emotions "theater" for Blauvelt—at the same time that it bred, through the enactment of feeling in writing, precisely the kind of emotionality (one that privileged sentimentality) that was most valued. Moreover, emotional life rendered in prose was a mirror for young women, and one in which they could admire themselves. Blauvelt surmises that young women seem to have done relatively little housework because of the amount of time they invested in reading novels and in writing (although their skill at housework after they were married suggests that they had been well enough trained in it during their girlhoods). Schooled informally in emotion at home, they were taught more pointedly at school about what kinds of feelings they should have, and, especially, pressed to supervise feeling through the application of "reason" to emotional life. Feelings arising from interpersonal frictions and from winning in academic or other competitions were to be submerged under virtue, an amalgam of genteel manners, a republican selflessness, and an ideological commitment to women's collaboration and unity (although Blauvelt offers a few exceptions to this). Students accordingly often found themselves in the predicament of feeling one way and believing they should feel another. That contradiction was not resolved as they grew older and experienced courtship and marriage. Knowing whom to marry required a finely tuned discernment of one's own feelings as well as those of the suitor. Victorian courtship rituals unfolded as a ritual of testing each others' feelings, an exercise meant to avoid getting, as Mary Guion wrote, "blind in love" (p. 109). As young girls matured, became mothers, thickened their bonds with religion and took on roles as overseers of other young women, they learned more of the subtlety, as well as the necessity, of emotional control. The diary writing that shaped young women's emotionality, and in the process constrained in important ways the development of self, proved to be groundwork for the emotional roles the women took on as adults. Among other things, maturity closed for them a window for the expression of anger that had been open for them—a seeming exception to the rules of feeling—for a short while when they were younger.

Central to the structuring of Blauvelt's analysis is the characterization of women's cultivation and practice of

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tightly defined emotional roles as "emotion work." She borrows the term from Arlie Hochschild's study of the emotional training of workplace women in the twentieth century and Hochschild's strongly constructivist theory of emotionality that foregrounded culturally authorized "feeling rules." Although the term "emotion work" represented a groundbreaking perspective on emotionality about twenty-five years ago, in the years since it has been surpassed by more precise and complicated theory that takes more seriously the interplay between cultural commands to feel (or not) and what people actually do feel. The study of desire driven by queer theorists and disciples of French neo-Freudian scholars, as well as by debate in scientific journals that specialize in neuroscience and endocrinology, has led to rethinking the casting of a social hegemon in the role of prime mover-and-shaper of emotion. While Blauvelt's study has much to recommend it, her analysis of the contradictions that women felt, and especially women's struggles with their anger (and lust) would have benefited from a more complex and recent framework of interpretation. This critical note aside, Blauvelt's study is an important addition to the growing body of historical research on emotion in American history. Her insistence that "emotional communities" are crucibles of gender, class, race, economic life, religion, and political ideology, and that in studying them we can uncover connections we previously missed, ought to lead us to embrace the history of emotions regardless of debate about how to approach it.

JOHN CORRIGAN
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HELEN SHEUMAKER. *Love Entwined: The Curious History of Hairwork in America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 250. $45.00.

In this book, Helen Sheumaker documents the arcane history of hairwork in the United States from the end of the eighteenth century until around 1920. The book tells not only of the manipulation of human hair into various cherished objects reflecting the sentimentality of the time, but also of sentimentality itself. To a twenty-first-century reader, generations removed from both the craft and the sentiment that drove it, the subject of the book seems remote and somewhat bizarre, even viscerally objectionable. Today, it is almost impossible to imagine saving combed-out hair or taking clippings in order to painstakingly work it into tidy coils, ropes, beads, flowers, feathers, and festoons placed into jewelry settings to adorn a friend or lover, or even to memorialize a departed loved one. As the author points out, hair is part of a living body, a growing essence of that person. As such, by wearing bits of it, "that severed piece of self," (p. 270), hair was used to symbolize the closeness of friendships, loving couples, and families. A second popular use was to fashion various family members' hair into wreaths of flowers which became typical middle-class household decorations. Although these are the best known hair-crafted reminders from the nineteenth century today, Sheumaker also spends considerable time on albums—autograph, friendship and family, poetry and sentimental verse—that reinforced the sentimentality of the time.

The strength of Sheumaker's book lies in her primary sources. She has been diligent in searching historical societies and museums throughout the country to find esoteric documents, family and personal letters, journals, city and business records, and sentimental scrapbooks of the time. I sense that every mention of hairwork she could find was included here, perhaps to the book's detriment. A little more direction and a little less inclusion might have told a cleaner story. A second strength is the author's documentation of the manufacturing of hairwork. One tends to imagine that the extant objects today were the intricate creations of some loving woman, done in the solitude of her parlor, or at least something she arranged to have done by her local jeweler. Sheumaker disabuses us of this simplistic belief. She does mention the how-tos that were published by magazines such as *Godey's Lady's Book*, but she spends much more time on the professionals who for the most part eked out their livings doing this highly specialized work. Not surprisingly, the peak of the industry came during and after the Civil War, but it fell away with the rise of mass manufacturing and retailing in the latter part of the century.

The book begins with the "Curious Art" itself, then describes its fashioning into "talismans of the heart," its tie to the strong sentimentality of the time, its manufacturing, and its rise and wane. Unfortunately, there is considerable repetition of detail and emphasis throughout. Further, although the eighteenth century is mentioned, it is given short shrift. Perhaps this is because Sheumaker's focus is the United States. Moreover, many memorial pieces of that era were hairwork made into rings and fobs and, often having been arranged for in the wills of the deceased, were handed out to mourners at funerals. This tradition lasted well into the following century, but there is little mention of the tradition in Sheumaker's book.

The author concentrates on the use of hair from the mid-nineteenth century on, when sentimentality was at its height and full-blown fashions mirrored it, but she tends to skim over the earlier forty years of that century, with its more restrained looks. Indeed, she ignores the changes of fashion in the entire period she writes about, even though knowledge of the history of design, and jewelry design in particular, is essential to a clear understanding of the subject. Jewelry, like any other fashion, changes over time. The hair jewelry of the earlier part of the century reflected the light, delicate clothing and styles of that era. As time went on, jewelry got heavier, larger, more impressive, and, in the case of hairwork, more sentimental. By the end of the century, the sentimentality was gone, and so too were the earlier styles that had been fashionable previously. The jewelry after the 1880s became simple adornment rather than anything with deeper meaning. Yet the author shows little understanding of these developments. Indeed, she

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jumps from the 1860s to the 1890s to the 1840s to the 1880s, as if these were interchangeable. A chronology combined with some understanding of the history of jewelry and fashion design and its changes over time would have helped this book enormously, as would have more illustrations.

My reservations aside, this book will shine a new light on a previously hidden aspect of nineteenth-century sentimentality.

PATRICIA CAMPBELL WARNER,
EMERITA
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

JOSHUA R. GREENBERG. *Advocating the Man: Masculinity, Organized Labor, and the Household in New York, 1800–1840*. Electronic book. New York: Columbia University Press. 2006. Site access $195.00, individual title $49.00.

An American workers' movement emerged in the wake of the American Revolution as skilled, white, wage-earning craftsmen organized sometimes strong trade unions in printing, shoemaking, and similar trades. Although these unions established the first, short-lived city federation in 1796, these new kinds of association made their presence explosively felt in 1827–1829. As the political authorities followed the British model and sought to prosecute such bodies, the unions reacted by going into open insurgency, launching the earliest labor parties. As Jacksonian politics and its rhetoric overwhelmed local "workingmen's parties," the various crafts combined for mutual support into city-wide "trades' unions," again corresponding to developments in England. Even as American labor militants launched a "National Trades' Union," a persistent political agitation resulted in the emergence of the "Locofocos" or "Equal Rights Party."

Joshua R. Greenberg took his title from the most persistent and important labor paper in the antebellum movement, George Henry Evans's *Workingman's Advocate*. Cartoons and contemporary graphics supplement his lucid text, arguing for a reconsideration of early New York labor history from the perspective of an emergent masculinity. The author approached the making of a New York working-class experience in terms of the definition and evolution of the working-class household. The collective dimensions of the movement grew from religious and marital imperatives of English-speaking artisans. Workers became preoccupied with securing a living capable of sustaining what they saw as the traditional patriarchal household. Greenburg traces the organizing impulse to this fundamental concern. Anecdotal evidence, based on individual and biographical accounts tend to support his argument. Using the printer Theophilus Eaton and the carpenter Robert Townsend, Greenberg documents the concerns of workingmen about the need for financial security, standing in the community, and social stability. Part of the preoccupation with defending the family, financial security, community standing, and social stability was the old Franklinesque preoccupation about the merits of temperance and thrift.

Having thus set the stage for his key argument, Greenberg discusses the gendered response of the movement of "workingmen" to the exigencies of the marketplace. There, the merchant introduction of the auction system and the emergence of banking generated immense profits without having to produce anything tangible. The rhetoric of Andrew Jackson and the Democratic Party, engaged in its conflict with the Second Bank of the United States, cast the political conflict in terms of unproductive bankers and dandies leeching off the labors of productive workingmen. By implication, this rhetoric pits the righteous craftsmen as the defender of the family, the household, and the rising generation against the greed of unproductive bankers and dandies.

Within the workplace, this conflict took the form of the struggle by labor organizations to sustain the value of craftsmanship. Hired men measured the worth of their masters by whether or not their management of the workplace defended craft skill or devalued it. Hired men battled the introduction of child labor under the thin veneer of an exploitive use of the old apprenticeship system, admitting young boys not to train them in "the art and mystery" of the craft but simply as cheap workers. So, too, the journeymen called the only partially trained products of such a system "half-way" or "two-thirds" men.

Greenberg sees white, adult male exclusivity as a central impetus toward organization and struggle. From this perspective, young boys, unskilled men, convicts, foreign workers, or African Americans defined "the other" as laborers that undercut both the craftsman's standard of living and threatened domestic security. Even more directly, he argues, female workers threatened to turn such a world upside-down, not only by undermining the wages necessary to sustain the household but also by challenging masculinity in the abandonment of that household. From this perspective, the basic elements of trade unionism represented an aid to masculine breadwinning. Its mutual and cooperative features represented efforts to manage the problems of individual illness, accident, and death with strike benefits coming along almost as an afterthought.

So, too, for all the superficial radicalism of the Workingmen's Party, a closer look reveals more concern about the preservation of masculinity. The New York movement shattered into three fragments. The most radical, led by Thomas Skidmore, aimed at the redistribution of wealth through an agrarian "patrimony" that would place capital, in one form or another, in the hands of everyone reaching the age of maturity. George Henry Evans and others formed a more polyglot current largely interested in promoting public education and were more drawn to the Jacksonians. Finally, a faction oriented to the National Republicans or Whigs used rhetoric in defense of business development, the

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family, and religion. All, argues Greenberg, reflect a fundamental defense of masculinity.

Greenberg's arguments would be more persuasive if informed by a more critical examination of the voluminous sources the movement of the 1820s and 1830s generated. Perhaps no book-length look at the "Workies" has discussed less about the Owenite Scotswoman Frances Wright than this study of gender in the movement. Wright worked alongside Evans, John Windt, and other Workies, promoting their cause and, in turn, being admired and supported by them. However, as this study approaches the subject of "Fanny Wright men," the subject changes from the beliefs and values of the movement that appreciated her to how their enemies and social betters used the term to taunt them.

Greenberg's assertion of "a culture of worker misogyny" among the Workingmen's movement is not tied to primary sources but to "studies of gender and work" by other scholars whose interests were generally on broader sections of the work force. Surely, one key argument for this misogyny—the exclusion of females from the workplace—reflected primarily a gendered (and ethnic) stratification of labor by the owners rather than a matter primarily in the hands of workingmen. So, too, the subjects of this study certainly used "specific gendered terms"—and other language that seemed to exclude non-whites or the young—because the gendered and ethnic stratification of labor were part of the social order that shaped language as the household structure.

While Skidmore expressed his plan for a "patrimony" in gendered language, his proposed redistribution of property was to accord equal proportions to women and non-whites as well as skilled white craftsmen. So, too, when Evans advocated the right to organize and, later, the right to land, he explicitly included everyone. Clearly, the use of gendered language could represent a serious attempt to redress the injustices of gender.

Greenberg misunderstands the Typographical Society clash with Robert Dale Owen over women's rights and birth control as expressing representative views of a labor organization. It is worth noting that the mastermind of this conflict, Adoniram Chandler, seems most likely to have been attempting to damage the Democratic Party toward which Owen was leaning. None of the dozens of other labor organizations in the city thought the issue worth taking a position. Moreover, not only was the Typographical Society itself not a trade union, but the conflict moved the admirers of Owen—Windt and other "Fanny Wright men"—in the printing trade to take measures to establish a union in the craft. That women organized in this period with the active support of workingmen is also neglected. Even within a gendered terminology, the issues being raised might represent an impulse quite different than misogyny.

Greenberg's fascinating and provocative new look at the subject will encourage further exploration. The more scholars focus on this subject, the better we will come to understand the rich complexity and diversity of working-class life and language.

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DANIEL WALKER HOWE. *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848.* (The Oxford History of the United States.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 888. $35.00.

Daniel Walker Howe won the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for history for this intricately detailed and sonorously written account of the dramatic changes that swept antebellum America, spurred by the era's remarkable developments in transportation and communication. Invoking Samuel F. B. Morse's resonant telegraph message, Howe's title points beyond technology to religion, particularly to the soaring reform aspirations inspired by the Second Great Awakening. In a striking departure from earlier retellings of this oft-told story, he explicitly rejects the polarizing figure of Andrew Jackson, as well as his followers' supposed struggle for democracy, as the dominant forces of the age.

The political contests of post-1815 America are hard to ignore, of course, and Howe gives full attention to the misnamed "Era of Good Feelings," to Jackson's path to the White House, to the raging policy battles of his administration, to the rise of political parties, and to the struggle for continental expansion. But with the exception of Jackson's victory over nullification, Howe can find little to praise or even defend about "Jacksonian Democracy." For him, Indian Removal and the defense of slavery were the core objectives of Jackson's movement, and "white supremacy, resolute and explicit, constituted an essential component of what contemporaries called 'the Democracy'—that is, the Democratic Party" (p. 423). With isolated exceptions like the Dorr War and the early labor movement, he finds no serious struggle over white male democracy in antebellum America, or any meaningful debate over economic power triggered by a so-called "Market Revolution." In his telling, the rights of white men and the benefits of economic development were widely accepted on all sides. Howe occasionally admits that some Americans had mixed feelings about the economic changes of their times, and acknowledges that Whigs and Democrats were divided by "rival visions of the national destiny" (p. 582), but he mostly emphasizes that Americans shared the same fundamental objectives and only differed over details like the legitimacy of government intervention in the economy and the relative priority of agriculture and urban development.

In place of Jacksonian Democrats, Howe's clear favorites are the reformers and visionaries—white and black, male and female, and almost exclusively Whig—who campaigned for a New Jerusalem in the young republic. He anchors the political dimensions of their movement in the ambitious plans of National Republicans like John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, formulated in the decade after 1815. Carefully explaining

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the difference between pre- and postmillennialism, he grounds the culture of reform in the utopian fervor of the Second Great Awakening and its secular manifestations in antislavery, benevolent reform, women's rights, and literary renaissance. Building on his earlier scholarship, Howe brings these political and cultural movements together in the rise of the Whig Party, first as a reaction against the abuses of Jackson, then as a vehicle for "political postmillennialism" (p. 580), and finally as "the party of America's future," cheated of contemporary success by the "cruel fate" and "appalling blunder" that replaced William Henry Harrison with John Tyler (pp. 611–612).

Historians commonly reply to their predecessors. To an unusual extent, Howe has shaped his argument as an explicit rejoinder to two other recent syntheses, Charles Sellers's *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846* (1991) and Sean Wilentz's *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (2005). Behind these loom a host of still older historians of "Jacksonian Democracy," from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., back to George Bancroft. Where Sellers concluded that "democracy was born in tension with capitalism" (Sellers, p. 32), Howe insists that "economic development did not undercut American democracy but broadened and enhanced it" (pp. 850–851). Whereas Wilentz gives primacy to politics itself, and focuses on what he calls "the most profound political transformation in modern history: the triumph of popular government" (Wilentz, p. 4), Howe insists that "some of the most important debates of the period did not take place within the arena of politics" at all (p. 851). In other words, and perhaps inevitably, a partisan age has generated its own partisan historiography.

Howe makes a masterful case for his chosen heroes and their point of view. His sonorous voice and polished phrases carry shrewd insight, as when he describes the reformers' optimistic dreams for a better world, the contrasting worldviews of Whigs and Democrats, the brutal hypocrisy of Indian Removal, and the multiple meanings of the Seneca Falls women's rights convention of 1848. Other specialists will probably complain, however, that Howe occasionally stumbles in his eagerness to deny the Jacksonians their pride of place. Reluctant to acknowledge the Democrats' sincerity, he denies, then admits, then minimizes how party differences indeed derived from differences in voters' principles and social circumstances. Questioning the centrality of politics, he still allows party battles to dominate his pages. His stress on the communications revolution befits his emphasis on culture but comes through more clearly in the opening chapter than in the body of the narrative.

Honoring the enemies of slavery, the champions of women's rights, and the defenders of civil liberties, Howe brilliantly paints the cultural ancestors of modern liberals but cannot fully account for their failures, or the appeal of their opponents. Undeniable as it was, racism alone cannot suffice, and calling reformers "the party of the future" is unsatisfactory as well. In brief, how can Howe write a whig history of the era when his Whigs lost most of the elections? Like them or not, we must still come to terms with the Whigs' maddening yet unavoidable adversaries, the often-elusive Jacksonians.

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PHILIP F. GURA. *American Transcendentalism: A History*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2007. Pp. xv, 365. $27.50.

There are so many things to like about Philip F. Gura's most recent book that it is hard to know just where to begin. Gura, who is widely recognized among Americanists for his lively and expansive scholarly interests (in the past decade he has published books on the American banjo, the Massachusetts State Prison, and the eighteenth-century divine Jonathan Edwards), has now given us a comprehensive, deeply informed, and briskly narrated history of American Transcendentalism that will be regarded for many years to come as the definitive examination of the subject.

Transcendentalism was first and foremost a religious phenomenon, and that is exactly where Gura begins his study. "The intellectual genealogy of Transcendentalism," Gura notes, "began in early nineteenth-century New England among clergymen caught up in unresolved theological battles initiated more than half a century earlier" (p. 23). Those early nineteenth-century battles were between conservative Trinitarians and liberal Unitarians. Gura provides a lively and detailed account of how these struggles played out, reminding us, along the way, that the feisty Andrews Norton—who soon enough would be sneered at by Transcendentalists for his religious dogmatism—was one of the earliest and foremost liberal spokesmen of Unitarianism. After William Ellery Channing's sermon "Unitarian Christianity" (1819) was roundly attacked by Moses Stuart and his conservative colleagues at the Andover Theological Seminary, it was Norton who jumped to Channing's defense.

The "intellectual genealogy of Transcendentalism" was also greatly indebted, of course, to foreign sources. Readers will find the early chapter, "Reinvigorating a Faith," in which Gura carefully traces the influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Emanuel Swedenborg, and numerous German and French theologians and philosophers, one of the most succinct treatments anywhere of this important aspect of American Transcendentalism.

The development of the Transcendental "movement" was punctuated by several memorable and dramatic incidents, and Gura recounts all of these in lively detail. Whether it is the controversy over the authority of miracles, Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Divinity School Address," or the hard-hitting Orestes Brownson threatening revolution if the wrongs of "The Laboring Classes" were not redressed, the irrepressible Theodore Parker going head-to-head with the American Unitarian Association over his explosive sermon, "A

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Discourse of the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" (1841), Gura provides such rich context for these and other familiar Transcendental "moments" that the reader is happy to review them all over again.

In his chapter "Centripetal Forces and Centrifugal Motion" Gura discusses some of the "projects that bound Transcendentalists in a common purpose" (p. 136), such as George Ripley's *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature* (1838–1842), a fourteen-volume series of translations of prominent German and French philosophers, Margaret Fuller's celebrated series of "Conversations," and Elizabeth Palmer Peabody's foreign-language bookstore on West Street in Boston that served as a "salon for the city's intelligentsia." The best that the Transcendentalists ever managed to do, however, was to agree to disagree, and Gura makes very clear how Transcendentalism had already become "a many-headed Hydra" (p. 122) by the early 1840s. He chronicles in telling detail the many different activities that contributed to the fracture—from early disagreements over the import of German and French thinkers, to Brownson's steady disaffection among proponents of the "Newness" for his strident economic and political views, to Ripley's embrace of a social egalitarianism that required him to resign his ministry and launch (without the support of any of his more prominent Unitarian colleagues) the utopian Brook Farm community. The difference between those like Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott who believed that the imperative of Transcendentalism was individual sovereignty, and those like Ripley, Brownson, Parker, and the later Fuller, who believed that the imperative was social amelioration through institutional change, is vividly dramatized in the chapter "Self and Society," as Gura alternately points and counterpoints the activities of Emerson, Parker, Thoreau, and Fuller.

Histories of American Transcendentalism invariably end at the Civil War. Gura, too, includes a chapter on the 1850s and the "curse of slavery" in which he tracks the activities of Emerson and Thoreau, and, often less well publicized, of Parker. Parker died in 1860 and Thoreau in 1862, but the influence of Transcendentalism was still palpable into the twentieth century. Gura thus devotes the final chapters of his book to the "inheritors" of the Transcendentalists—second generation Transcendentalists who, in different ways, promulgated the religious and philosophical principles of the antebellum Transcendentalists.

To be sure, the contours of the intellectual and philosophical battles in the postbellum period were often different from those waged in the 1830s. In one very fundamental respect, however, the struggle was no different at all: it pitted materialists against idealists. The "most unusual group" of idealists emerged in the 1850s in Cincinnati and St. Louis, united in their admiration for the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. Another postbellum group of radical Unitarians formally organized in 1867 as the Free Religious Association. Many of the names associated with the St. Louis Hegelians and the Free Religious Association are very familiar to students of Transcendentalism, such as Cyrus Bartol, O. B. Frothingham, and Caroline Healey Dall. Together, they "kept alive a dream of a common humanity based in the irreducible equality of all souls" (p. 271). Gura's attention to these and other like-minded individuals and organizations sets his examination apart from all other histories of American Transcendentalism.

STERLING F. DELANO
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RYAN P. JORDAN. *Slavery and the Meetinghouse: The Quakers and the Abolitionist Dilemma, 1820–1865.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 175. $29.95.

This book examines why, given Quaker antislavery beliefs, the majority of Quakers did not support the campaign for immediate emancipation. The result is a thoughtful and provocative study of the limits of religious liberty and the tension between individual conscience and organizational cohesion. While closely focused on one society and the antislavery movement, the book raises questions about religious pluralism generally, both within a given religious society and in the nation at large.

In the opening chapter, Ryan P. Jordan recounts the early nineteenth-century divisions within the Society of Friends, particularly the Hicksite challenge to Quakers involved in reform organizations. Hicksites feared both evangelical contamination of Quakerism and a link between religion and the state. As antislavery activism reached its height in the South and moved north, Quakers were already preoccupied with issues of denominational unity and the boundaries that should be set on individual conscience. The book's only international content is an examination of British and American Quakers' debates in this period over the feasibility of eliminating slavery in America.

Jordan's early focus on Quakers in southern states is a welcome reminder that antislavery efforts were far more active in the South than in the North prior to 1830. Both Quakers and antislavery sentiment migrated north as southern legislators made it increasingly difficult for both to survive in the former strongholds of Virginia and North Carolina. Northern Quakers entered the 1830s having already been defeated in their efforts to convince their neighbors to emancipate their slaves. This early failure, and its cost, helps to explain their general unwillingness to try again.

The question of which should take priority—one's responsibilities to the state or one's religious beliefs—was central to the Quaker debates. Those less willing to rock the national boat suggested that Quaker pacifism and antislavery beliefs should be applied, quietly, to Quakers and not to others. More activist Quakers felt their theological beliefs had to be translated into political action. The question of the line between church and state was thus central to the debate.

Quaker leaders, like many other Christians and pol-

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iticians, differed on whether a higher value should be place on respect for diversity of opinion and slow conversion of minds, or on immediate action to eliminate the sin of slaveholding. The question was one of timing, but also one of style. While some Quakers were energized by William Lloyd Garrison's division of the world into those who supported slavery and those who opposed it, most Quakers were appalled. Such an antagonistic, fiery, and radical approach violently contrasted with Quakers' pacifism. The irony is that Garrison professed to support pacifism and promoted many Peace Societies, but orthodox Quakers felt his style completely undermined the substance of his arguments. Jordan's book is thus a useful contribution to the continuing debate over means versus ends in antislavery studies.

The book's analysis of the creation of Antislavery Friends' communities in Indiana is a major contribution, highlighting the strength of antislavery values in the Midwest as well as the spreading conflict between moral suasion and political action. Other chapters examine the question of the Negro pew and Quaker commitments to racial equality, the creation of Progressive or Congregational Friends (with a focus on women's equality), and the issue of civil disobedience or "disunionism." Each chapter stresses the tension between individual conscience and the harmony of a community. Liberty of conscience had strict limits defined by the security of the community and the nation. This book makes clear that Quakers faced sharp division over the question of liberty versus union prior to the rest of the nation.

This excellent book includes only a brief discussion of gender in Quaker theology and practice. Orthodox and Hicksite Quakers both argued that politics and religion should be "separate spheres"; the radical "come-outers" who saw the two as fundamentally intermixed were the only ones to support more equal rights for women. Orthodox Quakers' focus on living "peaceable and quiet lives" left them exiled from the two manly activities of the nineteenth century, politics and war, which became a major challenge as the Civil War approached. Quaker support of the free produce movement, through which slavery would be undermined by domestic decisions within the home, highlighted women's central role as the primary purchasers of household goods.

Jordan is clearly supportive of the radical minority that opposed slavery. Yet he recognizes the deep personal and institutional price that opposition took on individuals and communities. At its heart, this book is an explanation of why an organization that believed in pacifism and the presence of God in every human person could be so resistant to the (ultimately) righteous view that slavery needed to be immediately abolished. The book succeeds admirably in portraying the conservative majority's need to preserve harmony, while never accepting it as the right decision.

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SCOTT GAC. *Singing for Freedom: The Hutchinson Family Singers and the Nineteenth-Century Culture of Reform*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 312. $45.00.

In this book, Scott Gac offers a fresh, insightful, and persuasive account of a surprisingly overlooked component of the antebellum reform movement: the Hutchinson Family Singers, arguably the most popular musical troupe of its day. Gac's book is a powerful study of antebellum "music, careerism, reform," the history of religion, communication networks, nineteenth-century consumerism, "and the transformation of American culture" (p. 18).

The Hutchinson Family Singers distinguished themselves in several ways. In their songs, they preached morality at a time when musical entertainment was often considered a dubious medium for communicating moral judgments; they anchored their musical style firmly in an American idiom when home-grown talent was considered inferior to that of European performers; and they managed to blend church hymns and blackface minstrelsy, adding their own lyrics, altering tempos, and harmonizing chorus refrains in ways that were genuinely new and innovative. By the 1840s, the Hutchinson Family Singers were, by any standards, famous, and they were to become even more so as they transformed themselves from largely backwoods and church-trained singers into powerful voices, literally and figuratively, for antebellum reform.

More broadly, the Hutchinson Family Singers intervened in critical political issues, especially regarding slavery and, early in their career, temperance. Yes, says Gac, the family made money from their endeavors, but, he argues, they frequently reallocated a good deal of what they made directly into progressive causes, notably the antislavery movement. The Hutchinsons were, in Gac's view, thoroughly authentic in their commitment to the elimination of racial prejudice, and their performances did much to maintain the profile of the antislavery cause. The Singers also drew on revivalism for their inspiration, were instrumental in selling sacred music, and elaborated not only the meaning of revivalism but also disseminated it to a growing body of antebellum consumers (a point that scholars of American popular music have oddly overlooked). Although the Singers were not without their detractors—anti-abolition mobs disrupted their performances—their music traveled well and found considerable support in Britain especially.

Gac does a wonderful job of proving all of these points in appealing prose and with compelling evidence. His history of the Hutchinson Family Singers also suggests that we should pause before accepting too readily some cherished historiographical "truths." For example, Gac shows that history of the Singers exposes the "frailty" of constructions touting the "linear narrative of white musicians' theft of 'everything but the burden' from black artists" during the antebellum period (p. 7). While Gac is fully aware that southern (and

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some northern) criticism of the Singers exposes "the limits of reform in song" (p. 194), he shows, successfully, that songs and music shaped politics in profoundly important ways, not simply in the context of elections but in the larger sense of helping generate cultural sympathy for the most pressing political causes—antislavery and abolitionism—of the day.

Although Gac helpfully engages a good deal of American historiography, he is less successful in entering into meaningful dialogue with a slew of work, written mainly by non-Americanists, concerning the nature and meaning of aurality and the social and cultural function not just of music but of acoustemology generally. Jacques Attali's work on the political economy of music and its production and its reception, for example, begs for comparison. After all, as Gac shows, a good deal of the appeal of the family's music was its emotional power, its ability to inspire listeners, both of which translated often into resolutely political behavior, exactly the sort of indexing Attali attempted to establish in his work.

More than that, Gac neglects to articulate his study with the few works on the history of sound written by scholars of the American experience. Richard Rath, Peter Hoffer, Shane White, and Graham White have all written helpfully about the role of sounds generally—musical and otherwise—in shaping the experience of a variety of Americans and some engagement with this work would have been welcome. In short, Gac's focus on music as the *sine qua non* of "sound" occludes the plurality of sounds available to listeners and producers in the context of antebellum reform. Not all sound was musical or vocal, and Gac could have offered us a richer aural tapestry by placing the sounds generated by the Singers—and consumed by their audiences—into a larger context of antebellum soundscapes.

Yet, on its own terms, this is a beautifully contextualized study, one that not only helps us make sense of the Hutchison Family Singers themselves but, more importantly, broadens our understanding of reform in antebellum America generally. Gac's intervention in such an important field of scholarly inquiry demands as much scholarly applause as contemporaries frequently offered the Hutchinson Family Singers.

Mark M. Smith
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Yonatan Eyal. *The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828–1861*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 252. $75.00.

This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of antebellum political party development, particularly of the Democrats; and for some time it will likely be an important resource for information about the lives and political activities of the still-underappreciated New Democrats of the Young America Movement. Rethinking the relationship between Democrats and the market revolution, Yonatan Eyal argues for splitting the antebellum period in two. Whereas scholars have traditionally seen Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren as champions of subsistence farmers and artisans who were skeptical of the market revolution and federal government power, Eyal draws a sharp distinction, noting that "Young America's imprint moved the Democratic organization closer toward the Whig line of thinking, accepting economic growth and American nationalism to a degree that would have seemed alien to many of the party's founders. During the 1840s and 1850s, the Democracy began to leave behind much of its outmoded ideology of agrarian solidity and republican virtue, coming to terms with market growth, technological invention, entrepreneurial opportunity, and other aspects of what contemporaries considered the modern world" (p. 2). Beginning with the ascendancy of James K. Polk in 1844, Eyal sees Young America as the dominant Democratic Party voice. This is the book's primary contention, and it is convincing.

Eyal's contribution here is to pay almost exclusive attention to political as opposed to cultural, intellectual, or even economic dimensions of the Young America Movement. He tells us about the machinations of Samuel Tilden, George Bancroft, James K. Polk, Sidney Breese, John Quitman, Robert Walker, James Shields, George Sanders, John L. O'Sullivan, John Wentworth, Pierre Soulé and many other New Democrats, prominent and not so prominent. Eyal argues that these New Democrats helped reunite the party after the Barnburner and Free Soil revolts by concentrating energy on territorial expansion and war with Mexico. If the United States only expanded enough, there would be plenty of land for both Northern free-soilers and Southern planters.

Eyal argues that by concentrating on expansion, New Democrats managed to delay the effects of sectional animosities that destroyed or helped destroy the Whigs and Know-Nothings earlier. "Because voters and activists could unite around the values defining Pierce's candidacy—expansion, commercial growth, American empire—bitter disputes remained contained for several more years" (p. 215). This may be too kind. Predictably enough, disputes arose over slavery in the newly acquired territories. Eyal lays special stress on the presence of free-soilers in Young America, but the interpretation lies rather close to hand that the rabid expansionism of Young America, untempered in the least by qualms about slavery or international law, led to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and if anything, helped bring on the Civil War.

Eyal's explanation that New Democrats made the move toward support for internal improvements in response to "bottom-up pressure" (p. 15) seems plausible. Particularly in Illinois, it makes sense to see Stephen A. Douglas, Shields, and Breese as responding to perceived social needs in the Old Northwest by promoting railroads and canals. Nevertheless, Eyal never really demonstrates that his relatively elite protagonists made this shift under pressure from constituents. There may be more to this story; Young American enthusiasm

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for the world market economy was so heartfelt and rhapsodic, one suspects these particular Democrats never doubted the utility of market expansion for a second.

On this point, the book would be richer had Eyal situated his argument more thoroughly in recent historiography. For instance he states that "although historians have long recognized that certain types of reform touched the imaginations of Jacksonian Democrats, most have sustained the dominant view that the antebellum reform was a Whig-evangelical tradition" (p. 34). Here Eyal cites only Arthur M. Schlesinger's *Age of Jackson* (1971). One would have liked him to situate his arguments in the context of existing debates among Daniel Walker Howe, Charles Sellers, John Ashworth, Sean Wilentz, and especially Daniel Feller.

Given his contention that New Democrats had essentially become Whigs on issues related to the use of federal power in promoting economic expansion, Eyal has difficulty explaining why in fact these renegades did not simply join the Whig Party. "The Young America Democracy served as a 'half-way' house between older agrarian Democratic ideas and the new nationalist spirit of the Republicans" (p. 13). Eyal helps us understand how some New Democrats eventually ended up in the Republican fold, but if Young Democrats and Young Whigs really were that similar, one wonders why Abraham Lincoln and Douglas did not see it that way. If anything, Whigs like Lincoln were marginally more restrained about technological innovation and market expansion than Young America Democrats. Explaining this may require an even more thorough-going revision than Eyal offers here. Eyal has called our attention to an important historiographical problem and helped us along the way, but one suspects this will not be the last word.

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HAROLD HOLZER and SARA VAUGHN GABBARD, editors. *Lincoln and Freedom: Slavery, Emancipation, and the Thirteenth Amendment*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, with the Lincoln Museum, Fort Wayne, Ind. 2007. Pp. viii, 271. $34.95.

This attractive volume contains a collection of essays issued by the Lincoln Museum of Fort Wayne, Indiana, in tribute to the upcoming bicentennial celebration of Abraham Lincoln's birth in 2009. Among the museum's artifacts and memorabilia are two prized possessions: a rare copy of the Emancipation Proclamation, and an original Senate copy of the Thirteenth Amendment, both bearing Lincoln's signature. As Harold Holzer explains, the president's signature was not required on the latter measure—indeed the Senate passed a resolution soon thereafter repudiating the president's act of signing it as constitutionally unnecessary. By inscribing his name on the document, Lincoln wished to indicate to posterity his instrumental role in giving birth to this constitutional revolution and pushing it through Congress. In large part, this volume assesses Lincoln's own claim to historical agency in the constitutional demise of slavery. It also provides a useful review of the latest scholarship regarding Lincoln's stewardship of the journey from the reckless effort by the Supreme Court in 1857 to dig a constitutional trench around slavery in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* to the final triumph over slavery—not in 1863, but with the Constitutional Amendment of 1865.

These crisp fifteen essays, which are kept handily brief in length, come from an impressive batting order of top scholars and public historians: James Oliver Horton, Joseph Fornieri, Phillip Shaw Paludan, Lucas Morel, Allen C. Guelzo, Matthew Pinkster, Hans Trefousse, John Marszalek, Ronald C. White, David E. Long, Herman Belz, Michael Vorenberg, Ron J. Keller, Frank J. Williams, and co-editor Harold Holzer. None of the essays contributes new knowledge to the scholarship about Lincoln or the evolution of emancipation, with the possible exception of Pinkster's penetrating investigation into exactly where and when Lincoln wrote the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (he discards oft-repeated discreditable tales that came after the fact and makes a strong case for the deed occurring Sunday, July 20, 1862, at the White House). These essays do, however, provide concise summaries of the conclusions reached in the most important books on these subjects, such as Vorenberg's *Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment* (2001) and Guelzo's *Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America* (2004), and are laced throughout with lively observations and thought-provoking insights.

A general consensus seems to exist among the contributors that Lincoln should be given a great deal of credit for developing a legal and constitutional rationale for emancipation, for cunningly employing a war measure as a means by which the antislavery democratic principles buried within the constitution could be redeemed from its compromises with slavery, and for making certain that the constitution was permanently altered to prohibit slavery forever. A constitutional amendment, as Belz points out, was by no means the only course of action, nor was it an unproblematic one, but it was the course Lincoln most preferred. No one worked more tirelessly behind the scenes for its success than did Lincoln, according to Vorenberg and Keller. For instance, Lincoln, eyeing the ratification process ahead, adamantly desired that the amendment receive Congressional approval during the Thirty-Eighth Congress's lame-duck winter of 1864–1865. He hoped that its passage, before the Republican-dominated Thirty-Ninth Congress began its session, would strengthen its claim of bipartisan support. Leaving little to chance, it seems that Lincoln deserved the credit he sought for the Thirteenth Amendment.

There are very few notes of scholarly discord or debate acknowledged directly in this volume. When Horton casually notes that "like most white people of his day, Lincoln assumed and accepted white supremacy as

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a part of the natural order" (p. 13), it comes as a jarring observation among a group of essays that generally celebrate Lincoln's determination to use federal constitutional powers to limit, weaken, and finally end slavery. Of course, the question of racial equality is a different issue. Yet aside from Horton's lead essay, which sets the historical and social context, Lincoln's racial views are unexplored. Marszalek's essay on the role of the United States Colored Troops ought to have raised at least the well-worn controversy about the relative agency of black Americans, who, as some scholars assert, forced the issue of emancipation on Lincoln. According to that view, Lincoln might be depicted as reacting to events more than shaping and guiding them to his design. Yet Marszalek describes Lincoln's slow embrace of emancipation and black soldiers as a grand strategy—"The president's deliberate approach had worked," he declares (p. 125)—thus giving Lincoln the benefit of the doubt that the end result is what he had been working toward all along.

Finally, a few highlights of the volume not yet mentioned include Fornieri's lively analysis of Lincoln's response to *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1856); White's essay on Lincoln's rhetoric that invites us to speak Lincoln's words aloud; and Holzer's satisfying closing essay that surveys the iconography of emancipation and Lincoln's place within it.

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Earl J. Hess. *Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 313. $39.95.

The Overland Campaign of 1864 brought a new kind of combat to the American Civil War. Instead of armies maneuvering in search of decisive battle, followed by a period of resting and refitting, the confrontation between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee evolved into a series of clashes that lasted nearly seven weeks, with the armies shifting from just below the Rapidan River all the way to the James River and beyond. One of the most prominent features of the campaign was the widespread use of field fortifications. In this volume, which covers the period from the opening of the campaign to the stalemate at Cold Harbor, Earl J. Hess offers the most detailed explanation yet of the evolution of trench warfare during the war in Virginia.

As Hess convincingly demonstrates, the use of field fortifications underwent a fundamental shift during the Overland Campaign, although he adds that it would be a mistake to conclude that soldiers on both sides had never before constructed fieldworks. What was different was the increased role of entrenchment in battlefield operations. No sooner had either army taken up position than it started to fortify in anticipation of future combat. Much has been made of Lee's use of fortifications prior to the Seven Days to allow him to thin out his defensive lines in order to mass troops for offensive operations; Hess argues that Grant employed the same approach in the spring of 1864. The continuous contact between the two armies, especially at Spotsylvania, eroded the combat effectiveness of both armies, although the damage was more evident in the Army of the Potomac because of Grant's commitment to offensive operations. After the disastrous assault of June 3 at Cold Harbor, Grant commenced employing siege techniques for a week as he made preparations to swing southward once more, this time by crossing the James River.

Hess's narrative is informed by extensive documentary research as well as visits to the battlefields in question. Anyone who walks these battle sites will come across the remnants of entrenchments, some of which are fairly well preserved. These visits are in their way as essential to understanding what happened as any documentary record, for the ground itself is a text to be viewed, understood, and interpreted. Once one engages in such fieldwork, one wonders how anyone can undertake a competent and informed campaign or battle study without it. Hess carefully documents his findings with sketches as well as photographs, providing a visual record to assist anyone who decides to journey to these battlefields. Preserving them in its way becomes as important as preserving other forms of evidence.

The work of Gordon Rhea, Mark Grimsley, and Hess, to name but three scholars, offers a compelling reappraisal of the Overland Campaign. Recent work reevaluating numbers and losses reveals that timeworn notions of mindless assaults, epitomized by the now completely discredited notion that the Union assault on the morning of June 3 resulted in cutting down 7,000 men in an hour or less, should be set aside in favor of a more thoughtful assessment of the campaign. But old myths die hard, even among some professional historians. Nor should this be of concern to military historians alone. Certain understandings of the Civil War attribute Union victory to the continuous funneling of superior numbers into a meat grinder operated by a mindless butcher. Undermining that interpretation is in its way as important as questioning whether the war was about slavery, economics, or state rights. In truth, Grant's conduct of operations during this campaign, although far from flawless, demonstrated his willingness to use maneuver as well as assault in battling the Confederates, while Lee's dogged defense benefited from good fortune as well as skill. The Union commander succeeded in seizing and retaining the initiative: if this came at a high price in terms of battlefield losses, he also inflicted heavy losses on a foe that was no longer able to replace those losses without stretching thin Confederate resources elsewhere. It is perhaps Hess's most important point that field fortifications contributed as much to offensive as defensive operations. However, he also points out that Grant did not fully comprehend how fieldworks functioned in the campaign, and one might point out that Grant's failure to achieve the de-

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cisive victory that many northerners expected contributed to public war-weariness, as did those casualty lists.

This book is a welcome contribution to the ongoing reassessment of how both the Union and Confederacy waged war. It is also an example of how the findings of serious military history may have implications beyond battle and campaign studies.

BROOKS D. SIMPSON
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CHRIS GREEN, RACHEL RUBIN, and JAMES SMETHURST, editors. *Radicalism in the South since Reconstruction.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2006. Pp. viii, 274. $69.95.

The essays in this collection come from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and broach a range of topics and time periods that fall under the broad umbrella of "southern radicalism." The editors impose little on the individual pieces of the collection—including not insisting on consistency in such issues as capitalization of "south"—choosing instead to let the differences between the articles attest to the richness of the subject. The goal of the project, largely achieved, is to demonstrate that radicalism was not just present in the South since Reconstruction but has been and should remain an intricate part of the region, a core piece of its identity and not the outlier that it has so often been thought to be.

Choosing to define "radical" as people and organizations "working to restructure . . . the relations of power," this collection covers traditional political and social organizing as well as music, poetry, and the arts (p. 8). The editors have included pieces that range from the earliest African American challenges to disfranchisement in the nineteenth century and racism in the late twentieth century (Shawn Leigh Alexander and Bill Strickland), to anarchist and communist organizers (Bruce E. Baker and James J. Lorence), to essays on music, literature, and theaters in twentieth-century movements for social change (Ronald D. Cohen, Chris Green, James Smethurst, and Pat Arnow), to labor organizing in the 1970s (Lynda Ann Ewen), to interviews with "artist-activists" Stetson Kennedy, Raul Salinas, and Si Kahn.

Despite this range, two common themes appear throughout the volume. First, most of the efforts at radical organizing resulted in failure (at least failure narrowly defined as strikes lost, organizations imploding, and legal and violent reprisals), but together they make up "a larger pattern of struggle" that asks us to shift our conception of the region and see continuity in activism across time, space, and individual issues (p. 58). The second theme is that of boundary crossings. Repeatedly, radical organizing was radical in large part because it crossed the lines that structured the traditional South: lines of race, of region, between rural and urban. Southern organizers drew on northern ideas and resources. Blacks and whites sometimes learned to work together and, as was the case with unemployed organizing with the Communist Party in 1930s Atlanta, learned the powerful threat that collaboration posed. But because the gulf between groups was real, socially reinforced, and deeply engrained, most activists and organizations learned how profoundly fleeting alliances could be.

While this bigger, thematic picture does indeed contain important implications for reviewing the South as a region of protest that produced individuals, organizations, and traditions that challenged existing power structures, the individual essays generally lack a broader context, are overly specific, and often far too provincial. The authors do not speak directly enough to each other or to a core set of issues, and while admirable introductions to each piece do some of this work, it will not be enough for most readers interested in the general topic who are not immersed in the individual worlds each author takes up. The concept behind the collection offers a sound reappraisal of southern history to include a tradition of radical protest. A strong theme of boundary crossing—both the difficulty of getting it started and the retribution it often engendered—runs throughout the collection. It is a shame that the narrowness of the individual pieces makes it hard to appreciate these strengths. Perhaps this is just the intent of the editors: to let dense questions whet our appetite for straightforward and inclusive appraisals that are yet to come.

GEORGINA HICKEY
University of Michigan, Dearborn

JOSEPH GERTEIS. *Class and the Color Line: Interracial Class Coalition in the Knights of Labor and the Populist Movement.* (Politics, History, and Culture.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 274. Cloth $84.95, paper $23.95.

During the two decades following Reconstruction, the Knights of Labor and the People's (or Populist) Party both attempted, with varying degrees of conviction and success, to unite white and black "producers" across the South into organizations that would represent their shared class interests. Despite some short-lived successes, the Knights and the Populists both collapsed by the end of the nineteenth century, and sadly, as Joseph Gerteis notes in this book's concluding chapter, the lesson that white and black southerners alike drew from the failure of these movements was that "such coalitions were fruitless" (p. 202). Gerteis attempts to draw more meaningful lessons from the Knights' and Populists' efforts at building interracial class coalitions by examining both the sources of their success and the limits that ultimately prevented more significant success.

The bulk of Gerteis's analysis draws upon the history of the Knights of Labor in Richmond and Atlanta and the Farmers' Alliance and the Populist Party in the states of Virginia and Georgia. The Knights, for a short time, built a significant interracial movement in Richmond in the mid-1880s but failed to do so in Atlanta,

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while the scenario was reversed for the farmers' movements in those states: the Farmers' Alliance (which was segregated in the South into white and "colored" organizations) and the Populist Party made little headway in Virginia but briefly showed significant promise in Georgia.

Gerteis's three chief arguments, presented at the beginning of the book, are as follows: first, the Knights and Populist movements "were both inclusive and exclusive at the same time" (p. vii); second, the movements' republican concern with civic virtue provided both opportunities for and constraints upon interracial organizing; and third, the movements' prospects for success or failure in interracial organizing varied according to local context and change over time. This last point in particular comes through quite clearly in Gerteis's case studies. By the time the Knights of Labor arrived in Richmond in 1885, black workers already had developed autonomous organizations and communities, which helps explain why the Knights "came closer" to achieving "the ideal type of interracial organizing in Richmond . . . than they did anywhere else" (p. 78). Atlanta, on the other hand, "had no settled and well-defined black community" (p. 103), and therefore in the minds of white workers the city's black workers seemed to lack the civic virtue that Richmond's black workers already had demonstrated. White Knights, including national leader Terence Powderly, viewed Atlanta's black workers "as a 'stumbling block' rather than as potential coalition partners" (p. 113). On the other hand, the common problems confronting white and black farmers alike in the predominantly cotton-producing state of Georgia meant that white farmers could envision building an economic and (for a time, at least) a political alliance with black farmers. Both the white Southern Farmers' Alliance and the Colored Farmers' Alliance became quite strong in Georgia by 1890. But when the nonpartisan Alliance movement gave way to the Populist Party, the race issue ultimately helped destroy the movement, due in part, ironically, to Georgia Democrats' manipulation of black votes and their charges that the Populists were fostering "Negro supremacy." In Virginia, the presence of a stronger Republican Party than in Georgia, blacks' bitter memories of William Mahone's Readjuster movement, which they had supported for little tangible return, and a more diverse agricultural economy with less reliance on a single cash crop all prevented the Farmers' Alliance and Populist movements from developing as strong of an interracial class coalition as in Georgia.

In the book's concluding chapter, Gerteis suggests that while class interests and republican notions of civic virtue could help or hinder interracialism depending upon local contexts or conditions, the biggest obstacle lay in the always thorny issue (in the post-Reconstruction South) of "social equality," which never seemed to be far from the minds of white southerners in that era. "Social equality," writes Gerteis, "was widely rejected because it was associated with a loss of status in the personal, local interactions that mattered to white Knights and Populists" (p. 210). If Gerteis is not the first author to draw that conclusion, he nevertheless makes the case convincingly.

This well written, impressively researched book has much to praise and little with which to find fault. Historians of Populism will undoubtedly notice Gerteis's false contention that the Populists won the South Carolina gubernatorial race in 1892 (winning candidate Ben Tillman, as many scholars have shown, was an Alliance Democrat but no Populist). Gerteis's assertion that "industrial laborers, artisans, and independent farmers and tenants all came to see themselves as a class of 'producers' with common interests" (p. 47) is too broad a generalization; as other historians have demonstrated, the Knights of Labor and the Farmers' Alliance locked horns at various times in many parts of the South. Nevertheless, this book is well worth reading for scholars of labor, politics, and race relations in the late nineteenth-century South.

MATTHEW HILD
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BRYAN D. PALMER. *James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 1890–1928.* (The Working Class in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 542. $50.00.

A historically meaningful and useful biography is one that places a person's life into a context that incorporates change over time and the impact that that person had on the historical moment. Bryan D. Palmer does just that with this book. James P. Cannon's life is an excellent portal through which to experience and better understand the radical Left in the United States at a crucial period when the United States was developing into the world's most powerful capitalist, industrial nation. The American Left sought to challenge that historical trajectory from within, and Cannon was a leading agent in that struggle. Palmer writes this biography as history with a fine command of the dizzying array of personalities and ideological splits that characterized the movement.

Palmer sets the historiographic framework for his biography with a brief examination of American communism and how it has been dealt with by communists of the period and by historians. One of the goals for his study is to explain how home-grown radicals such as Cannon were embraced by the communist revolutionary Left only later to be purged by the movement along with much of its radicalism. Nevertheless, this study is anything but an institutional history of the early development of American communism. At its heart is the study of a man of the Left whose early adult years were spent at the forefront of a revolutionary alternative to both monopoly capitalism and a communism that was evolving into Stalinism. Palmer uses ample primary material left by Cannon, his associates, and other documents of the era to reconstruct the history of this radical life.

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According to Cannon, his introduction into the revolutionary Left was through the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). For a young man primed for radical action garnered from his left-leaning father, the Wobblies proved irresistible. Cannon's experience with the IWW coincided with the union's effort to organize on the street as well as at the point of production. Cannon's skills as a public speaker during free speech fights and later as a writer were recognized by the IWW leadership, and he was brought into the inner circle of some of the most influential Wobblies of the 1910s. He learned to ride the rails and work as an itinerant organizer of significant strike actions in the Midwest. During this period, Cannon also spent a stint working at *Solidarity*, one of two IWW newspapers, honing skills that would serve him well for the rest of his life. On an ideological and on a personal level, however, Cannon became disillusioned with life as a Wobbly. Palmer explains Cannon's perspective on the limits of IWW tactics and strategy, which makes for a clear segue to his embrace of a new revolutionary movement sweeping out of Russia.

Cannon was like a number of young Wobblies and left-wing socialists of his time. They hungered for something new, successful, and inspiring, and it was the revolution in Russia that offered them a direction and a model for change at home. It also offered them an opportunity to be part of a worldwide transformation that cut to the foundation of human civilization. The IWW and the Socialist Party seemed antiquated in comparison. The choice to join the Communist Party, however, had serious consequences. Not only did communists face official and unofficial repression, but the U.S. movement was born sectarian, with the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party competing for adherents. Palmer takes the reader into the sectarian underground and aboveground efforts to consolidate the movement in accordance with directions from Moscow. Cannon, in the early 1920s, emerged as a figure poised to unify the Left with the Workers' Party.

Over the rest of the decade, Cannon tried to balance Moscow's directives with an American Left that seemed innately resistant to unity. Moreover, Palmer makes clear Cannon's own concerns about the Soviet regime's true interests when it came to the struggle in America. That concern eventually led to his expulsion from the unified communist movement that he tried to build. Cannon tried to work out differences with the likes of William Z. Foster, Earl Browder, and Jay Lovestone during the crucial first decade of American communism. In the end, he was on the losing side. Cannon's ouster was a blow to the construction of a mass American revolutionary Left. Palmer, however, does not want Cannon's legacy to be one of defeat but one of hope for a more just society that can be born out of the revolutionary innocence that Cannon championed.

GREG HALL
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MELISSA R. KLAPPER. *Small Strangers: The Experience of Immigrant Children in America, 1880–1925*. (American Childhoods.) Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2007. Pp. xix, 219. $27.50.

In exploring the experience of immigrant children in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century America, Melissa R. Klapper has identified an engrossing and significant subject. The main themes that recur throughout this book—the proposition that immigrant youngsters had to shoulder "the double burden of their new countrymen's fears and their parents' expectations" (p. 20), and that they had to "navigate between the twin shoals of cultural retention and cultural adaptation" (p. 179)—are points well taken. In considering these propositions, Klapper touches upon such important matters as the nature of American values, the process of identity formation, the role of stereotyping and racism in society, and the impact of gender on the experience of young people. A very interesting element of this book is its description of some of the approaches various immigrant communities employed in trying to perpetuate their cultures, approaches such as the establishment of language schools, the promotion of ethnic holiday observances, and the celebration of traditional life cycle events.

Unfortunately, Klapper's attempt to deal with such a rich and complex subject in such a slim volume has led her to produce a work that is superficial and not completely satisfying. Although she admits that "there was no singular immigrant experience" (p. 177) and that important differences characterized various immigrant groups, Klapper paints the picture of immigrant childhood with such broad strokes that one gets little sense of these differences. Vast topics are treated in no more than a few pages. The discussion of kindergartens is barely three pages long, for example, and does little more than make the point that these institutions were agents of Americanization.

Although one must always be cautious in criticizing a book for what it does not do, some omissions from this book are too significant to be ignored. The juvenile justice system is mentioned once or twice in passing, but readers learn nothing about it. Child labor and compulsory education laws are mentioned early in the volume but never discussed. There is no demographic information provided, so readers never learn how many immigrant children were to be found within the various ethnic communities of the United States around the turn of the twentieth century, nor even the total number of "small strangers" in the country. Surely topics such as these should be central to a consideration of the experience of immigrant youngsters.

As Klapper points out, information on immigrant children can be gleaned from the literature of a number of fields, including American history generally, the history of various ethnic groups, and the history of immigration, education, social welfare, and health care. Klapper is to be commended for mining sources in so many sub-disciplines in order to pay "sustained atten-

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tion to immigrant children as a group" (p. 195). On the other hand, the nature of her study sometimes leads her to write about the experience of immigrant or working class families in general, and simply to remind readers that children were part of the picture. This approach is particularly apparent in chapter five, dealing with immigration restriction after 1924 and the effects of the Depression, in which references to the lives of specific children, quite frequent in earlier chapters, disappear completely.

Another weakness of this volume stems from Klapper's practice of citing her sources so infrequently. Seldom does she provide a reference note for anything but a direct quotation and so, throughout the volume, statements that beg for a citation that would allow for verification and for follow-up remain undocumented. Klapper tells readers, for example, that "immigrant girls' memoirs often recalled, with barely disguised hurt, the privileges their brothers received just for being boys" (p. 32), but, without a reference note, readers cannot discover what "often" means here, nor from which immigrant communities the girls in question came, nor where to go for more information on this matter. Similarly, when Klapper reports that in the late 1920s and early 1930s "enrollment in language schools dropped sharply" while there was "a steady rise of ethnic intermarriage rates" (p. 169), one wants to know how she knows these things and where specific data might be found.

This book serves as a worthwhile reminder that the experience of children deserves to be given serious attention in the story of immigration to America, and Klapper was wise to include in her study a consideration of immigrants from Mexico, Canada, and the Far East, as well as of those European newcomers who are most often the focus of studies dealing with late nineteenth and early twentieth-century immigration. It is to be hoped that her work will stimulate further inquiry into this important subject.

LEE SHAI WEISSBACH
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JENNIFER EASTMAN ATTEBERY. *Up in the Rocky Mountains: Writing the Swedish Immigrant Experience*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2007. Pp. xx, 304. Cloth $60.00, paper $20.00.

The handwritten letter was a flourishing and evident part of migrant life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Due to their abundance in Swedish and Swedish American archives and their richness in content and form, letters have developed into valuable sources for research in the humanities and social sciences. Migration affected both those who left Sweden for America and those who stayed in Sweden; letters linked them together. The large number of letters written by individuals in both countries suggests their importance as a form of communication.

Jennifer Eastman Attebery's book is a result of research into fifty-four collections of letters housed at the Swedish Emigrant Institute in Växjö. These collections comprise 331 letters written from 1880 to 1917 by seventy-four Swedish immigrants to the Rocky Mountain region of Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico. Inspired by David A. Gerber's analysis of letters by British immigrants to America in *Authors of Their Lives: The Personal Correspondence of British Immigrants to North America in the Nineteenth Century* (2006), Attebery acknowledges that each one of the fifty-four collections may read as an epistolary autobiography but Attebery chooses to work *across* the collections.

The purpose of studying these letters is to acknowledge their expressive power as vernacular form and to increase the understanding of Swedish America as including the American West. This dual purpose of study is fulfilled. With a theoretical framework and methods drawn from folklore, Attebery takes as her point of departure the assumption that personal letters are interesting as both genre and as practice. The letters express not only what immigrants from Sweden find important to tell family and friends but also the structure, phrases, and metaphors by which they describe their everyday life. Attebery provides an informative introduction to vernacular writing, an interpretation of such practices, and a chapter about the immigrant letter as genre.

In five empirical chapters, Attebery pays attention to repetitious openings and closings of the entire corpus, directing her main interest to the letters' middle section which express themes important to the immigrants' everyday life. The first empirical chapter casts light on the tight-knit networks of Swedish immigrants in the Rocky Mountains across rural and urban settings. This chapter shows that Swedish immigrants had a multitude of affiliations. The second chapter illuminates work as a universal topic. Attebery sees work as a way in which Swedish immigrants transformed into American citizens. This is perhaps the chapter which most clearly affirms previous research into Swedish American culture, albeit the letters provide more clearly the individual workers' points of view. The third chapter illuminates money as an important topic of letter writing, not least among men. The exchange of money—or the lack of such exchange—was a frequent theme of the letters and is interpreted as a symbol of reciprocal relationships, connecting families across the Atlantic. The fourth empirical chapter highlights the specific circumstances of immigrants in the Rocky Mountain region, which provided access to a multitude of cultural groups and ways of living. The fifth and last empirical chapter demonstrates how religious language was part of vernacular writing, thus showing the Christian influence on immigrant life in the Rocky Mountain area.

The empirical chapters contain some historical and biographical background regarding both letter writers and recipients. Attebery considers this background necessary to her analysis of the letters as personal documents. I found the background material superfluous. It shifts focus from the analysis of form to the individual letter writers. This deviation is most obvious in the

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chapter called "Here are Many Swedes" in which the reader is introduced to a vast number of writers and recipients. Some of these letter-writers are described further in the appendix biography, others are not.

By selecting letters on the basis of representation, Attebery aims at deviating from the analytical path of H. Arnold Barton, Fredrick Hale, and Solveig Zempel, all veterans in Scandinavian American scholarship. Their selection of immigrant letters served primarily to give social history a personal voice. By studying letters in terms of vernacular writing, by which Attebery means the language of everyday discourse as linked to the cultural concept, she puts to the fore recurrent themes, repetitive language, phrasing, and metaphoric images. By interpreting the immigrant letter as vernacular, she sets it apart from other forms of writing and emphasizes its use within an informal context of shared culture and cultural texts. The analysis shows that formulae such as "I work every day" and "I am sending money" convey the writers' concerns, while the use of forms from oral tradition such as turn taking, metaphorical, and metonymic imagery intensifies their message. Thus these letters articulate a culture that may be identified as ethnic and regional as well as give shape to a particular immigrant experience.

Attebery's book displays some minor weaknesses, such as an inaccurate map of Swedish place names, which easily could have been corrected. Another confusing element of the book is a rather lengthy introduction to concepts used in the study of folklore, which are not put to use in the empirical chapters. Nevertheless, the book is an interesting and highly useful contribution to Swedish American scholarship and its related fields.

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WALDEMAR ZACHARASIEWICZ. *Images of Germany in American Literature*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 253. $39.95.

Ever since Benedict Anderson published *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), works on national identity have proliferated exponentially. Not only have scholars in various disciplines redefined the meaning of national identity, but they have begun to scrutinize more closely how national stereotypes evolve, how they change over time, and what they reveal about the relationship between two cultures. Drawing on both well-known and more obscure literary works, travel accounts, and personal documents, this highly informative and concise volume is concerned not so much with Germany's construction of its own national identity but with the American construction of Germany's national identity. Waldemar Zacharasiewicz argues that American writers and journalists applied a fairly consistent spectrum of clichés and stereotypes to different degrees at various moments in time. Those ranged from the positive image of the scholar, intellectual, and musician, to the negative one of the obedient, militarist, and at times cruel nationalist. This study echoes both Zacharasiewicz's earlier writings and those of others, most notably Werner Sollors. Yet its compact nature and poignant analysis of key texts makes it an indispensable reference for those studying American images of Germany.

Zacharasiewicz's approach draws extensively on the methodological concept of imagology, developed by French and German scholars of comparative literature in the 1960s. According to this approach, groups of people construct relatively stable concepts of the identity of one's own group (autostereotype) as well as of other cultural or national groups (heterostereotype) (p. 5). Written texts, both fictional and nonfictional, contribute to the construction of these stereotypes.

The book's thematic organization follows the major historical landmarks in the political and cultural relationship between the United States and Germany, beginning with the seemingly contradictory early nineteenth-century image of Germans on the one hand as frugal, hardworking farmers, and on the other as poets and thinkers in the tradition of J. W. von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller. The former image drew extensively on the lives and customs of Pennsylvania Dutch immigrants, the latter on the experience of American intellectuals like George Bancroft, Edward Everett, and Joseph Green Cogswell, who studied in Germany and sought to replicate the German university model in the United States (p. 19).

Zacharasiewicz sees a marked transformation in the German image emerging in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War as Germany rose to military and economic prominence in Europe. From this point on, he argues, two opposing views of Germany competed with one another for recognition; the artistic, musical side, often associated with southern Germany, and the militant unemotional one, associated with the Prussian North (p. 43). Not surprisingly both World Wars I and II produced crudely negative depictions of Germany's national character, drawing heavily on the Prussian militarist model. Yet Zacharasiewicz also unearthed more nuanced depictions, especially during the brief interlude of the Weimar Republic. Authors and journalists, among them Upton Sinclair, Dorothy Thompson, and Thomas Wolfe, continued to search for the "other Germany" providing more balanced reports on the cultural and political landscape in interwar Germany.

The book is surprisingly pessimistic about the postwar relationship between Germany and the United States. Despite a rapid improvement in economic and cultural relations, Zacharasiewicz argues, "a negative variant of the image of Germany gained ground and, from the 1960s onward, again dominated the media" (p. 141). Works like John Hawkes's *The Cannibal* (1949), Thomas Berger's *Crazy in Berlin* (1958), Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse-Five* (1969), and Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973) draw heavily on the

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Nazi period and its immediate aftermath. Yet not all those works depict Germany as an "other." In some of them the boundaries between hetero and auto-stereotype seem fluid. Postwar Germany's cultural and political trajectory had become so closely intertwined with that of the United States that looking at the "other" meant looking at oneself—with all one's flaws and shortcomings.

Zacharasiewicz might have asked more probing questions about how class and gender imagery influenced the depiction of Germany at different moments in time. He alludes to both in his discussion of the image of the German housewife, or the crude behavior of the beer drinking ruffians in the mid-nineteenth century, yet he develops no consistent class or gender analysis. In addition, the conclusion offers little guidance on the larger questions of how stereotypes evolve, transmute, and become shaped by both personal and political interactions between the two nations. Zacharasiewicz instead ends with a brief discussion of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's controversial 1996 book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1996). To give Goldhagen the last word on Germany seems a poor choice for an otherwise excellent treatment of literary diversity. Nonetheless, this book should inspire its readers to look in the dusty corners of their nearest library for the forgotten works of the likes of George Bancroft, Hugo Münsterberg, Kay Boyle, and others.

PETRA GOEDDE
Temple University

HEATHER D. CURTIS. *Faith in the Great Physician: Suffering and Divine Healing in American Culture, 1860–1900*. (Lived Religions.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 269. $49.95.

During the 1870s and 1880s in Great Britain and the northeastern United States, thousands of middle and upper-middle-class white Protestants professed belief in divine healing. Through such devotional disciplines as prayer, meditation, laying on of hands, confession of sin, fasting, and anointing with oil, they attempted to recover Christianity's "lost legacy of miraculous healing" (p. 12) in order to revitalize the church, evangelize the world, and effect cultural change. Unlike other studies, Heather D. Curtis's book focuses less on theology than on the ritual acts through which those professing belief in faith cures overcame suffering and attained an active spiritual life. In so doing, she offers a "finely-grained [and] richly textured" (p. 20) retrospective ethnography of the spiritual practices used by those who replaced an earlier devotional ethic promoting self-sacrifice and submission with one emphasizing vitality, strength, and the possibility of healing.

Curtis begins with the story of Mary Rankin, who was an invalid for much of her life. Drawing on Rankin's popular memoir, *The Daughter of Affliction: A Memoir of the Protracted Sufferings and Religious Experience of Miss Mary Rankin* (1858), Curtis describes Rankin's acceptance of suffering as a proper Christian response to physical pain. In 1842, for example, after enduring countless painful "remedies," Rankin agreed to have her leg amputated, refusing all analgesics. Feeling God's loving arms underneath her, she believed that Christians were to accept and cherish their afflictions. According to Curtis, Rankin's memoir drew on the long tradition of Protestant hagiography, nineteenth-century notions of women's innate spirituality, and the association made by many late medieval female mystics between the endurance of pain and ecstatic, visionary states of awareness. This chapter provides an important historical and theological context for the emergence of Christian Science, Spiritualism, and other late nineteenth-century religious movements while setting the stage for similar, although less extreme, responses to illness and suffering by Protestant evangelicals.

Curtis's focus on devotional ethics begins with a case study that stands in sharp contrast to that of Rankin. Drawing on public testimonials and published works by Carrie Judd (whose 1880 book, *The Prayer of Faith*, became one of the foundational texts of the divine healing movement), Curtis describes Judd's transformation from an invalid to an energetic worker engaged in Christian service. Viewing God as a benevolent sovereign who continues to perform miracles through the work of the Holy Spirit, Judd, like thousands of other late nineteenth-century evangelicals, drew on a devotional ethic that encouraged active resistance to physical suffering. Like many others, she emphasized the paradoxical relationship between divine sovereignty and human agency in leading to the certain promise of physical health. Subsequent chapters similarly focus on individual testimonials and foundational texts written by leading proponents of faith cure. They describe devotional exercises espoused by evangelicals and clarify why, despite a shared emphasis on God as the Great Physician, evangelicals regarded the teachings of Christian Science and Spiritualism as "devilism" (p. 132). Particularly illuminating is Curtis's discussion of faith homes, founded for sufferers in need of additional theological instruction and practical training. Opposed by physicians and exacerbating tensions among faith-cure leaders, thirty such homes existed in the United States and at least five in England by 1885. Descriptive names that conjured up images of rest, blessings, and new life; consecration rituals; and Bible study and prayer meetings as the only scheduled activities, encouraged sufferers to view such homes as sacred spaces where, unlike medical facilities, one could gain active faith and true healing. Many former "guests" of such homes later joined such voluntary organizations as the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations (YMCA and YWCA), the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), and the Salvation Army. Others joined evangelical leaders in an urban ministry that reached out to prostitutes, the sick, the hungry, and the poor, alleviating their physical suffering and hopefully opening them up to the life of the spirit. Women in particular, were called on to participate in these efforts.

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Curtis has written a fascinating book that offers a new and insightful look into late nineteenth-century evangelicalism. It is not, however, easy reading. Curtis's thick description of her case studies, her detailed analysis of texts and devotional practices, and the inclusion of innumerable leaders of Holiness and health reform movements make this book largely inaccessible to general readers, despite its many wonderful photographs. Nonetheless, religious historians, theologians, and anthropologists of religion will appreciate the breadth and depth of Curtis's critical analysis and research. So will scholars engaged in gender studies. Curtis's examination of the particular appeal of faith cure to women results in an important discussion of notions of "true" Anglo-Saxon femininity and masculinity in late nineteenth-century American culture. Highly recommended for purchase by university and seminary libraries, this book is "must" reading for scholars of late nineteenth-century American religion.

ELLEN M. UMANSKY
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ROBERT CAMPBELL. *In Darkest Alaska: Travel and Empire along the Inside Passage*. (Nature and Culture in America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. 348. $45.00.

This book traces the late nineteenth-century incorporation of Alaska into the American empire and places tourists and travel writers at the center of a truly compelling story of the imagination and consequent transformation of that place. While indebted to Mary Louise Pratt's seminal study *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (1992) and to the insights of Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Thorstein Veblen, Sigmund Freud, and Walter Benjamin, among others, Robert Campbell's study is far from derivative. He draws on this wide range of theoretical foundations to construct a truly innovative analysis, one that is itself boldly structured around the geographic stages of the Inside Passage journey, rather than chronologically. Each of the travelers' main stopover points—Fort Wrangell, Juneau, Glacier Bay, Sitka—"highlights different forms of imperial appropriation—sex, curios, minerals, cosmologies, authentic indigenes, and the landscape itself" (pp. 8–9). The end result is one of the most sophisticated and important studies of western American travel and tourism and one of the most significant histories of Alaska.

While on one level a book about the tourist/traveler "discovery" of America's last frontier and how Alaska served as a geographic and psychic substitute for the perceived loss of the contiguous western frontier, it is really an examination of "the American relationship to the wider world of nineteenth-century imperialism" (p. 10). Campbell's travelers are (often unwittingly) the architects of empire, or at least of its consolidation. They are the verbose chroniclers of the people and landscapes of the United States' new northwestern domain, bringing the scenically dramatic and the culturally exotic into the parlors of bourgeois society, making Alaska familiar, and thus rendering it American.

Campbell's probing comparative analysis of the African and Alaskan experiences of travel writer Edward Glave drives the opening chapter; his coverage of the guide book depictions of Alaska occupies the following one. In the next five chapters he examines the tourists'/travelers' efforts, at the key sites along the passage, to depict scenery, understand Alaskan Indians' culture, procure their handicrafts, and comprehend the magnitude of industrial operations in Juneau (home to the Treadwell mining complex, which for a generation, beginning in the 1880s, "was the largest industrial gold mine in the world" [p. 189]). The travelers' and guidebook authors' accounts and their economic impact on the natural and cultural landscape were transformative, Campbell contends, but not in a positive way: "wielding the written word . . . [they] rivaled the actions of military commanders" (p. 176). One wonders, though, if the tail of tourism is not wagging the dog of empire here a little too stridently.

Campbell's primary subjects, the "bourgeois travelers," or "bourgeois tourists," or "bourgeois adventurers" (the label varies, but the prefix remains the same), do not come off well in the narrative, which is hardly surprising given the theoretical foundations the analysis is built on. His seasonal sojourners are most often objects of derision, and sometimes even pity; they go to the far north to escape the modern world of industry and commerce, but it is only the products of that industrial age that transport them to the scenic sublime of Alaska and shape their reading of it as pristine wilderness, and they are oblivious to the irony. Since their writings are used primarily to illuminate a larger discourse of empire construction and consolidation emanating from a broader cultural milieu, the book's protagonists sometimes fail to come to life. One fascinating exception is the military veteran, Philip Van Buskirk, a man racked with guilt over his same-sex and pedophile desires who travels the Inside Passage in search of a Native wife or concubine to take home to his farm and thus begin life again in redemptive heterosexual normalcy. Van Buskirk's travels and his diary serve as a fascinating backdrop to Campbell's discussion of Anglo exoticization of Tlingit women, and of the lives some of them led as sex workers.

This book is a brilliant study on many levels and a superb inaugural volume in the new Nature and Culture in America Series. It is theoretically rich, structurally innovative, very well written, deeply researched, and beautifully illustrated. It is a model monograph and a wonderfully challenging one. Campbell brings the Inside Passage to life through superb descriptions of the region's changing cultural and natural geography in the late nineteenth century. But the travel writers themselves, the purported protagonists of the narrative, do not always take such evocative form. Their attitudes and actions are treated as reflections of the bourgeois cultural world from which they hail and cannot escape. If this is the case, can they really be ascribed such a

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significant part in the process of incorporating Alaska into the American empire, or are they themselves just evidence of processes of incorporation already underway? One gets the sense that if the authors of the sources Campbell draws on had not made their journeys, then other bourgeois travelers would have done so and written essentially the same accounts. All of which raises this question: do these travel writers and tourists have agency, and if not, then how can they be truly significant agents of empire?

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Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr. *The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century*. (Animals, History, Culture.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 242. $50.00.

Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr have produced a brilliant account of an incredibly important but understudied topic: the role of horses in nineteenth-century American cities. As the authors make clear, horses as "living machines" made the nineteenth-century city possible. While we tend to think of that period as the age of steam, it was human and equine feet that powered most short and medium-distance transportation needs until the coming of the electric trolley at the end of the century. In just 181 pages of text, McShane and Tarr wonderfully develop both the importance of this living technology and some of the problems horse power and transport created. The great strength of this work is the combination of period and modern sources that the authors use to draw together the complex story. In both the work's conciseness and its use of sources also come its frustrations: it is too brief. The work is more a provocative sketch than a completed painting, and the authors' conclusions are often too qualified. However, this book is an excellent first step in thinking about the importance of the horse to the urban world of nineteenth-century America.

The nineteenth-century urban horse is a largely forgotten yet crucial piece of technology. It is literally in the background of almost every painting and story about a city during this period. It provided transportation for people and freight, provided status for the wealthy, and provided power for factories and ferries. The horse and its support system affected the urban form, influenced laws and law enforcement, and shaped veterinary care. All these key stories are told briefly in the eight chapters of this volume. Every issue raised in the book is important but few are followed in sufficient detail to be more than a well-conceived sketch. Given the potential vast scope of the topic, the authors clearly struggled to make sense of the complexity of their subject and they organized the book around themes developed in an 1881 *New York Times* editorial on the horse in the city. Using this period writing as an organizational piece works reasonably well; while one can debate both the typicality of New York City and the *Times*'s editorial concerns, the themes help the book stay focused on nineteenth-century issues. The authors have also done an excellent job of using recent scholarship to illuminate their discussions. The breadth of the literature in the notes is impressive, and it helps to ground the books' conclusions.

Tempering the work's many strengths, however, are issues related to its conciseness. The authors, both urban historians, have asked important questions and gathered some very important evidence, but much of the evidence is episodic rather than comprehensive. Although the work recognizes that there were vast differences in horse usage and population among the cities, many of the chapters are developed largely from New York City sources. How typical was the New York experience? The authors clearly acknowledge that New York was often different, but it will be for future scholars to determine how different and whether this variance affects any of the book's conclusions. In a related issue, the authors seem acutely aware of the thinness of their evidence at times and often raise provocative issues that are never resolved. An excellent example of this is in the discussion of Pittsburgh undertakers whose facilities also functioned as livery stables (pp. 112–113). The authors discuss this dual role and then acknowledge that it was found in no other city studied. Two full pages out of a brief twenty-four page chapter on stables are spent on an anomaly for which the authors can offer no explanation.

Despite shortcomings flowing from its concision, this is a very important work for scholars interested in technology, the environment, animals, and the urban form in nineteenth-century America. The authors have illuminated the key roles that horses played in cities and moved these animals from the background to the foreground. The book may not have answered every key question completely, but by highlighting the horse as a living and urban machine, McShane and Tarr have contributed significantly to historical literature.

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Wilkes University

Timothy J. Gilfoyle. *A Pickpocket's Tale: The Underworld of Nineteenth-Century New York*. New York: W. W. Norton. 2006. Pp. xvii, 460. $27.95.

In 1895, George Appo, one of Gotham's most infamous pickpockets and confidence men, faced a long prison sentence for stabbing a police officer. His lawyers urged Appo to write an account of his life of crime to convince the presiding judge to hand down a more lenient sentence. No ordinary biographical statement, Appo was literally writing for his life. His small five-foot, four-inch frame could not take another incarceration. Moreover, having testified for the Lexow Committee in its investigation of police corruption in New York City, Appo had become a "marked man." Appo's compelling nine-page document swayed the judge to limit his sentence to six months. Upon release, Appo did his best to steer clear of his former life, working instead with his lawyer,

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Frank Moss, and the Society of Prevention for Crime (SPC), as an undercover investigator. A reformed man, Appo produced a short memoir that appeared in Moss's *The American Metropolis* (1897). In 1915, Appo wrote a more detailed ninety-nine-page account of his life as a professional criminal. Never published, this document remained among the papers of the SPC at Columbia University until its rediscovery by Timothy J. Gilfoyle.

Gilfoyle makes terrific use of Appo's autobiography to structure his narration of the twin histories of nineteenth-century urban crime and punishment. The book begins with Appo's birth to an Irish American mother and Chinese American father—the equally infamous Quimbo Appo, a merchant turned murderer whose imprisonment left young George to grow up in the notorious slums of Five Points. Living on the city's streets, Appo worked as a newspaper boy and pickpocket. As an adult, he became a larcenist of grand proportions as a confidence man in the national "Green Goods graft" that lured unsuspecting victims with the promise of large sums of counterfeit money in exchange for cash. Each chapter opens with one of Appo's colorful descriptions of these events to frame key themes, such as pickpocketing and "grafts," police harassment, prisons, or opium smoking and other illicit forms of leisure, to paint both a personal and social portrait of life in New York's newly emerging criminal "underworld."

An urban historian, Gilfoyle demonstrates the broad socioeconomic transformations of New York City's industrial and commercial life in the late nineteenth century that made possible the emergence of an urban criminal subculture with a distinct class of professional criminals. Densely populated streets and crowded streetcars helped to screen pickpockets from easy detection. Downtown commercial neighborhoods drew money-laden businessmen and female shoppers, creating the ideal hunting grounds for pickpockets. The breakdown of the traditional craft system meant fewer options for working-class immigrant youth and displaced many apprentices and journeymen, who turned to petty theft for survival. Opium dens, saloons, and hotels meanwhile served as sites of retreat where members of the underworld congregated and developed a subculture that fostered communality and sociability among different ethnic and racial groups, socioeconomic classes, and genders. More than a means to satisfy various addictions, such gathering places allowed these original "good fellows" to share trade secrets or meet up with one another to form working partnerships.

The book's strongest chapters are those chronicling Appo's journeys through the various types of nineteenth-century correctional facilities to illuminate the changing purpose and form of America's penal institutions. In 1871, Appo became the subject of a short-lived reform experiment as an inmate on board the *Mercury*, a vessel used to reform the city's juvenile delinquents through nautical training and basic grammar instruction. Chronicling incidents of young male rebellion and same-sex sexual experimentation, Gilfoyle discusses the homosocial world aboard the *Mercury* as it made its transatlantic crossings to and from New York Harbor. The chapter on Sing Sing shows the increased centralization and industrialization of the penal system as a sprawling "industrial plantation" with a captive labor force supplying its numerous workshops that manufactured goods for profit. Forms of corporal punishment—flogging, whipping, and paddling—eschewed any notion of rehabilitation, marked prisoners' experiences as convict laborers, and ensured the labor and prison discipline required. Gilfoyle, however, convincingly argues that the nineteenth-century penal institution was not a totalizing disciplinary force but remained porous and vulnerable to challenges by inmates. For example, inmates on the *Mercury* as well as Sing Sing and Blackwell's Island often rebelled by escaping at the first possible moment or resisting the authority of guards.

A thoroughly researched and richly textured social and cultural history, it is too bad that Gilfoyle does not interrogate further the production of Appo's memoirs and consider how the work extends from Appo's attempts to seek social redemption through his work with the SPC. It is also worthwhile to contemplate further the relationship between Moss and Appo, with the former subsidizing the autobiography's production. That is, we might approach Appo's writings through textual analysis rather than as a set of memories or testimony of a former life to be verified for their accuracy. Perhaps such questions would help us better understand the man behind the unpublished autobiography.

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Marcy S. Sacks. *Before Harlem: The Black Experience in New York City before World War I.* (Politics and Culture in Modern America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2006. Pp. 231. $49.95.

Recent scholarship on black urbanization has moved from the Great Migration to postwar deindustrialization, but this book looks back to the formative stage between the 1880s and 1910s. As the federal government retreated from Reconstruction, black southerners moved north and west, especially as the more liberal states passed equal protection legislation. Migrants weighed factors of white violence and Jim Crow, and the potential for prosperity and pleasure. Also, in this pre–World War I phase, the so-called "talented tenth" migration sought dignity and education in traditionally black urban destinations. According to Marcy S. Sacks, whatever their expectations, in New York City most "black people labored in unskilled jobs, and many lived in poverty" (p. 5). They continuously moved in the metropolis to escape violence or harassment, settling above 125th Street, "nearly the only area in which black Manhattanites could easily reside" (p. 85). Seth Scheiner's pioneering monograph on the same topic, *Negro Mecca: A History of the Negro in New York City, 1865–*

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1920 (1965), consciously departed from the orthodoxy of "reading works that look at the Negro only in relation to white society" (p. vii). While Sacks focuses on the "internal workings of urban black populations," she also analyzes the response of white New Yorkers to the newcomers, what she sees as a kind of racism "subtler than in the South" (p. 32).

Sacks analyzes patterns of settlement, employment, and politics while introducing valuable information about the role of black women. Drawing on the census, labor union records, and printed reports, Sacks demonstrates that new white immigrants displaced black service workers, who were relegated to the least desirable occupations. She also finds intriguing evidence of black anti-union sentiment and strike breaking. She uses the records of anti-vice commissions and social scientists to discuss middle-class responses to the southern "folk," but avoids the historiographical debate over their motivations: was racial uplift more a matter of altruistic civic work or hegemonic social control?

Some of the most important research demonstrates the significance of black/white vice districts that fostered both illicit and creative activities in the black community. Although she locates the true "Negro Metropolis" in the founding of religious and benevolent institutions in Harlem after 1900, the preceding chapters on the Tenderloin suggest the extent to which commercialized leisure, service work, and rooming houses laid the foundations for black working-class culture. It also reveals that some aspects of black sexuality originally involved significant black-white contacts, qualifying recent books that emphasize a separatist conception of black "destiny" or an isolated "New Negro" urban life. If the poor and marginal commingled in the "black and tans" of the Gay Nineties, Sacks nonetheless argues that the white, largely Irish immigrant police singled out black residents for abuse and arrest. Here the book excels in a rich description of the criminal justice system that served as an arm of white supremacy. Along with the popular racism of "coon songs," black migrants labored under a racialized ideology of male criminality and female immorality.

An error in the historiography on African American women is the tendency to dismiss, ignore, or hide evidence of prostitution. Fortunately, Sacks's chapters on the so-called vicious classes, black employment, and the police clearly demonstrate that economic discrimination led black women to work in brothels and casual streetwalking. Black reformers were more likely to condemn than seriously attempt to uplift the already fallen black woman. Sacks also suggests that participation in this underground economy stimulated recuperative efforts by black women reformers to secure comfort and safety in their domestic sphere, organizing for better education and playgrounds. Anxiety over having homes motivated the sort of work that stabilized the community during the tumult of displacement and migration. By the 1900s, Harlem was a community of diverse origins, complexions, aspirations, as well as classes and lengths of Manhattan residence.

Although Sacks incorporates some scholarship on Caribbean immigration, noting a divergence in racial perceptions and religious worship, much of her analysis follows rather than extends or revises work on this subject. Sacks remains close to the data and seems reluctant to press an argument or speak to larger questions of the period; and as a result this book remains of interest to specialists in urban and African American history. The book suffers from an entirely insufficient index; it has no entry for prostitution, for example. Yet, at a time when major works in cultural history eschew the study of race relations in favor of intraracial discourses, this carefully documented urban history objectively explicates the central forces of economic disadvantage and white racism in African American life.

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ROBERT M. DOWLING. *Slumming in New York: From the Waterfront to Mythic Harlem*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 200. $35.00.

Robert M. Dowling analyzes texts set in New York's netherworlds from the 1880s through the 1920s. The texts range from the canonical—Stephen Crane's *Maggie* (1893), Jacob Riis's *How the Other Half Lives* (1891), James Weldon Johnson's *The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man* (1912)—to little-known or barely remembered works such as Helen Stuart Campbell's reformist tract *The Problem of the Poor* (1882) and Crane's *George's Mother* (1896). Alongside their authors, Dowling's cast includes various contemporary literati who commented on these works (William Dean Howells, H. L. Mencken, W. E. B. Du Bois) and the fictional characters who populate them. For the most part absent, other than in the form of demographic statistics, are the real-life denizens of the neighborhoods in which the tales are set: the merchant mariners of the New York waterfront, the Bowery "B'hoys," Lower East Side Jews, and the African Americans of the Tenderloin district and, later, Harlem. Their absence, however, is in part the point: Dowling offers not a history of these neighborhoods and their inhabitants themselves, but rather an analysis of their representation in American print culture from the late Gilded Age through the 1920s.

In so doing, he constructs a well-developed argument over five chapters. Early efforts to capture in print New York's "down-low" neighborhoods were informed by the patronizing rhetoric typical of Progressivism, whose general objective was to impose upon the urban poor (the "insiders," in Dowling's terminology) the values of the middle class (to whom most of his "outsider" writers belonged). In time, however, the outsider effort to force middle-class order upon the slums came to be viewed in literature as one that corrupted and thereby stifled the authenticity of urban, working-class culture. By the turn of the century, an inversion of sorts had taken effect: middle-class writers who still "slummed" came not

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to impose order from without but, on the contrary, to benefit from their exposure to the new and unknown. While the outsider writers found inspiration and a sense of renewal, the neighborhoods of which they wrote experienced a cultural validation that defused much of the anxiety mainstream society felt toward them. The literary slummers of Dowling's narrative thus helped alleviate the social antagonisms of the turn-of-the-century city while themselves encountering compelling subject matter, a symbiosis illustrated by Hutchins Hapgood's paean to the Lower East Side, *The Spirit of the Ghetto* (1902), and Carl Van Vechten's controversial celebration of Harlem, *Nigger Heaven* (1926).

In both of these cases, the outsider writers benefited from insider guides who helped familiarize them with their terrain: Van Vechten was introduced to the Harlem scene by African American writer Walter White, and Hapgood to the Lower East Side by Jewish intellectual Abraham Cahan, whose own famous novella *Yekl* (1896) constitutes another of Dowling's case studies. The mutually beneficial relationships that existed between middle-class writers and their insider guides are one of several narrative strands woven through the book. Reformed ex-con Jerry McCauley, an Irish convert to Protestantism who later ran a mission near the East Side docks, acted as guide to social reformer Campbell, whose early efforts to impose order on the waterfront, like those of the later Jacob Riis, were an attempt "to improve the conditions of the poor in a manner that would substantiate the hegemony of the middle class" (p. 34). Such real-life guides also find their fictional counterparts. Thus the greenhorn Gitl finds a mentor in Mrs. Kavarsky in Cahan's *Yekl*; Crane's George Klecey finds one (however flawed) in Charley Jones in *George's Mother*; and James Weldon Johnson's ex-colored man and his white patron, "the millionaire," find one in each other.

This latter point is important: outsider writers needed insider guides to legitimize their presence in the slums, but they returned the favor by introducing their guides to an upper-class milieu that offered opportunities for artistic and financial success. Johnson's fictional millionaire introduces the ex-colored man's creative talents to an appreciative white middle-class audience, much as, in real life, Van Vechten later introduced his Harlem contacts to the white publishing world. A story that begins with outsiders seeking to tame and stifle the authenticity of working-class culture thus ends with the triumph of the insiders instead. As Dowling correctly points out, "indigenous [i.e., insider] voices . . . are more widely read now than Van Vechten . . . will probably ever be" (p. 174). That Dowling acknowledges the cost at which this was achieved—white publishers nourished Harlem's local talent while turning a blind eye toward the suffering of its less talented nine tenths—as well as the gap between the ideals of the fictions he analyzes and the actual historic contexts of their writing ("literature alone could never accomplish the equalitarian policies insider authors and their outsider advocates championed," he concedes) further distinguishes this fine historical literary study (p. 135).

PETER CONOLLY-SMITH
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RUSS CASTRONOVO. *Beautiful Democracy: Aesthetics and Anarchy in a Global Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 287. Cloth $60.00, paper $24.00.

In *Necro Citizenship: Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (2001), Russ Castronovo described a process of abstraction that drained away the particularities of gender and racial identity from the mid-nineteenth century American public sphere. In his new book, he considers the interaction of aesthetics and politics in the construction and reconstruction of citizenship between 1877 and 1936. Each of his chapters pivots on a different set of literary or cinematic texts by Jacob Riis, William Dean Howells, W. E. B. Du Bois, Charlie Chaplin, and Frank Norris, but the texts are less the focus of analysis than occasions for wide-ranging and challenging discussions of much larger issues.

The book has a broad theoretical range, from Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller through Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Antonio Negri. But one of the most striking elements is Castronovo's construction of what he terms "Aesthetics 101," a synthesis of aesthetic theory as defined by the turn-of-the-century American academy, in college texts and syllabi, dissertations, and lecture notes (p. 9). In this period of professional consolidation in American universities, Castronovo argues, aesthetics sought to define itself as a discipline by linking aesthetic and social order, art and citizenship.

These linkages began with efforts to use notions of aesthetic form—in the construction of the City Beautiful, or the exposure of the masses to art and beauty—to shape ethical citizens and an ordered populace. Riis's magic lantern shows placed the aesthetic in the service of social reform, but a universalizing, abstracting emphasis on beauty could also enforce middle-class norms and obscure the particulars of material conditions. On the other hand, the aesthetic might also produce potentially radical, transformative effects such as the creation of a heterogeneous mass subjectivity that was emotional or irrational in its responses.

A similar ambiguity lay in the way aesthetics brought America into contact with the foreign, both as it drew from continental philosophy, and in a more unsettling way, as it opened American culture to European social and political radicalism. The labor violence that spread across America in 1877, Castronovo suggests, was understood in aesthetic terms, as a reenactment of earlier events in Europe. What were once "foreign" notions of collective action were thus "translated" into American culture.

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Similar tensions reappear in a later chapter, "Beauty Along the Color Line," which examines Du Bois's efforts to counteract the universalizing thrust of the aesthetic by resituating it amid the realities of American racial violence and injustice. The *Crisis*'s regular column "Along the Color Line," for instance, juxtaposed notices of cultural events with reports of lynchings, as Du Bois sought to re-politicize the concept of "art."

Du Bois was skeptical of motion pictures as an art form, based on both the demeaning images of African Americans in early cinema and the experience of segregation within movie houses. Many white critics, however, remained believers in film as a democratic form, long after its mix of working-class and immigrant audiences had been replaced by an overwhelmingly middle-class model of spectatorship. Castronovo reads Chaplin's *Modern Times* (1936) as a critique of the commodification of the movies and the loss of the "prospect of motion pictures as a collective, even global medium" (p. 141).

The book's second theme, the link between aesthetics and globalization, dominates the last section, on Norris's *The Octopus: A California Story* (1901), in which Castronovo sees aesthetic formalism playing a key role in the conception of the globe as an economic unit. The marketplace absorbs the category of the "foreign," and thus "materializes the concept of the universal" (pp. 3–4). The arc of Castronovo's book is in the end a downward one, with the possibility of a global democratic ideal displaced or absorbed by the economic force of global imperialism.

Castronovo's work is perhaps most thought-provoking in the way it moves between different registers and forms—from history to literature and from philosophy to photography. These moves do, however, leave gaps and slippages. "Aesthetics 101" is a useful construct, but each of Castronovo's "archives" is produced at a different historical moment, speaking to and shaping a quite different audience, and he does not often seek to anchor these texts in terms of their actual production and reception. Also missing is the possibility of a culture not simply democratic in its reception or in its subject matter, but in its production as well. As Castronovo notes, audience interaction with stage performers was the norm through much of the nineteenth century. One also thinks in this connection of the African American folktales gathered after the Civil War, or the work songs, spirituals, and oral histories recorded in government projects of the 1930s. These too offered aesthetic formulations of both individual citizenship and collective national identity.

In the end, one of this book's key assets may be the looseness of its structure. Its linked essays allow literary and historical moments to retain their unruly particularity, rather than subordinating them to a single theoretical argument. As Castronovo notes in his conclusion, "beauty does not necessarily require a state of completion," emerging as it does on the borders, in the gaps between states and institutions (p. 216).

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MICHELE H. BOGART. *The Politics of Urban Beauty: New York and Its Art Commission*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006. Pp. xvii, 368. $55.00.

The Art Commission of the City of New York (ACNY) is a weird little entity. Established by the City Charter of 1898 (when the five boroughs were consolidated), the ACNY operates out of the city mayor's office. Ostensibly independent, its purview is to review and approve the designs of anything created or constructed on city property, from mailboxes, lamp posts and street signs to monuments and memorials. As a body, its membership has included some of the twentieth century's most notable architects, painters, sculptures and New Yorkers; as an oversight agency, the ACNY has exercised a great deal of influence on the "look" of New York for 110 years. Oddly, however, very few New Yorkers are aware of its existence.

Fortunately, Michele H. Bogart is very aware of the ACNY, having long studied public art and civic identity—most notably in her wonderful *Public Sculpture and the Civic Ideal in New York City, 1890–1930* (1989)—and having served on the commission during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The fruits of this service, alongside much impressive research, form the backbone of the book under review. Unlike *Shaping the City: New York and the Municipal Art Society* (1995), Gregory Gilmartin's sprawling account of the Municipal Arts Society, Bogart's book is less a comprehensive history than a series of important case studies. She examines the creation of the Heinrich Heine Memorial (1891–1899), the designs for the Bronx County Courthouse (1903–1904), the renovation of Union Square (1929–1930), the racial politics of New Deal murals (1934–1939), and the battle for a Jewish Martyr's Memorial (1947–1964), to name but a few—each of which illuminates a spectrum of issues and eras. Like the commission itself, Bogart picks her battles with care and insight.

Bogart begins by answering the obvious question: why the need for an official oversight agency in the first place? Commemoration became a burgeoning industry after the end of the Civil War, and by the 1890s "monument mania" had arrived in New York. Everyone, it seems, wanted to erect statues and memorials to pet projects and heroes, and amid the competing claims of different interest groups, someone needed to decide whom New York ought to commemorate, not to mention how and where. If not for some formal process, the streets and parks of New York would come to resemble a chaotic, ramshackle version of Prague's Charles Bridge, but without the cohesion.

The ACNY was also a product of the emerging City Beautiful movement, complete with the claim that

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physical environments can profoundly affect moral order. And for both good and bad, this aspect—tinged with elite class prejudices—has continued to define the commission throughout its history. What often resulted, though, was not high-handed civic sermonizing but a complex set of negotiations between the ACNY—usually very much aware of its own aesthetic proclivities—and various political and ethnic groups, business interests, neighborhood activists, artists and architects, and occasionally, high-ranking officials from other countries. The history of these interactions provides an object lesson in how an official body schooled in the elite, academic traditions of art history has interacted, and might continue to interact, with the real world of fractious urban politics.

The accent on politics and personalities is the book's most eye-opening and original feature. As a branch of the mayor's office, the history of the ACNY is really the history of New York politics played out through the world of public art and design. The tale of how waxing and waning personalities and changing political climates combined to respond to new artistic trends and constituencies supplies a fascinating lens through which to trace an important political counter-narrative: the history of how successive mayors have imagined not only how New York should be run but also how it should look. The results are often surprising (in the case of Fiorello LaGuardia) or dolefully familiar (in the case of Rudolph Giuliani), but always fascinating.

As a former commissioner, and current member of ACNY's Conservation Advisory Group, Bogart might well seem like an interested party seeking to vaunt the commission's achievements and promote its mandate, but this is not the case. She is forthright about the ACNY's failures and prejudices: where it has proved ineffective or indifferent. In fact, her insider knowledge is a real boon to understanding the various ways in which the commission has operated, especially in recent years. The closing chapter on the Giuliani and Bloomberg administrations is the book's most lively and involved section, but it is a balanced assessment that steers clear of political pronouncements. Giuliani, for example, is chastised not for his vision but for his contempt for independent oversight; likewise, Bloomberg is commended for his willingness to enter into discussion and dialogue. The chapter ends with a wonderfully plaintive consideration of 9/11 memorials, and the moral complexities of imposing design standards on sites of mourning, especially when the need for them to exist, in almost any form, might far outweigh their long-term aesthetic value.

Combining the twin virtues of service and scholarly research, Bogart's book provides an intriguing, alternative history of the world's most strikingly visual city—and in many respects its most political one—over the last 110 years. I recommend it highly.

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EDITH SPARKS. *Capital Intentions: Female Proprietors in San Francisco, 1850–1920.* (The Luther H. Hodges, Jr., and Luther H. Hodges, Sr., Series on Business, Society, and the State.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 329. Cloth $59.95, paper $19.95.

Over the last thirty years, women's and gender historians have transformed our view of nineteenth and early twentieth-century U.S. cities, demonstrating that women occupied public life as wage workers and as activists and reformers who attempted to influence nearly every aspect of urban life, from housing to electoral politics. Add to that vision women proprietors who transformed the public landscape as owners of hotels, boarding houses and brothels, laundries and restaurants, and millinery and dressmaking shops. While women's economic role as proprietors is not news to historians, it has until recently received far less attention than women's public life in politics and wage earning. Edith Sparks adds another piece to the puzzle, providing a picture of women small-business owners in San Francisco from 1865 to 1920. Part of a wave of new attention in business history to smaller ventures, Sparks's book illuminates the relationship of women's business activities to family and daily life within the context of shifting economic opportunities.

Sparks explores the conditions under which women became proprietors, the businesses they began, and their efforts to gain start-up funds, attract customers, and manage day-to-day finances. Business ownership might sound more prestigious than wage work, but Sparks shows that most women business owners chose their economic niche because few other options were open to them. Most were married, divorced, or widowed, which meant that much wage work was closed to them. They often cared for children as well as winning their bread. They chose businesses that allowed them to balance their many duties and drew upon skills that they gained as part of a typical female life course. Women used domestic skills when they took in borders and ran hotels or restaurants. They opened millinery and dressmaking businesses to capitalize on sewing skills. Often, women business owners tended their children at the workplace; when children became old enough they contributed their labor to the endeavor.

Small businesses were risky: few proprietors became wealthy and many failed. A successful small business often operated at subsistence level. The exception to this rule in San Francisco was the early years of the gold rush, when California's gender ratios were greatly skewed and women could make excellent money providing domestic services (especially hotel, restaurant, and laundry services) to gold prospectors. After the first heady years, however, women's profits tempered, and San Francisco's business opportunities for women eventually came to resemble those in eastern U.S. cities. Sparks shows that women's business ownership peaked in 1880 at 10 percent of all women employed, and thereafter declined as married women found other

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options in expanding wage work, including office work, by the early twentieth century.

Historian Wendy Gamber has argued persuasively that women dressmakers formed a "female economy," drawing on networks of women business owners and customers to generate capital, credit, and profits; Sparks finds, in contrast, that women proprietors in San Francisco operated in a heterosocial economy. Indeed, much of what Sparks tracks for women held true for male small business owners as well: a high failure rate, and a preponderance of immigrants in the field. However, married women also experienced some additional challenges due to the lingering legal inequities of coverture. Their ability to own and invest in property was limited, and they had less access to capital, credit, and the free labor of their children, as well as to training through apprenticeships or (male) business networking. Unlike in other cities, women did not form credit networks in San Francisco. The degree to which women formed informational networks is unclear.

Despite the fact that women responded to limited choices, Sparks emphasizes that they acted with "capital intentions." That is, they gained skills in drawing customers and upgrading services in response to expanding consumer standards, and gained financial knowledge about licensing, taxes, investments, and debt management. In aggregate and when successful, they kept families afloat and turned the wheels of the daily economy of San Francisco.

Sparks makes a welcome contribution to women's business history and the understanding of small businesses in the United States. More work could follow on women of color and their market activity in turn-of-the-twentieth-century San Francisco, particularly Chinese women who often ran family businesses. In addition, Sparks reveals that more work is to be done on the inter-relation between business ownership as formally recognized in legal documents and women's market activities that pass under the radar, whether because they ran business formally owned by men or they operated off the books when selling wares or providing services. In all, Sparks demonstrates that we have much yet to learn about small businesses run by women and men, including immigrants and people of color, and that such an approach can augment more familiar ways of doing history "from below" even while providing a new vantage point on economic transformations.

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THEKLA ELLEN JOINER. *Sin in the City: Chicago and Revivalism, 1880–1920*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 271. $39.95.

This book examines three Chicago revivals that spanned what is sometimes called the "Third Great Awakening": the Dwight L. Moody revival that coincided with the Columbian Exposition of 1893; the J. Wilbur Chapman and Charles Alexander campaign of 1910; and the William Ashley "Billy" Sunday revival of 1918. Thekla Ellen Joiner is interested primarily in the conjunction of religion and popular culture and in the societal definition of sin. Her analysis of these "Second City" revivals focuses on the ways in which issues of gender, status, and race informed the perspective and tactics of evangelicals in urban America at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.

Joiner contends that in the face of economic change and growing ethnic, racial, and religious diversity that seemed to threaten cultural homogeneity and white Protestant hegemony, revivalists allied with such forces as the Prohibition and Social Purity movements. Revivalists sought to reinforce middle-class morality as the norm and, by implication, to define any divergence from that norm as inferior, immoral, and destabilizing. Revivalism's emphasis on an individualistic, highly personal theology and its espousal of a nineteenth-century rural and small-town code of morality precluded effective responses to the increasingly complex socioeconomic problems of the day. Furthermore, by defining, implicitly at least, the lifestyle of large numbers of immigrants and African Americans as beyond the pale of acceptability, it espoused a gospel of exclusiveness that undermined the very harmony and unity for which many evangelicals longed. Thus, while Third Awakening revivalism increased church membership in Chicago and reinforced the existing moral norms, it appears to have done little to address the fundamental economic, social, and cultural problems of the city.

Joiner's examination of the role of gender norms in Chicago revivalism is the most thorough and interesting facet of her study. She elucidates the significance of the ideology of domesticity as a moral and religious bulwark against what was perceived as the corrosive effects of change. She describes the important role of women, such as Emma Dryer, Virginia Healey Asher, and Grace Saxe, in the revivalism of their day. In a variety of secular venues, these able and dedicated women preached, sang, conducted prayer meetings, and established Bible study groups. Some, like Dryer, found masculine domination of evangelical efforts problematic. Others, like Asher, restructured conventional marriages for the sake of their work. Yet, they rarely consciously and directly challenged conventional gender norms, even as they probed the limits of these in the process of expanding the moral and nurturing ideals of domesticity into the public arena. The author also explores the evolving evangelical image of urban women from victims of masculine sin and irresponsibility in the 1890s to, by the 1910s, free agents whose abandonment of traditional gender roles was itself undermining morality and stability.

The author believes the "culture wars" of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to be in some ways similar to the evangelical crusades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She sees in conservative evangelicals of both eras a defensive posture that tends to equate material and cultural change with

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decay while largely oblivious to the degree to which they were and are participants in, and beneficiaries of, that change. She discerns in both movements a belief that the excesses of individualism must be checked "by the morality of the home and family" (p. 236). Consequently, ideas about domesticity in the two eras are remarkably similar, as are ideas about the social role of women. While the sins of the city are less the object of evangelical concern today than are such threats as big government, the liberal media, and the pervasive culture of consumerism, Joiner believes that both Third Awakening evangelicals and those of today have seen personal transformation as the key to social transformation and have espoused the same narrowly focused understanding of the Gospel as a message of personal salvation and morality. This fact impedes current-day evangelicals, as it did for their precursors, from effectively addressing the profoundly divisive problems of American society.

While Joiner's work offers little that is new in terms of our general understanding of gender, racial, and social norms or of conservative Protestant attitudes and values in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it does afford useful insight into the ways in which the interaction among these norms and changing conditions in Chicago informed the Moody, Chapman-Alexander, and Sunday revivals. Furthermore, while we should be wary of facile comparisons of historical parallels over a century, Joiner's observations regarding the similarities in evangelical attitudes at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries and those of today are thoughtful and warrant further consideration.

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LAURA M. WESTHOFF. *A Fatal Drifting Apart: Democratic Social Knowledge and Chicago Reform.* (Urban Life and Urban Landscape.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 309. Cloth $47.95, CD $9.95.

This is an important, thought-provoking, and sometimes difficult book about the new democratic thinking forged by leading Progressive reformers based in Chicago. Laura M. Westhoff's topic overlaps broadly with what some might term the formation of an ideology, social theory, or discourse, but what she calls "social knowledge." She uses the term much the way pragmatist and romantic thinkers of the time did: one that collapses the hierarchy and distinctions between social scientific or rational knowledge, public doctrine, and the practical, everyday knowledge that guided common people. Such knowledge became a new "praxis" suitable for those seeking to democratically reconstruct modern industrial society.

Westhoff grounds her study in the response to what Jane Addams called "the fatal drifting apart" of classes and races, strikingly evident in deepening class distinctions and hostilities, labor upheavals and violent confrontations, and rising racism and segregation. Like other historians she argues that an older knowledge based on the logic of autonomous individuals competing and associating in a self-regulating market, a knowledge that she calls "liberal republicanism," offered no solutions but only exacerbated the Gilded Age's "social problem." Out of this crisis came a new democratic social knowledge.

While scholars such as James T. Kloppenberg, Dorothy Ross, and Mary O. Furner have examined "new liberal" knowledge as it emerged from academic philosophy, social science, and investigations by public commissions, Westhoff shifts the focus of knowledge creation to the projects of grass-roots reformers. In five case studies she examines how reformers created new forms of knowledge in the course of rebuilding community through the founding a civic federation embracing diverse social interests; the creation of Hull House; arbitrating labor disputes in the wake of the Pullman Strike; challenging racist ideology and the new racial segregation; and constructing a new city charter.

The new knowledge that resulted was historical rather than natural, social rather than individual, plural rather than unitary, provisional rather than fixed, face to face ("proximate") rather than impersonal, and sympathetic rather than abstract. Each case study is used to give substance to these generalizations.

For example, in bringing together business and union leaders, social scientists, clubwomen, and civic reformers, the Civic Federation of Chicago integrated different agendas into a single "organic" conception of civic society. It did so through encouraging mutual recognition by often hostile and isolated groups and the blending of social science with grassroots investigations into social problems. Meanwhile, Addams used a pragmatic outlook to wed scientific "objective" methods with the relational and sympathetic modes of knowing common to women. In contrast to the ethics associated with the market and the increasing emphasis on expert administration by the Civic Federation, Addams looked more to the intimate knowledge and social ethics arising from personal and sympathetic interactions to overcome class and ethnic differences.

In the wake of the Pullman Strike, the movement to have the state arbitrate labor disputes served to denaturalize and loosen the grip of market-mediated conceptions of justice and serve as a conduit for workers' workplace knowledge to enter the public sphere. Finally, by the turn of the century, Westhoff shows how Ida B. Wells tried to overcome popular images of blacks as savages through humanizing in her writings the victims of lynching. Meanwhile, Progressive allies created venues for sympathetic interaction between blacks and whites.

In each case study, Westhoff refuses to romanticize her subject matter and critically evaluates the limitations, contradictions, and flaws in this emergent democratic knowledge. For example, the sympathetic knowledge of the social settlements was often unable to serve as a basis for collective action and legislation and privileged white, middle class experience.

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In her last case study, examining the attempt of the Civic Federation to write a new city charter, Westhoff concludes that the original unity of democratic social knowledge fragmented into two distinct forms. Thus, in contrast to Eldon J. Eisenach, for example, she does not see a coherent Progressive social knowledge surviving the turn of the century, but instead follows historians such as Robert B. Westbrook and Kevin Mattson in distinguishing between a more participatory and pluralistic reform outlook and one defined by Walter Lippmann as "democratic realism," which relied on public administration by elites and experts.

This book inspires the reader's confidence with its judicious and extensive mining of the relevant primary sources. It also seriously engages the relevant secondary sources in a way not often evident in a first book by a historian. There are, however, some evident drawbacks to the book. The writing is sometimes unnecessarily dense and jargon filled; this is especially true of the introduction, which the reader may want to put off reading until the end. Moreover, the arguments are often repeated without being deepened and ramified. Nonetheless, this is a valuable addition to Progressive-era historiography, one that compels us to look at well-known events and topics in new ways.

RICHARD SCHNEIROV
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RICK TILMAN. *Thorstein Veblen and the Enrichment of Evolutionary Naturalism*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2007. Pp. xxii, 344. $49.95.

In the latest of several volumes he has written on the make-up and persisting relevance of Thorstein Veblen's work, Rick Tilman argues that the philosophical foundation of Veblen's social science and cultural criticism is rightly defined as "evolutionary naturalism," and that *only* this system of belief could foster and sustain the full range of Veblen's interests and propositions. Defined roughly as a combination of evolutionary principles drawn from Charles Darwin (and some Lamarckian residues) with the efforts of John Dewey and other American pragmatists to generalize the methods of scientific inquiry to all the ways humans pursue knowledge, "evolutionary naturalism" both guided Veblen's thought and underwent improvement (or "progressive enrichment") in Veblen's hands. Tilman himself is an advocate of evolutionary naturalism and a spirited defender of Veblen's work. There is, however, something odd about Tilman taking a perspective (evolutionary naturalism) that is ostensibly opposed to all absolute, ideal "foundations" and presenting it as a system of belief providing the necessary and sufficient basis for all of a complex writer's historical output. The venture is reminiscent of dogmatic Marxists of the past insisting that "dialectical materialism" provided the philosophical foundation of Karl Marx's work, even though Marx himself insisted that he sought to escape the thrall of philosophy by engaging in historical inquiry and action. As in that case, the result of this pursuit in Tilman's account is a kind of fundamentalist orthodoxy that does not entirely honor the spirit of the original thinker.

Tilman provides a sound corrective to those readers who would reduce Veblen's social criticism of the American business system to a crude positivism and "technocratic" ambition. Veblen's appreciation of "industrial" technique as opposed to "business" waste and corruption did not imply, for Veblen, that ethical values receded behind undiluted aims of efficiency and high output. Rather, as Tilman reminds us, Veblen's value-laden standpoint rested on modest principles he defined as "the generic ends of [human] life" (p. 278). These ends, considered both definitions of the good and aims to be pursued in social change—peaceable communities, the proficiency of "workmanship," the desire for knowledge, use of critical intelligence, and solicitude for children—remain profoundly at odds, in Veblen's view, with social orders based on the "invidious" ranking of groups and individuals (pp. 171–172). In short, Veblen upheld a radical egalitarianism and solidarism that sustained Enlightenment visions of progress, assailed their perversion in capitalist modernity, and pessimistically recognized the persistence of "atavistic" urges to exploitative force, fraud, and superstition that might never loosen their hold (p. 310).

Otherwise, Tilman's book surveys Veblen's thinking on the problem of "cultural lag"; the critique of sports, gambling, and religion; aesthetics; and methods later to be called "structural-functionalism" and "sociobiology." There are in these varied chapters a number of useful observations and interesting comparisons with other theorists (major and minor, and often far removed from Veblen in time and context). Yet the ostensible purpose of the volume as a whole—elucidating the "metatheoretical" commitments (p. 258) entailed in evolutionary naturalism concerning the nature of knowledge, reality, and value—often fades from view. Throughout, it remains unclear whether Tilman's notion of a "progressive enrichment of evolutionary naturalism" (p. xii) means that Veblen refined the understanding of these metatheoretical matters, that he added to the principles of Darwin and Dewey a viable social analysis, or merely that he wished to see a social order emerge that would allow principles of evolutionary naturalism to flourish. Besides this unresolved ambiguity, the book is marred by long, tendentious rebuttals of Veblen's critics and exaggerated estimates of Veblen's foresight in anticipating much later developments in fields ranging from Kuhnian philosophy of science to population genetics.

Still, Tilman raises some fascinating questions of social theory. Is "cultural lag" (usually associated, too narrowly he suggests, with sociologist William Ogburn in the 1920s and 1930s) a viable notion akin to what others call uneven and combined development, a sense that most societies are "always . . . in a state of disequilibrium and change" (p. 289)? If that is indeed the case, how is it nonetheless that "different parts of any human society . . . are powerfully integrated" and that princi-

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ples of exploitative domination effectively "seep into" and "fill" all the "interstices or lacunae" in social structure (p. 289)? According to Tilman, Veblen made both points, and while that may be a mark of Veblen's subtlety and flexibility, we might like to know more about how he combined them. And if Veblen as Darwinist was determinedly "nonteleological" (p. 195), by what means could he sustain a directional, stage theory of development that almost inevitably underlies judgments of what is uneven or lagging? On puzzlers like these, Tilman's book could have made a great contribution.

HOWARD BRICK
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R. CLIFFORD JONES. *James K. Humphrey and the Sabbath-Day Adventists*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 2006. Pp. v, 250. $50.00.

This book is really broader in scope than its announced topic: the life of a pioneering African American Adventist minister, James K. Humphrey, and the black Adventist denomination that he eventually founded. R. Clifford Jones has also provided us with a helpful and incisive review of race relations within the Adventist movement prior to 1929, the date that the United Sabbath-Day Adventists were founded.

Even in its earlier Millerite phase of the 1840s, Adventists had some black ministers, but there appears to have been little or no continuity in this respect to the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) denomination founded in 1863. The crucial phase in the development of SDA racial policies came in the 1880s and 1890s, when this denomination and the prophet that it regarded as inspired, Ellen G. White, sometimes articulated egalitarian and even integrationist ideals, but in general gravitated toward racially segregated mission work, especially, but not only, in its evangelism in the American South. One of the first black converts and evangelists, Charles M. Kinney; and Ellen G. White's son Edson, who was very active in the missions to the South; both urged accommodation to southern mores with the practice of segregation. This racial separation carried over to the early twentieth century, most notably with the establishment in 1909 of the North American Negro Department to oversee work among African Americans, and it resulted in very uneven levels of outreach.

One of the earliest African American converts to Seventh-day Adventism in the North was a Jamaican immigrant, James K. Humphrey, in 1903. Humphrey had planned to become a Baptist missionary to Africa, but with his conversion to Adventism, he stayed in New York City and was ordained in 1907 as an Adventist minister. The author judges that of the several African American ministers affiliated with the Adventists in the early twentieth century, Humphrey was the most talented. Renowned for his revivalism, he rapidly gained a dominant role in Black Adventism in New York, and by the 1920s he was the pastor of the First Harlem SDA Church. For more than two decades, he was outspokenly loyal to Seventh-day Adventism. But, eventually, like some of his other African American SDA colleagues, he ran afoul of the church's white authorities. Jones concludes reasonably that what Humphrey was after was not integration but rather a fair share of power within the denomination. Humphrey's plans for a Health Benevolent Association in New York's northern suburbs and his cavalier attitude about consulting with other denominational leaders provided the occasion for a break in 1929.

At this point, Jones's narrative becomes more narrowly focused, leaving behind the topic of race relations among Seventh-day Adventists generally to follow the fate of Humphrey and his break-off United Sabbath Day Adventist Church. The sources on Humphrey seem not to be plentiful, but Jones manages to put together a compelling portrait through conducting oral history interviews. Suffice it to say that although the charismatic Humphrey had large plans for his new denomination, few if any came to fruition. Humphrey's death in 1952 seemed to occasion a further decline, and all that was left of his church by the turn of the twenty-first century was a rather small, struggling congregation in Harlem.

Jones is concerned with the larger context and relates Humphrey to other African American leaders such as Richard Allen, Henry McNeal Turner, and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., but the comparisons do not seem particularly compelling, as the scope of his work and his legacy was considerably smaller than that of the other leaders whom he mentions. Unlike Allen, Turner, or Powell, the politically conservative Humphrey "never dabbled in or delved into politics" (p. 158), a conclusion that seems indubitable. While Jones seems to have an impeccable grasp of Adventist sources, there are occasions that one wished that he reached outside of that fairly insular world. In one contextual passage, he concludes rather too easily that unnamed white abolitionists "were conspicuously contemptuous in their treatment of blacks" (p. 105), relying on a questionable Adventist source for this judgment and not taking into account James M. McPherson's authoritative work *The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the NAACP* (1975).

The fragmentary record on Humphrey's life and work undoubtedly made the author's organization of material challenging, but this reviewer sometimes wished for a work more strongly ordered by chronology. The Adventist record on race relations, key for an understanding of Humphrey and his career, was not examined until chapter four.

These reservations notwithstanding, this book explores a highly neglected area of American race relations and church life, and does so with meticulous attention to rare primary source material. This book opens a compelling and thought-provoking window into the racial politics of Adventism during the early twentieth century, and for that reason alone, it should be widely read.

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EDWARD J. BLUM. *W. E. B. Du Bois: American Prophet.* (Politics and Culture in Modern America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 273. $39.95.

Those of us of a certain vintage can remember when high fidelity was replaced by stereophonic sound. The new dimension gave added depth, power, and clarity to old familiar music. That is very similar to what Edward J. Blum has done for W. E. B. Du Bois by urging readers to add a serious religious dimension to their understanding of the familiar contours of the life and work of the great scholar and activist.

Blum acknowledges that Du Bois's personal theological beliefs were always elusive, but he strongly disagrees with biographers who suggest that they were superficial, or nonexistent. To be sure, Blum does not suggest that his subject was a Bible-thumping evangelical. Du Bois railed against religious dogma, "scoundrel" preachers, and sanctimonious segregationists, but he was never dismissive about religion or spiritual striving. According to Blum, the entire corpus of Du Bois's work reveals a man who was "deeply spiritual" and who was remarkably conversant and comfortable with scripture. As he challenged materialism and injustice, he was like a prophet "seething with spiritual anger" (p. 12). Blum contends that Du Bois was an "astute religious theorist who was well ahead of his time" (p.13). In short, this book "defies almost every assumption about religion in Du Bois's life" (p. 8).

Blum does not base his thesis on new sources, nor is this volume a conventional religious biography. Instead, each chapter illuminates the religious dimensions of a different category of Du Bois's writings, including his five novels. In his autobiographical works, Du Bois recalled fond memories of attending church and being an active participant in Sunday school in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. When he was a graduate student in Germany, Du Bois marked his twenty-fifth birthday with a ceremony that included a prayer, the hymn "Jesus Lover of My Soul," and concluded with a passage from the Book of Esther. While he was a young professor at Atlanta University, Du Bois wrote a series of prayers and meditations that were published after his death under the title *Prayers for Dark People* (1980). The president of the university stated that "some of the deepest and most vital expressions of religious life came from his lips as he conducted evening devotions" (p. 181).

During his long and multifaceted career, Du Bois wrote for the *A.M.E. Church Review* and the *Homiletic Review*, and he spoke at the Philadelphia Divinity School. He admired and worked with progressive ministers such as Reverdy Ransom, John Haynes Holmes, and William Howard Melish. At ninety-one, Du Bois was comfortable affirming the visions of both Karl Marx and Isaiah in a speech he broadcast to the Chinese people. Finally, in accord with his last wishes, Reverend Melish traveled to Ghana in 1963 to give Du Bois's eulogy and provide the benediction for an extraordinary life. It would seem that "Du Bois could never escape religion, and he never seemed interested in doing so" (p. 13).

Blum describes *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903) as being "steeped in biblical language and prophetic utterances" (p.76). The book was, in part, a finely crafted refutation of the racist theology that posited that blacks might be lacking souls and were cut off from access to the divine. According to Du Bois, the spiritual position of black Americans was quite the opposite. He referenced an image and borrowed some language from Exodus 26:33, in order to make the point that black people and their souls existed "within the Veil" that set apart the space that was "most holy" and closest to the divine. Blum avers that with the publication of *Souls*, Du Bois opened "a new front in the battle against white supremacist theology." (p. 76) Almost two decades later, Du Bois continued to develop that theme in *Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil* (1920), which begins with a section called the "Credo," an allusion to the Apostles' Creed.

Blum even explores the religious dimensions of Du Bois's historical magnum opus, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880*, which was published in 1935 when its author was in his late sixties. Amid its 700 pages of facts and analysis, there are some poetic passages in which Americans plodding "down Wall Street" are chided for being so jaded about religion that they cannot comprehend the power and beauty of the faith of the freedpeople who saw the hand of God in emancipation. Du Bois explained that for most former slaves, "God was real. They knew Him. They had met Him personally" (p. 118).

Blum shows that among Du Bois's most remarkable and distinctive accomplishments was his ability to marshal the powers of both penetrating analysis and elevated faith in the pursuit of social justice. Blum's work pushes far beyond Phil Zuckerman's very useful collection, *Du Bois on Religion* (2000). Still, it is to be regretted that he did not attempt the daunting task of actually defining his subject's theology, or contrasting it with the religious beliefs of prominent contemporaries, or with those of current exponents of liberation theology.

This book is compelling, engaging, illuminating, and at times combative. Hopefully, it will generate responses and debate, particularly from the scholars with whom Blum takes issue, including Susan Jacoby, Arnold Rampersad, Shamoon Zamir, and David Levering Lewis. This volume could also be usefully contrasted with Eugene Victor Wolfenstein's recent psychoanalytic reading of *Souls*, entitled *A Gift of the Spirit: Reading Souls of Black Folks* (2007). Some readers will find Blum's argument thoroughly convincing. Others will dissent with vigor. In either case, anyone with even a casual interest in Du Bois must read this important book and come to terms with its thesis.

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University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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CYNTHIA TAYLOR. *A. Philip Randolph: The Religious Journey of an African American Labor Leader.* New York: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 290. $39.00.

Possessing "a passion for progressive religion" (p. xi) herself, Cynthia Taylor is keen to find and trace this quality in her study of religion and A. Philip Randolph (1889–1979), radical journalist, leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), and civil rights activist. Taylor challenges the "common interpretation of Randolph as an atheist and antireligious" and makes a largely persuasive case for his "generally positive relationship to religion and religious institutions" (p. 2). Using archival collections, the reminiscences of Randolph and key associates, and stories and editorials in the *Messenger*, which Randolph co-edited, and the BSCP paper *Black Worker*, Taylor focuses on Randolph's life through the Prayer Pilgrimage of 1957 in Washington, D.C., and adds a brief epilogue about his later years.

Raised by an African Methodist Episcopal (AME) clergyman father and devout mother in Florida, Randolph migrated to Harlem, New York, in 1911 and became a socialist, which Taylor regards as "a natural evolution from the social gospel message of his parents' African Methodism" (p. 4). She argues that during his first ten years in New York, Randolph's journalism brought him a reputation "as an atheist and severe critic of all institutional religion" (p. 27) that has unfairly dominated historians' interpretations of his approach to religion during the remainder of his life.

Taylor contends that by 1925 Randolph rejected accusations of atheism, and for decades he worked with progressive elements in black and white religion to advance BSCP organizing and civil rights, while criticizing African American clergymen who emphasized salvation in the hereafter without addressing economic and racial problems. In the 1940s Randolph advocated the use of Gandhian nonviolent civil disobedience from religious conviction, not just as a matter of political tactics, and he "anticipated a theology of black liberation" (p. 159) as well as many of the modern civil rights movement's tactics.

Randolph and his associates encouraged Martin Luther King, Jr., to adopt the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence during the Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama that brought King to prominence. Randolph subsequently worked with King on the Prayer Pilgrimage and the March on Washington in 1963. After many years without church membership, Randolph joined an AME church in Harlem in 1957 and remained a regular financial contributor to it thereafter.

Taylor sometimes overstates her case, which hampers an otherwise strong interpretation with a good evidential base. Randolph later recalled "preaching atheism" in his early years in Harlem, but Taylor argues unconvincingly that his use of the term was ambiguous and maintains that he never expressed "a disbelief or doubt in God" (p. 31). She adds that, in any case, "the words and actions of his later career suggest the opposite" (p. 31). Here Taylor seems, like the historians she criticizes, to be dismissing contrary evidence and using other material anachronistically. She states that "By the late 1920s, Randolph flatly denied he was an atheist" (p. 31), but notes several pages later that he had pragmatic reasons for doing so since a denial was essential if his BSCP organizing drive and bids for political access were not to be fatally damaged.

Taylor argues for "the complexity and genuineness of his Christian beliefs" (p. 84) that blended "an African Methodist social gospel and a Christian humanist perspective informed by a philosophical belief in the sacredness of the human personality" (p. 225). Yet, she might be closer to the truth when she states that he was not "a deeply religious man" and that he used "religion as an organizing tool" (p. 4). Taylor demonstrates Randolph's use of religious imagery in his speeches, but this is perhaps not surprising in the son of a minister who knew his audience, and it was an approach used by some communist activists in 1930s Alabama and some nonreligious civil rights organizers in the 1960s South. It seems likely that Randolph turned away from religion in young adulthood before returning to it gradually, rather than always possessing a religious core. Taylor claims that the Prayer Pilgrimage "did contribute to the Civil Rights Act of 1957" (pp. 219–220) but offers no further explanation or support for this assertion.

Nevertheless, Taylor's well-written study demonstrates that Randolph's criticisms of organized religion eased as elements within it demonstrated willingness in the middle decades of the twentieth century to engage in social action. He engaged constructively with concerned religious leaders and clergy, and later in life even accepted a one year appointment as chairman of the Protestant Council of the City of New York.

MARK NEWMAN
University of Edinburgh

NANCY MARIE ROBERTSON. *Christian Sisterhood, Race Relations, and the YWCA, 1906–46.* (Women in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 276. $45.00.

Nancy Marie Robertson has finally given the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) the thorough study that this influential organization deserves. She focuses on the concept of Christian sisterhood as it was understood by African American and white members in the early twentieth century. Pushed by black women and liberal white women, the YWCA ended segregation within its own doors in 1946. In so doing, it was years ahead of its male counterpart, the YMCA. This book provides further evidence for the "Long Civil Rights Movement," with in-depth research and a nuanced reading of the process of negotiation over the YWCA's policy and practices.

YWCA rhetoric, which stressed women's commonality across racial difference, often fell short in reality. African American women were frequently excluded

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from meetings, social events, and leadership positions. However, African American women consistently turned to that rhetoric to compel white women to come closer to the ideal. When the YWCA formed from the merger of two different organizations in 1906, few black associations were organized sufficiently to join. However, their absence was immediately a cause for contention. A group of mostly southern white women met in Asheville, North Carolina, in 1907 and recommended that work in the South focus on white girls and young women; work for colored women would be delayed a year. In the meantime, African American programs in the South would be administered from the New York national office. Robertson states that their priority was for the YWCA to continue development as a national organization. Not willing to alienate southern white women, the YWCA acquiesced to segregation, assuming white women would remain in control. This decision was similar to the policies of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC). Each organization allowed for local segregation of African American women in separate unions, clubs, or branches; the WCTU and the YWCA did allow African American women to participate at national conventions. Robertson contends that southern white women did not want to work with African Americans and therefore asked that black branches report directly to the national board. The board even hired Addie Hunton to recruit, evaluate, and assist local black branches. Here a comparison with the WCTU would have been interesting. White WCTU women wanted to control local black unions, but they were sometimes thwarted when black women, to maintain independence, organized as WCTU #2s, which reported directly to the national. Within a couple of years, however, YWCA policy changed, and black associations had to organize as branches under the local central (white) association, ceding some of the independence that had been possible when they reported to New York. African American women grumbled, Robertson found, but ultimately "saw the choice not as between segregation and integration, but as between segregation and exclusion" (p. 43).

Although whites became more interested in interracial work during World War I, their aim was improved harmony between the races and better opportunities for African Americans; it was not challenging segregation. African American women, however, began to push white women in the YWCA to reconsider segregation in the 1920s. They were spurred on in part by the "Paris incident" in which Mary Talbert was turned away from the American Women's Club in Paris run by the YWCA. A series of meetings between prominent African American women and white representatives of the YWCA yielded small changes only. Robertson's detailed research and nuanced understanding of meetings and correspondence provides a rich portrait of the difficulties white and black women encountered, even when they tried to work together. She reads sources through the eyes of African Americans, compares official reports to the more complicated meeting notes, and notes the unofficial grumblings of black women found in their correspondence.

By the 1930s, the YWCA insisted on interracial accommodations at conventions, included more African American women in leadership positions, and advocated for a federal anti-lynching bill. A commission to Gather Interracial Experience conducted an expansive survey of integration efforts within the YWCA, producing a 116-page report in 1944. That report was presented in 1946 as an interracial charter with thirty-five recommendations, all of which the convention accepted. Robertson reminds us that this official desegregation of the YWCA, just like desegregation in the nation as a whole, still had to be put into practice. African American women complained that they were not treated equally in some instances, and sometimes were reluctant to give up the control that all black branches had provided. Thus while white women saw the 1946 charter as the final achievement of their goal, African American women understood there was much work still to be done. It took another twenty years for the organization to expel local branches that did not comply.

Robertson has written a thoroughly researched and comprehensive history that, while focused on the YWCA, tells the larger story of interracial work and is essential reading for those interested in the long civil rights movement. Many women in civil rights organizations like the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee got their start in the YWCA. More importantly, her conclusion that this was not "a history of inevitable progress but a history of continuing tension and negotiation" underscores just how difficult the struggle for civil rights was even in what was one of the more progressive organizations of its time.

Joan Marie Johnson
Northeastern Illinois University

Catherine E. Rymph. *Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage through the Rise of the New Right*. (Gender and American Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 338. Cloth $59.95, paper $24.95.

In this important and well-researched book, Catherine E. Rymph offers a compelling portrait of the challenges women faced in their attempt to find an influential and equal place within the Republican Party in the six decades following the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Throughout her narrative, Rymph highlights the recurring tensions between women who served the Grand Old Party (GOP) as party officials, women who were part of the vast network of all-female Republican clubs, and, later, the party's more conservative, even reactionary, female members. Central to these tensions were competing definitions of women's proper role within the Republican Party and how best to promote the party's agenda nationwide. Empowered by the growing prominence of the New Right and an essen-

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tialist, outsider politics, conservative party women, by the 1970s, vied with Republican feminists for influence over official party positions on issues important to women. Led by Phyllis Schlafly, the anti-feminists ultimately "proved successful in winning the Republican Party in the war over feminism" (p. 2).

In the first half of her book, Rymph stresses how Republican women's various partisan choices led to both rewards and disappointments. Party women's strategy of creating separate positions for women on committees, for example, increased women's visibility within the GOP but also limited their ability to offer a serious challenge to traditional positions of male authority. Women who chose to practice partisanship in independent clubs faced their own particular challenges. Characterized by a crusading political style and a belief in women's moral superiority, these clubs, by the late 1930s, represented an enormous array of agendas and ideas about the meaning of women's political involvement; yet, they also had the potential to serve as a vast, grass-roots network for the GOP, as many Republican leaders recognized. The task of transforming the hundreds of independent women's clubs into a single, disciplined party unit fell to Marion Martin, who formed the National Federation of Women's Republican Clubs in 1938. Under Martin's leadership, the Federation promoted women's loyalty to the party, uniformity of purpose, and a male political style that eschewed independent thinking, criticism of official party positions, and a cautious approach to controversial issues like the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and racial equality. By the 1950s, Rymph writes, Republican women's clubs played a largely supportive, auxiliary function and took primary responsibility for the party's grass-roots volunteer work, a role critical to sustaining the party but one that led to few rewards and little power for women within the GOP.

Throughout the second half of her work, Rymph describes how anti-communism and the resurgence of morality-based politics led to a spike in the Federation's membership and fostered a new, right-wing constituency that increasingly grew frustrated with the moderate Republicanism of the Eisenhower years. It was this constituency, led by Schlafly, that mobilized behind Barry Goldwater's unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1964 and that began to campaign against the ERA and other goals of the 1970s feminist movement. While Republican feminists remained hopeful that they could continue to influence the party's platform by linking feminism to the GOP's traditional support for individual rights and social reform, they eventually lost out to the conservatives and became increasingly marginalized by the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

There is little to criticize in this sophisticated work. In the early chapters, Rymph is careful to note the particular challenges and discriminations African American women faced in the partisan arena, but this analysis grows thinner as the book progresses. Also, Rymph's explanation for the eventual triumph of social conservatives within the Republican Party is not entirely satisfactory. Linking this triumph more deliberately to developments such as the party's realignment on civil rights issues and the rise of the Religious Right would have strengthened and better framed her argument. Finally, more attention to how the experiences of Republican women compared to those of activists in the Democratic Party and nonpartisan organizations like the League of Women Voters would have underscored her point that women who entered politics in the twentieth century represented a variety of gender ideals, goals, leadership styles, and organizational strategies.

The strengths of Rymph's splendid book far outweigh these minor weaknesses. Unlike many previous accounts that focus on the so-called "heyday" of women's political activism, Rymph examines how the rewards and pitfalls of partisanship continued to characterize women's political experiences throughout the twentieth century. Detailing the many tensions and conflicts among party regulars and clubwomen and Republican feminists and social conservatives, she complicates the story of women's political activism and the history of the Republican Party itself. Historically, women have used essentialist definitions of womanhood to advance not just progressive causes but more conservative and reactionary ones as well, she points out. And because the Republican Party today is so closely identified with social conservatism and the Religious Right, Rymph's work serves as an important reminder that feminists like Mary Louise Smith once found a comfortable home in the GOP. Perhaps most important, by showing how contrary ideas about women's political nature and their roles in society shaped internal party debates, the public's perception of Republican womanhood, and the growing conservatism of the Republican Party, Rymph's study reaffirms that women and gender have been tremendously central to the development of American politics.

JAN DOOLITTLE WILSON
University of Tulsa

JAN DOOLITTLE WILSON. *The Women's Joint Congressional Committee and the Politics of Maternalism, 1920–30.* (Women in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. x, 245. $40.00.

Jan Doolittle Wilson's book is a solidly crafted and original contribution to the history of U.S. women's reform and the study of U.S. social policy. It offers an in-depth analysis of the legislative debates over the Sheppard-Towner Bill and the child labor amendment, two of the most important pieces of social welfare legislation in the 1920s; and its authoritative account of the origins, goals, and influence of the Women's Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC) raises significant questions about the changing nature of women's political citizenship and power before and after suffrage. In short, Wilson's study should be considered a major addition not only to women's history, but also to what Meg Jacobs

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and Julian Zelizer trumpet as the "new political history."

Wilson's story of the rise and fall of the WJCC, the formidable national organization that coordinated women's lobbying efforts throughout the 1920s, confirms the now standard view that women's political activism did not come to an abrupt end with the passage of the suffrage amendment. Set up in 1920 by Maud Wood Park, the president of the League of Women Voters, the WJCC had considerable success, Wilson argues, in advancing the legislative goals of social feminists in the early 1920s. Their success rested in part on their skillful navigation of the dilemmas women reformers faced in the political culture of the 1920s. Separate-sex women's reform organizations, deriving their political authority from maternalist claims, encountered increased public skepticism. Many now expected women to adopt the same political practices as men: that is, to advance their political claims through partisan politics. Yet women who turned to party politics found their power sorely circumscribed. The women who founded the WJCC recognized this new political context. The umbrella structure and open membership policy of the WJCC, Wilson explains, "provided for coordinated legislative efforts reminiscent of the suffrage movement, while it permitted diversity of political interest among its members" (p. 19). Thus, the WJCC hoped to maximize the power of women's separate political culture without discouraging women's partisan participation.

WJCC's flexible, pragmatic approach paid off handsomely in the battle over the Sheppard-Towner Bill. The United States had one of the highest female and infant mortality rates among industrialized countries in the 1920s, and the majority of women's organizations agreed that the federal government should take some responsibility for addressing this problem. Wilson spends two fascinating chapters detailing the legislative debate over the Sheppard-Towner Bill, its passage in 1921, and the subsequent campaigns for its implementation through the state boards of health. It is a skillful account not only of women's participation but also of the prominent role played by progressive male politicians in both parties.

After 1924, however, the WJCC met stiff resistance from conservative and business organizations, and its effectiveness declined precipitously. Following the leadership of Florence Kelley and others, the WJCC pushed hard for the passage of an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting child labor. Congress passed the child labor amendment in 1924, but it met defeat in state after state, often being voted down by popular referendum. In explaining this turn of political fortune, Wilson follows the emphasis of J. Stanley Lemons on the adroit use conservative groups made of the public's fear of Bolshevism. Wilson recognizes the significance of other forces: the waning appeal of maternalist rhetoric, the inability of the WJCC to frame the amendment as in the "public interest," and the unpopularity of the provision specifying anyone under eighteen as a "child." But, she concludes, "right-wing attacks, more than any other factor, greatly undermined organized women's ability to pursue social reform in the 1920s" (p. 148) and led to WJCC's loss of political efficacy. Wilson's careful uncovering of the aggressive red-baiting rhetoric used by the National Association of Manufacturers and its allies, the "Woman Patriots" and the "Sentinels of the Republic," is an important and untold story. Yet the defeat of the child labor amendment and WJCC's waning influence may have derived as much from the other factors Wilson cites as from the red-baiting campaigns of their opponents. As Wilson notes in passing, many voters had legitimate concerns about restricting the employment of older teenagers and the economic losses to the family economy.

One of the more original contributions of the book is Wilson's consistent attention to the bitter disagreements over state regulation. The fiercest opponents of women's reform in the 1920s, Wilson contends, were driven by a fear of government regulation and intrusion. Conversely, women reformers, at least those associated with the WJCC, shared a consensus that the federal government needed to take more responsibility for regulating health and employment. In this respect then, her title does not fully suggest the richness of her study. It is as much about the "politics of regulation" as the "politics of maternalism."

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JENNIFER RITTERHOUSE. *Growing Up Jim Crow: How Black and White Southern Children Learned Race.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 306. Cloth $49.95, paper $19.95.

In 1929, Albon L. Holsey, an administrator at Tuskegee Institute and a leader of the National Negro Business League, published an article in *American Mercury* called "Learning How to Be Black." Among other memories of growing up African American in Georgia in the late nineteenth century, Holsey's account of running an errand when he was about ten years old stands out in its illustration of the banal horrors of segregated childhoods. As young Holsey passed the porch of a white family's house, a father pointed at him and said "Look—nigger" to his infant son. "Say 'nigger' " (p. 71). This is just one of many great stories that Jennifer Ritterhouse includes in her book. Sarah Fitzpatrick looked back from the Depression at her life in the segregated South and told an interviewer, a black child was "al'ays scaid dat sump'in gonna hap'en all de time; scaid he gwin' butt into some white fo'ks an' have trouble, al'ays scaid ya' gwin' do sump'in 'rong an' have de white fo'ks beat'cha up" (p. 40). From the other side of the color line, two young white girls, ages ten and eleven, read the papers and decided that the way to get attention was to accuse a black man of attacking them. "The children had been hearing and reading sensational stories throughout the country which have been very frequent

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in the papers recently, and they thought that they would get up a sensation on their own account," a Florence, South Carolina, paper reported. "They made up the tale and only the fact that the sheriff was a level-headed man saved that section of the country from an outbreak of lawlessness" (p. 74). The best parts of this monograph are the gems Ritterhouse digs out of the rich oral history collections at the Library of Congress, Duke University, and the University of North Carolina.

Ritterhouse grounds her study in the idea that "far more than physical separation, white southerners wanted social distance" (p. 15). White southerners, she insists, "desired intimate but demonstrably unequal relations" or African Americans' performance of their allegedly inferior status (p. 14). This "racial etiquette," she argues, marked one crucial way in which white southerners created distance and hierarchy between people who otherwise often lived and worked close together. Physical separation, as other scholars have argued, acted in the late nineteenth century as a substitute and even occasionally a concession, a way whites controlled spaces because they failed to entirely control black people. White southerners created legal segregation, at least in part, because blacks refused to follow white rules of racial etiquette. But racial etiquette in effect also taught white and black children the meaning of race. Racial difference and racial identities have to be made, Ritterhouse argues, and a key part of that making is teaching them to children. For white children, this process involved forgetting non-racist alternatives. Black children, by contrast, learned to fight "etiquette with etiquette," learning, especially from their middle-class parents, "an alternate code of respectability" (p. 56).

While these ideas about race and segregation are not new, no scholar has examined how children learned race in the segregated American South as deeply or as broadly as Ritterhouse has. In particular, Ritterhouse covers interesting ground when she describes how black middle and working-class parents taught their children to navigate the "lessons," backed always by the threat of violence, that white southerners were intent on teaching. Black parents, she argues, gave their children two forms of explicit verbal directions, restrictions against too much social intimacy with whites and instructions in naming and the use of courtesy titles. Black middle-class parents believed that what they saw as respectable behavior both proved the lie of white supremacy and gave their children some psychological protection against whites. Black working-class parents often taught their children to appear to accommodate white demands even as they worked to subvert them. Given the kind of literary and autobiographical sources that provide much of her evidence, however, a more interdisciplinary approach would have enabled Ritterhouse to examine the psychological and cultural complexity of black efforts to navigate the always potentially bloody terrain of racial etiquette that she admits is at work, for example, in Richard Wright's famous elevator story (p. 48).

In the end, Ritterhouse asserts that the "comparative openness of childhood race relations was not enough, in itself, to encourage and sustain dissent among white southerners" (p. 235). In fact, other scholars have argued persuasively, these childhood connections often serve the opposite purpose. White adults' thinking back on the racial openness of their childhoods was part of how segregation worked, one way in which white southerners perpetuated white supremacy. Southern whites' longings for connection and intimacy with African Americans—a lack of social distance—could be acknowledged and given outlet and yet also dismissed as nostalgic and childish, something to be cherished and yet put away on a shelf like a favorite toy. Much more persuasive is Ritterhouse's suggestion that black accounts of interactions between black and white children provide scholars with a way to trace the growing anger of black adolescents that exploded with such political and cultural force in the civil rights movement.

GRACE ELIZABETH HALE
University of Virginia

ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF. *Waves of Opposition: Labor and the Struggle for Democratic Radio*. (The History of Communication.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 307. Cloth $60.00, paper $25.00.

This book investigates labor's participation in American broadcasting from the 1930s through the 1960s, and its struggles both within and against the dominant commercial radio system. That labor once had a very significant media presence is, Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf notes, not well remembered, and indeed almost impossible to imagine in today's United States.

The book is framed by an understanding that through this period labor and business were engaged in an ongoing ideological struggle, and that radio became an important site of that contest. One strand is the history of attempts to establish labor stations, from the Chicago Federation of Labor's WCFL in 1926, to the disappointments of the 1930s when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) turned down labor applications for station licenses, to the brief careers of five labor FM stations in the late 1940s. Perhaps even more significant than the histories of these flagship stations were labor's attempts to speak over or to produce programs for mainstream radio. Here Fones-Wolf draws out well the complexity of the relationship between labor's broadcasting ambitions and state regulation. The FCC was often hostile to labor, although briefly more sympathetic in the later 1930s and early 1940s. But through the whole period covered by the book, Fones-Wolf argues, it was (in contrast to the deregulated present) the "governmental regulatory regime that provided public interest groups with at least the opportunity to fight for a more democratic media" (p. 7).

Some of labor's most intractable problems resulted from broadcasting industry self-regulation. The Na-

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tional Association of Broadcasters (NAB) adopted a code in 1939 that forbade the sale of time on radio for discussion of "controversial" issues. Labor found its message almost always classified as controversial and was thus generally unable to buy airtime; it became reliant upon station management for occasional gifts of time or invited appearances on panel or forum programs. In previous work, Fones-Wolf has argued that the code "virtually knocked labor off the air." In this book, in longer perspective, the code story is as importantly one of recovery and resilience. Labor did regain its presence on the air. The code was defeated, in part through the interventions of a more activist FCC, which, in a series of decisions and public statements, had "all but destroyed the code" before the NAB finally abandoned it in 1945 (p. 124).

Some of the most original work in the book is on the less-explored postwar period. Fones-Wolf identifies a renewed media reform movement immediately after World War II (p. 134)—and in this respect she offers a less pessimistic picture than Robert McChesney, who saw the defeat of media reformers in 1934 as permanent and absolute. Fones-Wolf documents the extent of labor broadcasting during the Cold War era. In the early 1950s there were fifteen weekly local Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) programs in Michigan alone (p. 179), and union leadership was a familiar presence on network radio (p. 202). The networks in these years sold time to labor for variety and serial as well as news commentary programs. One of the strengths of the book is its parallel attention to the business presence on radio. Labor programs responded to and in turn provoked openly ideological broadcasts from business lobbies, and Fones-Wolf plausibly sees pro-business radio activity as one measure of the effectiveness of labor's broadcasting.

A persistent problem for radio history is that most of the programming can be read about but not heard. Here we get a good sense of the kinds of things labor did on the air, but less of the aural texture of the programs—although where possible Fones-Wolf makes use of listener letters as some evidence about how programs were heard. This is an openly partisan book, and at times its relentlessly positive interpretation of labor's—and especially the CIO's—radio ventures seems to limit its critical edge. The failure of the labor FM stations, for example, is blamed on manufacturers' failure to develop low-cost FM sets and the broadcasting industry's failure to promote FM (p. 200). But fascinating suggestions were not followed up, such as that the preference of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union stations for classical music and overtly educational programming may have had something to do with their relatively small audiences. The complexity of the labor stations' relationship with popular commercial entertainment forms might well have been teased out a little further. Fones-Wolf does perform a most valuable service in reminding readers of the ideological divisions that pervaded radio's first fifty years. The book is detailed and very well researched in numerous archival collections, but it also offers a bigger picture of change over time. It makes a major contribution to our understanding of American labor's radio activities and ambitions and is sure to be the standard work on the subject for many years.

DAVID GOODMAN
University of Melbourne

DANIEL HUREWITZ. *Bohemian Los Angeles and the Making of Modern Politics*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. x, 367. $29.95.

In greater Los Angeles, a few miles from downtown, is a hilly area encompassing Silver Lake and Echo Park that was once known as Edendale. Los Angeles's "bohemia in the decades following the First World War," Edendale was, according to Daniel Hurewitz, the place where a "new ideology of identity" came to be constructed by groups of like-minded bohemians and opposition from the larger society (pp. 13–14, 279). Hurewitz's thesis is that the "politicization of essence" (p. 154) was shaped by this neighborhood whose artists, leftists, and homosexuals reimagined "the relationship between politics and emotions" through a process, ca. 1918–1953, in which "one cultural world was destroyed and another—a political one—was born" (p. 18).

The meaning of all this, and the relevance of such a history, is stated most clearly in the conclusion (where readers might wish to begin). The "new political culture" whose evolution Hurewitz traces over five decades in Edendale, from artist communities to communists to the homophile founders of the Mattachine Society, was one that elevated individual essence and group identity—as exemplified in Mattachine's conception of homosexuals as an oppressed social minority (p. 279).

The impetus for Hurewitz's book was his desire to locate the roots of twenty-first-century identity politics, to "peel back the most recent set of additions to American conceptions of selfhood, in particular the conception of a politicized essential identity" (p. 281). This project is surely of interest to many readers, and the author sets out a credible and ambitious plan to approach it. At its heart are six chapters on different communities or scenes, progressing chronologically and situated in greater Los Angeles. The individual chapters focus on deviant gender and sexual cultures and legal persecution in 1910s–1930s Los Angeles; Edendale artist communities ca. 1927–1938; the rise of vice and anti-vice forces in 1930s Los Angeles; 1930s–1940s Edendale communists; Los Angeles racial politics and identity conceptions ca. 1910s–1950s; and Mattachine's founding and homosexual-identity conception ca. 1950.

The book also contains an introduction, prologue, and conclusion. The prologue is devoted mainly to vaudeville's once-renowned female impersonator Julian Eltinge, who seems to emerge here as a principal subject. Only after further reading did Eltinge's role in this story as barometer of cultural notions of gender and sexuality become clear to me. One reason is the

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book's isolating treatment of the Edendale–Los Angeles scene. Seeing no in-text acknowledgment of the existing literature on twentieth-century U.S. culture's shift from gender inversion to homosexual identity, I read Hurewitz's "reinvention" of this transformation through Edendale's Eltinge expectantly, waiting (in vain) to discover its unique, perhaps local, significance. Was Eltinge *sui generis*, or a West Coast counterpart to George Chauncey's Newport seamen, caught unaware by the same dawning paradigm of sexual identity? Clearly the Eltinge episode was local, but are we to understand its significance globally? What about the book's overall topic, the evolution of a "politicized essential identity"? Did this take place uniquely or originally in Los Angeles? Were Edendale's mid-twentieth-century artists, communists, and homophiles particular progenitors of twenty-first-century identity politics? Such questions arise in reading the chapters, but the book's most direct answers to them appear in the introduction and, especially, the conclusion. Ultimately these answers do not so much elucidate the relationships between local and national cultures as sustain the ambiguity. To wit: local homophile politics were merely a "demonstration" of the cultural merging of personal and political (p. 273); but Edendale's own "key players . . . altered American culture," leaving us with a "legacy" of a "self simultaneously private and political" (pp. 281–282).

The book's large-scale argument often disappears from its chapters, and the occasional attempts to connect with it can seem tenuous. In chapter four we are told, "In many ways, Edendale leftists forged a personal-political identity not unlike what Mattachine would embrace" (p. 155). There is no elaboration of the "many ways" the one identity is "not unlike" the other, and the leftist-Mattachine comparison seems strained, opaque, or both given its novelty and the fact that the book's Mattachine chapter, self-contained like all the chapters, is yet to come. Similarly tenuous connections surface elsewhere, starting with the earliest mentions of Eltinge and Mattachine founder Harry Hay. Hurewitz recalls having "stumbled across" Eltinge while researching Hay and acknowledges that these two never knew each other and flourished in different historical moments (p. 3). "Yet," he continues, "Eltinge and Hay had a fair amount in common. These two tall white men loved to perform" (p. 4).

The individual chapters succeed in presenting engrossing, often compelling narratives. These are grounded in solid scholarship, including extensive archival research and original interviews (there is no bibliography to tally the sources). But linking the varied narratives in the service of the overall argument proves more elusive.

NADINE HUBBS
University of Michigan

KEVIN ALLEN LEONARD. *The Battle for Los Angeles: Racial Ideology and World War II*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 360. $34.95.

Given its demographic diversity, Los Angeles provides an excellent case study of how various groups conceptualized the meaning of race over time. Kevin Allen Leonard carefully listens in on the multiplicity of views expressed in print from Angelenos across the color line in this provocative study, utilizing Peggy Pasco's thesis that American racialism (the view that racial identity, culture, and behavior were inextricably linked) gradually gave way to modernist racial ideology (which tended to view race and culture as separate factors).

Leonard locates the origin of the debate over race with the 1941 Fair Employment Practice Committee hearing held in Los Angeles. While the hearings opened over the question of whether racism was at all a factor in employment and promotion practices, the focus of the larger debate on race shifted dramatically after the attack on Pearl Harbor to become a question of whether Japanese could ever be fully American, regardless of where they were born. The question of race, patriotism, and citizenship momentarily shifted to include Mexican Americans, as traditional racialists looked to biology as the primary explanation for the imagined rise in juvenile delinquency among Mexican Americans during the crises of the Sleepy Lagoon Murder Trial and Zoot Suit Riot. While the focus returned to the so-called Japanese question after the latter ended, Leonard finds that the nature of the debate changed in subtle but important ways as more modern racialists organized to combat traditional views. Thus by the time World War II was over, traditionalist views of race were on the wane as modernist views gained favor. But Leonard is careful not to sound a triumphalist note. While he finds that modernist views about race became more common in the postwar era, he also concedes that few whites were willing to yield the privileges of whiteness.

Surveying the collective dialogue of a city through print in order to tease out the nuances of various views is a difficult task, and Leonard provides the best attempt to date in trying to pick out the melodies of competing choruses. His careful, thoughtful reading of what certain people wrote about race (and perhaps more importantly, how they wrote) offers a snapshot of various positions seen through the lens of major newspapers with circulations in the thousands as well as small community newspapers with far more limited audiences.

This methodology, however, is both the strength and weakness of the work. Leonard deserves much credit for doggedly sifting through every available issue of certain Los Angeles newspapers, both large and small. Indeed, this is the first scholarly examination of Los Angeles newspapers to include the small Japanese American paper *Rafu Shimpo*, along with theAfrican American newspapers *California Eagle*, *Los Angeles Sentinel*, and *Los Angeles Tribune*, and the Spanish-language *La Opinión*. Yet Leonard provides no rationale for why certain newspapers were selected over others, and he provides no quantitative study that would have strengthened his assertion that the debate changed in qualitative ways. His narrative, in fact, provides com-

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pelling evidence for an alternative reading of the debate—that both traditionalist and modernist views on race changed markedly little during the war and continued to compete fiercely with one another in the postwar era. Further, while Leonard provides a careful reading of primary sources, he is less careful in his reading of some of the secondary literature. Finally, for a study of racial ideology, Leonard curiously fails to explore what race meant for white Angelenos. Race exists instead as something that only non-whites possessed.

Leonard initially set out to discover what people thought and believed about race during this formative period in Los Angeles, and, having confronted the complexity (if not impossibility) of accessing belief, he modified his study to explore the equally important question of how writing about race changed over time in the popular venues of Los Angeles. While that quest is still a daunting one, it is clearly an important and worthwhile undertaking. This book is one of the best studies thus far to provide students of history with an overall sense of divergent voices on the question of race and rights during a fluid moment in the city's history.

EDUARDO OBREGÓN PAGÁN
Arizona State University

JOSHUA M. ZEITZ. *White Ethnic New York: Jews, Catholics, and the Shaping of Postwar Politics*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 278. Cloth $65.00, paper $24.95.

Joshua M. Zeitz's book is a comprehensive little gem of detailed research, crisp writing, and cogent analysis. Zeitz challenges the accepted consensus-school thinking on ethnicity in politics that by 1949, "third-generation" immigrants, having risen to the middle class, were "only the more anxious to achieve the further respectability of unhyphenated Americanism" (p. 3). Instead, Zeitz traces a persistent differentiation along ethnic lines in the politics of New York City.

New York's Jews, Zeitz contends, remained part of the New Deal coalition into the 1970s; New York's Irish and Italian Catholics, on the other hand, became increasingly conservative and Republican as the Cold War progressed. The key reason for the difference: Jews advanced a liberal political culture "mandate[d] to question authority in the larger interest of promoting social justice" (p. 41), while Catholics accepted authority because of their long from-the-top-down religious tradition. "Certainly every Jew was not a freethinker," Zeitz qualifies, nor every Catholic a mindless slave to authority figures. "But," he concludes, "the culture of Italian and Irish American Catholicism ... stressed obedience and community, while Jewish theology and secular culture [lauded] individuality, intellectual freedom, and dissent" (p. 80).

New York, like the rest of the country, had to deal with several divisive issues during and after World War II, including fascism and communism. While Jewish opposition to fascism and Nazism was steadfast, the Irish community rallied around a teacher accused of "ridiculing Jewish students" by suggesting that Adolf Hitler was not all bad (p. 89). New York's Italians slowly broke away from Franklin D. Roosevelt's coalition "partly in response to the president's outspoken opposition to Benito Mussolini's fascist regime" (p. 93). America's struggle with communism also divided the communities. Neither Jews nor Catholics were pro-Soviet, but Zeitz notes that they differed on approaches to anticommunism. New York's Catholic establishment "endorsed" Joseph McCarthy even after the Army-McCarthy hearings (p. 134), while "New York's organized Jewish community seemed less concerned by the specter of communism than by perceived threats to free speech" (p. 135). The challenges of antifascism and anticommunism drove a wedge between the factions of the New Deal coalition.

Zeitz's observations of ideological divisions are prologue to his key discussion of how and why New York City politics changed in the 1960s; that discussion revolves around the growth of the black and Puerto Rican populations and the response of whites to it. Zeitz presents the challenges facing blacks and Puerto Ricans in an extended essay called "Race." As informative as the discussion is, it interrupts the thrust of his larger argument involving white "Reaction." Zeitz is careful to note that some economic and demographic features of New York City are idiosyncratic, particularly regarding race relations. New York has a history of ethnic and racial diversity, making it more accepting of multiculturalism. Furthermore, because it is a city of renters rather than owners, the violence and intimidation that resulted in other cities when blacks moved next door did not occur as commonly in New York. There was, however, still a white reaction to the changes.

"Throughout the 1960s," Zeitz insists, "social upheaval in New York drew Jews and Catholics closer together in their position on race relations" (p. 171). Mayor John V. Lindsay played a pivotal role in this development. Lindsay, according to Zeitz, made an overt play for the race vote, upsetting the "usually more subtle" race politics of the city (p. 190). Lindsay created what many New Yorkers viewed as an overly permissive society; this fostered racial polarization and caused many Jews to "abandon liberal positions on integration and urban race relations" (p. 195). This did not translate into votes at the polls or to a purely racial politics, however; New York's Jews did not join the Republican Party, and "Gotham never played host to a unified white political culture" because ethnic divisions persisted (p. 228).

There is much to praise in Zeitz's work. He successfully melds quantitative and qualitative research, utilizing primary and significant secondary sources. While such studies could perpetuate stereotypes, Zeitz judiciously qualifies his conclusions. His observations on generational relations inside the Catholic and Jewish communities raise interesting issues for further study. On race and white backlash, the study demonstrates New York's uniqueness while contributing to the discussion on the national level. The author's observations

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are balanced: he toes the line that backlash was not just about race but acknowledges that "despite their attempts to qualify such fears as color-blind, [whites] associated African Americans with urban blight and decay" (p. 194). Thus, as with most literature on the subject of race relations, Zeitz's work begs the question: would a similar backlash have resulted if those challenging stable neighborhood patterns were not racial minorities? Perhaps that cannot be answered. Regardless, Zeitz makes a most positive contribution to the discussion.

STEPHEN GRANT MEYER
Iredell-Statesville Schools

JOYCE ANTLER. *You Never Call! You Never Write! A History of the Jewish Mother*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 321. $24.95.

Joyce Antler's book is at once seriously delightful and delightfully serious. The book provides a model of how to simultaneously deconstruct stereotypes and investigate the impact the same stereotypes can have on real people's lives. Antler argues that each generation of American Jews from the early twentieth century forward has created its own images of the Jewish mother, some with longer staying power than others. By examining the changing social and cultural conditions of American Jewry, she offers an intriguing exploration of the fluctuating meaning of motherhood, the shifts in private and public gender dynamics, and the role of popular culture in shaping ideas and behavioral norms.

The book unfolds both chronologically and thematically. In the first chapter, Antler demonstrates the presence of competing images of the Jewish immigrant mother, from self-sacrificing martyr to money-mad matron and beyond. The complex identity issues faced by Jews in America during this period are evident in the stories they told about their mothers to themselves and others. In later chapters, Antler traces the development of the "Jewish mother" as a concept that spread through song, radio, fiction, film, and comedy routines. By the time Philip Roth imagined the monstrous Sophie Portnoy of *Portnoy's Complaint* (1969)—a creation recently counterbalanced in the quietly heroic Jewish mother of Roth's *The Plot Against America: A Novel* (2004)—wide American audiences had gotten to know radio and television persona Molly Goldberg, had tried Catskills resort doyenne Jennie Grossinger's rye bread and book *The Art of Jewish Cooking* (1958), and had laughed at Jewish mother jokes. Jewish mothers were not just for Jews anymore.

Photographs and images of Jewish mothers and examples of Jewish mother jokes help ground the themes of the book. They also demonstrate the ambivalence felt both by and about American Jews in terms of their relationship to American life. In some cases, the "Jewish mother" was barely distinguishable from the "American mother," but in other cases the differences indicated a hostility expressed through popular culture. Antler suggests that this hostility sometimes came from Jewish sources as well, as in the case of American Jewish feminists during the 1960s and 1970s who uncompromisingly rejected their mothers' lives and looked for new ways to conceptualize motherhood and social reproduction.

The most fascinating section of the book deals with the Research in Contemporary Cultures Project, a post–World War II anthropology project based at Columbia University and run by Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict. Teams investigated the national characters of a number of cultural groups, such as the French and Chinese, and including Eastern European Jews as well. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, it is perhaps not surprising that the publications of the researchers working on Eastern European Jewish culture would be nostalgic, but Antler argues that the staying power of such publications as *Life Is with People: The Jewish Little-Town of Eastern Europe* (1952) is due in large part to the elegiac portrait of Jewish mothers. Despite the fact that *Life Is with People* has been criticized since the time of its publication for presenting a homogenized view of heterogenous Jewish populations and subcultures, its view of Jewish women as both exceptionally loving and nurturing and as exceptionally controlling and even castrating has refused to die. Mead and Benedict were innovators in incorporating new kinds of psychoanalytic and cultural data into anthropological research, but their much vaunted objectivity was not apparent in the research team's conclusions about patterns of Jewish culture. By analyzing the original research materials and meeting notes of the research team, Antler provides important insights into the development of social science research during the mid-twentieth century.

With some exceptions, this book focuses more on discourse than lived reality, but Antler keeps her narrative grounded, particularly in her discussion of memoir and women's history toward the end of the book. She makes good use of raw data from several surveys of Jewish women in order to gain an understanding of how Jewish women think of themselves as mothers. The book ends with a reconsideration of what it means to be a "Jewish mother" in an era of adoption, conversion, intermarriage, and post-ethnicity.

No book that covers an entire century can claim to be comprehensive. Many of the topics Antler covers deserve more space and time. In one of the later chapters, for instance, Antler examines the recent representation of Jewish mothers on popular television shows, such as *The Nanny* and *Will & Grace*, and in popular movies, such as *Kissing Jessica Stein* (2001) and *Meet the Fockers* (2004). Though she makes many good points, the chapter feels a bit rushed. Overall, however, the book is extremely entertaining and written with a light touch that belies the extensive research that went into it. It is already attracting a wide popular audience and makes significant scholarly contributions as well. Antler engages thoroughly with the increasingly sophisticated historiography on American Jewish women and takes for granted the complex intersection of gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and other identity factors that shape

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both the experience and the social/cultural category of Jewish motherhood.

Melissa R. Klapper
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Jill Fields. *An Intimate Affair: Women, Lingerie, and Sexuality*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 375. $21.95.

If underwear is increasingly peeking out from outerwear on the streets of American cities, so, too, is the subject of lingerie and its multiple meanings increasingly attracting attention from scholars. Jill Fields's book adds to scholarship on underwear and clothing more generally that demonstrates that what women wear can be revealing not only of bodies but of economic, political, and social change as well.

Fields focuses on the United States in the twentieth century, making use of a cultural studies approach that combines methodologies from history, art history, literary and film criticism, and the social sciences. By exploring the trade journals and advertisements of undergarment manufacturers, fashion magazines, representations of lingerie in literature and film, the work and activism of garment workers, oral histories, (including that of her grandmother), as well as the garments themselves, Fields paints a picture of unequal contestation over the shape and meaning of lingerie in American culture. She is interested in power in a Foucauldian sense, pointing to the ways that the ideological separation of production and consumption plays out on the bodies of women making and wearing undergarments.

The book begins with the garments themselves, with wonderfully rich chapters on drawers (underpants), corsets, bras, and black lingerie. Each makes a particular point. We learn that open-crotch drawers represented a way to differentiate female from male divided garments and that, as women gained economic, political, and social space in U.S. society, the association of open-crotch drawers shifted from modesty to eroticism and sexual access. We encounter the corset manufacturers' panic about corsetless styles in the early twentieth century and their determined efforts to keep women encased in their changing products. We view the move from the "monobosom" of the turn of the century to the flattened breasts of the 1920s to the separated and uplifted breasts that we take for granted today—all requiring some form of brassiere to mold women into their "natural" shapes. In her chapter on the eroticism of black lingerie, Fields argues, not always entirely persuasively, I think, that white women wearing black bras and corsets are donning "blackface" to embrace the hypersexualization of black women and the sexiness of death. But it is an important inclusion of racialized gender in a story that is mostly about the women whose skin matched the "flesh" colored garments that appeared in the course of the twentieth century.

The remaining chapters take off in a different direction, one analyzing advertisements for intimate apparel and the ways they function for male and female viewers, another the women workers who produced lingerie and their labor and cultural activism, the last the postwar "New Look" that brought the corset back into fashion. An epilogue uses feminist art to explore fashion changes since the 1960s. As a whole, the book argues convincingly that change in undergarment fashion must be understood as a complex process of negotiation among manufacturers, cultural producers, and women themselves, all set within a context of women's fight for political rights, their changing position in the labor force, and changing social conditions. What Fields calls the "fashion-industrial complex" is, she shows, an important force in understanding the lives of American women throughout the twentieth century.

As a member of the generational cohort that threw out girdles, garter belts, and bras (for a time, at least), I longed for more evidence of resistance. Fields is insistent that women are not mere pawns and dupes, but in the end, it is hard to see that the fashion-industrial complex is not all powerful. Field argues that the fact that corset manufacturers had to work so hard to sell their products shows that women were dubious, but whether they were called corsets or girdles or something else, women wore them. She tells us that about ten percent of customers refused to wear uplifting bras when they were introduced, but this is more about clinging to older styles than resisting discomfort. At the end of the chapter about bras, Fields suggests that the glorification of large breasts is not just a male fetish but a way for women to claim power through glamour, but what has gone before is a tale of women molding their breasts into a variety of shapes as dictated by changing fashion. In discussing the New Look of 1947, Fields says that women "may have donned these garments to heighten feelings of sexual pleasure and desire," but we have no evidence of that (p. 263).

Nevertheless, this is a richly researched, provocative, and highly interdisciplinary work of history that, offering all sorts of fascinating insights along the way, convincingly argues the importance of underwear.

Leila J. Rupp
University of California, Santa Barbara

Carroll Pursell. *Technology in Postwar America: A History*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 280. $35.00.

Searching for a single adjective to characterize this book, I ended up with idiosyncratic. Now I must explain. Carroll Pursell has certainly done his homework and is comfortable dealing with different aspects of many technical advances. His writing style is clear and direct, and he uses some interesting illustrations (too few, I would argue). His narrative progresses in a straightforward manner: the first chapter deals with the mobilization of scientific and engineering capacities needed to win World War II and the rest of the book

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goes over a well-known ground of America's post–World War II technical advances.

First, Pursell focuses on the postwar housing boom with the electrification of homes and the introduction of shopping centers. Then a brief review of America's foreign aid is followed by the developments of nuclear industry and rocketry and by descriptions of new mass production in factories and on farms. The following four chapters shift the focus to perceptions and impact of technical advances: "It's fun to live in America" looks at houses and cars; brain drain and the feared technical gap are examined next; and then two chapters contrast the enthusiastic techno-optimism ("From technology drunk") with one of its great correctives, the appropriate technology movement ("to technology sober"). Then the focus shifts again to describe technical advances that became prominent during the last twenty years of the past century and the book closes with brief musings on globalization, modernity, and the postmodern.

None of this in itself would make the book unusually idiosyncratic, but the choices Pursell makes—matters he omits and points he stresses—certainly do. Those who know a great deal about post–World War II technical developments will find much that is useful, but any novice would walk away with a very partial and a strangely truncated understanding. Pursell chose too many things to address and this leads to a large assemblage of mini-histories with selective coverage. Three notable examples illustrate this approach. In his history of early electronic computers, Pursell never mentions the two men who built the first one. The chapter "Standing Tall Again" includes, predictably, sections on the history of the U.S. missile defence, on Ronald Reagan's Star Wars project, and on SUVs—but also (quite incongruously) on the European superjumbo Airbus 380. How does that make America tall again? And yet Pursell does not have a single sentence on Boeing's innovative 787. And while he rightly castigates the rise of SUVs there is not a single sentence on the remarkable performance improvements of America's bestselling cars (Hondas and Toyotas made in the United States) and the astonishing reductions of automotive air pollutants (emissions/km were cut by more than ninety-five percent since 1973).

Recital of such puzzling choices and omissions could continue for many paragraphs. They result in a book that is largely a serial description of beginnings with very little (and in many cases absolutely no) follow up. Pursell is curiously uninterested in tracing the evolution of techniques whose introductions he describes, and he has very little to say about their eventual rates of adoption, their improvements and impacts. There are no systematic, long-range comparisons of capacities, costs, and efficiencies (that word does not even appear in the index), no long-term retrospectives and no attempts at a balanced appraisal. A single key example must suffice.

Pursell ends his (brief and highly disparaging) account of America's nuclear energy development in 1979, with the Three Mile Island accident (which actually did not release any radioactivity outside the containment building and did not kill anybody). An uninitiated reader might remember that and some ridiculous statements made by Glenn Seaborg and Edward Teller about the future of nuclear energy that Pursell quotes with relish, but that reader is not told that there has been no similar mishap in any U.S. plant since 1979, that the country has about one hundred reactors whose performance has been improving, and that nuclear fission produces twenty percent of America's electricity.

Pursell clearly dislikes both capitalism and modernity (approvingly quoting Karl Marx in that context), has little positive to say about technical innovation, but devotes plenty of space to anti-technology sentiments and to "appropriate" technology (whatever that loaded term means) that was supposed to save our environment. Yet he has nothing about the United States as the world's leading emitter of greenhouse gases or about the fact that China has now taken that dubious primacy from America.

Those who would like to know about the beginnings of many post-1945 technical innovations (but care little about their long-term fate) and those who look for reinforcement of their own negative attitudes about modernity and innovation will find this a congenial and readable book. Those looking for a more balanced approach and a historical perspective will have to look elsewhere.

VACLAV SMIL
University of Manitoba

RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES. *The FBI: A History*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 317. $27.50.

A prolific historian of the United States intelligence community, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has now produced an informative survey of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although founded in 1908 by Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte as the Bureau of Investigation (the word "Federal" was added in 1935), Jeffreys-Jones begins his story with the Ku Klux Klan's rise. In 1871, "a significant originating year for the FBI," the one-year-old Justice Department borrowed agents from the Secret Service (part of the Treasury Department) to track the Klan (p. 4). Because those agents sometimes hired freedmen as informants and engaged in other intelligence gathering and counterintelligence operations, the author identifies the color line as "the dominant theme in the FBI's history . . . especially its positive impact"—bouts of "Afrophobic reaction" aside—on the struggle for racial justice thereafter (pp. 1, 4, 7).

If Jeffreys-Jones's argument is not always convincing, his coverage of Reconstruction and other adventures of Secret Service agents and private detectives holding contracts from various federal appendages is fascinating. But the author occasionally loses sight of his born-with-the-angels argument, summarized in a chapter entitled "Proud Genesis." This is especially true when

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pursuing two subthemes: namely, that historians have overstated longtime FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's importance and understated the importance of attorneys general from Bonaparte to John Ashcroft. A third subtheme, holding that a persistent xenophobia and the occasional racist impulse interfered with the FBI's progressive origins and purpose, is aptly captured by another chapter title: "Loss of Mission."

Jeffreys-Jones places special emphasis on xenophobia as an impediment to effective police work in the age of anti-American terror. Other scholars have emphasized the bureaucratic wall that prevented the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from sharing information on al-Qaeda's presence in the United States prior to September 11, 2001. A former CIA officer suggested the thickness of that wall when silencing a Senate hearing by saying the only good thing that happened on 9/11 was the collapse of a World Trade Center tower on John O'Neill, the FBI's most aggressive Osama bin Laden stalker, who had retired after thirty-one years to direct World Trade Center security.

Jeffreys-Jones does not mention O'Neill and fails to make other obvious arguments for the FBI (or at least some FBI agents) as good guys. There is no room for the FBI pursuit of Jack Abramoff, the lobbyist who looted at least $86 million from five Native American tribes with the blessing of (and sometimes help from) various Republican members of Congress and White House officials. And the author misses the FBI decision to stand tall on a particularly horrific episode of post-9/11 frenzy. By the time the United States abuse-and-torture scandal broke in 2004 with digital "trophy" photographs snapped by military personnel at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, the FBI had already made a stand against what President George W. Bush has called "an alternative set of [interrogation] procedures." The most revealing report on where water boarding and the like first surfaced and where such techniques migrated, compiled by Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier General John Furlow, is entitled "Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility" (2005). That report places responsibility with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush. According to the Schmidt-Furlow interview of Major General (Retired) Michael E. Dunlavey, the officer charged with setting things up at Guantanamo: "The SECDEF told me that DOD had accumulated a number of bad guys . . . he wanted a product and he wanted intelligence now. . . . Initially, I was told that I would answer to SECDEF and USSOUTHCOM. . . . The directions changed and I got my marching orders from the President of the United States." FBI complaints, in other words, are directly responsible for much of what we know about detainee abuse; and this story, had Jeffreys-Jones told it, would have advanced the "Proud Genesis" argument.

Jeffreys-Jones leaves a smaller hole in a story he does tell, a story that advances the counter argument ("Loss of Mission"). There is no index listing for "Starr, Kenneth," even though FBI agents and retired FBI agents on contract to the Office of the Independent Counsel did the heavy lifting for Starr (and all other Clinton-era independent counsels) from Whitewater forward. And most of those independent counsels or their successors (Starr had two) kept humming straight through the impeachment and *Bush v. Gore* and beyond. Jeffreys-Jones does identify the FBI's CAMPCON investigation of Democratic fundraising as a massive bureau investigation. But the index has no room for "Gore, Al," even though he was the central target. That focus is numbing and in its own way as horrific as the interrogation techniques the FBI opposed at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, and the reader will wonder what a scholar of Jeffreys-Jones's talent would make of this plain fact: while President Bill Clinton was being impeached (with the FBI's help), the FBI found time to target Vice President Gore, launching what the author calls, again, without mentioning Gore, the bureau's "largest investigation ever, until 9/11 came along" (p. 222).

KENNETH O'REILLY,
EMERITUS
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DANIEL J. LEAB. *Orwell Subverted: The CIA and the Filming of* Animal Farm. Foreword by PETER DAVISON. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2007. Pp. xxiv, 195. $55.00.

In 1945, George Orwell's *Animal Farm* was published. A parable of the triumph of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, *Animal Farm* was quickly recognized as a modern classic and a biting critique of existing communism. Indeed, so admired was the book that, in 1949, an anonymous party acquired the film rights to the novel. In 1954, the first animated film version of *Animal Farm* appeared in theaters, although it was poorly distributed and received and never the propaganda hit hoped for by its underwriters—later revealed to be the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

These, we might say, are the "facts." They have been known for some years, although it required decades for the full story to trickle out of various sources, public, private, and classified. What was left of the story was mostly in the details, some of them interesting, most of them not. In the book under review, Daniel J. Leab repeats the essence of what is known and pads that with masses of such details. Indeed, were it not for the dullness of the subject and writing, this book might qualify as a typical celebrity exposé, and one might even be led to think that, rather than being a relatively minor footnote in the Cold War of the Eisenhower era, the transformation of Orwell's book into film was something of a high point in that conflict. Alas, it was not.

It is no great secret that the CIA was deeply involved in supporting various cultural activities of the non-Stalinist left, in the United States and Europe, or that it engaged in both covert and overt psychological operations to sway public opinion against the Soviet Union

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and in favor of the United States. Although a great deal has been written and revealed about those activities, and they seem to have had the desired effect in some instances, there is no doubt as much or more is still held in classified files that the Agency's censors deem too sensitive to release. In response to Leab's repeated requests for files on the various individuals involved in the production of the film, for example, the CIA resolutely provided nothing, responding that it could "neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence" of any files pertaining to George Orwell for "reasons of national security" (p. xiv). One is left to ponder the implications of such dissembling.

Leab was therefore forced to investigate non-classified sources of intelligence and rely on previously published materials. He was able to obtain access to the papers of Louis de Rochemont, held at the University of Wyoming. De Rochemont, an American filmmaker of no great repute, was the producer of *Animal Farm*. His papers offer a treasure trove of minutiae, not only about the making of the film but also about many other aspects of his life. Other archives provide additional details about producers, directors, animators, agents—both film and CIA—and their histories, experiences, and post-film lives. We learn not only about the travels and gustatory habits of various *dramatis personae* but also that Sonia Orwell probably did not meet, or demand to meet, or even ask to meet Clark Gable, as others have written or speculated.

In the preface, Leab writes that the book "began as an article for a proposed collection." It would have been better had it remained so.

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DAVID L. STEBENNE. *Modern Republican: Arthur Larson and the Eisenhower Years*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 363. $35.00.

The Republican Party has shifted significantly to the right over the last fifty years. Study of this shift has generated a great deal of historical scholarship, the majority of which has focused on the political philosophy and major figures of the party's right wing. What has been left out, until recently, is scholarly consideration of the party's once dominant moderates, at the expense of whom the right wing grew. According to David L. Stebenne, this has made moderate conservatism "the least studied yet most influential force in modern American history" (p. x). Stebenne's book helps to remedy this situation.

Arthur Larson may seem an unlikely subject for a book-length study. His credentials as undersecretary of labor (1954–1956), director of the United States Information Agency (1956–1957), and chief presidential speechwriter (1957–1958) do not suggest a career of great historical importance. It is not these positions, however, that make Larson interesting to historians. It is, rather, his role as "chief theoretician" of the Republican Party's moderate wing, and his considerable influence with President Dwight D. Eisenhower (p. x). This is, therefore, more than a biography. Stebenne uses Larson's life and career as a vehicle for exploring an all-but-forgotten faction of the Republican Party.

Political historians may be tempted to skip over the chapters that outline Larson's life prior to joining the Eisenhower administration, but this material is important to Stebenne's argument. Larson's political education led him to embrace moderate positions as a viable alternative to more extreme positions on the left and right. This interpretation contrasts with the more commonly held view that political moderation is a philosophy of compromise or indecision. Of particular interest is Larson's decision, while a young legal scholar, to pursue workers' compensation law as his field of research. While producing a major treatise on this subject, Larson was suffering from back pain so intense that it would have been impossible for him to pursue many professions, and his recognition of this fact contributed to his life-long interest in social welfare.

Larson believed that "good" conservatives "aimed to preserve time-honored ideals and values in ways that evolved in response to changing social conditions" (p. 143). This point of view, reminiscent of Republican progressives from an earlier generation, put Larson in perfect alignment with Eisenhower. The president had already recognized him as an articulate spokesman for the administration when Larson's *A Republican Looks at His Party* was published in 1956. The success of Larson's book exceeded everyone's expectations and when the president publicly praised it, Larson earned the reputation as the administration's "philosopher" (p. 169). While Eisenhower and his supporters recognized Larson's views as their own, the party's growing right wing was incensed by them. From the moment that Larson became a recognized public figure, his fortunes closely mirrored those of the president. His initiatives, like Eisenhower's, were defeated by an unlikely coalition of Democrats, who now controlled Congress, and conservative Republicans, who had had enough of what Eisenhower now referred to as "Modern Republicanism" (p. 175).

After leaving the administration, Larson found himself marginalized by a party that continued its rightward shift. In 1964 he proclaimed Barry Goldwater "utterly wrong or utterly unrealistic on every foreign and domestic issue" and endorsed Lyndon B. Johnson for president (p. 245). Larson hoped that Richard M. Nixon's election in 1968 would lead the party back toward "Modern Republicanism" and open the door for his own return to government. Nixon's Vietnam policies, however, drove Larson further away from the party and the president. He continued to think of himself as a Republican but no longer played a public role in the party's affairs.

Stebenne makes an important contribution to the scholarship on Eisenhower Republicanism. His book is well written and carefully researched. Stebenne utilizes materials at the Eisenhower presidential library, where

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Larson's papers are located; the Truman and Johnson presidential libraries; the Nixon presidential papers project; the National Archives; and several other repositories. Although he is sympathetic to Larson, this is no hagiography. Stebenne does not exaggerate Larson's importance, nor is he reluctant to point out when Larson's arguments were weak or his actions misguided. Stebenne may lose some general readers due to the amount of detail he incorporates into his discussion of Larson's writings, speeches, and policy recommendations, but specialists will appreciate his depth of analysis. This book may also find an audience with students of contemporary politics. In recent years the term "compassionate conservatism" has come back into fashion. Stebenne reminds us of a time when this term might have been more appropriately used, and how far today's Republican Party would have to go to live up to it.

STEVEN WAGNER
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DAVID A. NICHOLS. *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2007. Pp. 336. $27.00.

On the list of U.S. presidents who served from 1945 to 1969, juxtaposing Dwight David Eisenhower's name with civil rights is considered an oxymoron. Compared with Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson, Eisenhower has fared poorly. Most of the criticism against him stems from his refusal to endorse *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) as more than a legal necessity, and his disparaging comments, made in private, about the author of that decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren. Although some scholars, most notably Fred I. Greenstein, have challenged the conventional academic wisdom that depicts Eisenhower as a weak president who drifted with the tide of do-nothing, anticommunist conservatism in the 1950s, few have disputed the Republican president's perceived record on civil rights.

David A. Nichols has written a carefully researched account designed to rehabilitate the thirty-fourth president's reputation on civil rights. The title of his book refers to the constitutional and moral obligations the nation owed African Americans. Yet it also signifies that as a matter of scholarly justice the many contributions the Eisenhower administration made in furthering black freedom must be acknowledged. Nichols has mined the Eisenhower presidential archives to uncover evidence to reveal as much of the chief executive's private thoughts as we are likely to see. In addition, the author has read widely in contemporary newspapers and periodicals and gathered material from congressional files and papers of civil rights organizations.

Nichols argues that Eisenhower did more than any other president, with the exception of Johnson, to expand civil rights. He implemented the final integration of the armed forces and, immediately following *Brown*, issued an executive order desegregating public schools in the federally supervised District of Columbia. He also used his personal influence to encourage owners of movie theaters and other public accommodations in the nation's capital to admit African Americans on an equal basis with whites. Eisenhower believed that in circumstances where the president had clear-cut authority he could assert it to promote desegregation against any contrary claim by the states. Accordingly, as commander-in-chief, Eisenhower promulgated the integration of facilities on the Charleston, South Carolina, Naval Base and in schools located on military bases in the South.

Led by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., the chief architect of Eisenhower's civil rights policy, the president secured congressional passage of two civil rights acts in 1957 and 1960, the first since the end of Reconstruction, dealing mainly with the right to vote. Eisenhower was also the first president since Reconstruction to dispatch troops into the South to uphold a federal court order for nine black students to attend high school in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hardly noticed at the time, Eisenhower appointed a number of racially progressive federal judges in the South, which stands in stark contrast to the white supremacist appointments of his successor, Kennedy. Furthermore, Eisenhower selected E. Frederick Morrow as the first African American to serve as a White House counselor. As for his problems with Warren, they did not originate from *Brown*, Nichols asserts, but from competing presidential aspirations.

Whatever his substantial accomplishments, however, Eisenhower received little credit because his words spoke louder than his actions. He upheld the legality of *Brown* and his constitutional duty to enforce it, but he refused to give it his moral endorsement. Nichols concludes that stronger words from the popular Eisenhower would not have mattered in convincing the South to comply with the landmark decision, but this does not take into account the welcome support that forceful approval from the president would have given besieged blacks and moderate whites in the region. Worse still, as late as 1958, the president admonished African Americans to be patient in pursuing justice and equality. As Nichols admits, Eisenhower never understood black perceptions and expectations, perhaps the primary reason that his civil rights achievements have been undervalued.

Nichols makes a valuable contribution to the literature on postwar presidential politics and its relationship to the black freedom struggle. Although he unnecessarily minimizes the contributions of Truman and Kennedy, he is correct in demonstrating that Eisenhower was no different than Kennedy or Johnson in treading lightly before stepping over the boundary line between federal and state authority. In the burgeoning age of television, rhetoric did matter, more than Nichols acknowledges, and Eisenhower fell short compared with those who came immediately after him. Despite the considerable benefits of this book, it suffers from limited vision, the same problem that besets other top-down, presidential studies of civil rights as well as

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bottom-up, community studies of the freedom struggle. Instead, scholars need to integrate the local with the national (and international) to explore the varied dimensions of the postwar civil rights movement. Nichols provides an important and previously distorted piece of the puzzle, but a more complete picture remains to be drawn.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
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MICHAEL S. SHERRY. *Gay Artists in Modern American Culture: An Imagined Conspiracy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. 292. $29.95.

Michael Sherry's book is a highly readable, intelligent, and fully realized study of postwar American attitudes about homosexuality. Sherry presents a "biography of an idea": "the homintern," or the notion that there existed a conspiracy among homosexuals to dominate and degrade the arts. Buttressing the homintern discourse, Sherry argues, were interrelated anxieties over American authenticity and cultural potency during the Cold War.

The book proceeds neatly from the introduction through five chapters, which can be read as self-contained, convincing essays on their own. When taken together they provide a compelling narrative of how Americans viewed homosexuality and how those views had much more to say about widely felt American fears than about homosexuals themselves. The discourse was not a benign creation, however, as it has become a foundation for modern anti-homosexual thought and action. Sherry proposes that the homintern discourse became fully formed around 1950, due in large part to "alarmists" who "emphasized the numbers, cohesiveness, and power of homosexuals . . . and their capacity to corrupt American culture" (p. 14). While the specter of the Cold War and the widespread fear of hidden enemies are always present in this book, Sherry directs our attention to the "surging ambitions for American culture and swelling contributions to it by homosexuals" (p. 14) to explain why the discourse became so powerful.

As the 1950s wore on the homintern discourse was picked up with great enthusiasm by psychoanalysts, art and music critics, liberal anticommunists and intellectuals, filmmakers and novelists, and even by a few homosexual observers. In the minds of many of these commentators, the presence of a homosexual conspiracy in the arts was confirmed largely through a dismissal of the notion that homosexuals as a group possessed any native creative talent. Some, like analyst Edmund Bergler, acknowledged the existence of gay artistry but claimed "if a homosexual is a great artist, this is so *despite*, and not because of his homosexuality" (p. 53). Many others argued that the art produced by homosexuals was quaint and shallow, neither serious like serialism nor masculine like abstract expressionism (approaches both dominated by heterosexuals). With the creativity of gay artists denied, the only remaining rationale for the presence of gay men in the arts was conspiracy.

The homintern discourse, according to Sherry, reached its fullest, most vociferous expression in the early and mid-1960s. Not only did this era witness the rise of mass media treatments of homosexuality with vivid articles in the *New York Times* and *Life*, but gay artists produced important cultural milestones, from Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* (1962) to Andy Warhol's pop art silkscreens. The criticism of these works was as intense as that leveled upon artists such as Aaron Copland in the 1950s. But rather than being disliked as shallow or unmanly, gay-created art in the 1960s was seen as inauthentic—a damning critique in this era of authenticity. Social and cultural critics alike condemned gay artists for disguising gay stories through the false prism of heterosexual ones. By the late 1960s, as Sherry perceptively demonstrates, the gay liberation generation picked up where the anti-gay critics left off and also condemned older homosexuals for their campy, inauthentic, and coded creative work. This theme is further explored in a chapter on Samuel Barber, and, in particular, the grand failure of his opera *Antony and Cleopatra* (1966), which according to the critics provided convincing evidence of the fallacy of homosexual talent and the pernicious workings of a conspiracy among gay artists.

Sherry argues that "shifts in gender, sexuality, and empire pushed aside the homintern discourse" beginning in the late 1960s. One of the most interesting shifts leading to this change is that gay artists, perhaps taking heed of gay activists and earlier anti-gay critics, started to create art, write books, and produce plays with undisguised gay themes. Sherry notes that this shift excused many gay artists from accusations of inauthenticity, while it simultaneously opened to them to charges of irrelevance and marginality. The book ends with a departure from the homintern discourse to a still fascinating, and utterly reasonable, discussion of how the marginality/normality opposition has now come to occupy the center of discourse about but also by homosexuals.

Achievements aside, Sherry's book invites questions about omissions: were the critiques of Copland and Barber in the 1950s widely understood as anti-gay when the sexuality of those artists was not broadly known? Why direct attention to Albee in the 1960s but give so little to Tennessee Williams in the context of the 1950s? Moreover, Sherry does not examine what homosexuals thought about themselves or what they thought about the theories heterosexuals developed that demonized homosexuals. As a result, the book does not shed light upon the real life workings of homosexual social networks in the arts and the degree to which there was at least a preponderance of homosexuals among the composers and choreographers but also among musicians, make-up artists, and gallery owners who facilitated American cultural achievement. Still, this book is a re-

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markable achievement and as such deserves a wide readership.

MARTIN MEEKER
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IAIN ANDERSON. *This Is Our Music: Free Jazz, the Sixties, and American Culture.* (The Arts and Intellectual Life in Modern America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. 254. $39.95.

This is Our Music is the title of an album released in 1960 by the Ornette Coleman Quartet. Coleman, an African American alto saxophonist, had endured years of ridicule by musicians and audiences for improvising on a plastic toy instrument, producing rough-edged tones, and using unconventional chord changes. In 1960, though, Coleman became the toast of Manhattan's jazz scene. Sympathetic critics called him the prophet of free jazz, music's "new thing."

Borrowing its title from the album, Iain Anderson's study uses Coleman's story to begin an exploration of free jazz in American culture. Before 1945 jazz was commercially popular, and enthusiastic young critics emerged from the ranks of its fans, but it won little praise from the critical establishment or support from arts organizations. Before World War II jazz signified pride and even social protest to urban African Americans, but whites rarely ascribed social importance to the music. After the war, though, as Anderson shows, sophisticated new styles such as bebop and "cool" jazz inspired more elaborate critical discourse and won followings among the growing population of college students. Critics, especially, likened new jazz innovations to European-style artistic modernism. Waging the Cold War, government officials increasingly viewed jazz as a "secret sonic weapon," a cultural ambassador exhibiting allegedly American traits such as group improvisation and free expression within self-imposed limits. Simultaneously, in the era of colonial independence movements and *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), African American musicians considered jazz to be an expression of the struggle for civil rights and economic improvement.

Anderson shows how these conflicting interpretations of 1950s jazz set the stage for Ornette Coleman's popularity and imminent troubles. Coleman was preceded to New York nightclubs by the pianist Cecil Taylor, whose intense performances bristled with classical avant-garde influences and who suffered from critical derision and neglect, and by John Coltrane, whose spiritual odyssey after 1957 caused him to experiment daringly on his saxophone. Coleman's vogue in Manhattan café society suffered a quick demise. Jazz critics at *Down Beat* magazine and elsewhere excoriated free jazz. Like most other black musicians Coleman resented his inferior pay, and in 1962 he began a three-year boycott of club performances. Anderson sees Coleman's ordeal as a prelude to the main 1960s story: "The critical establishment's insensitivity to flaws in the [music] industry's racial and economic framework led many innovative musicians to question the liberal principles at the core of jazz music's Cold War identity" (p. 7). Successive chapters examine the involvement of musicians such as Taylor, Coltrane, and Charles Mingus and the influential critic Amiri Baraka in the Black Arts movement, the efforts of free jazz advocates to meet the needs and win the support of urban African American audiences, and the ironic dependency of many free jazz musicians after 1970 on grants from public and private endowments and university teaching positions.

Anderson's book benefits from his extensive research into jazz periodicals and archives and government and foundation repositories. The study places free jazz within rich historical contexts. Building upon Penny M. Von Eschen's *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (2004), he provides a nuanced overview of 1950s jazz's cultural import. The chapters on jazz and black nationalism, focusing on the 1960 alternative Newport Jazz Festival (launched by Mingus) and Baraka's activism, cover much the same ground as Scott Saul's *Freedom Is, Freedom Ain't: Jazz and the Making of the Sixties* (2003). Neither Anderson nor Saul covers the late 1960s as fully as they survey the preceding half-decade, and Anderson slights such important locales as Los Angeles and St. Louis. Readers thus should also consult John Litweiler's *The Freedom Principle: Jazz after 1958* (1984), Eckhart Jost's *Free Jazz* (1981), and Clora Bryant et al.'s *Central Avenue Sounds: Jazz in Los Angeles* (1998). Anderson's most novel contribution is to explore free jazz's ironic fate within the American tradition of the sacralization of high culture, culminating in the musicians' reception of college and university teaching positions and grants from the National Endowment for the Arts and private foundations. Anderson both draws upon Lawrence W. Levine's *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* (1988) and defends it from its critics, who argue that American elites failed to empower "high art" and to abase popular culture.

Anderson's interpretation of free jazz is hobbled somewhat by his book's structure. The chapters are relatively disconnected essays on the main subtopics, and the study lacks a conclusion that might make it a comprehensive interpretation of jazz since 1960. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fault Anderson's research and the wide range of his provocative insights. And it is quite appropriate that the book appeared in the same year that Ornette Coleman, at age seventy-seven, was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for music.

BURTON W. PERETTI
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LAURIE B. GREEN. *Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle.* (The John Hope Franklin Series in African American History and Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. 415. Cloth $65.00, paper $24.95.

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Three main trends can be identified in recent civil rights scholarship: a chronological push back before the well-known events of the mid-1950s; a shift in focus away from prominent national leaders and toward local, grassroots activists; and a reorientation that acknowledges legislative advances but measures these against the expansive understanding of freedom that the movement popularized among its mostly poor and working-class constituency. Laurie B. Green's book hits all the right notes in complementing this evolving literature but attempts, more ambitiously, a rounded examination of the social, economic, and cultural developments that transformed Memphis, Tennessee, across the middle of the last century, surfacing powerfully in the 1968 sanitation workers' strike.

Memphis is an apt setting for examining the transformation of black southern life in a period that brought rapid change. Uneven mechanization of the cotton industry and the protracted decline of the plantation regime drove tens of thousands of African Americans out from the Delta, and while most would venture further north, many came to call Memphis home. The city's function as an "urban-rural crossroads" (p. 7) is key to Green's study: in becoming Memphians, black newcomers universally confronted the stark gap between their expectations for a new life and "white employers' efforts to perpetuate in the city the plantation relations of the [rural South]" (p. 1). Green is concerned with demonstrating the ways in which the array of indignities visited upon black Memphians acted to sustain a social order that ultimately rested on low-paid black labor, and to show how collective struggles against this laid the foundations for the 1968 strike.

At the heart of Green's study are more than sixty oral histories, but the book is conversant with recent literature on black working-class culture and is deeply influenced by Robin D. G. Kelley's call for a "history from way, way below." Thematically organized to explore the "consciousness, culture, and politics that inspired and shaped the freedom movement" (p. 4) the study touches briefly on the period of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) organizing elsewhere illuminated by Michael Honey, but moves quickly into a discussion of the upheaval brought on by World War II. The incongruity between democratic and egalitarian official rhetoric and the reality of intense racism and discrimination made for an explosive confrontation. In tune with A. Phillip Randolph's Double Victory campaign, black Memphians attempted to take advantage of the openings provided by the war to dismantle barriers erected against their entry into skilled work in the defense industries, and in the case of black women, into industrial employment generally.

Green is attentive both to the regional and national dimensions of the Memphis story, but she is especially adept at illuminating its local permutations. Easily the most significant element shaping local conditions was "Boss" Edward Crump's formidable Democratic Party machine, which dominated Memphis from the 1920s until his death in 1954. Over the years Crump built a remarkably effective machine that combined paternalism, corruption, and intermittent brutality to safeguard an arrangement that kept black workers on the bottom.

Unsurprisingly, black Memphians' struggles against police brutality figure prominently in every period covered in the study. Members of Crump's notorious police force were at the center of suppressing labor militancy in the prewar and postwar periods; they aggressively enforced the color line in wartime Memphis, and served as the first line of defense against radicalization and youth rebellion in the postwar period. Their involvement in a series of sexual assaults on black working women, incidents that powerfully demonstrated the gendered dimensions of Jim Crow in Memphis, galvanized an outraged black community in the postwar period and had a cathartic effect in generating a challenge to the "plantation mentality."

Crump's rule rested not only on force, however, but on a complex system of patronage that rewarded allies and punished others. Crump "drew into his circle a select group of black leaders who delivered votes and advanced racial cooperation," Green writes, "but also ruled with an iron fist" (p. 22). Green has uncovered rich, suggestive material on the complex relationship between the Crump machine and black leadership, and on the tensions this produced among African Americans, and early in the book she notes that this internal struggle "needs to be more fully elaborated in civil rights histories" (p. 9). Ultimately she does not do enough with this aspect of the story, however, and while the evidence is intriguing, Green never delivers the kind of extended analytical treatment that these obvious tensions merit.

The study offers many compensations, however. Green's rendering of the prelude to the 1968 strike is nuanced, original, and full of untidy ironies. One might expect to find that the powerful currents emanating out of the city brought winds of change to the more isolated, rural Delta, but Green suggests instead that a wave of spirited rural organizing helped pull Memphis's "moribund" civil rights activism out of the doldrums (p. 258). In turn the freedom movement, drawing upon rising student militancy, helped revive labor militancy in the city, and black workers subsequently channeled local civil rights agitation into areas relevant to working people. Black working women played a central role in this revival, and Green contends that the slogan that would eventually galvanize the sanitation workers—"I *Am* a Man"—resonated no less powerfully among them, embodying for all black workers the struggle against the plantation legacy. The sanitation strike, often "represented as erupting out of the blue," was in reality "the most visible and symbolically resonant" confrontation to develop out of a "groundswell" of black working-class activism (p. 252). Coming four years after landmark federal civil rights legislation, it marked not the end but the beginning of an extended period of black workers' activism in Memphis.

The thematic organization of this book can make for difficulty in following the thread of the story, and there

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are points where a reader might wish the author had slowed to ponder the meaning of her evidence a bit more. Overall, however, Green has produced an important and engaging study that, in uncovering the wellsprings out of which Memphis's distinctive freedom movement surged, offers an original contribution to a vibrant field.

BRIAN KELLY
Queen's University Belfast

JEFFREY F. TAFFET. *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*. New York: Routledge. 2007. Pp. x, 301. Cloth $95.00, paper $24.95.

Contemporary U.S. "nation-building" efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have frequently elicited comparisons with the Marshall Plan. But perhaps the better comparison is the 1960s Alliance for Progress, which the Kennedy administration couched as a Marshall Plan for Latin America. Under this aid program, the United States sought to promote democracy in a region with a long history of authoritarianism by modernizing its "traditional" social and economic structures. Ultimately, the Alliance for Progress failed to achieve its main social and economic goals, while its democratizing project ended with much of Latin America under brutal military rule.

Few historians have examined this failure. The main historical study has hitherto been Stephen G. Rabe's *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (1999), which explores the program's origins and initial implementation under the Kennedy administration. Jeffrey F. Taffet's book, by contrast, not only traces the Alliance for Progress's course through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations but also illuminates in unprecedented ways the role that Latin American governments played in its rise and fall. Based largely on newly released U.S. government sources, Taffet's clearly written study is a valuable—and timely—contribution that sheds new light on the most ambitious U.S. effort to reshape Latin America in its own image.

Taffet's main goal is to illuminate the limits of economic aid as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. He first examines how the Cuban Revolution's embrace of communism pushed the Kennedy administration to design the Alliance for Progress. If U.S. officials had previously feared that external forces would spread communism to Latin America, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution led them to focus on communism's internal sources, especially poverty, social inequality, and the absence of democracy. To curb communism's appeal in Latin America, U.S. policy makers drew on the insights of U.S. modernization theorists to develop a massive aid and reform program designed to promote economic development, social justice (largely via land reform), and democracy throughout the region. In defending the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy famously warned that "those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

The bulk of Taffet's study examines how Kennedy's "peaceful revolution" was undermined from within. From the start, many U.S. congressmen opposed financing a ten-year, $20 billion undertaking that appeared to threaten U.S. business interests. The Alliance for Progress also suffered from a weak bureaucracy and resistance by Latin America's conservative elites. The program subsequently experienced crippling cuts as the Johnson administration struggled with the soaring costs of the Vietnam War and Great Society programs. When President Richard Nixon essentially ended the Alliance for Progress in 1969, it had already, as Chile's President Eduardo Frei noted, "lost its way."

Ultimately, however, Taffet argues that the program's failure stemmed mainly from U.S. officials' unwillingness to engage its most natural Latin American allies as real partners. He develops this argument by examining (in separate chapters) the Alliance for Progress's impact on the four countries that received most of its funds. In Brazil and the Dominican Republic, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations used the program to pressure the left-leaning governments of João Goulart and Juan Bosch, both of which backed the Alliance's reforms, to drop their support for revolutionary Cuba and proscribe local communists. Unable to sway Goulart and Bosch, U.S. officials deployed the program's funds to first destabilize their governments and then to prop up their unconstitutional, anti-reformist successors. In Chile and Colombia, by contrast, the U.S. government granted aid to reformist yet reliably anti-communist governments throughout the 1960s. But even here, the Alliance for Progress's successes were limited, largely because U.S. officials forced their Chilean and Colombian counterparts to forsake development projects in favor of economic stabilization programs.

Taffet breaks new ground by revealing how the Alliance for Progress antagonized its staunchest Latin American supporters. But since his analysis rarely strays beyond the realm of policy makers, important questions about the program's local impact remain unanswered. Did its social reforms, as some studies of Chile imply, further polarize local societies and thus inadvertently contribute to the region's eventual turn toward military rule? Taffet also reveals little about the program's effects for civil-military relations, even though U.S. officials encouraged Latin American militaries to implement its reforms in the countryside via "civic action projects." While designed to strengthen the military's respect for democracy, did these projects instead help militarize rural society and thus undermine democratic rule?

In sum, Taffet greatly advances our understanding of the role that U.S. officials played in one of the most tragic U.S. policy failures in Latin America. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he shows that the failure of the Alliance for Progress stemmed not only from U.S. officials' anticommunist paranoia but above all from their stubborn belief in U.S. superiority. As Taffet concludes,

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U.S. officials ran the Alliance for Progress as if it were anything but a real alliance.

MICHEL GOBAT
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AKIM D. REINHARDT. *Ruling Pine Ridge: Oglala Lakota Politics from the IRA to Wounded Knee.* Foreword by CLARA SUE KIDWELL. (Plains Histories.) Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press. 2007. Pp. xxviii, 274. $34.95.

Akim D. Reinhardt has written a comparative study that discusses the significance of two political events that occurred on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The first section of this book examines Oglala Lakota political experiences between 1934 and 1936 under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The second part looks at reservation politics between 1970 and 1973. Reinhardt concludes that the second occupation of Wounded Knee was a spontaneous grass-roots response to forty years of oppressive indirect colonial rule under the IRA rather than an outcome of political activism by leaders of the American Indian Movement (AIM).

This volume contributes to the academic discourse among historian Lawrence M. Hauptman, anthropologists Thomas Bilosi and Paul Robertson, as well as other scholars, about how the IRA created cultural tensions and conflict on reservation communities, diminished tribal sovereignty, and made tribes dependent on the federal government. Reinhardt participates in this discussion by showing how the Oglalas were allowed to govern themselves under a 1936 IRA constitution but not in ways of their own choosing because all important decisions were made by either the superintendent or the secretary of the interior.

Furthermore, IRA voting districts on Pine Ridge were based on colonial geographic boundaries instead of extended family *tiyospaye* communities. These artificial constructs divided the Oglala's into factions that resulted in the 1936 election of Frank G. Wilson, an autocratic mixed-blood leader, as the first IRA tribal president. He intensified political conflict between full and mixed-bloods by using the IRA tribal court to consolidate his power. Wilson also held inaccessible tribal council meetings at Pine Ridge, characterized full-bloods as ration Indians, and embezzled tribal funds. In response, full-bloods called for his impeachment and signed a petition that asked federal officials to dismantle the tribe's IRA government.

The author then jumps over several decades to link the grass-roots political protest at Pine Ridge in 1936 to the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee. Reinhardt argues that these two events represent bookends of mid-twentieth-century Oglala Lakota resistance to United States colonial rule.

In 1972, tension arose when Richard Wilson, a mixed-blood, was elected tribal president. He created tension on the reservation by refusing to hold quarterly IRA council meetings. Wilson also organized a goon squad or private army to silence his critics. In response, the Oglala Inter-District Tribal Council, women elders, and other individuals insisted that Wilson resign or face impeachment. When their protest met resistance, disenchanted Oglalas met at Calico Hall and requested assistance from leaders of the American Indian Movement to remove Wilson from office. This triggered events that led to the siege at Wounded Knee and a proclamation that confirmed the existence of an independent Oglala Nation.

Despite its title, this book does not provide an extensive overview of Oglala Lakota politics from the IRA to Wounded Knee. Consequently, the author missed an opportunity to address topics germane to ongoing Lakota protest. For instance, William Fire Thunder, a former president of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council, used his position as vice-president of the National Congress of American Indians in 1950 to oppose termination because it nullified treaty rights and legal protection under the IRA. Furthermore, in 1953, tribal president Charles Underbaggage joined the Republican National Committee's Indian Advisory Group to formulate policy alternatives to the Oglala IRA tribal court and government. Other Oglala leaders also worked for a claims settlement that included the return of the tribe's sacred Black Hills, and they endorsed the 1961 Chicago Indian Conference that issued a Declaration of Purpose equating the experiences of Native Americans with other colonized people.

This book is part of a broader scholarly endeavor to construct a new Native American political history. In 2007, Daniel M. Cobb and Loretta Fowler edited *Beyond Red Power: American Indian Politics and Activism since 1900.* The sixteen chapters in this volume study the experiences and internal dynamics of tribal communities to give indigenous people a historical voice and demonstrate how they have strengthened tribal sovereignty and achieved more self-determination.

Reinhardt uses this new methodology to better understand Oglala political history. He has examined a wide variety of primary sources that do not rely on the testimony of policy makers and outside observers. The result is a narrative that restores historical agency to Oglala people. By discussing historical events in their local context and listening to Indian voices, the author convincingly demonstrates that the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee stemmed from longstanding tribal discontent with its dysfunctional IRA government.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

MATT D. CHILDS. *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery.* (Envisioning Cuba.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 300. Cloth $55.00, paper $21.95.

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In the early months of 1812, several revolts and conspiracies took place on the island of Cuba. All these movements shared a similar goal (emancipation) and involved the participation of slaves and free people of color. Although it is unclear whether and to what extent these movements were connected, they are collectively known as the Aponte Rebellion, having been named after one of the leaders of the revolt in Havana, the free black artisan José Antonio Aponte.

With the exception of one important book by Cuban historian José Luciano Franco, the Aponte Rebellion has attracted limited scholarly attention. It is remembered in Cuban history as an early and somewhat anomalous instance of a struggle against slavery in a colony that not only remained loyal to Spain, but was in the process of building a successful slave-based plantation economy. Indeed, Cuba is frequently portrayed as an exception in Latin America: one of the few colonies that remained under Spanish control after its vast empire collapsed in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Childs's carefully researched, lucid book challenges this interpretation by placing Cuba in a Caribbean context, where liberation from colonial rule was the exception (as in Haiti) rather than the rule. He also provides the first historical account of the rebellion that is based on an exhaustive and thorough use of the documentary record, particularly of the voluminous judicial transcripts kept at the Cuban National Archives and other local archives. The result is a nuanced reconstruction of these movements that takes us significantly closer to the actors themselves, to their identities, their preoccupations, strategies, and goals.

By placing the Aponte Rebellion in the context of the Age of Revolution, Childs explores how slaves and free people of color in Cuba reacted to local conditions and exterior events. The author sees the rebellion as a "critical case" to study "what role the ideas from the Age of Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution in particular, played in catalyzing slave and free people of color revolts in the Americas" (p. 14). Childs does this by carefully tracing the origin of several rumors that circulated around the island at the time and that were heard and repeated by slaves and free people of color. These rumors invariably dealt with emancipation, which had been allegedly granted to all slaves by either the Cortes of Cádiz or by the kings of Spain, England, Kongo, or, of course, Haiti. As was the case in other Caribbean territories, some slaves and free blacks in Cuba followed with interest the news about the coronation of Henri Christophe in Haiti. Some took it as a sign that the hour of their freedom had arrived. Others spoke of Haitian agents and emissaries who had arrived in Cuba and were demanding the immediate emancipation of all slaves from colonial authorities.

Slaves and free people of color transmitted this and other news through complex social, residential, and occupational networks. One of the most important accomplishments of this book is that it shows how slaves and free blacks created spaces where they could socialize, exchange ideas, and assert a modicum of autonomy. Two institutions were particularly important in this regard: the militia and the *cabildos de nación*. Both had a long history in the island. The militia had traditionally provided free men of color with a corporate identity and with a path to social distinction and mobility. Militiamen combined their military training and access to weaponry with a position of leadership in their communities. This combination had been used in the past to defend the colony against foreign attacks, as with the English attack of 1762, but could be used by black militia officers to overthrow the colonial government. The expansion of plantation slavery in the island meant that in the early nineteenth century the traditional privileges of the militiamen of color were under assault. From their ranks came several of the leaders of the revolts.

The other important institutions were the *cabildos de nación*, fraternal, mutual-aid associations in which people of similar ancestry came together. The *cabildos* included free individuals as well as slaves as members. Most were Africans, but criollos born in the island also participated. These institutions functioned as intermediaries between Africans and colonial authorities and served to consolidate social networks debilitated by enslavement. Childs shows convincingly that slaves and free people of color used the *cabildos* to exchange valuable information and to make plans for the revolts. He also shows that urban and rural slaves communicated frequently and collaborated in planning the rebellion.

This book successfully places Cuba in the Age of Revolution and recovers the identities and actions of a group of slaves and free people of color who issued the first declaration of independence in the island. It is an important and welcome addition to a growing scholarship that has been challenging key assertions and silences in Cuban nationalist narratives and to the literatures on race, slavery, and resistance in the so-called Atlantic world.

ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE
University of Pittsburgh

WHITTINGTON B. JOHNSON. *Post-Emancipation Race Relations in the Bahamas*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2006. Pp. xii, 190. $59.95.

In 1834, slave emancipation ushered in dramatic changes that reshaped the nature of race relations in British Caribbean societies. Almost overnight, black, brown, and white were forced to renegotiate their positions within a new economic system and reconsider their identities within a new social climate. In this book, Whittington B. Johnson examines the key forces shaping the development of race relations in this unique setting. Drawing on court records, census data, and personal correspondences, Johnson skillfully investigates the way race relations played out in politics and the economy during the Bahamas' formative period (1834–1865) as a free society, a period in Bahamian history that until now has received little scholarly attention. Education, law, and religion provide Johnson with es-

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pecially useful prisms through which to view the social changes that followed the abolition of slavery. More importantly, Johnson embraces a comparative perspective to highlight the relatively smooth transition of the Bahamas to a free society and show the rather peaceful nature of post-emancipation race relations in that nation. In particular, Johnson contrasts post-emancipation race relations in the Bahamas with those in the American South, where a powerful white planter class sought to maintain its control over former slaves through policies of disenfranchisement and the institutionalization of hate groups. While race riots and violent clashes often marred race relations in other post-emancipation settings, such events were rare in the Bahamas.

After emancipation, the Bahamian Assembly instituted one of the most liberal voting rights policies of any former slave society in the Americas. These policies were promoted, in part, by a series of sympathetic British colonial governors who attempted to reel in the power of the local white minority and create a truly color-blind society. Nonwhites gained representation in the Bahamian Assembly, and their efforts helped integrate the educational and criminal justice systems. While nonwhites held the majority of votes in most districts, they did not typically vote in bloc for nonwhite candidates. As a result, a white minority continued to dominate the national assembly. According to Johnson, the absence of explicitly discriminatory laws against nonwhites and the low intensity of racial prejudice in the Bahamas precluded the emergence of a unified nonwhite voting bloc. Moreover, Johnson argues that color biases, as well as social divisions within the nonwhite community based on class, religion, and ethnicity further inhibited the rise of a unified nonwhite voting bloc. Unlike the other British Caribbean colonies during this period, the nonwhite population of the Bahamas included a large number of liberated Africans, and their presence added to the dynamic and complex nature of Bahamian race relations. The diverse economic structure of the Bahamas also may have inhibited greater unity among nonwhite voters. While many former slaves in the sugar-producing islands of the British Caribbean were forced to return to sugarcane cultivation after emancipation, nonwhites in the Bahamas had other economic opportunities, especially in maritime activities, such as fishing, turtling, harvesting conch shells, and salvaging wrecked ships. Sharecropping also offered former slaves opportunities for economic mobility, and the system of sharecropping practiced in the Bahamas was much less exploitative and oppressive than that practiced in the American South following the U.S. Civil War.

In an excellent chapter entitled "Social Change and Social Challenges," Johnson demonstrates that the abolition of slavery "was a liberating, not a leveling, event." The social structure of Bahamian society remained rigid after emancipation, and class, color, religious affiliation, and ethnicity determined one's place in the social order. "In short," writes Johnson, "abolition was an orderly change from a slave to a free society, not a revolution to destroy the social order or institute democracy" (p. 69). The emergence of civic organizations and friendly societies in the Bahamas created stability during the apprenticeship period that immediately followed slavery, and helped ease the transition from slavery to freedom. These self-help organizations played an "assimilating" role, and membership was considered a "rite of passage to good citizenship" (pp. 56–58). Johnson ends the chapter by outlining a series of legal cases involving the protection of nonwhite Bahamians abroad. The cases show that nonwhite Bahamians were guaranteed the same legal standing as all British subjects, which Johnson argues helped foster a sense of colonial pride and Bahamian nationalism that is still strong today.

Race relations took many different paths in the former slave societies of the Americas. This book illuminates the Bahamas' successful transition to a free society and the peaceable nature of its race relations. It makes important contributions to our understanding of Caribbean race relations and sheds new light on the social development of a unique West Indian society. It is a must read for all serious scholars of Caribbean history and African diaspora studies.

FREDERICK H. SMITH
College of William and Mary

GERALD HORNE. *Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and Independence Struggles in the British West Indies*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2007. Pp. 262. $25.95.

During World War II and in its immediate aftermath, power in the English-speaking Caribbean shifted from London to Washington, D.C. In part, increasing U.S. influence was a function of British postwar weakness and is representative of the larger story of the decline of the British Empire. But growing U.S. power was not as simple as replacing one hegemon with another. U.S. security concerns during the war and the acquisition of bases led to Washington's greater scrutiny of imperial rule and to conflicts with the British over how to best manage the restive and poor inhabitants of the region.

Gerald Horne argues that two specific issues motivated the U.S. government. Unsurprisingly, he contends that Washington worried deeply about leftist labor organizers and the likelihood that they would follow an independent line in the Cold War. In this respect, U.S. involvement in the West Indies fits into wider patterns of Cold War behavior. More interestingly, Horne suggests that U.S. leaders feared that radical labor agitation among blacks in the West Indies might lead to trouble in communities such as Harlem where many Caribbean leaders had close connections.

In examining the rise of radical labor leaders, Horne focuses his attention on the creation and travails of the Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC), an organization formed to unite regional labor organizers and press for collective action. The CLC never lived up to its promise

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because leaders from different islands found working together difficult and could not agree on how to approach questions of ideology and organization. As the 1940s progressed, radical leftists vied with reformists and accommodationists for control of labor organizations and ultimately the course of each colony's political future. Conflicts within the CLC assumed a Cold War cast as the United States began to worry about leftists and helped more conservative leaders. This story is important because labor organizers, especially the ones helped by the United States, dominated pre- and post-independence West Indian politics.

Horne is at his strongest in explaining the differences between conditions in the various British territories. In the biggest colonies—such as British Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica—the sheer number of workers and their need to migrate created opportunities for radical labor leaders to capitalize on economic frustrations. Some smaller islands, such as St. Kitts and Antigua, had a great deal of labor militancy, while others, such as Anguilla, Montserrat, Nevis, and Barbuda had none; Barbados, which was larger and wealthier than most of its neighbors, appeared less likely to embrace radicalism. In pleading for an understanding of the dissimilarities in the region, Horne bolsters his arguments about the inability of CLC or other pan-Caribbean leaders to work together.

Although each territory had its own unique character, they shared deep connections to black communities in the United States. Leading radical black figures in the United States like Paul Robeson traveled extensively in the region, and firebrands such as Cheddi Jagan lived and had family in the United States. The war strengthened ties as Caribbean blacks migrated north to work in farms and factories. Horne argues that because of the close connections between the two communities, it was important to keep the British colonial territories placid; otherwise, U.S. blacks might be more likely to embrace revolutionary positions. This suggests that the British Caribbean was extraordinarily important in the Cold War relative to its size. There was no fear of Soviet intrusion, but by allowing labor militancy to flourish, the U.S. government would be undermining race stability at home.

Unfortunately, Horne's case on this significant point lacks convincing evidence. Makers of U.S. policy toward the West Indies were all at low levels in the State Department's hierarchy. No U.S. politician of consequence made a sustained appearance, and there is little evidence presented demonstrating even the low-level policymakers felt the situation required urgent action. Most references omit the names of policymakers involved, as Horne generally uses the terms "Washington" and "the United States" to refer to the actors concerned with Caribbean labor radicalism. Given the lack of specificity in who was involved and the inability to demonstrate how much the concern agitated top policymakers, the argument appears to be a stretch. There is no question that some U.S. policymakers worried about the connection between labor radicalization in the West Indies and racial tumult in the United States. The issue is who worried and how much they worried.

By failing to analyze critically who in Washington was paying attention to the Caribbean and how much their concerns resonated with the full policy-making community, Horne misses an opportunity to explain how racial and labor issues were part of the international Cold War narrative. By accepting that the British West Indies was an area of limited concern, Horne could have demonstrated much about the changing dynamics of global power in the post–World War II world. The unconvincing claim about the centrality of the region undermines his analysis of how Caribbean leaders negotiated the new environment and the role that race played in the early Cold War.

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Malcolm Ebright and Rick Hendricks. *The Witches of Abiquiu: The Governor, the Priest, the Genízaro Indians, and the Devil*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 344. $21.95.

From the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, witchcraft flourished in Europe and America. Outbreaks of sorcery and witchcraft occurred occasionally and were serious enough to disrupt entire communities and force authorities to launch formal proceedings and mete out severe punishment. However, toward the end of the seventeenth century these flare-ups became rare and eventually disappeared just as mysteriously as they had started. While sensational, the 1692 witch trials of Salem, Massachusetts, occurred at the very end of this cycle of witch hunts. Yet Salem was not the last of such occurrences. Seven decades later and two thousand miles away, in the precarious town of Abiquiu in northern New Mexico, the last major witchcraft trial of North America unfolded. Between 1760 and 1766 some three dozen men and women of indigenous background (*genízaros*) were accused of witchcraft and sorcery, of having a pact with the devil, and of having engaged in a variety of activities that—to the modern eye, at least—often seem like mere forms of folk medicine and native ceremonialism.

Malcolm Ebright and Rick Hendricks have researched the main protagonists of this colorful episode and have collected the main documents of the trial to fashion a highly readable and enormously enlightening book, divided in two parts. The first six chapters amount to an extended background to the trial and cover such topics as the history of Abiquiu, a Hispanic outpost in an area otherwise dominated by nomadic Indians; the social and cultural construction of the identity of the *genízaros*; brief biographical treatments of Fray Juan José Toledo, the priest who first accused the *genízaros* of witchcraft, and of Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín who oversaw the proceedings during a climactic phase of the trial; as well as overview chapters on the Abiquiu land grant and on how New Mexico's colonial authorities dealt with witchcraft in general.

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While these chapters are didactic in nature and meant to provide context to the trial, they contain valuable information drawn out of primary source research that should not be missed. For instance, the discussion of *genízaro* identity is especially enlightening and greatly enhanced by a series of flesh-and-blood vignettes. Similarly, the chapter on Governor Vélez Cachupín details his bold and remarkably successful strategy for dealing with the powerful Indian nations surrounding New Mexico and shows just what a significant political figure of colonial New Mexico he was.

The second half of the book, chapters seven through eleven, delves into the witchcraft proceedings themselves, although considerable context is included here as well. The web of allegations and counter-allegations opens a fascinating window into the social life and religious beliefs of a frontier town settled primarily by detribalized Pueblo and Plains Indians. In these chapters one learns a great deal about how ordinary residents explained illness or went about trying to restore their health in a community that was well beyond the pale of the medical establishment of the vice-regal and provincial capitals, or about the overwhelming challenges faced by the lone resident priest in his quest to bring the locals into the Christian fold.

The unfolding of the witchcraft proceedings is both fascinating and convoluted involving a series of reports, apprehensions, investigations, exorcisms, and a full-scale tussle with the devil himself, a process that not only drew a cast of local characters but ultimately required the involvement of civil and ecclesiastical authorities from Santa Fe and officers of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Mexico City. These chapters are lucid and revealing, and I have only two very minor quibbles. First, sometimes the comparisons to other proceedings within New Mexico or elsewhere in Mexico or in Europe break the narrative flow and add yet another level of complexity to an already convoluted situation (some of this vital context could have been imparted in earlier chapters). And second, although we have the occasional quote, surprisingly little space is given to the voices of the participants themselves. The characters are so compelling that we wish we could hear them more often.

In sum, this is an excellent book. The illustrations by Glen Strock and the images of petroglyphs and the rugged surroundings of Abiquiu only add to the text and introduce an aesthetic quality that is rare in academic monographs. It is also very versatile and can be profitably used at the undergraduate as well as the graduate levels and in a variety of courses not only dealing with New Mexico, the Southwest, or colonial Mexico but also about witchcraft and witch hunting around the world.

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MARTINA WILL DE CHAPARRO. *Death and Dying in New Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2007. Pp. xxiv, 261. $29.95.

In this insightful and gracefully written study, Martina Will de Chaparro views the economic, religious, and political history of New Mexico in the late colonial, Mexican, and territorial periods through the highly revealing lens of deathways. She shows how New Mexicans' attitudes toward death and funerals changed or persisted with the economic growth of the late eighteenth century, the secularization of the Franciscan missions, and the Bourbon monarchs' attempts to reform burial customs and mold popular piety. For the years from 1821 to 1848, she examines the impact of liberal anticlericalism emanating from central Mexico and the growing influence of Anglo-American immigrants. Although the changes surrounding the U.S. takeover fall outside her principal focus, a fascinating epilogue shows how New Mexicans selectively adopted Anglo-American funeral practices after 1848. Her sources include nearly five hundred wills, burial registers, and other documents generated by clerics; travel accounts; and documents issued by government officials from Madrid and Mexico City to town councils and other authorities in Santa Fe and smaller communities. The findings of art historians and archaeologists further complement her research.

Will de Chaparro begins with an examination of the Catholic theological concept of the "good death" as expressed by New Mexicans in their wills. She then moves to a detailed and perceptive discussion of changing burial customs. Historians have long believed that social hierarchies were far less rigid on New Spain's northern frontier than they were in central Mexico, an assertion further corroborated by the data on deathways presented here. New Mexicans' scant resources permitted little of the pomp that attended the elite funerals in Mexico City and other major cities. Moreover, Indians as well as Hispanos were interred inside New Mexico's churches, often in proportions that replicated the demographic makeup of the community, while elsewhere church burials were often an exclusive prerogative of the socially prestigious. Nor was there an established pecking order within the churches, for colonial New Mexicans paid slight heed to the specific sites of their resting places as long as they were not relegated to outdoor burial grounds. Rarely did they place markers on their graves, and only after 1848 did some Hispanos begin using coffins. Corpses remained intact and in place for just a few years, as graves were continually reused, and bones mingled haphazardly, regardless of the decedent's social status. Will de Chaparro observes that this apparent disregard for the body after interment contrasted with the respectful grooming and dressing of a corpse for burial, because New Mexicans regarded death as the gradual and perilous transit of the soul from this life to the next, when the devil made his last frantic efforts to thwart the indi-

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vidual's salvation. Once the soul had reached its final destination, mortal remains lost their significance.

The Bourbon kings of the late eighteenth century and their successors in Mexico City after independence tried to promote the construction and use of cemeteries located away from population centers. Some New Mexicans tacitly accepted the reforms as inevitable if not desirable, but others resisted overtly. Clerics and local officials charged with implementing the changes displayed considerable flexibility when local people proved intractable. Meanwhile, social hierarchies became more evident in funeral practices in the nineteenth century, as local elites circumvented the rules by burying their dead in private chapels and sometimes even in churches. The numbers of New Mexicans whose testaments called upon specific saints to guide them to eternity declined precipitously in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Their wills also manifested growing concern with the disposal of their material goods, while making fewer bequests for masses and other religious ends. Other evidence points to a more equivocal advance toward secular mentalities, however. Many historians have noted such phenomena as the rise of the Penitentes and the fusion of religious fervor with budding nationalistic sentiment as Hispanos faced the specter and ultimate reality of Anglo-American conquest. Will de Chaparro offers fresh evidence to support this claim, documenting a small but significant rebound in the number of New Mexicans whose wills invoked the spiritual aid of favorite saints between 1826 and 1875.

Solidly grounded in borderlands and colonial Mexican historiography, and drawing on studies of nineteenth-century deathways in the eastern United States as well, Will de Chaparro has effectively shown how historians can use new evidence to learn how "ordinary" people experienced sweeping political, economic, and social change. Although more modest in scope than such studies as Andrés Reséndez's *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800–1850* (2004) and Ross Frank's *From Settler to Citizen: New Mexican Economic Development and the Creation of Vecino Society, 1750–1820* (2000), this book is a welcome addition to the literature on the transformation of New Mexico in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

CHERYL E. MARTIN
University of Texas, El Paso

JULIANA BARR. *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 397. Cloth $59.95, paper $19.95.

Over the past generation, historians have increasingly turned to gender as a lens through which to view interethnic relationships in borderland regions. One prominent theme in this line of inquiry has been gender's utility as a colonial tool. Colonizers often invoked indigenous deviation from supposedly natural standards of masculinity and femininity to essentialize difference and fuel racist discourses. Once newcomers enjoyed enough demographic and military power, native communities came under immense pressure to abandon their "deviant" notions about gender and reconfigure basic elements of their societies.

Juliana Barr's book reorients this now-familiar interpretive tack by examining the gendered nature of interethnic relations in eighteenth-century Texas—where native peoples predominated over colonizers. Vastly outnumbered and confined to isolated hamlets and besieged towns, Spaniards in colonial Texas were in little position to impose their notions about gender or race upon the region's diverse Indians. Consequently, Barr argues, Texas was different than other colonial borderland regions because in Texas native social and economic values—defined above all in gendered kinship terms—remained "at the crux of Spanish-Indian politics" (p. 2) for more than a century after initial colonization.

This book has a satisfying, tripartite structure that guides readers sequentially through the main sub-regions of Spanish-Indian interaction in Texas. Part one concerns Spain's earliest colonial efforts, amidst the Caddo chiefdoms in the east. Barr chronicles the haphazard and often self-sabotaging activities of Spanish friars and soldiers among the Caddos. Unwilling to emulate their French neighbors from Louisiana and forge kin ties by marrying into Caddo villages, Spaniards remained impotent outcasts in east Texas for most of the colonial era. What little influence Spain did enjoy there had less to do with missionaries, officials, or soldiers than with the personal relationships that the area's small, heterogeneous colonial settlements maintained with specific Caddo villages. Part two concerns diverse native peoples to the west and south. Ravaged by disease and harried by mounted Apaches, Coahuilteco, Tonkawa, and Karankawa-speaking peoples sought refuge at Franciscan missions. However, they came not as supplicants but partners; cooperating with Spaniards for mutual defense, resisting the friars' critique of their gendered social and cultural values, and, most importantly, leaving seasonally to attend to their annual subsistence round. Meanwhile, women became key figures in Spanish-Apache relations, most often unwillingly. For decades Spanish forces responded to raids by enslaving Apache women and children (something Barr explores in searing detail). When, by mid-century, attacks from powerful "*norteño*" Indians (Comanches, Wichitas, and Caddos) forced Apaches to adjust their relations with Spaniards, captive women became crucial intermediaries in the rapprochement. Part three concerns the halting process whereby Spaniards and these mighty *norteños* forged peace. Concentrating on the ways in which masculine notions of honor and female hostage-taking and hospitality both complicated and structured emerging alliances, Barr guides the reader through the gendered "practices of peace" (p.

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276) that led to unprecedented stability in late-colonial Texas.

As a study of interethnic relations, this book succeeds beautifully. Barr adds tremendous depth and texture to the narrative of colonial Texas recovered by Elizabeth A. H. John, Gary Clayton Anderson, F. Todd Smith, and others. Never before have these collective relationships been rendered in such intimate and humane detail. Barr has a striking gift for reading colonial documents against the grain and for recovering the complex, gritty, and oftentimes moving experiences of diverse peoples struggling to relate to one another on the ground. But in insisting that her readers will find "no stories of Indian assimilation, accommodation, resistance, or perseverance" in eighteenth-century Texas, but rather "a story of Indian *dominance*" (p. 7), Barr understates Spanish power. We learn too little about physical and material coercion in missions, for example. Moreover, the author notes punishing Spanish attacks against native villages, attacks that necessarily forced some Indians to assimilate, accommodate, or resist. Most broadly, dominance is clearly situational. Despite demographic and territorial advantages, Caddos, Wichitas, Apaches, Comanches, and especially the diverse and besieged peoples of central Texas wanted things from Spaniards. As such, interactions required native as well as Spanish compromises. Indeed, Barr provides fascinating examples of native peoples making onerous journeys to Spanish settlements, coveting Spanish goods and merchandise, appropriating Spanish symbols, and struggling to communicate in terms they believed Spaniards found meaningful.

In this sense it seems to me that colonial Texas as Barr has revealed it, while often an extreme case of asymmetrical indigenous power, still has more in common with other borderlands than the author allows. This is for the good, because this book should be read by anyone interested in colonial borderlands—both because of its exquisite portrait of a complex region, and because it exemplifies what scholars of other places, in North America and beyond, might accomplish by paying more attention to gendered "practices of peace."

Brian DeLay
University of Colorado, Boulder

María Raquél Casas. *Married to a Daughter of the Land: Spanish-Mexican Women and Interethnic Marriage in California, 1820–1880.* Reno: University of Nevada Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 261. $34.95.

A bit more than a century ago, histories of Spanish and Mexican California glowingly told of the American liberation of the future golden state from the indolence of its Hispanic inhabitants and their system of Indian servile labor. The few women who intermarried with Americans were seen to have been similarly emancipated from the unenlightened social system. Then, by the early twentieth century, commodity-oriented Americans came to celebrate the graciousness of "Old California" in fanciful history books and pageants. By the 1970s, Chicano historians had come to see it all as racist conquest, hailed the once vilified resistors to American imperialism, and cast a somewhat suspicious glance at those women who slept with the enemy. A short while later, historical research revealed the meanness of California patriarchy and relations with the Indians and understood the accommodationist role of these "daughters of the land" who married Euro-Americans. María Raquél Casas attempts to put at the center of this history of California neither manifest destiny or conquest, nor accommodation or resistance, but the important roles that Spanish-Mexican women who married outsiders played in forging the history of nineteenth-century California and, ultimately, these "women's worth as agents of cultural change" (p. 8).

To affirm the agency of these *hijas del país*, Casas studies intermarriage neither statistically nor with the intent of drawing conclusions about general nuptial trends, but rather adopts a "highly interpretive and qualitative" approach utilizing "detailed portraits of some individual Spanish-Mexican women engaged in intermarriage" (p. x). Indeed, the variously successful, sorrowful, conflictual, and occasionally odd marriages will engage any reader interested in social or women's history. The elite de la Guerra sisters, Anita, Teresa, and Angustias, married Anglos, one of whom proved to be incompetent financially while two were incontinent sexually and one was a fairly good husband. Teresa, the least fortunate of the sisters, "was forced in his (William Hartnell's) absence to supervise, maintain, and control their household" (p. 60), and this she did quite well. After her neglectful husband died, Teresa married a *Californio* and "was clearly a greater, if not an equal, participant in running and maintaining the ranchos." Moreover, "throughout her married life Teresa adhered to her community's proscribed cultural role of wife and mother" (p. 63).

Laws governing marriage and property changed after 1848 when the United States took over California, "but women were now more willing to use the social structures, particularly the legal system, to protect their, and their children's, well-being" (p. 144). María Villalobos, for example, acquired bondsmen and together they used the law to "thoroughly protect her five ranchos" (p. 120). Others bought and sold rancho property. Casas argues that while "men were seen as the principal actors . . . Californianas recognized this postwar legal shift and modified their actions accordingly" (p. 125).

"Agency," of course, is something that comes in degrees; it is not something that can be evaluated in either/or terms. It is also quite difficult to argue from the specific about the general; if some women exhibited an active role in their marital or property concerns, it is difficult to conclude authoritatively what these individual examples indicate about all women. Indeed, I would think that some readers of this book would take these few examples of active women not as proof of agency but as exceptions that prove the general rule of female dependency for Spanish-Mexican women in nine-

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teenth-century California. Indeed, what does the case of Teresa de la Guerra reveal? Certainly, though, Casas has demonstrated the wide variety of *Californiana* (as she calls these Spanish-Mexican women) activities, responses to marriage and errant husbands, and success and failure in negotiating restricted social space of *Californio* patriarchy. But other matters of *Californiana* agency remain unresolved, at least for this reviewer. Statements such as "Women, on the whole, faced limitations based on their gender, but they fully negotiated the social space open to them" (p. 145) seem both vague and overstated.

The strength of this book lies in its breadth and depth of knowledge about marriage in nineteenth-century Spanish America and its application to the distant outpost of California and in its command of sources. From the Council of Trent, to Latin American notions of honor and virtue, to the changing roles of the Catholic Church and civil authorities in various matters of marriage, even divorce, this book enlightens and demonstrates the mutability of the institution of marriage. Casas utilizes a wide variety of sources including court records, archival collections, and the famous reminiscences that Hubert Howe Bancroft had collected in the 1870s. Her appreciation for the expanding body of secondary sources on nineteenth-century California is thorough and sound.

It seems particularly true for California that matters of marriage in every historical era will remain arenas of conflict for students of the subject. Casas has contributed significantly to those debates, but, much like marriages then and now, nothing ever seems completely resolved.

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Colorado College

Jürgen Buchenau. *Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2007. Pp. xxvii, 277. Cloth $80.00, paper $34.95.

Jürgen Buchenau's book fills a conspicuous gap in the historiography of the Mexican Revolution. The author presents Plutarco Elías Calles (president of Mexico 1924–1928), as an authoritarian populist who gained public support by appealing to worker and *campesino* (peasant) demands that burst to the surface during the revolution. Once in power, however, Calles moved to centralize authority and limit broad-based participatory politics. He worked to incorporate radical independent workers' organizations into a state-sanctioned union to control them, and he sought to placate rebellious *campesinos* by making token gestures of agrarian reform. After his presidency, Calles operated behind the scenes, wielding considerable influence during the truncated terms of three other presidents and earning the moniker *Jefe Máximo*. He made his most lasting impact on Mexican political life when he played a leading role in the construction of a state party that purported to represent the popular aspirations that had fueled the revolution. The author's argument that "Calles' career therefore reflects the contradictions of Mexican revolutionary populism" is compelling.

Buchenau suggests that the Mexican Revolution was "lacking ideological focus" and therefore provided fertile ground for populist leaders who played on popular desires to emerge, even as they only occasionally delivered tangible benefits. There is some truth in that. Yet it is also true that those revolutionaries with a clear agenda, like the Zapatistas and other agrarian rebels, simply lost the fight. Likewise, the other main group voicing cogent "popular" demands was the industrial working class, which, in a nominally industrial society, was too small and too weak to prevail. The result was that upper-middle-class winners, like Calles, followed an upper-middle-class agenda as much as they could, not so much because the revolution lacked ideological focus, but because they won the armed struggle. Meanwhile, workers and peasants, although beaten, remained dangerous. Whatever the reason for the rise of "revolutionary populism," Buchenau's work is thought-provoking. He tells a fascinating story about the political tightrope that Calles walked as he tried to put in place an apparatus that could co-opt agitated popular classes by giving them some of what they wanted, while also controlling them. The state party that he helped to create provided the institutional power base for that effort, providing an instrument for constant patronage and occasional repression.

Buchenau blends Calles's personal story into the larger drama of the revolution and its aftermath. Calles was born into a prominent Sonoran family whose fortunes had declined. His mother died when he was young and the boy did not grow up with his father around either. Before the revolution, he taught school, started a family, and pursued a variety of failed business ventures. Convincingly portraying Calles as an "opportunistic and lukewarm revolutionary" who joined the revolution late, the author shows how the revolution created opportunity for ambitious men. Calles did not participate in Francisco Madero's revolution that overthrew long-time dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1911. His major break came after that, when he was appointed Comisario of Agua Prieta and helped put down a rebellion led by Pasqual Orozco against the new revolutionary government in 1912, and then fought against the coup led by Victoriano Huerta that overthrew Madero in 1913. When the revolutionary factions that had temporarily united to fight Huerta turned on one another, Calles ended up on the winning side. As a reward, he became governor of Sonora. His policies as governor included a war against the Yaqui Indians for confiscation of Indian lands, increased government attention to education, the enforcement of a meager 1.5 percent tax on foreign copper companies, military protection for the foreign-owned mines, and the confiscation of his political enemies' property, which was then distributed to supporters.

Calles followed similar practices as president, although as a savvy politician he cultivated the leadership of what remained of the revolution's popular move-

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ments, especially urban labor. Calles carried out some progressive reforms in the early years of his presidency. The state-sponsored labor union, the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), grew tremendously and workers' wages went up thirty-four percent. Independent unions were bullied though, and the CROM sent scabs to end wildcat strikes. As for *campesinos*, Calles carried out some land reform where it was a political necessity, like in Morelos, but his tenure was marked by more rhetoric than action on this score. Adamantly anticlerical, Calles's presidency was marred by the Cristero Rebellion, which erupted in response to his attacks on a variety of church activities, coupled with regional reactions to the central government trying to impose itself on local autonomy and ways of life. Calles lived in tumultuous times and the picture one gets from this clearly written and well-researched book offers a window on the revolution and its aftermath that should be read with interest by students and scholars alike.

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Texas State University

DANIEL LEWIS. *Iron Horse Imperialism: The Southern Pacific of Mexico, 1880–1951*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 179. $35.00.

The title of Daniel Lewis's book must be ironic because, as the reader quickly finds out, it tells the story of the capitalist equivalent of "The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight." Lewis offers a case study of the Southern Pacific of Mexico ("SP de Mex"). Founded in 1879, the line ran from the U.S. border down the west coast to Guadalajara. The U.S. railroad giant, the Southern Pacific Company, took over the company in 1898 and operated the line as a wholly-owned subsidiary until 1951, when it was purchased by the Mexican government. Yet, despite access to the enormous resources of the parent company (by 1926 the second largest corporation in the United States), SP de Mex turned a profit in only five years in the half-century of its existence. Lewis asks why such a successful firm in the United States could not replicate its successes in Mexico. His study, however, is less business history than it is an analysis of U.S. railroad management culture and how that culture failed to understand, much less accommodate to, the necessities of doing business in Mexico.

Lewis begins with an overview of why SP de Mex continued in Mexico "long after it made any business sense" (p. 4), concluding that executives held to a conquest culture that urged them on even in the face of economic failure, and that this image of the railroads as "penetrators and conquerors" (p. 10) underlay the often-contentious relationships between the firm and the Mexican government. Lewis continues with an historical overview of the Mexican government's railroad policies from 1837 to 1920. We pick up SP de Mex's trail again in chapter three. In that chapter and the four that follow, Lewis traces the railroad through the changing attitudes of the regime of Porfirio Díaz, the deprivations of the revolution, the expensive construction of the last difficult miles in the 1920s, the volatile 1930s, and ends in 1951, when the Mexican government agreed to buy SP de Mexico—the last railroad not under government control. In a particularly interesting chapter ("Multicultural Mosaic: The Impact of Otherness, 1923–1929"), Lewis's story takes a cultural twist in his treatment of the ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts involving Chinese, Mormon, Yaqui, Mexican, and North American workers on the line; the Cristero Rebellion; and the concept of "otherness" applied to the company itself. While the labor sections are well done, the author's development of "otherness" is unconvincing.

Lewis's book suffers from several weaknesses. First, itwould have been stronger, and more conceptually sound, had it placed the issues within the broader context of business history. For example, readers will want to contrast Lewis's approach and findings with Sandra Kuntz Ficker's work on the U.S.-owned Mexican Central Railroad (*Empresa extranjera y mercado interno: El Ferrocarril Central Mexicano, 1880–1907* [1995]) and especially her article in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* (2000). Ficker's more theoretically grounded approach emphasizes Mexican economic and institutional constraints to explain the failings of the Mexican Central Railroad, while Lewis focuses on the ineptness of SP de Mex's U.S. management and its adherence to inappropriate American railroad culture. Neither approach is mutually exclusive, of course. Finally, the book's coverage is uneven—the critical 1930s receive barely twenty-eight pages and the firm's last decade is summarized in less than four pages. The lack of data on the war years is particularly unfortunate, as Mexican lines carried vital war goods and workers to the United States.

On the other hand, Lewis's analysis of the SP de Mex's corporate failings is important. The company's aggressive U.S. railroading values were often counterproductive in Mexico. In 1936, an independent railroad consultant admonished the company for attitudes that, in Mexico, were considered "incivility and rudeness," and praised German and Japanese business agents who "are careful to avoid offense" (p. 129). Particularly damning was the charge that U.S.-based executives often lacked knowledge about market conditions in Mexico, and had a "general lack of comprehension of customs procedures, embargoes, and tariff matters" (p. 129). Mexican governmental policy also affected the profit margin, of course, including labor laws that favored workers. Deprivations during the Cristero Rebellion (1926–1929) added to company woes, and U.S. protectionism during the Great Depression was particularly injurious. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 raised tariffs on Mexican vegetables by 600 percent and devastated the line's profitable shipping of winter and spring vegetables to the U.S. and Canada. Still, Lewis convincingly argues that SP de Mex was its own worst enemy.

Lewis's overarching thesis is that the story of SP de

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Mex is not simply one of a developing country fending off U.S. corporate hegemony, but a more subtle tale of the Mexican government actively influencing the firm to contribute to "Mexican nationbuilding" (p. 14). In other words, Lewis turns the usual imperialism argument on its head. Far from being fleeced, Mexico obtained a badly needed addition to the nation's infrastructure, while successfully advancing Mexican sovereignty vis-à-vis powerful capitalist interests. This is an important, if controversial, interpretation. Despite its weaknesses, Lewis's work is an insightful, perceptive, and welcome addition to Mexican business history, even more so because he attempts to infuse business history with a cultural perspective. If the latter is sometimes less than satisfying, the attempt itself is noteworthy.

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Florida State University

AARON BOBROW-STRAIN. *Intimate Enemies: Landowners, Power, and Violence in Chiapas*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 271. Cloth $79.95, paper $22.95.

The southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas has received a great deal of scholarly attention since 1994, when the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) began a well-publicized rebellion against the Mexican state that launched invasions of more than 200,000 acres of agricultural land. Intellectuals and activists from around the world, attracted by the rebellion's rejection of neoliberalism and NAFTA and its savvy use of image and technology, have produced a steady stream of books and articles on the conflict, almost all of them about the rebels and allied indigenous organizations. Aaron Bobrow-Strain's book is the first scholarly work in English to focus on the landowning elites whose land the indigenous organizations invaded.

Bobrow-Strain uses fifty interviews with landowning elites and documentary sources from eleven archives, including municipal archives and the diocesan archives of San Cristóbal de las Casas, to study the coffee planters and cattle ranchers of Chilón, in north-central Chiapas. He argues that these local landed elites deserve a more nuanced understanding than those provided by the Marxian "economic logic of landed production" (p. 40). Rather, landed elites and landed production, he contends, should be seen as "constructed through contingent processes of social struggle" (p. 10). In Chilón, this struggle concerned territoriality, which he defines as "the social creation of a bounded space in an effort to exercise control over that space" (p. 42).

German entrepreneurs created vast coffee plantations in the late nineteenth century, but most of the elites studied by Bobrow-Strain are the descendants of "itinerant merchants, skilled laborers, and poor professionals" (p. 55) who worked on the German plantations and then carved out smaller estates of their own. Through the sale of *aguardiente* (sugar cane liquor), these small-scale planters intentionally created a workforce of indigenous peons whose debts effectively bound them to the land. During the early decades of the twentieth century, in this "seamless cane-coffee complex," the "aguardiente distilled from the first crop [sugar cane] lubricated production of the second [coffee]" (p. 69). However, the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) produced new actors who eventually undermined the seamless nature of the landowners' control. Because the 1917 Constitution empowered the state to give peasants land expropriated from large estates, federal teachers, agrarian agencies, special prosecutors, and other representatives of the state replaced local elites as dispensers of justice, mediators, and sources of credit, supplies, and—of most concern to the planters—land.

As Bobrow-Strain skillfully demonstrates, landowners resisted the new mediators and the threat of expropriation through old tactics such as violence, intimidation, and coercion, and through new tactics such as reclassifying their estates as "small properties" that were constitutionally protected from expropriation and by moving from coffee to less labor intensive cattle ranching. This shift enabled them also to represent themselves as ranchers rather than as planters, "swapping the planter's white suit for blue jeans and boots" (p. 173), but this repackaging of themselves succeeded only for a season. In the 1970s and 1980s, revitalized agrarian organizations and radical Roman Catholic catechists were pushing, sometimes successfully, for land redistribution. The state seemed increasingly ready to sacrifice its traditional protection of the landed elite of rural Chiapas in return for peace in the countryside. In the 1990s, landowners proved surprisingly passive as new waves of peasant mobilizations seized forty different properties in the Chilón area and "state-brokered purchases distributed 7,312 hectares—66 percent of private properties larger than 5 hectares in the municipio—to indigenous land claimants" (p. 133). Afraid that the state would no longer protect their safety or their land, landowners left the area in record numbers. In 2005, Tzeltal indigenous merchants had replaced *mestizos* (people of mixed ancestry) along Chilón's main street and the Tzeltal language dominated.

Bobrow-Strain, trained as a geographer and currently holding a position as a political scientist, strays too often into jargon and devotes too much space—including the first three chapters—to explaining and justifying his method and approach. Sentences such as the following do little to advance his argument: "Fear shapes space, or more accurately, representations of fear and violence are among the many social-spatial practices through which space is produced" (p. 207). Nevertheless, this is an important book that, in a logical and convincing manner, explains how landowners responded to the various pressures and tensions of their positions as local elites in an isolated area of Chiapas and why they ultimately accepted the loss of the land that had provided them with status and almost unassailable power.

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Bobrow-Strain is to be commended for his facility in using oral and archival sources to provide what had been one of the missing pieces in the Chiapas puzzle.

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AIMS MCGUINNESS. *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush*. (The United States in the World.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 249. $35.00.

This fine book tells a multilayered story about intersections among people, capital, and nations in Panama during the gold-rush era. In chapters that mix a chronological and thematic approach, Aims McGuinness examines the dramatic transformations that accompanied the migrations to California, as Panama (under the Republic of Nueva Granada, the predecessor to Colombia) became a bridge that linked the eastern and western United States. The sudden influx of people and commodities associated with "La California," well remembered in Panamanian history, focused complex contests over jurisdiction and power.

McGuinness portrays a Panama beset with the confusions, suspicions, and clashes common in imperial settings. People suddenly thrown together often held differing attitudes about the meanings of skin color, the uses of time, perceptions of gender and honor, and conventions of commodity and monetary exchange. Many from the United States were both fascinated and also appalled by Panama's poverty mixed with natural bounty, its interracial milieu, and its remnants of a more glorious past. Most saw both California and Panama as distant and potentially rich lands that were destined to succumb to more progressive Anglo-American ways. Within just a few years, a U.S. company had linked the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with a rail line, displacing the local workers who had initially prospered from the surging demand for food, shelter, and mule or canoe transport.

How to make money from the arrivals and departures of gold-rush migrants, however, brought conflicts within as well as between nationalities. North American fortune hunters, for example, often complained about exploitation by U.S. steamship and rail companies. On the other side, Panamanian workers often vied with elite merchants over who might capture the new business opportunities, and splits between Liberal and Conservative parties also became more acrimonious. Ultimately, the U.S. rail company, after importing a workforce and tackling the problem of disease, built a Caribbean-coast enclave that could both profit from, and police, the new commercial and transit hubs. Panamanians saw few of the once anticipated benefits.

The sudden presence of North Americans sparked a number of political developments. Some Panamanian leaders, beset by economic dislocations, a rural rebellion, and fears of U.S. filibuster attempts inspired by William Walker in Nicaragua, came to advocate a Federal State of Panama and envisioned ultimate independence from Nueva Grenada. Political ferment also interfaced with the liberal political revolution in Nueva Granada, bringing the abolition of slavery in 1852 and a constitution in 1853 that granted habeas corpus and universal manhood suffrage with no exclusions based on property or color. Moreover, the idea of a United States–run transit zone in the isthmus would, in time, inspire some American quests for a canal.

The expanding sense of Panamanian pride and distinctiveness clashed with the condescension of U.S. immigrants and set the stage for an incident in April 1856, when an argument between a man from the United States and a Panamanian watermelon vendor spiraled into a fight and then into a brief U.S. intervention. The fear of a U.S. threat also prompted a repression orchestrated by the Conservative party in Bogota. The incident of April 1856, and its diverse historical memories, provide the fulcrum of McGuinness's book, which includes an account of the author's own participation as a historical re-enactor in Panama's 150th commemoration of the well-known altercation and intervention.

McGuinness argues that the gold rush dislocations and, specifically, the U.S. intervention contributed to a new geopolitical idea: the concept of "Latin America." In the 1850s U.S. "manifest destiny," which fueled the war with Mexico, filibustering projects, and talk of an eventual protectorate over Panama, spawned an opposing discourse that pitted a materialistic and industrial "raza yankee" against a noble and spiritual "raza Latina." The imaginary of "Latin America" thus took shape in the context of U.S. empire-building.

Contrary to the fears of many Panamanians, however, the U.S. rail company in Panama was less interested in territorial acquisition than in maintaining a weak government that would not impede the company's business. McGuinness's book thus argues that U.S. informal empire-building, often associated with the end of the century, took shape much earlier in the transportation enclave in Panama.

This book has many virtues: a self-reflexive style; a rich source base in autobiographies, travel accounts, and records from both the United States and Panama; a focus that both acknowledges states and also presents them as comprised of disaggregated actors; a sense of historical change as contested. A set of unbound documents in the Panamanian archive provides McGuinness with the central metaphor both for contingencies in his research and for his aspirations in writing this study. "All bindings in the end are provisional rather than permanent" (p. 15), he writes, and thinking of history as unbounded to any single nation, group, or story opens the possibility of reading events in new ways. A certain mystery related to a cache of unbound documents frames the book's artfully written prelude and coda.

In this small and carefully researched book, McGuinness rises above the specificity of time and place to address broad questions about race, gender, class, nation, and empire. He also stresses the often lopsided nature of historical remembrances. Scholars from many differ-

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ent fields will appreciate the book's expansive thematic and interpretive reach.

EMILY S. ROSENBERG
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Erin O'Connor. *Gender, Indian, Nation: The Contradictions of Making Ecuador, 1830–1925*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 2007. Pp. xxiii, 261. $49.95.

In this book, Erin O'Connor explores how Ecuadorian conceptualizations of race and gender interacted with nation-state-building during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Ecuador, nation-building presented a dilemma. While the economic and political elite claimed they were building a nation that included all people, they still wanted to exploit and exclude the indigenous population. "Ecuadorian statesmen were caught between their proclaimed desire to fashion a nation out of liberal individuals and their deeply embedded conviction that Indians were unfit for inclusion in the nation" (p. 13).

O'Connor explores gender and Indian-state relations by focusing on three pivotal points in Ecuadorian history: the debate over the 1857 abolition of the Indian-only tribute tax; nation-building during the conservative regime of Gabriel García Moreno (in office 1861–1865; 1869–1875); and liberal-era secular social reforms, 1895 to 1925. O'Connor holds that "rural peoples . . . were actively involved in shaping the state idea behind nationalism" (p. 8), even if they did so by remaining silent on the state's agendas. Indigenous people, by rejecting the values that the state insisted upon, helped shape the state that formed.

Authentic gains for indigenous people were few. The end of tribute did not bring better conditions for Ecuador's Indians. In its place came a new general tax for everyone in the underclass, and prior Indian protection laws (such as exemption from conscription, sales taxes, and judicial fees), were stripped away. Meanwhile, García Moreno's road building and other infrastructure projects depended on coerced Indian labor. Even the liberal-era abolition of *concertaje* (debt peonage) in 1918 came to be replaced with a similar forced labor system, *huasipungaje*, which lasted well into the twentieth century.

O'Connor rightly emphasizes the ever changing and deeply complex nature of gender roles, showing especially how dominant white formulations stood at variance to those of various indigenous communities. O'Connor provides especially strong treatment of indigenous marriage practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the use of *amañanza*, or trial marriage, a custom not honored in the non-Indian world.

In indigenous communities adult women, while outside the orbit of men, could sometimes enjoy economic power and influence. Widows, or "situational widows" (women whose husbands had been forced by circumstance to work elsewhere or who had been pressed into government labor gangs), represented their own interests in court cases involving land disputes. O'Connor shows how these women filed, pursued, and sometimes won their cases. Yet O'Connor finds more than just white-versus-indigenous differences over women's rights and roles, locating important variability within the indigenous world as well. Access to property was critical and O'Connor carefully demonstrates that women in independent indigenous communities had significantly more land rights and power than did Indian women on haciendas.

Some readers may have trouble with O'Connor's decision to place nation-building at the center of analysis. The evidence from the nineteenth century, a time of political chaos, repeated coups d'etat, and endless civil wars, suggests that Ecuadorians were more intent on the project of state destruction than state building. It is an open question as to whether anyone in Ecuador was truly that interested in state-building; the Indians did not care at all, and the most powerful elite groups seemed rather more intent on aggressively pursuing their own interests, evidently unconcerned that this might rip their country apart. In time, an Ecuadorian nation-state would emerge, but it would come while the elite were mostly busy fighting other battles.

O'Connor interprets García Moreno's measures against concubinage and drinking almost solely as part of his nation-building project, giving nearly no coverage to other possible motives. (His most bitter critics thought he was just a moralizing prig.) Likewise, O'Connor generally explores the struggle to end the tribute as motivated by the nation-building goal of making all citizens equal. But coastal cacao growers saw ending the tribute as an essential step in freeing Indians from highland haciendas and making them available to work on coastal cacao estates. Studying political actions only in reference to a single factor—the project of nation-building—tends to leave other motives, disputes, and regional agendas underappreciated.

O'Connor conducted extensive research in a variety of sources: presidential speeches, congressional debates, government reports, hacienda records, and most of all court transcripts. Yet the court cases are not as interesting as one might think and reviewing the trials one by one can make for pretty slow going. Still in all, this book is a strong contribution to the study of gender in the indigenous world of the Andes. O'Connor's work will be of considerable value to all scholars seeking a deeper understanding of gender role constructions across varied historical settings.

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KAREN B. GRAUBART. *With Our Labor and Sweat: Indigenous Women and the Formation of Colonial Society in Peru, 1550–1700*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 249. $55.00.

This book makes a valuable contribution to the rapidly growing literature on the role of indigenous women in colonial Peruvian society and economy. As with Jane E.

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Mangan's and Kimberly Gauderman's work on Potosí and Quito, Karen B. Graubart's main focus is on urban women—in this case, primarily the few hundred or so who were involved enough with city life to appear in notarized documents from Lima or Trujillo between 1550 and 1700 (and the choice of the coastal cities brings a welcome counterpoint to the highland emphasis of recent scholarship). The core of the book emphasizes how women were agents (and often considerably successful ones) in the material world of viceregal Peru; such agency, Graubart argues, enabled and produced greater social mobility and fluidity of ethnic categories, than is generally acknowledged. Lima and Trujillo existed largely outside the hierarchies of rural, indigenous communities and brought indigenous women into close proximity with Spanish Peruvians (with their disproportionate wealth and access to both markets and the lettered worlds of notaries and courts) and thereby offered migrants from the countryside the possibility of economic success in the colonial world. Through close ties to elite urban families, the development of extensive credit and debt networks, participation in the urban markets and investments back into the countryside through—as they noted in their wills—their "labor and sweat," the Indian women of Lima and Trujillo contributed to, and benefited from, these urban economies. Furthermore, these women successfully used colonial laws and institutions to achieve their desired outcomes, in terms of protection and disposal of property, collection of debts, and recognition of illegitimate children. In the strongest chapter of the work, a careful reading of the notary record shows how individuals performed, and in so doing produced, ethnic identity through dress as they sought to define themselves and their role in a complex, colonial society. Here, one of Graubart's central arguments—that ethnic identity was most malleable and protean earlier in colonial society, with categories and hierarchies produced by colonial actors over generations—is best demonstrated.

Serving as bookends to this reading of urban society are two chapters that take the reader into the countryside. The work concludes with a strong discussion of female succession in colonial *cacicazgos* (chieftainships) on the north coast. Graubart shows how the manipulation of "custom" and law by colonial actors helped create an "indigenous tradition" that enabled female succession. The first chapter adds to an understanding of the gendering of the early colonial economy by emphasizing the importance of indigenous women's textile production to both tribute payment (smartly labeled as "women's tribute production") and the viceregal market generally. Claims regarding a rapid acceptance of "wage-labor" ideals by rural women are less convincing, as is the rejection of an urban/rural dichotomy.

As a whole, this book treats historical agency as market agency. Graubart openly acknowledges this at the outset: her goal is to elaborate the ways in which "those who theory (and law) tells us were marginalized from political-economic power nonetheless found agency in that material realm" (p. 6); as she puts it, the actors in this book "were generally neither victims nor exceptions" (p. 120). However, this claim requires more engagement with the interaction of agency, choice, and subjection than the empirical analysis provides. Those interested in historical and philosophical questions of agency will be left wanting a more robust appreciation of the richness of the terrain of the indigenous subaltern. Also, methodologically, the two hundred indigenous women who, over one hundred fifty years, made notarized wills in the coastal cities of Lima and Trujillo, *were* exceptional, as were Lima and Trujillo among viceregal Peruvian cities. In this, the title is somewhat misleading: broad, occasional claims about the light this study sheds on "Peru" and "colonial society" notwithstanding, this book is above all a careful, well-written study of indigenous women who met with material success in Lima and Trujillo, and who through their choices and actions engaged in the formation and ongoing transformation of these cities' distinctive colonial societies.

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Reed College

MARÍA EMMA MANNARELLI. *Private Passions and Public Sins: Men and Women in Seventeenth-Century Lima*. Translated by SIDNEY EVANS and MEREDITH D. DODGE. (Diálogos.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 204. $23.95.

This translation of María Emma Mannarelli's 1993 book is a most welcome addition to English-language works on colonial Latin America. Scholars of colonial Peru with interest in family and gender history have long consulted the works of Mannarelli. She studies the cultural norms surrounding sex, marriage, and family in colonial Lima and highlights the significance of gender in her analysis of all these subjects. In the early 1990s, the book filled an important gap in the historiography of the colonial Andes with its novel treatment of urban social history.

Mannarelli takes as her central concern Lima's high rates of illegitimacy and extramarital relationships and examines the reasons for, and the impact of, these realities. How did practices of marriage in early modern Spain affect marriage in the colonial setting? Similarly, how did Lima's high proportion of slave women affect the institution of marriage? Her queries find inspiration in the history of the family as practiced by European historians. But Mannarelli acknowledges the unique elements of her colonial setting, racial diversity and demographic imbalance among them. At first glance, the topics under consideration suggest a study at the margins of colonial Lima. Mannarelli demonstrates, however, that both amorous relationships and their progeny abound outside of formal structures. Thus, she argues, these behaviors and relationships were not merely common; they constituted the very core of the colonial framework.

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Having established that adultery, concubinage, and children born out of wedlock were common aspects of lived experience, Mannarelli hones her inquiry through systematic analysis of sources like ecclesiastical court cases and baptismal records to understand the impact of the informal behaviors that were becoming institutionalized in colonial society. To avoid dishonor, extramarital affairs prompted child abandonment, which in turn occasioned illegitimate status and thus began a cycle of behavior that continued unchecked.

The book's main chronological focus is the seventeenth century. To begin, Mannarelli details relationship patterns in the first century after conquest. Her second chapter narrates Lima's dynamic social spaces from a gendered perspective, with an eye to how identity, occupation, custom, and architecture influenced the relationships between men and women. The core of the book uses the distinct themes of unwed couples, ecclesiastical divorce, illegitimate children, and extramarital affairs to describe the diverse circumstances surrounding men and women's sexual relations. For example, to study unwed couples she examines fifty-eight cases of *amancebados* (couples accused of living together outside of marriage). From evidence of mild punishments, long-lasting relationships, and repeat offenders she concludes that there was a high level of acceptance of relationships outside marriage. In another area of analysis, Mannarelli treats children born outside of marriage. She consults lawsuits over guardianship and inheritance, and wills to examine life trajectories for these illegitimates. The sources do not yield readily, but Mannarelli is a perceptive student of the emotional responses surrounding the birth and early lives of these children. The source base for abandonment is highly biased toward the eighteenth century. Was abandonment as high in the seventeenth century? Furthermore, was abandonment met with the same responses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?

Regarding the application of gender analysis, much of what Mannarelli asserts is consistent with what we know about colonial patriarchy: a sexual double standard existed and women's adultery was punished more severely than men's. The main point, however, remains: adulterous affairs, like unwed couples and illegitimate children, were not rare acts of transgression, but the norm. And, it was precisely through the predominance of these practices that a very small elite class of Peruvians embraced the institution of marriage and "maintained their stratified social system" (p. 149).

Mannarelli's book offers thick descriptions of family, friends, and kin networks in colonial Lima, weaving these tales through different locales in the city, including churches, taverns, bedrooms, schools, and courtrooms. The drama of human experience as it unfolds in her analysis conveys a vivid portrait of seventeenth-century Limeña life. Indeed, the book's style will lend itself to dynamic discussions in undergraduate classes.

Fourteen years elapsed between the original publication of Mannarelli's work and its English release. The translation by Sidney Evans and Meredith D. Dodge is well executed. Lengthy quotations from primary sources slow an otherwise quick read, but this presentation stems from the original. The reader will note occasional awkward phrases and errors (such as the dates on p. 7). A revised introduction might have taken up the interesting historiographical relationship between the original book and publications of the late 1990s such as Ann Twinam's (1999) on honor, identity, and illegitimacy in Spanish America or Bianca Premo's (2006) on children and illegitimacy in Lima. Nonetheless, the connections are clear. The impact of Mannarelli's book on subsequent studies of Spanish colonial social networks is indisputable. Now available in English, this book deserves a wider audience of historians who treat similar themes for early North America, the Atlantic world, and early modern Europe.

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NICHOLAS A. ROBINS. *Priest-Indian Conflict in Upper Peru: The Generation of Rebellion, 1750–1780.* (Religion and Politics.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 315. Cloth $59.95, paper $29.95.

The Great Rebellion, also know as the Túpac Amaru/Túpac Katari rebellion, was the largest anticolonial rebellion in Spanish America. It began in 1780, in the central Andes of what today are Peru and Bolivia as a largely indigenous revolt with messianic overtones and lasted until suppressed by hastily assembled Spanish armies in 1782. In its aftermath, over forty thousand Spaniards and creoles and sixty thousand Indians were dead. The crown abolished some of the most onerous colonial exactions and began to build up a militia that could defend against internal and external threats. The rebellion made the Hispanic population cling to the colonial regime longer than elsewhere for fear of independence stirring up another caste war; Peru and Bolivia became independent only after invasion by outside patriot armies in 1824 and 1825.

The importance of indigenous movements in the Andes over the past decade has provided a new impetus to reexamine the Great Rebellion, and the book under review is one of these efforts. Nicholas A. Robins focuses on the role of priests in the period leading up to the rebellion. The first part of the book is a brief on the priestly abuses against Indian communities. These abuses occurred within the context of the Bourbon reforms, when exploitation of Indian communities was at its highest, as the crown tried to extract revenues from its colonies. Robins postulates that the parish priests competed with the local Spanish administrators, the *corregidores*, for community resources. The *corregidores* mostly won, since tribute collection and the *reparto*, the forced sale of goods to the Indians, received priority. The *corregidores* also won because of the Bourbon administration's policy of reigning in the power of the Catholic Church. Colonial officials attempted to regulate clerical fees, thus restricting parish priests' income. The rich judicial record on priestly abuses that resulted

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yields the majority of this book's sources. Robins dedicates a chapter each to the most important abuses, including the overcharging of clerical fees, parish labor obligations, sexual abuses, and the problems with overcharging tithes and first fruits.

Next, he shows how divisions between secular and religious authorities and Spanish and creoles affected indigenous behavior toward colonial elites. Unfortunately, the chapter is mainly about the elites and does not explain much about the Indians' strategies of accommodation or resistance. The judicial system worked as an escape valve for the Indians' complaints, but Robins shows convincingly the inefficiency of the system and the various legal and extralegal ways that corrupt priests used to mitigate the effects of the many judgments against them. Indians who complained against clerics could expect to be beaten or jailed; also, litigation often dragged on for many years. The system, set up to prevent interference by the accused, rarely did so.

The lengthiest chapter deals with the rebellion itself and the actions by and against the priests during the revolt. The author provides evidence for varied actions by the religious: some initially supported the rebellion, whereas many lost their lives when the Indians killed village clerics. Robins does not find a consistent pattern in this behavior, and it is too bad that he did not try to correlate levels of priestly abuses with the reactions of the rebels. Indeed, one of the most abusive priests, Gregorio José de Merlos, appears to have been the advisor to Tomás Katari, the most important rebel leader from northern Potosí.

The book is valuable in pointing out the role of the Catholic Church and its representatives as one of the most significant factors in the Great Rebellion. However, the perspective on the regional level—all of what is today Bolivia—often fails to detect local dynamics. For example, Robins cites priestly abuses in frontier areas such as Tomina or Tarija that had no Andean indigenous component and are thus not truly relevant. I wish he had delved more into the symbolic content of priest-Indian relations before the conflict and utilized more the concept of moral economy, which he cites at the beginning. More importantly, the reader is left wondering about the frequency of priestly abuses. The author cites a limited number of cases, at most a dozen, in which priests were involved in problems. What percentage of priests were abusive in comparison with the total number of clerics in Upper Peru? Unfortunately, the book lacks a map. Despite these shortfalls, Robins's study is useful in showing an important aspect of the Great Rebellion that previously had not been sufficiently explored. It should be read by Andean specialists and advanced graduate students for insights into the role of the Catholic Church as a causal factor of this revolt and as a powerful description of late colonial exploitation in the Andes.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

JACLYN L. MAXWELL. *Christianization and Communication in Late Antiquity: John Chrysostom and His Congregation in Antioch*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 198. $85.00.

Jaclyn L. Maxwell's book makes a real contribution to the growing literature on sermons in late antiquity. Her careful analysis of John Chrysostom's preaching reveals "a process of Christianization that was gradual, interactive, and communicative" (p. 10). Crucial to Maxwell's argument is the assertion, already made by Raymond Van Dam in *Becoming Christian: The Conversion of Roman Cappadocia* (2003), that sermons are essentially dialogic. The style and subject matter of Chrysostom's homilies were affected by the concerns of his congregation (pp. 10, 120, 126).

Initial chapters make the case that an appreciation for public speaking was not dependent on formal education. Christian preachers had inherited the mantle of popular philosophers (pp. 40–41). An enjoyment of rhetoric depended more upon access to a lively urban culture than upon social class (p. 63). While Chrysostom's audience was mixed in terms of social class (pp. 67–76) and intellectual ability (pp. 96–98), everyone was expected to memorize scriptural stories and internalize the preacher's message (pp. 90–107).

The central part of the book, which analyzes Chrysostom's pedagogical program, is very fine. Maxwell argues that conflicts between preacher and congregation arose not from the laity's carelessness or inertia, but from different assessments of the weight of various sins (p. 125). Particularly fascinating is the way in which purity emerges as a crucial concern for the people (pp. 118–119, 165–167). Chrysostom's program, visible throughout his advice on daily life, was to heighten difference between Christian and non-Christian (pp. 129–140, 149–167). Here, the analysis rests explicitly on Pierre Bourdieu's *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (1984), whose concept of *habitus* illuminates the profound social impact of seemingly trivial matters of deportment (pp. 146–148). In the debate over what constituted an "orthodox" Christian life, Maxwell concludes, "the preacher's popularity gave him influence but not control over the laity's beliefs" (p. 169).

This book represents, in part, an extension and supplement of Averil Cameron's *Christianity and The Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (1991). Cameron argued that the Christianity of the early Byzantine Empire stood in continuity with the secular traditions on which it was based. Maxwell's opening chapters present an economical and lively survey of civic structures that seem to have changed little from classical times. The discourse that intrigued Cameron, however, was pointedly aristocratic and habituated to power. Maxwell, to the contrary, focuses deliberately on the lowly. She champions, quite self-consciously, the spirituality and good sense of "ordinary" Christians (pp. 8, 10, 143).

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Maxwell's choice of figures with whom to compare Chrysostom invites comment. In the early part of the book, in which the background issues of philosophical preaching and the contexts of public speaking are to the fore (pp. 11–64), the Cappadocians are cited frequently; we are even introduced to the obscure Amphilochius of Iconium (pp. 36–39). When the discussion turns to Chrysostom himself, however, the notes drift noticeably westward: Augustine and Caesarius of Arles become central points of reference. While the pastoral program of these men does support Maxwell's thesis, one is left wondering about Chrysostom's distinctiveness in his own milieu.

This study also represents the kind of work envisioned by Pauline Allen and Wolfram Kinzig when they began compiling the Chrysostom online database. For this reason, it raises the question of the reliability of homilies as repositories of social data. The fact that a given homily seems to invite us to imagine the preacher in direct, dynamic debate with members of his congregation, does not guarantee that it is a transparent record of that interaction. Since anticipated resistance is a rhetorical commonplace, it is quite possible that some of the objections Chrysostom places in the mouths of the laity do not reflect their views at all; they might be simply a rhetorical ploy designed to sway the congregation toward Chrysostom's own view. Maxwell herself observes that unflattering images of the congregation may be strategic rather than accurate (pp. 108–110). One wonders whether a deeper engagement with theoretical works, both ancient and modern, might have provided some useful leverage on this difficult problem.

Reliance on any one particular passage raises other concerns. Because Chrysostom was given to exaggeration and the occasional use of shock tactics (p. 127), his opinion cannot be adequately supported by a single citation. He may well have said, echoing scripture, that "the love of money is the root of all evil" (p. 125), but he knew perfectly well that money is desired for what it can buy: luxury, power, and above all, honor. Nor was he above altering his message to make a point (pp. 128–129). I would need to hear much more about the context of Chrysostom's remark before accepting that he believed that "attending church was not intrinsically valuable" (p. 134).

By advancing our understanding of Chrysostom's pastoral program and the dynamic process of Christianization in late antiquity, this book makes a valuable contribution to the field.

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Christina Lee. *Feasting the Dead: Food and Drink in Anglo-Saxon Burial Rituals*. (Anglo-Saxon Studies, number 9.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 176. $80.00.

This study by Christina Lee provides a survey of the material and literary evidence for the place of food and drink in Anglo-Saxon funerary contexts. In six chapters it examines the evidence for the place of food and feasting among the living, their place in graveside or other funerary rituals, the possible meanings and functions of food and vessels associated with food and drink in burials, the transformation of funerary feasts to remembrance feasts, the Eucharist as feast, and the evidence provided by documentary and art historical sources. The evidence from England is located within the larger context of that from early medieval Europe and Scandinavia throughout. The book is a welcome addition to the growing number of studies on feasting in general, and on its functions with regard to death and burial in particular. As such, it is an excellent counterpart to Bonnie Effros's work on burial and food in the Merovingian world. Like Effros, Lee is also at her strongest when discussing the material evidence. For example, in chapters two and three, careful consideration is given to the location of different types of animal bones and culinary vessels within graves, to the general distribution of the same in graves and cemeteries across England, and to parallels outside of England. This information is then used to ask questions about the value attributed to such remains and to draw more speculative conclusions about the relationship between these objects and gender or social status. Lee emphasizes that her conclusions must remain speculative and stresses that there is evidence to show that such associations varied by region and over time. In bringing this material together, however, she has opened up a number of potential areas for new research.

The book is not without its problems: some questions need not have been asked, others remain unanswered, and some of the conclusions are problematic. One of the guiding questions Lee asks is "If gift-giving plays an important role in the relations of the living, does it cease in death or is it possible that the dead, too, are involved in the circle of giving and receiving?" (p. 2) Surely this question has been answered in the affirmative by the work of Patrick J. Geary, among others, so it should come as no surprise that we find it to be the case in Anglo-Saxon England. But how does one tell the difference between the marks made on animal bone due to butchery for a feast, and those made in cutting a large animal down to size for offering on a funeral pyre (p. 58)? Some explanation would be useful for the non-specialist, especially as being able to tell the difference is important to some of Lee's conclusions. Further explanation should also have been devoted to the argument concerning ritual breakage and symbolic reuse of fragmented grave goods. Lee suggests that the piece of a vessel from the grave of an adult male (G 6) at Snape found nearby in the remains of a child's grave G 90 may have been symbolic, used to establish a family connection between the individuals in the graves (p.70). This is possible, but it could also be entirely accidental. In support of her argument Lee cites the ritual breaking of objects known from burials elsewhere; however, there is no evidence that the pieces missing from these objects were used in other burials. The two strands of discussion here need separating from each other. Else-

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where, in a discussion of the role of Christianization in changing burial rituals, Lee states quite rightly that the Anglo-Saxons did not have a developed concept of purgatory (pp. 12, 107), but she does not cite Ananya J. Kabir's important study of the Anglo-Saxon notion of the "interim paradise" as a step in that development (Kabir, *Paradise, Death and Doomsday in Anglo-Saxon England* [2001]).

The book also has mechanical problems. The index is not entirely reliable. For example, only the second of the two references to purgatory noted above is cited there, and the "Alamannic" of the text is spelled as "Alamanic." No edition is cited in the footnotes for the passages quoted from *Beowulf*. There are also numerous typos, missing words, and other infelicities. Such errors would be understandable in an unedited manuscript, but this is a finished book, and they should have been caught by the copyeditor prior to publication.

Despite the problems, this study does make important contributions to the field. Questions may remain unanswered, but at least they have been asked. Moreover, in bringing together a wide range of sources to chart changing funerary and commemorative practices from the conversion period to the eleventh century, Lee has provided us with a valuable new framework for understanding the relationship between the living and the dead.

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JEAN FLORI. *L'Islam et la fin des temps: L'interprétation prophétique des invasions musulmanes dans la chrétienté médiévale*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, with the Centre National du Livre. 2007. Pp. 444. €25.00.

Jean Flori's research focuses on the ideologies of medieval aristocrats and warriors, especially on chivalry and the crusade, during the tenth through the twelfth centuries. This book studies the relationships among apocalypticism, Islam, and crusading. Muslims played little part in apocalyptic patterns based on the world-week and the millennium. Muslims were even less prominent in works that employed Augustine of Hippo's antimillennial scheme of seven ages.

Muslims became, however, prominently associated with apocalyptic scenarios based on the little apocalypses of the synoptic gospels (Matthew 24; Mark 13; Luke 21) according to which various signs and omens foretold "the abomination of desolation" sitting in the holy place, i.e., the Temple in Jerusalem. This "abomination" was the Antichrist, and Muslims thus became precursors of the Antichrist. Pseudo-Methodius and Adso added another personage into the Muslim-Antichrist paradigm: the Last World Emperor, who would win a final and total victory over the Muslims, and retake Jerusalem before the Antichrist arrived. A natural event, an apocalyptic leader, and especially rumors of Muslim atrocities in Palestine could rouse medieval apocalyptic expectations.

The first trigger was the year 1000 C.E. (or alternatively 1033 C.E.), the end of a thousand years since the birth or the death of Jesus. Flori rejects the notion that terrors of the end-time created "a generalized mental paralysis" (p. 10), but he accepts that the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim's (996–1021) destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre triggered both antisemitic pogroms and a surge of interest and pilgrimage to the holy places.

Flori recognizes that several factors motivated the participants in the First Crusade. Among these were forgiveness for sins, irredentism, and the validation of the military profession. Then Flori adds that "[Apocalypticism] evidently furnished neither the only nor the principal motivation, but for some [crusaders] it was a real incentive to depart, as well as an ideological justification [for departing]" (p. 258).

Because reconquering Jerusalem and the other holy places was the primary focus of the crusaders, Flori argues that the conquest of Jerusalem and the establishment of the Latin Kingdom relaxed the apocalyptic tensions that had partly motivated the soldiers. The loss of Edessa revived them. Otto of Freising saw Louis VII, the king of France, as the Last World Emperor. Bernard of Clairvaux's *De laude novae militiae* was, according to Flori, primarily about spiritualization. Joachim of Fiore historicized the Augustinian pattern and developed the notion of a coming, millennial third *status* of the world. Flori argues that Joachim, although disappointed by the failure of the Third Crusade, still supported crusading, contrary to this reviewer's suggestion in a 1969 article.

Flori deals with the Fourth, the Fifth, and the two crusades led by St. Louis IX of France. He acknowledges Alfred J. Andrea's evidence that Pope Innocent III borrowed from Abbot Joachim in promoting what became the Fifth Crusade. Nevertheless, Flori thinks that apocalyptic expectation in the thirteenth century became concentrated among the Franciscan Spirituals from whom later came the heretical *Fraticelli*. "The result [was] a return to the historicizing study of the biblical apocalypses, more and more neglected by those ecclesiastics faithful to catholic orthodoxy . . . a resolutely anti-Roman and anti-papal tonality . . . [and] an increasing assimilation of the Antichrist and the papacy" (p. 402). Instead of influencing the main stream, these apocalyptic fanatics existed on the fringe of the late medieval world.

The apocalyptic scenario that Flori has traced resonates today among those Christians who strongly support Israeli colonization of the West Bank and possession of Jerusalem. Hence this study is important to understanding the past and relevant to today but it has flaws. Flori's research on the tenth and eleventh centuries is up to date, but his study of the later period relies heavily on out-of-date works such as Ignaz Döllinger's *Sektengeschichte* (1890), Flori's primary source for Peter Olivi, while neglecting David Burr's books on that same friar. Le Roy Edwin Froom's *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers: The Historical Development of Prophetic Interpretation* (1945), which Flori cites, sees

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Joachim of Fiore and his followers as forerunners of the modern Seventh-Day Adventists. Robert E. Lerner's research on the Refreshment of the Saints and his articles on Joachim seem to have escaped Flori's notice while his *The Powers of Prophecy: The Cedar of Lebanon Vision from the Mongol Onslaught to the Dawn of the Enlightenment* (1983), a study of the Tripoli prophecy, is listed in the bibliography but not cited in the relevant footnotes. The bibliography is described as selective but the omission of Bernard of Clairvaux's *De laude*, which Flori clearly used, puzzles this reviewer. In summary, Flori propounds an original and important synthesis in a book that deserves to be studied but approached cautiously.

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Adam J. Davis. *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 268. $39.95.

Writing medieval biographies is no easy undertaking. Rarely are there sufficient reliable sources to cover one individual's entire life, let alone the world in which he or she lived. Any attempt will be geared toward those periods and aspects of an individual's life that happen to be illuminated by the surviving records. As it happens, the life of Eudes Rigaud, archbishop of Rouen from 1248 to 1276, is more richly documented than most owing to the survival of a detailed *Register* that chronicles the archbishop's pastoral and administrative activities between 1248 and 1269. In addition, there are his theological writings produced while at the University of Paris. But it is not only the relative richness of the sources that makes Rigaud an interesting character for today's historian; he belonged to a new brand of ecclesiastical administrator in the thirteenth century. A Paris academic and one of the first Franciscan bishops, Rigaud's career taps some of the main strands of the standard narrative of thirteenth-century history: the growth and increasing importance of the mendicant orders within the church and the rationalization of political administration and economic management. It is within these parameters that Adam J. Davis presents this new biography.

Davis chooses a chronological and thematic approach starting with Rigaud's formative years at the University of Paris and his entry into the Franciscan order. Subsequent chapters deal with the archbishop's pastoral visits, his relationship with his suffragan bishops, his propagation of monastic reform, his supervision of the secular clergy, his jurisdictional authority, his role as economic and financial administrator, and his relationship to the French king. In accordance with the book's title, Davis presents Rigaud as a fervent Franciscan who, as archbishop, tried to propagate the "holy" principles of Franciscan spirituality and pastoral endeavor while at the same time pursuing the "bureaucratic" duties of an archbishop with exemplary energy and academic rigor. In doing so Davis rightly insists that the merging of Franciscanism and church governance, which lay at the heart of Rigaud's episcopal program, fitted the thirteenth-century scene despite its apparent and inherent contradictions. The work and career of Rigaud can even be read as one of the great success stories of thirteenth-century Franciscan ambitions because Rigaud managed to translate the Franciscan ideals of spiritual dedication and moral integrity into his efforts as a pastoral leader and church administrator.

Davis presents a sound argument based on thorough research. The picture he derives from this is lucid and comprehensive. Thanks to Davis's fresh treatment, which clearly extends the work of Rigaud's earlier biographers in both scope and quality, the famous archbishop of Rouen will now gain an even more prominent place within the historiography of the thirteenth century. There cannot be many a medieval bishop whose life and career have been rendered equally graspable to the modern reader.

I have two caveats, however. First, an in-depth analysis of Rigaud's *Register* is missing and would have been welcome as it is Davis's main source. The principles of record keeping employed must surely have had a bearing on the selection of information preserved in the *Register*. Also, the chronology of compilation and annotation might well reveal something of the techniques and purposes of the administrative process. A more systematic exploration of these issues could have yielded further interesting insights. Second, I do not altogether agree with the overall tone of the book and the resulting amount of implied praise heaped upon Rigaud. By the standards of progressive churchmen and state administrators of the thirteenth century, Rigaud was no doubt something of a hero and an example to be emulated. There must, however, have been a fair number of people who saw the archbishop as stubborn, intolerant, pedantic, and pompous despite his achievements. Some passages of Salimbene de Adam's chronicle certainly point toward this. Might it have been worth attempting to capture the perspective of those who may be considered the victims of people like Rigaud, i.e., all those negatively affected by the thirteenth-century drive toward control and standardization of people's moral and spiritual lives and their forced integration into ever more efficient legal and economic structures? These should be read as suggestions for further investigation rather than as criticism.

Taken on its own merits, Davis's book is a remarkable achievement that greatly enhances our knowledge of a prominent thirteenth-century archbishop and the world in which he lived.

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Evelyn Edson. *The World Map, 1300–1492: The Persistence of Tradition and Transformation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 300. $50.00.

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The fifteenth century was a very remarkable time for the development of mapping in Western Europe. Whereas three types of map—the *mappa mundi*, the portolan chart, and the Ptolemaic map—had long existed side by side, without any mutual influence, in the fifteenth century these three types came together in entirely new combinations, influenced by contemporary developments like church councils and merchant ventures.

It is this development that Evelyn Edson describes in her new book, in effect a sequel to *Mapping Time and Space: How Medieval Mapmakers Viewed Their World* (1997). The introduction leads straight into the matter by describing the work of Andrea Bianco, fifteenth-century Venetian, who in effect first brought the three styles together. Chapter one deals with the *mappae mundi*, which Edson leaves firmly rooted in their ecclesiastical origin, disregarding recent attempts to suggest as well some part played by lay courts. In chapters two and three, she is more receptive to attempts to push the origins of portolan charts back behind the traditional date of c. 1290; here she relies a good deal on the extensive work of Patrick Gautier Dalché. The recovery of Ptolemy's geography (compiled at Alexandria about 150 A.D.) comes only in chapter five, where it emphasizes the great influence of the cosmographers of fifteenth-century Florence, reminding us of the mapping concerns of Giovanni Boccacio and Francesco Petrarch (p. 115). Chapter four takes in what might be called the "surrounding influences," showing how the travels of merchants were reflected in the works of authors such as Marco Polo, Odoric of Pordenone, and Sir John Mandeville, all of whose writings made suggestions that had to be taken into account by mapmakers.

Edson is particularly insistent on the influence of Mandeville, whose work is often treated rather dismissively by modern historians. In chapter six we reach the first of the great cartographic synthesizers, Fra Mauro of Venice. This chapter is in effect a longish analysis of the sources of his great map (the original seems to have been made about 1450). Edson makes it clear that Fra Mauro relied on a dizzying range of sources, both literary and practical.

The next chapter takes in a variety of similar fifteenth-century cartographic ventures, including in particular the work of Giovanni Leardo (pp. 188–190). As elsewhere in the work, Edson shows great mastery of a wide range of secondary sources, not forgetting those in Italian, often very fruitful for her argument. By chapter eight we reach the end of the fifteenth century and come to the work immediately predating the first voyage of Christopher Columbus. Edson is rather gentle on some often heavily criticized sources, such as the Vinland map and the supposed Columbus map of part of Haiti, though she offers an excellent summary (pp. 215–219) of the work of Henricus Martellus Germanus, whose enigmatic maps have supplied ammunition for campaigns in favor of arguments for the pre-Columbian knowledge of the New World. She does not enter into this controversy, or indeed into the even further-fetched question of whether the Chinese fleets of the early fifteenth century ventured any farther westward than the Cape of Good Hope.

In a final chapter, Edson explains how the maps generated by the three schools with which she started the book (the portolan chart, the *mappa mundi*, and the Ptolemaic corpus) had been conflated and modified in the course of the century. The ocean space had been greatly expanded, and the whole world could be imagined as habitable. Maps were now almost always oriented to the north, and many mythical areas had faded away. Eurasia was better known but was still shown as extending too far in an east-westerly direction. This, indeed, was one of the concepts that encouraged Columbus on his fundamentally ill conceived venture.

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DENNIS ROMANO. *The Likeness of Venice: A Life of Doge Francesco Foscari 1373–1457*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xxvi, 468. $35.00.

Francesco Foscari is among the handful of Venetian doges whose name is still remembered. Lord Byron's play "The Two Foscari" and Giuseppe Verdi's opera "I due Foscari" made the tragedy of the doge and his son Jacopo known to a wider audience, as have canvases by nineteenth-century Romantic painters. For historians Foscari has remained a controversial figure who defies an agreed-upon characterization.

Dennis Romano's new biography of Foscari goes far beyond previous attempts to present a plausible portrait of a complicated man. The title is a reminder that the doge was the personification of the republic and its *imago*, thus more than its political head. Romano has tried to "restore Foscari to the full complexity of his life and times" rather than to "reduce him and his reign to a solitary theme" (p. xxiv), and he succeeds. Romano begins by presenting Foscari's early entrance into political life and his climb up the ladder of offices, aided by his remarkable oratorical ability, political acumen, and influential family members. In the absence of autobiographical material, the author examines a mass of pertinent documents like voting records in an effort to describe his subject's *modus operandi* in maneuvering the Venetian political system. Foscari built alliances, made deals, and above all relied on a network of relatives and friends long before his election as doge in 1423. But his successes in getting supporters appointed to offices earned him a reputation for corruption, as Romano makes clear.

Romano discusses the much-debated issue of Foscari's role in enlarging the mainland state. He carefully evaluates the authenticity of the reported speeches by Foscari's predecessor Tommaso Mocenigo (pp. 31–32) who advocated keeping the focus on the sea. Romano takes very seriously the dangers Venice faced by Milanese expansion in the earlier fourteenth century and convincingly puts Foscari's Italian politics in the

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context of the whole complicated political, military, and economic situation during the decades before the Peace of Lodi. Foscari emerges as an ambitious pragmatist and master diplomat dedicated to making Venice a strong, extensive, and defensible state that would protect the *dominante* and provide her with finances. While using secondary sources for much of his broader narrative in the sections dealing with wars, the author's reconstruction of Foscari's strategies is firmly anchored in archival material and shows the detailed intricate workings of the Venetian government in times of great military and financial difficulties.

The author examines anew the tragic history of Foscari and his only surviving son, Jacopo, whose princely wedding to Lucrezia Contarini in 1441, fully described in contemporary sources, paraded the splendor of the doge's house before the city and foreign guests. It was "a matter of state with international implications" (p. 168) that "tipped the scales to the princely side" of the ducal office by exemplifying Foscari's trend toward personal rule. Romano's interweaving of the history of Jacopo with his father's character, political events, and growing factionalism among the Venetian ruling class impressively presents the "Jacopo affair" in a fresh light, in part by using hitherto ignored documents (pp. 288–289). Jacopo was accused of having accepted bribes and gifts and of having corresponded with foreigners. He was tried by the Council of Ten and its *zonta*, tortured, and exiled. Foscari as doge had to uphold the decision, even to remind his son publicly of his obligation to accept the laws of Venice. Romano is judicious in his treatment of this tragedy of father and son, arguing that an obtuse Jacopo was the victim of an "increasingly activist Council of Ten" (p. 224) bent on diminishing Doge Foscari's power and requiring him to subordinate the interest of his family to that of the state. The struggle between supporters of republican ideals and champions of strong ducal power is presented at length and convincingly. It led to the doge's deposition and added to the tragedy of his life.

Romano has also broadened our understanding of Foscari by throwing new light on his building activities. They include major projects like the Porta della Carta between St. Mark's church and the ducal palace, the chapel of the Madonna in St. Mark's, and the family palace Ca' Foscari on the Grand Canal. All three are discussed in some detail and show what some art historians have called "the Foscari style."

This important book is meticulously researched, effectively organized, free of jargon, and based on a remarkable wealth of documentary sources. In brief, it makes compelling reading. Romano casts his net widely and succeeds in giving us a nuanced portrait of the doge and the Venice of his time. The author has made a major contribution to the memory of a remarkable Venetian and his *patria*.

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

ROGER CHARTIER. *Inscription and Erasure: Literature and Written Culture from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth Century*. Translated by ARTHUR GOLDHAMMER. (Material Texts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 203. $55.00.

One of the most distinguished historians of his generation, Roger Chartier helped make social history cultural and redefine its subject matter to embrace sets of human practices (*pratiques*) as much as webs of words (*discours*). With Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Jacques Le Goff, Chartier helped flesh out *mentalités*, the only social science sector an older generation of *Annales* historians had difficulty assimilating with history. Chartier's new book of essays, a translation of *Inscrire et effacer* (2005), is a study of writing practices. It ranges from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries, mostly focusing on authors' expectations of their craft, on the ways in which things came to be written down in medieval and early modern France, England, and Spain. Chartier is less interested in what people wrote in their discourses; his focus is the social, material, and ideological circumstances and technologies of their writing. His perceptive first chapters discuss an eleventh-century Benedictine, Bordri de Bourgueil, and a sixteenth-century novelist, Miguel de Cervantes. Chartier alludes to things that may surprise us about medieval and early modern authors' perspectives on themselves as writers and on their writing. Just when we moderns might have expected these authors to be conscious of their place in posterity, Chartier reveals with great skill their understanding of the expressive evanescence of writing. He relates a world of which we have lost sight, a world in which people wrote on wax and with a stylus, and even—later on, when they had a choice—preferred to do so. Wax was portable, personal, and private. Wax made writing all about thinking and composing, not defining. To write on wax with a stylus raised issues of inspiration and of memory. It neither settled things once and for all, nor did it instruct. Parchment did that. Parchment and paper were for copying: recoverable, public, and enduring, but these were matters for mere clerks and scribes. Reading was social and declamatory, meditative and mnemonic, and utterly unlike speaking. Mostly discussing Cervantes, a perceptive chapter on the new contribution of the early modern compositor and translator follows, with the associated displacement of a manuscript author's lien over his or her handiwork.

Chartier then considers—discussing Ben Jonson, but reminding me of Franco Venturi's great studies of the Italian press in the eighteenth century—another such displacement: the emergence of public opinion (but without any reference to Jürgen Habermas) as it appeared in the impersonal hack, the non-author who wrote flurries of frivolities about persons in the printed "news" sheets in Jonson's seventeenth century and in the centuries thereafter. A study of Cyrano de Bergerac's ideas about the front-and-center power in books

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follows, with arrest, censorship, and auto de fe on his mind. Chartier reminds us of the prudence of keeping things in manuscript and circulating them among friends.

Essays follow on Carlo Goldoni's sense of himself as author and on the French reception of Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa*, in which Chartier addresses debates about a "reading revolution" in the eighteenth century. Chartier endorses Hans Erich Bödeker and rejects Robert Darnton, emphasizing the new expressive intensity of readers' elective affinities but also maintaining that this did not displace more traditional forms of reading (p. 114). Chartier is especially skillful in noting the way Denis Diderot recorded himself as a reader responding to a (Richardson) text "without my noticing (*sans que je m'en aperçoive*)." This is a collection of essays to savor, the work of a master.

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PETER BURKE AND R. PO-CHIA HSIA, editors. *Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press and European Social Science Foundation. 2007. Pp. ix, 252. $95.00.

"No translations, no spiritual renewal, no Catholic Reformation" is how Carlos M. N. Eire sets the stakes in this collective study of the role of translation in early modern Europe. The stakes were high indeed. It was Erasmus's historically based philological approach to translation that undermined church doctrine. His new translation of the term *poenitentiam agite* helped spark the Protestant Reformation. Using the tool of translation in his 1516 edition of the New Testament, Erasmus argued that the term did not mean the institution of the sacrament of penance—and thus of the church's lucrative industry of selling indulgences—but rather a personal act of repentance or "changing one's mind." In one stroke, Erasmus showed that translation and scholarly interpretation could shake the foundations of Christendom. And they shook. The Reformation spread through vulgate translations of the New Testament and devotional works, causing religious, political, and economic upheaval that splintered the old order of the Middle Ages. As the encyclopedic set of studies in this book shows, the Renaissance, the Age of Discovery, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution sat on the shoulders of the seemingly innocuous practice of translation.

Both Peter Burke and R. Po-chia Hsia have made their careers as cultural translators. Famous for his work on the culture of the Renaissance and Italian popular culture, and responsible for three chapters of this book, Burke has worked like a modern Aristotle of historiography and knowledge, writing intellectual history and marking each trend in modern historical scholarship with a defining methodological work, as he recently demonstrated in his *Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot* (2000). One reason for his prescience is a tendency to collect literature on his topics of interest from as many countries as possible. Burke's footnotes are a linguistic collage of Slavic, Hungarian, Scandinavian, German, Latin, and Turkish sources. Thus Burke does not just write about translation; it is one of the primary tools he has used in his influential career.

Hsia has examined early modern witchcraft, the Counter-Reformation, and the history of early modern European Jews. He has also examined the shock of cultural encounters among inhabitants of Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Hsia's work shows that with the meeting of new languages and cultures came the need not only for linguistic translators but also for cultural translators: agents of understanding who could help these worlds—all new to each other—come to some form of understanding. The misunderstandings and the catastrophes that followed may have been spectacular, but there were curious and influential translators who tried to bridge cultures and not simply change, dominate, or crush non-Europeans. Showing the complex force of the Counter-Reformation movement, Jesuits and church scholars were pioneers on the new frontier of international translation, translating books out of and into Latin while also setting up workshops of translation in places such as China and Turkey. Between 1580 and 1750, Jesuits led by Matteo Ricci and aided by Chinese collaborators produced a European corpus of around 450 religious, humanist, and scientific texts in Chinese, from Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* to Galileo Galilei's writings on the workings of compasses. Translations of evangelical works dominated this corpus, but elemental works of natural science and mathematics were also influential, like Ricci and Xu Guangqi's Chinese translation of Clavius's Latin translation of Euclid's Greek *Geometry* (1607).

As Ricci's project showed, translation was not simply about religion. The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries saw the beginnings of the Scientific Revolution. Historians of science and philosophy take note: scientific ideas can be understood without cultural and social context, but their spread and influence cannot. The process of translation also played an elemental role in the rise of scientific culture. Isabelle Pantin illustrates how translations of sixteenth-century technical and scientific works into the vernacular set the stage for the acceptance of and fluency in scientific discovery in the seventeenth century. The ideas of Paracelsus and Francis Bacon were revolutionary. For these ideas to be accepted, they needed to be translated, spread, and explained. Geoffrey P. Baldwin shows the same function in political philosophy. Translators were the messengers of theories of liberty and monarchy; indeed, in translating works such as Paolo Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*, scholars like Amelot de la Houssaye injected their own ideas into pre-existing texts. Translating could be a pretext for writing itself.

S. S. Demidov, Feza Günergun, and Efthymios Nicolaïdis show that while European powers imported antiquarian objects and religious texts from the Ottoman

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Empire, Russians, Turks, and Greeks imported scientific works from Western Europe. The newly discovered classical works of ancient science and the products of new European natural philosophy and mathematics were *sans pareil*. If medieval Arab texts such as al-Idrisi's (1099–1166) *Geography* influenced Medici scholars in quattrocento Florence, the great seventeenth-century Turkish historian and geographer Kâtib Çelebi realized that he could not effectively write his own histories and maps of the Mediterranean without the new atlases of geographers such as Gerhard Mercator. Çelebi thus found a converted French Muslim who could translate Abraham Ortelius's *Atlas Minor* from Latin into Arabic, and then he himself translated and edited this into a Turkish version in 1654, *Levâmi'al-nûr fi zulmat-I atlas minor*, which included his own additions and appendixes.

In mapping the flow and influence of early modern translation, Burke, Hsia, and their contributors attempt to list the major translations of the period, while at the same time reminding us that translations flowed inward as well as outward. The success of a book not only meant vernacular translation, but also Latin translation as works like Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince*, written in Tuscan, made their way back into the old Roman language of authority. These are important points, but bigger questions about the nature of translation itself get less attention. In this book about culture, only two chapters tackle the greater cultural question of what it means to translate. Eva Kowalská examines the role of translation in creating linguistic and national identity in Hungary and Slovakia, and Maria Lúcia Pallares-Burke shows how literary and publishing genres themselves could be translated, or transposed, in new contexts. Thus we await a social history of translation that will not only tell us which books were translated, but how translation itself happened; who translated and where; what the different schools and theories of translation were; and how, along with texts, other cultural objects, and industrial products were translated or, to use the terminology of Michel Foucault, appropriated. Perhaps this will be the next volume in Burke's ever-growing encyclopedia of the history of knowledge.

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Gary K. Waite. *Eradicating the Devil's Minions: Anabaptists and Witches in Reformation Europe, 1525–1600*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 319. $65.00.

Gary K. Waite has written an interesting and useful book that examines the connections between Anabaptism and witch-hunting in Reformation Europe. Tracing trends in the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands, he observes that the first significant wave of witch-hunting appeared in the fifteenth century but had largely subsided by the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation in about 1520. For the next few decades, religious and political authorities were too busy fighting heresy and religious nonconformity to bother with witches.

Starting in the 1520s, Catholics and Lutherans began aggressively attacking Anabaptists, whom they viewed as being in league with the devil. The Anabaptists' rejection of infant baptism was a cause for suspicion, since Catholics and many Protestants believed that the soul of a child who died unbaptized could not be saved and that the failure to baptize infants might result in increased cases of demonic possession. Moreover, the Anabaptists emphatically rejected various "preternatural" beliefs and practices, including the doctrine, defended in different ways by both Catholics and Lutherans, that Jesus was physically present in the bread and the wine of the Eucharist. For safety's sake, Anabaptists also often met secretly at night, and these nocturnal gatherings could easily be conflated with the witches' sabbat. Although some of the early Anabaptists—most notably the infamous leaders of the violent millenarian experiment in Münster in the 1530s—were strongly apocalyptic, their successors tended to be pacifists and generally downplayed the role of the devil in this world, stressing human responsibility for sin. Be that as it may, opponents portrayed Anabaptism as a diabolical revolutionary movement that threatened the state, provoked the wrath of God, and needed to be eradicated. Unlike their Catholic and Lutheran counterparts, Dutch Calvinists were generally much less hostile toward Anabaptists, accusing them of misinterpreting scripture but not of forming a demonic sect.

Waite aptly points to medieval precedents of Christian groups that diverged from Catholic dogma on a few points and were eventually transformed by church authorities into devil-worshipping sects. The most important of these were the Waldensians, who in the fifteenth century were highly suspect for three reasons: they were extremely anticlerical; some of their charismatic leaders claimed to have divine visions and thereby seemed to wield supernatural powers; and women, who were believed to be especially prone to dabbling in magic, played significant roles in the movement. As Waite rightly notes, these characteristics all held true for the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century. Although he does not address the issue directly, Waite's findings strongly favor the view, defended among others by Jeffrey Burton Russell, that the early modern witch emerged from the medieval heretic rather than from the medieval magician, as Norman Cohn and Edward Peters have suggested.

Waite convincingly argues that decades of Catholic and Lutheran propaganda against Anabaptism paved the way for the renewal in the 1560s of aggressive actions against witches by, among other things, exacerbating fears of secret diabolical sects, dismissing Anabaptists' godly lifestyles as mere "demonic deception," decrying that prominent female Anabaptists violated gender roles, and even claiming that their baptisms were a form of "demonic inversion" of the true sacrament. Analyzing patterns in prosecutions in the

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Dutch Republic, the Spanish Netherlands, southern Germany, and the Austrian Tirol, Waite finds that as a general rule the hunting of witches began only after Anabaptism had effectively been quashed in a given region. The mildest persecution of both heretics and witches occurred in the Dutch Republic, largely because it became a religiously pluralistic society and the Calvinist Church there did not have coercive powers.

This volume includes a number of well-chosen period illustrations of Anabaptists and witches. Waite points out that historians have mistakenly identified some depictions of Anabaptists as representations of witches. In a similar manner, although theologians and jurists clearly distinguished between Anabaptism and witchcraft, there was definitely a popular blurring of the two in the sixteenth century.

All told, Waite makes a convincing case that religious and political leaders, with strong popular support, aggressively pursued both heresy and witchcraft as demonically inspired movements that had to be eliminated to assuage God's wrath. Anabaptism was strongest in parts of Switzerland (not covered in this study), the Holy Roman Empire, and the Netherlands. Waite's study suggests that it was no coincidence that, with the important exception of the Dutch Republic, these areas also witnessed Europe's most intense witch-hunts. Elegantly written and persuasively argued, this book will be of considerable interest to Reformation specialists and to anyone interested in the history of witchcraft.

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HENRIETTE DE BRUYN KOPS. *A Spirited Exchange: The Wine and Brandy Trade between France and the Dutch Republic in Its Atlantic Framework, 1600–1650.* (The Northern World, number 32.) Boston: Brill. 2007. Pp. xiii, 371. $139.00.

This monograph by Henriette de Bruyn Kops is a study of the trade in wine and brandy between France and the Dutch Republic and, more particularly, between the French city of Nantes and the Dutch city of Rotterdam. The book is well researched despite the paucity of surviving archives in Nantes dating from the early modern period, at least compared to the abundant records in French cities such as Rouen, Lyon, or Bordeaux. Bruyn Kops argues that coastal trades focused on comestibles and other bulky products of moderate value, such as that in wine and brandy, were more important economically than historians have hitherto realized and constitute a neglected pillar of the expanding Dutch economy of the seventeenth century. Historians have tended to focus excessively on long-distance trade in high-value products such as spices and porcelain from Asia even though these commodities in fact generated much less income and constituted a much smaller portion of Dutch trade than did wine and brandy. By the same token, Bruyn Kops sees these coastal trades as part of the larger Atlantic economy into which they should be integrated in historical studies. She makes a strong case that the distinction between intra-European commerce and long-distance trade in reality was far less sharp than historians have realized. Rather, coastal trades operated in a symbiotic relationship with overseas trade, with the former playing an important role in generating the financing for the latter. Nor can a clear distinction be found between merchants who engaged in these types of trade any more than wholesale merchants should be seen as separate from retailers. Integration of commerce, mobility of capital, and versatility of mercantile roles were the rule rather than the exception.

Although the book is primarily an economic history focused on the wine trade, some of its most interesting chapters are those in which Bruyn Kops explores the case for the argument that a primary draw for Dutch traders to French Atlantic ports and, specifically, to Nantes during the first half of the seventeenth century was the quest to obtain Iberian silver from the New World. The silver flowed through Spain into France due to the positive balance of trade. Legitimate trade in products such as French spirits became a means by which Dutch merchants could then surreptitiously transfer Iberian silver to the Dutch Republic in defiance of the Spanish embargo on Dutch trade. This conclusion does not seem farfetched, given that historians have long known that Spain leaked silver like a sieve and that much of this silver ended up in Dutch hands. Cities such as Nantes hence may have become favored way stations as much because of their ability to trade with Spain and Holland alike as because of the intrinsic value of products from the region, such as wine.

As Bruyn Kops points out, this hypothesis, while likely correct, has by no means been proved with economic data. Nor does it mean that Dutch trade in products such as wine was merely a cover for silver transfers. It does, however, help to explain the attraction of French ports to Iberian and, especially, New Christian merchants who otherwise might have been much less interested in the coastal wine trade. Bruyn Kops also engages in an interesting discussion of these New Christians in both Nantes and Rotterdam, although she does not distinguish sufficiently between the Spanish Iberians, who founded the famous *Contratación* of Nantes, and whom the French considered good Catholics, and the later-arriving Portuguese, mostly New Christians, whom the French considered—not always correctly—to be secret Jews. As Bruyn Kops points out, economic opportunities usually determined where an Iberian merchant settled, and location in turn often determined that merchant's religious choices, rather than the other way round. Moreover, the tensions that emerged between the Iberian merchants in France and the French were in fact rooted in commercial rivalries rather than religion and resulted in accusations of unfair trading practices against the Iberians that were identical to those raised against the Dutch merchants in France in the same period.

This book is a valuable and interesting study of a type of commerce, short-run coastal trade, that historians

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have tended to neglect. The volume could have benefited from tighter editing—there is a surfeit of short, choppy sections, some of them only one or two paragraphs long, which interrupt the continuity of the argument and, in some cases, contain information that could have been omitted or integrated into another section. The use of "Ms." for women discussed in the book is unnecessary and jarringly anachronistic. Despite these flaws, however, this work is an important step in the task of placing intra-European trade into the larger framework of Atlantic commerce.

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DAVID L. PIKE. *Metropolis on the Styx: The Underworlds of Modern Urban Culture, 1800–2001*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 377. Cloth $69.95, paper $27.95.

This splendidly illustrated and superbly researched book introduces a wide range of new, noncanonical, and/or neglected texts to those in the scholarly audience interested in the transmission and transformation of the single most important myth in European culture: that of the descent to the underworld. Additionally, it offers new and original methodologies for the interpretation of those texts—by which I mean not only literary texts but such nonverbal texts as urban architecture, illustrations in magazine serials, and paintings (to name a few). Following Walter Benjamin's lead, David L. Pike expands his discussion to include the many spaces of urban, civic life that become underworldly domains in novels, films, panoramic guides to cities, plays, and serial illustrations: spaces such as sewers, arches, tunnels, underground railroads, catacombs, bridges, ghettoes, and cemeteries. Pike's is a tale primarily of two cities, London and Paris (with excursions into New York), which is focused on the political and social dimensions of representations of the underworld in the mystery novels, spectacles, and periodicals of the two cities during the nineteenth century.

The illustrations alone make this book worth the price of purchase. In his work, Pike offers a rich sampling of images diligently mined from a variety of sources: lithographic pictures of the Thames Tunnel; graphics of the Cascades of the Trocadero; engravings of sordid underground interiors in London from nineteenth-century newspapers; frontispieces of novels by authors like Alfred Delvau, depicting a journey into the lower depths of Paris; and Salvation Army views of a "verticalized" Victorian world from 1890. Added to these are the marvelous still photos from films such as Fritz Lang's *M* (1931), Abel Gances's *J'accuse!* (1938), and Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982), the last of which Pike evokes as depicting the "polyglot city of future noir, emptied of productive meaning" (p. 218).

Such a generous range of new texts made available for commentary and analysis is further expanded to include noncanonical literary works, recently introduced into the curriculum, such as the mystery novels of G. W. M. Reynolds, Eugène Sue, and Thomas Peckett Prest, along with travelogues for tourists by such writers as Delvau. This expansion of texts made available for scholarly discourse is one of the many fruits of the debates about the canon that emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s, through which new materials were gradually introduced and made their way into the anthologies of the 1980s and 1990s. One also senses the importance of semiotics and poststructuralism, as expounded by writers such as Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, both of whom brought the texts of daily life into the theoretical debates about signification and myth that were central to the explosion of critical theory in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Still, in spite of the ambitious breadth of this book, one wonders about the conspicuous exclusions: the canonical figures Pike so studiously avoids. Why not say a few words at least about Marcel Proust, Thomas Mann, James Joyce, Robert Musil, and Hermann Broch, all of whose works are richly informed by the myth of the descent to the underworld (what I in my books call the *nekyia*), and many of whom (particularly Joyce in *Ulysses* [1922]) link the myth to the metropolis in ways that lend themselves to Pike's argument? And what about images of the metropolis in the oneiric sequences in Ingmar Bergman's *Wild Strawberries* (1957), Jean Cocteau's *Orphée* (1950), or any number of Federico Fellini's films (such as *Roma* [1972] or *Satyricon* [1969])? One suspects that Pike would have interesting things to say about these canonical works, more familiar to many in his audience than the sometimes obscure and minor pieces he evokes.

One also wonders about the exclusive focus on the demonic and the satanic in Pike's view of the underworld, which, by narrowing the conception to the infernal, overlooks the more positive images of the underworld: the underworld as crypt (where one communicates with the ancestral dead), *temenos* (a positive space of revelation and transformation), or cornucopia (where the seed forms of the imagination, those fundamental structures of mind, society, and nature that provide the blueprint for the forms of the material world, are disclosed).

Apart from these quibbles, this is a remarkable book, showing how the myth of the underworld was used from the nineteenth to the twentieth century to help understand the changing world of the city, as its citizens struggled to cope with and respond to the shifting tides of politics, economics, and culture. In other words, the myth does what T. S. Eliot said all myths do: it confers shape and significance upon the anarchy and futility of history.

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PHILIPP THER. *In der Mitte der Gesellschaft: Operntheater in Zentraleuropa 1815–1914*. (Die Musikkultur europäischer Metropolen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.) Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 2006. Pp. 465. €39.80.

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Are you interested in spectacle? In sites of social interaction, shared by servant girls and princesses, industrial magnates and artisans, journalists and jurists? In the politics of representation and the representation of wealth and power? In revolution, in aesthetics, in the application of technology? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, Philipp Ther argues in his new book, then you are interested in opera.

As its title suggests, Ther's monograph demonstrates that opera occupied a central place in the social, political, and cultural history of Europe analogous to the location of Europe's most famous opera houses in its urban centers. From the Congress of Vienna to World War I, opera "lay on the pulse of the times, and quickened it"; opera houses served as prisms through which to view "other, ostensibly social or political changes" (p. 17). To make his case, Ther examines the opera on three levels. First, he asks how the opera, as an institution, related to external forces (whether governmental or civil, financial or political) that alternately supported and restricted its activities. Second, he turns his eye to the audience, itself a microcosm of nineteenth-century society. Finally, he considers the operatic repertoire and how it reflected aesthetic values and the political imagination.

By the end of the nineteenth century, aristocratic and bourgeois opera houses stood in public urban spaces in every larger city in the Habsburg Empire and neighboring German and Italian states, whether "rich or poor, industrial or agricultural" (p. 342), from Augsburg, Basel, and Coburg to Warsaw, Zagreb, and Żytomierz. From this rich assortment, Ther chose three case studies: the Court Theater in Dresden, the Polish Theater in Lemberg (Ukrainian: L'viv, Polish: Lwów), and the Czech National Theater in Prague. Together, he explains, these three cities represented a historical space bound by structural similarities—an old imperial order confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, but challenged by growing emancipatory impulses; a nobility that retained extraordinary political, economic, and cultural importance; and a broader population marked by linguistic and confessional diversity. This space cut across multiple contemporary and current political boundaries, as well as the disciplinary division between "German" and "Eastern European" history. Ther uses opera to suggest the coherence of the idea of Central Europe (which he calls *Zentraleuropa* rather than *Mitteleuropa*) as a space connected by "rapidly thickening communication, intensive cultural transfers, and cultural networks" (p. 21). Symptomatic of this shared culture were the 48 "theaters glistening with gold and chandeliers" in cities ranging from Zürich to Odessa that were built by a single Viennese architectural duo, Ferdinand Fellner and Hermann Helmer, between 1870 and 1913 (p. 343). In many ways, however, Ther's claims are not specific to Central Europe, but rather convey the significance of opera across the continent. While Paris and Vienna are not the focus of his study, Ther reminds his readers that his "second-order metropoles" (p. 22) stood in the long shadow of those other operatic capitals.

Ther opens with an extended section on the golden age of opera in which he follows the mutation of its primary social function from moral education to the preservation of national literature and language. Both the educational and the national project exploited opera's social reach, which was much broader in that distant age than it is today. The wealthy and prominent who wanted "to see and be seen" (p. 60) asserted their status through dress, jewelry, toilet, and the price categories of their luxurious seats. At the same time, skilled laborers could purchase less favorable seats for about the same price as a loaf of bread.

Competition within and between cities was the invisible force that propelled lively and creative artistic endeavor. For example, the closure of the German theater in Lemberg, which left the aristocratic Polish Theater without any major counterweight in the city, is one of several factors Ther credits with Lemberg's inability to keep up with Prague or Dresden. While Dresden, Prague, and Vienna developed a tradition of opera as musical drama, Lemberg's operas retained the outdated flavor of vocal concerts. Significantly, it was only its stellar reception at the "First International Exhibition for Music and Theater" (p. 317) in Vienna in 1892 that saved the Czech National Theater in Prague from a financial crisis and transformed Prague from a "site of national art" in the 1880s into "one of the centers of operatic modernity" (p. 341), imitated across Central Europe.

As Ther explains, looking at operatic repertoires turns the cliché of the cosmopolitan West and the ethno-nationalist East on its head. "It was in exactly those opera cities in which cultural nation-building long stood in the forefront that relatively pan-European repertoires were established" (p. 397). Paris, in contrast, remained "self-referential" (p. 395) in its conservatism and cultural protectionism. As the opera "connected values and forms more than it separated them" (p. 416), Ther tells us, "Paris was forced to make room for a polycentric musical and operatic world" (p. 411). The cosmopolitan impulse of Central European opera would not be denied.

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JAN RÜGER. *The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*. (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 26.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 337. $95.00.

In this engaging new study, Jan Rüger offers a fresh perspective on the pre-1914 Anglo-German arms race, arguing that naval, diplomatic, and economic historians have for too long ignored the cultural (or "imagined") dimensions of this conflict. In his narrative, battle fleet construction, naval reviews, and ship launches are transformed into public theater and spectacle, an ap-

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proach that helps to shed light on three key elements in late nineteenth-century "identity politics": nation, monarchy, and empire. A further theme is the rise of modern "mass" consumption, as seen in the increased use of naval imagery in commodities like newspapers, children's toys, and luxury foods, and the growth of "battleship tourism," with Thomas Cook and its rivals offering all-inclusive trips to view the latest maritime marvels. My personal favorite, however, combining as it does naval power and the idea of the nation, is the advertisement displayed outside a London tailor in 1909: "Dreadnought and Wear British Clothing" (p. 13).

Monarchs were heavily associated with the "public staging" of their respective fleets, as the use of epithets like *Flottenkaiser* and "Sailor King" clearly illustrates (pp. 182–184). The fact that the Hohenzollerns and the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas were related by blood endowed their role in the "great naval game" with even greater symbolic meaning. Yet in other respects Rüger downplays the significance of royal authority, noting, for instance, that monarchs had to do more than simply "invent" new traditions if they wanted to assert their "continuing relevance" at a time of increasing social unrest and constitutional/parliamentary conflicts in both countries. How naval celebrations were to be organized and paid for, in other words, and in whose name they were to be held, became matters of great public interest and corresponding media attention, and could not be left to royal advisors or "traditional masters of ceremony" alone (p. 50).

The carefully choreographed rituals which marked out the "naval theater" provide striking visual evidence of how these "modern" political tensions were played out. Whereas in Britain both government and Parliament were represented alongside the monarch during naval reviews, in Germany the equivalent ceremonies took place without any official role for the Reichstag or civilian administration, and were intended as a public display of the kaiser's personal connection with *his* navy. In Rüger's view, though, it was enough for the kaiser simply to act as if he were exercising his unrestricted right of command (*Kommandogewalt*): "While Wilhelm II inspected his navy passionately and demonstratively, the reality was that the navy had the Kaiser on parade just as much" (p. 190). Following Christopher Clark and others, Rüger believes that Alfred von Tirpitz was the actual driving force behind the presentation of German *Flottenpolitik*, although in this respect his domestic agenda (securing popular support for increased naval estimates at home without the burden of parliamentary scrutiny) was often at odds with his external objectives (avoidance of hostile relations with Britain until the danger of a preemptive strike had passed) (pp. 189, 223).

With regard to empire, Rüger is interested in the multiple meanings of naval theatrics. Particularly noteworthy is his reflection on the sea as a "cultural space" between Britain and Germany (pp. 8–9). Here the commercial links (and rivalry) between London and Hamburg as major trading ports were as much a part of the popular imagination as the political antagonism between London and Berlin as "centres of power" (p. 9). For Hamburgers and Londoners (as for the peoples of Kiel and Bremen, or Newcastle and Glasgow) pride in the wealth, skills, and enterprise that came from involvement in shipbuilding and communication with the outside world was an indispensable part of identification with the imperial idea. At the local and global levels, the cultural similarities between Britain and Germany are thus very striking, and certainly much more so than at the national and constitutional levels.

Finally, Rüger seeks to challenge conventional wisdom on the link between "militarism" and the "mobilization of the masses" in the period up to 1914 (p. 10). Two points in particular emerge. First, the key role played by civic dignitaries, commercial and voluntary bodies, and representatives of the "new media" (cinema and the popular press) in the staging of maritime events allowed the opening up of the navy to a much more varied audience than either Hans-Ulrich Wehler's model of "manipulation from above" or Geoff Eley's notion of "self-mobilization" by the radical right "from below" would suggest. Second, in parallel with recent work by Peter Fritzsche and others on the "patriotic" crowds of July–August 1914, Rüger's evidence shows that people could be drawn into taking part by the excitement and drama of naval theater without necessarily becoming passionate supporters of the arms race. Thus, even if governments, political parties, or nationalist pressure groups sought to use the navy as a tool of mass persuasion, there were in reality "strong limits to such strategies" (p. 138).

How far does Rüger succeed in demonstrating the importance of the "cultural dimension" more generally? In the larger scheme of things, the answer is very well. Yet in a more narrow sense there is still a danger, in my view, in attributing too much importance to public opinion or the "mass market" when explaining strategic decisions taken at the highest level. Wilhelm II's order in August 1914 that the High Seas Fleet should stay in port, for instance, was hardly popular with naval enthusiasts, but was made for more traditional reasons: Germany was still seen first and foremost as a land power (as the shift back to army spending after 1912 showed), and the battleships were there for "prestige" reasons only. When it came to fighting a "real" war, Wilhelm could not imagine that the German navy would ever overthrow Britain's supremacy at sea, and this is why right-wingers like Count Reventlow (and Tirpitz) essentially despised and distrusted him.

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RICHARD NED LEBOW, WULF KANSTEINER, and CLAUDIO FOGU, editors. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 366. Cloth $84.95, paper $23.95.

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This collection of nine essays is the fruit of a collective commitment on the part of the three editors to engage with important and thorny aspects of the scholarship on memory as it has flourished over the past two decades. The editors began conversations about the usefulness and direction of memory studies in 1999 and continued their discussions and debates over the next three years, working through their disciplinary and theoretical differences on this topic. To their credit, the editors are transparent about the fact that some of these divergences are still there, and that research on memory means different things for different people. Ultimately, the volume is an attempt to construct more theoretical, methodological, and thematic bridges among these differences. Yet the book also stands as an example of the impossibility of doing so successfully within the parameters set up here.

The book is neatly framed by two chapters, not an introduction and conclusion, but more provocatively two different takes on the relationship between "politics" and "memory," asking basically how each one inflects the other from opposite ends: "The Politics of Memory" and "The Memory of Politics." The other seven chapters are individual case studies focusing on Austria, France, West Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and the Soviet Union/Russia. Each of these case studies offers new insights into the scholarship on memory with reference to that respective country and, in the case of Switzerland, introduces English speakers to a history that is largely unknown. There is in fact a great deal of variation in the level of familiarity most scholars of memory have with these case studies. Whereas West Germany represents a paradigmatic case, Poland is just now reaching a level of research and analysis that are making it comparable to Germany. These important differences in the historiographic field make it hard to compare the seven cases. It is not only that they are quite different in terms of the political, military, and social realities of World War II. It is also that historians, public intellectuals, and politicians in these countries have tried to use World War II as a memorial backdrop or theme for their own activities in different ways. So, while it is in fact quite interesting to read each of these generally well researched and persuasively articulated individual analyses, it is difficult to place them in any wider framework that would help highlight their specificities and make them comparatively significant.

In the end, comparisons are useful in so far as the assumptions on which they are based and the structure they adopt helps reflect with some degree of faithfulness all the cases that are being compared. But how is that possible, when one compares seven cases that are known to such different degrees? The editors set up a very ambitious task for themselves, and although it is a worthy goal, I do not see it as realizable within these parameters. In fact, the two essays that frame the case studies are more useful for future comparative work on the question of memory in the European context, most likely at a more regional level, than for trying to embrace the entire continent as a collection of monolithic national cases. Still, in their juxtaposition with the case studies, the essays that analytically frame the volume suggest just how difficult it is to move beyond the empirical in theorizing about memory and, conversely, how cumbersome theorization can be in capturing the dizzying complexity of real life. I admire the editors for their sophisticated attempt to bring theory and empirical evidence together, but I walked away from the volume wondering exactly what it was that they offered the reader in terms of "reframing the study of memory" writ large (p. 284).

Another more modest goal is expressed in the last chapter: "The scholars working on topics such as processes of collective identity-formation . . . will find in the material presented here a valid stimulus to include the institutionalization of collective forms of memory within the range of variables bearing on the phenomena they analyze" (p. 294). This goal is much closer to being realized, if judging by the proliferation of articles about the European memory of World War II posted in the online publication *Eurozine* over the past year by prominent European and North American scholars. Indeed, I do not see memory as a subject of political and historical analysis as being in any way on the wane. What has not yet surfaced in this literature, including much of the present volume, is sustained attention to the meaning of memory *beyond* "the institutionalization of collective forms of memory." One can only hope that future scholars of memory intent on comparison will take the insights offered in this volume farther and look beyond museums, parades, newspapers, and official pronouncements into more subterranean forms of remembering and commemorating.

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KEVIN MCDERMOTT and MATTHEW STIBBE, editors. *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. Foreword by PAVEL SEIFTER. New York: Berg. 2006. Pp. xiv, 210. Cloth $94.95, paper $29.95.

How much more do we know about historical events after some time has passed than was known at the time of the events themselves? On the surface it appears obvious that we should have a considerably more sophisticated understanding of events after documents that were closely held when the passions of the moment were running high are available for researchers. But is it really true? What do we actually mean by "knowing more?" Does the accumulation of an ever larger number of data points change our basic understanding, or do they simply provide fodder for the interpretive styles of a new era? The opening of Soviet and East European archives in the 1990s momentarily gave the promise of bright new understandings of the momentous events of the period 1989–1991, but as this collection put together by Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe suggests, any new understandings do not seem to come

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from an increase in data but rather from the interpretive stance through which they are understood. Indeed, the only article in the collection that is "new" is James Krapfl's application of Lynn Hunt's typology of how the French Revolution has been interpreted to the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. Krapfl argues that interpretation of the Velvet Revolution began in a romantic vein in which human beings were thought capable of heroic deeds and the people were trusted to act for the general good. This was followed by the comic interpretation that criticized this quest for transcendence and sought legal continuity. The tragic moment, for Krapfl, was when Václav Klaus split the Civic Forum by creating his own political party, thus breaking both the heroic and continuity threads. Finally, we appear now to be in the satiric era in which human agency is increasingly deemed a delusion and the great events of 1989 are often referred to as the "so-called revolution." In other words, the new documents that have been uncovered since 1989, and there have been plenty, have not greatly changed the interpretation of those events. Rather it is the dynamic of Czech and Slovak societies that has developed and changed, and along with it the interpretations into which whatever new data that emerges is placed.

Even at a more positivist level, it does not appear from the brief studies in this collection that much has changed. The Yugoslav Communist Party's past assertions that it was always standing up to the Soviets was an exaggeration; Władisław Gomułka was not as strong and decisive in his meeting with Soviet leaders in Warsaw on October 19, 1956, as many have assumed; Alexander Dubček always strongly favored the Soviets, and was not so much a reformer as was once thought; Imre Pozsgay and the precursors to the Hungarian Democratic Forum were more important than earlier interpreters, including myself, may have written. It is nice to know these things with a bit more certainty, but, as Joanna Granville suggests in her useful effort to compare the Polish October of 1956 and the Hungarian Revolution of the same year in the light of new data, "the documents do not change previous interpretations fundamentally" (p. 57).

This outcome is probably not what the editors had in mind when they put this volume together. I suspect they hoped that access to "recently accessible archival material and post-communist historiography" would produce something more exciting than the conclusion they suggest, namely that their collection "affirm[s] the diversity of East European responses to perceived Soviet hegemony." Unfortunately, their claim that the articles "represent the very latest research" can not be taken too seriously. Even Granville's good chapter is a shortened and revised version of an article that appeared in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History* four years before publication of this collection. Stibbe's article on the East German Uprising is not up to Jonathan Sperber's excellent review article of two years earlier, "17 June 1953: Revisiting a German Revolution," *German History*, Vol. 22 (2004), pp. 619–643. And much of Dennis Deletant's article on opposition in Romania simply consists of verbatim renderings from the chapter entitled "Dissent" in his book *Ceauşescu and the* Securitate (1995).

Several of the pieces in this book have merit. Nevertheless, to keep up with the "latest research" in the "relationship between the USSR and its client states" (all quotes in the last two paragraphs from page 1), both factual and interpretive, I would recommend browsing the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, the work of Mark Kramer, the National Security Archive Cold War Readers, and the bulletins and other publications of the Cold War International History Project, all of which are referred to sparingly in this collection.

GALE STOKES
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DAVID ARMITAGE, editor. *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press, in association with the Folger Institute, Washington, D.C. 2006. Pp. xi, 326. $90.00.

Arguably, the so-called "Cambridge School" in the history of political thought is headquartered in Washington, D.C. Since 1985 the Folger Center for the History of British Political Thought has orchestrated a formidable series of seminars and associated published collections which have set the pace in fusing history with political theory. The present volume marks two decades of work, but it is no retrospective, and it offers a set of fresh explorations, rather disparate in topic, but all of an eminently high standard. These essays exhibit two principal ways in which the history of anglophone political thought has metamorphosed over the past generation. The first is the remarkable affinity that now exists between the disciplines of history and English literature. Of the dozen substantive chapters here, four are by historians and four by political scientists, but there are also four by literary scholars. The effect has been radically to expand the textual domain of "political thought" to include drama and poetry. The second transformation is the Atlanticization of the subject. British political thought is increasingly understood in terms of theories of empire and their consequences for the colonization of territories and the subjugation of peoples. Atlanticization, it is true, is more visible in Washington, D.C., than in Cambridge, England, where Europeanization is equally salient. The relationship among three modes of surmounting Anglocentricity—the Atlanticist, the European, and the "Three Kingdoms" or "Britannic"—remains contested territory, as this volume testifies.

Many of the chapters are programmatic, attesting how disciplinary myopias might be rectified. The literary scholars seem to protest too much at what they take to be the continued failure of historians to notice William Shakespeare or John Milton or John Dryden. Andrew Hadfield writes that "political thought is too important to be left to political science and history alone"

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(p. 111), for it must embrace literary texts. He pursues the republican tradition by reminding us that early modern education was saturated with knowledge of Roman history, and particularly with the founding of the republic and its later relapse into monarchy. This meant that politics was taught through the narratives of the rape of Lucrece, the banishment of the Tarquins, the civil wars, and the characters and motives of Julius Caesar, Brutus, Catiline, and Cicero. "Republicanism was a literary phenomenon . . . because it consisted of a series of stories" (p. 118). Hadfield's injunction to neighboring disciplines is capped by Steven Zwicker's hyperbolic claim that the conventional canon of texts in political thought fails to allow the scholar to get to grips with "figuration, uncertainty or irony" (p. 145). To readers of Thomas More, Niccolò Machiavelli, or Thomas Hobbes, this will seem an odd claim. Less stridently, Karen O'Brien calls for improved "inter-generic conversation" (p. 168), pointing out that, before the nineteenth century, poetry was not "*belles-lettristic*," not yet distanced from the concerns of other modes of public writing. She explores the Hanoverian poetry of empire, and its nexus of ideas about commerce, liberty, and international community, arguing that poets shaped conceptions of imperial trusteeship, service, and paternal benevolence, which offered as much a critique as a defense of colonization. In the fourth literary essay in this book, Jean E. Howard explores William Shakespeare's politics through the treatment of Cade's Rebellion in *Henry VI*.

Other chapters take us to the question of the geographical purview of anglophone political thought. John Morrill asserts that "much intellectual history remains breathtakingly blinkered" (p. 28) in its neglect of the political thought of the Catholic Irish and the Presbyterian Scots. He also holds that Atlanticization is in danger of trumping Europeanization: the Atlantic ought not to be privileged over the English Channel, for English political thought must be understood in the context of the Wars of the Five Kingdoms (France and Spain as well as the British monarchies). Nicholas Canny joins Morrill in insisting upon the debt of Irish Catholic thought to continental political ideas, as well as observing how English Protestant views of Irish culture (not least those of Edmund Spenser) provided templates for the English in later encounters elsewhere. Colin Kidd appeals for a closer look at "ecclesiology, feudal jurisprudence and heraldry" (p. 66) in his exploration of rival Scottish mythographies concerning the kingdom's autonomy, or subordination. Tim Harris sounds a rather different note, cautioning against excessive particularization of the Three Kingdoms. He offers examples of commonality of thinking, driven largely by confessional solidarities.

Duncan Ivison offers a bold overview of the "globalization" of the discipline, both in the sense of the cosmopolitan domain of the subject matter, and in the sense of substantive early-modern connections among theories of rights, property, colonization, and state formation. Paradigmatic is the thought (which Richard Tuck has done much to familiarize) that the classic positions of Hobbes and John Locke were grounded in the Grotian insight that the rights-bearing individual in the state of nature was an analogue of the emerging sovereign state in the international sphere. Center stage, too, in this "globalized" reading of the early moderns, is the construal of the fifth chapter of Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, "Of Property," as a manifesto for colonization in the New World, in its assertion that industrious labor in tilling the earth and rendering it fruitful gives right of ownership to the laborer. As the *Sydney Herald* announced in 1838, in a classic extrapolation of this argument to the Australian context, the Aborigines "bestowed no labour upon the land," so that "their ownership, their right, was nothing more than that of the emu or the kangaroo" (p. 197). The arresting paradox is that "Locke" led two posthumously influential lives, as an ideological instrument for the authorization of expropriation as well as for resistance against oppression. Ivison's capacious essay deserves to be on student reading lists as a key primer in this now large area.

Neither the interface of literature and history nor the globalization of political thought exhausts new directions. The feminization of the subject is represented here in Joanne H. Wright's essay on Margaret Cavendish, which argues for the continued utility of the public/private spheres distinction in understanding women's "political" writing. Kirstie M. McClure's chapter is an investigation in reception history, a subject that will surely play a larger role in the future. We do not need to pronounce the death of the author in order to see that texts rapidly escape authorial control once in the hands of publishers and editors. Redaction, selection, anthologizing, translation, editorializing, even fonts and formats reshaped texts and amended the ways they were received. McClure takes the example of eighteenth-century versions of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, showing how unstable the text could be once let loose in Grub Street.

Standing somewhat aside is the final chapter, in which Richard E. Flathman offers observations on "Cambridge School" methodology in the light of orthodox practices in political philosophy. He reminds us that most pedagogy in political science remains "canonical" rather than "contextual," and he appeals for an Oakeshottian differentiation of modes of intellectual practice. In rehearsing the case for ahistoricity—in favor of the "here and now" and the "always and everywhere" of classic philosophical texts—he makes play of "the charge that contextualist studies are merely antiquarian" (p. 273), noting the anxiety of Cambridge School practitioners themselves to avoid such a charge. Needless to say, every chapter in this book bears witness to the intense present-mindedness of scholars in setting the questions they ask of past texts. It could not be otherwise.

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KRISTEN POST WALTON. *Catholic Queen, Protestant Patriarchy: Mary, Queen of Scots, and the Politics of Gender and Religion*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. Pp. xiii, 220. $69.95.

The originality of this work lies in the fact that it is less about what Mary did (or did not) do and more about how she was perceived. When she returned to Scotland in August 1561 she was in the nineteenth year, both of her life and of her reign. She had not seen her native land since she was seven years old, however, and had no experience of being anything other than a French princess and (briefly) queen consort of France. Scotland had endured a turbulent decade after her departure, and much had changed during her absence. When she left, France was the dominant power; her mother, Mary of Guise, although not regent, was a powerful figure, and the Catholic Church appeared to be (at last) putting its house in order. When she returned to Scotland, all this had been swept away. Her mother had become regent in 1554 but had been overwhelmed by Protestant rebellion and had died in 1560. The French had withdrawn, and an English-backed Protestant Council ruled the land. Many Scots were still Catholic, but the official kirk was reformed. Few voices were raised against Mary's right to rule; she had, after all, succeeded her father unchallenged in 1542. John Knox might perceive her gender as an obstacle, but he was in a tiny minority. Mary was, however, expected to adapt herself to the situation which she found, and to marry as soon as might be practicable.

For about four years she managed remarkably well, not least because her sights were set on the English succession, and that made her amenable to compromise at home. She even put down the Catholic Huntly rebellion in 1562. The issue in England was not her gender (understandably) but her nationality and religion, the former more than the latter in the early stages. She had been born out of England, of non-English parents, and had been ignored in the succession act of 1544. This was the main theme of the extensive polemic used against her claim. However, the one person in England who mattered—Elizabeth—remained noncommittal. As the English lawyers argued over Mary's entitlement, her marriage became increasingly important. Herself unwed, and with an eye on the succession, Elizabeth urged an English husband in preference to the foreign princes Mary was considering. With her eyes firmly fixed on the south, in 1565 she chose Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley, an English subject with a distant claim of his own to the throne. In making this choice, Mary "asserted herself," as Kristen Post Walton argues, ignoring alike the ponderous advice of Knox and the opposition of most of her nobles.

As "*une femme couvert*," Mary's gender again became an issue. As a sovereign, she was Darnley's superior, as a wife she was his subject, and this issue was made more complex by the mounting evidence of Darnley's deficiencies and incompetence, a theme to which the bulk of the book's third chapter is devoted. Only in one respect did he succeed. In fathering Prince James he offered a potential way out of the mess that Mary's reign was increasingly becoming. Walton is not concerned with the issue of Mary's involvement in his murder, but only in the way in which the assumption was used against her. Freed from the embarrassment of Darnley, Mary might again have asserted herself, but she self-destructed by marrying Lord Bothwell, who was generally thought to be the guilty party. With her support diminished almost to the vanishing point, she was imprisoned and deposed. Her escape and flight into England are briefly mentioned, but what finally engages Walton's attention is the prolonged battle, both physical and polemical, between the "King's men" who supported James and the "Queen's men" who strove for Mary's restoration. Her gender was this time an issue, because of the problems that marriage had confirmed, but religion was more important, in spite of the fact that Mary had blotted her copybook with the Catholic Church by marrying Bothwell with Protestant rites. As her prospects in England faded after 1568, nationality ceased to be an issue, and Walton focuses on the battles in Scotland, which finally came to an end with the surrender of the Castilians at Edinburgh in 1573.

Unlike most studies of the Scottish queen, this work is not concerned with her ultimate fate. It does not tell us much that we did not know about Mary herself, but it is very informative of the attitudes of those about her, particularly those who attacked or defended her in writing. Like Elizabeth, Mary was a woman trying to do a man's job in a man's world, but her strategy was quite different. Neither her religion nor her gender were obstacles to her position, but both became extremely problematic for the manner in which she exercised it. The "Protestant patriarchy" of Scotland sought to dictate terms to Mary, and she used her gender in an attempt to circumvent them. She failed, and her failure made her the stuff of tragedy. This is a perceptive but somewhat limited study of the polemics that attended her efforts down to 1573.

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MARY HAMPSON PATTERSON. *Domesticating the Reformation: Protestant Best Sellers, Private Devotion, and the Revolution of English Piety* Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 2007. Pp. 449. $75.00.

The aim of this book is to analyze the way in which "high theology" was presented to the "ordinary people" of Elizabethan England in three texts chosen to represent three genres of Protestant devotional literature: Thomas Becon's *The sick man's salve* (a godly dying manual); part one of John Norden's *A pensive man's practice* (a prayer manual); and Edward Dering and John More's *A brief and necessary instruction for householders* (a catechism). Mary Hampson Patterson suggests these were "fantastically conspicuous books," albeit written by "relatively inconspicuous men," and that as "specimens of acculturation" they help show how families ne-

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gotiated change as part of "the revolution of English piety." A third of the book is devoted to setting the scene both in broad terms—the historiography of the Reformation, print, and literacy—and more specifically the context for the composition of the three core texts, and a final third is devoted to a conclusion, appendixes, bibliography, and index, which leaves just a third for Patterson's detailed analysis of the texts.

While such an enterprise is to be welcomed, there are problems with the form it takes here. First, the project appears to have been undertaken with a number of assumptions in mind: that by the 1570s there was a coherent Protestant identity and an established "genre, industry, and vehicle of activism" that historians can identify as a new devotional literature; that Becon, Norden, and Dering were all consciously feeding that industry; and that because labels like "sick man," "pensive man," and "householder" appear on a title page those works were intended for "ordinary people" and demonstrate how the Reformation in England was "domesticated." But this risks putting the cart before the horse. Recent scholarly work tends to view English Protestantism as having taken generations to achieve results among the laity at large, and being far from homogeneous when it did: Becon and Dering were clearly "godly," but Norden was much nearer the conformist center to judge from his debt to the Book of Common Prayer and inclusion of a calendar of saints' days and festivals. Nor were the three authors inconspicuous: all had contacts with the social and educated elite of the day, and were on the fringes of the royal court. Moreover, to judge from the bequests made by Becon's "sick man" he was head of a large household and had several hundred pounds at his disposal; indeed, the *Salve* was so long that with a binding it would have cost an ordinary man several weeks' wages. The choice of prayers in Norden's work, both in part one and in parts two and three (composed later when his surveying business was not paying well), suggests he too had moderately wealthy, educated, and leisured readers in mind for the most part. By contrast, the *Brief and necessary instruction* was certainly a cheaper work, but the inclusion in Stockwood's extended form (which may have sold twice as many editions as the original) of an ABC and scripture proofs printed either in full or abridged form, presumably for those who did not own Bibles, may indicate that Stockwood's revision was aimed at the young and illiterate and for use in churches and schools as much as homes. In fact we do not know nearly enough about how copies of any of these works were actually distributed and used to assume that they had a major impact on the average Elizabethan family, let alone contributed to a "revolution of English piety." The only evidence cited here for the actual use of these works is Chris Marsh's article on the use in some wills of phrases taken from Becon's *Salve*; but wills, too, were drawn up for those with some property rather than the genuinely poor.

A second problem is that in analyzing the ways in which "high theology" was communicated to the "plain man" Patterson has opted to focus on a limited range of criteria. What we have in chapters five, seven, eight, and ten is an often refreshingly insightful dialogue between a theologically and historically well-informed scholar of the early twenty-first century and the printed texts of some enthusiastic Protestant authors of the sixteenth century. What we do not have is a detailed consideration of how far those texts were original or modifications or translations of earlier works, how far the language the authors used was colloquial or regional rather than "elite" or "official," what was the significance of the dedicatees, or what part canny publishers played in turning a written text into a steady seller. Time and again we are given speculations at to why these works became popular, when they may tell us much more about the views of their authors (and of Patterson) than their readers' reactions to those views. The text also seems to have been finished some time before it was published, to judge from the insights made available in recent years, as in the articles and bibliographies in the relevant articles in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004).

Ian Green
University of Edinburgh

Jonathan D. Moore. *English Hypothetical Universalism: John Preston and the Softening of Reformed Theology*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 2007. Pp. xx, 304. $36.00.

The title of this work is not likely to attract a large audience, and those who do come to it will find both the subject and the style tough going in places, but this is a must read for those who are interested in early modern religious history, and particularly the evolution of Reformed thought in Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Because of John Preston's influence on many of the first generation New England clergy, it is also a work that students of American Puritanism should familiarize themselves with. Negotiating the historiographical thickets of English Calvinism and anti-Calvinism, Jonathan D. Moore offers important new insights into the thought of William Perkins, James Ussher, John Davenant, and, of course, Preston.

After a preliminary section offering a brief biography of Preston, Moore develops the context for his analysis with a careful discussion of the theology of Perkins. Perkins was the pre-eminent theologian of the late Elizabethan church. In his explication of John Calvin's understanding of predestination, Perkins took a particularist approach which asserted that God had determined who was to be saved and who condemned before the creation. This supralapsarian position meant that while Christ's sacrifice was sufficient to save all men, his death only atoned for those who had been elected and predestined. God (the Trinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit) always intended to save only the elect; Christ's sacrifice was for the elect only. During Perkins's lifetime there were few English challenges to this position.

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Having established the tradition from which Preston emerged, Moore spends the remainder of the book analyzing his theology. Aside from requiring some very particular interpretations of scriptural passages which suggested that Christ died for all men, Perkins's interpretation offered little incentive for clergy to preach the message of salvation to the members of what was a national church. Hypothetical universalism as crafted by Preston and others accepted the belief in the absolute nature of God's decrees but asserted that the gospel call was universal, though the actual gospel covenant whereby salvation is offered was extended only to the elect. In essence he argued Christ's death brought about separately the hypothetical salvability of all humanity and the payment whereby the elect were saved. This departure from Perkins's position provided the theological motive for the evangelicalism that drove the Puritan movement.

This section includes chapters elucidating Preston's views of the divine decree, the death of Christ, and the Gospel call. The last chapter in the section offers an excellent reinterpretation of the York House Conference of 1626, which most historians have viewed as a watershed moment in the fortunes of Calvinism in England. Moore persuasively makes the case that in attacking the presumed Arminian position of Richard Montagu, Preston offered his own interpretation of Calvinism, which distinguished him from the particularist position of Perkins and as a result disappointed some of the lay puritans in attendance such as the Earl of Warwick and Lord Saye and Sele.

Moore next offers a section on "Preston's Mentors," which could well have come earlier in the structure of the book. In it he argues that both Ussher and Davenant paved the way for Preston's hypothetical universalism. Again, the author combines a close reading of the writings of the two theologians with a discussion of how others have viewed their works. In particular he addresses the issue of how Ussher could have offered this softened view of Calvinism and still have had a large role in the formulation of the strongly Calvinist Irish Articles of 1615. He finds Ussher, Davenant, and Preston not only offering similar positions but supporting those positions with similar analogies and references. Looking beyond the three, he explains Richard Baxter's relationship to their thinking later in the seventeenth century—a position related but yet distinct.

No summary of Moore's arguments can suggest his nuanced reading of the material and the careful distinctions he makes in setting forth his case. Throughout this study he carefully engages with those who have written on English Calvinism before him, including scholars such as R. T. Kendall, Nicholas Tyacke, and Peter White. In the process he not only identifies an important dimension of English theological writing in the period but reinforces our awareness that "Calvinism" at the time was a far more complex system than as it is commonly presented, with Preston and others offering a softer version of predestination than what Perkins had argued for.

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EMILY COCKAYNE. *Hubbub: Filth, Noise and Stench in England, 1600–1770*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 335. $35.00.

Seventeen years ago, David Hackett Fischer noted the degree to which early American historians, and presumably others, had grown estranged from the societies that they studied, owing in large measure to both the secularization and urbanization of modern life. Our knowledge of the natural world has especially suffered, limited, at most, to our children's pet gerbils or an occasional campout with the Cub Scouts or Brownies. All of this is true enough, but in recent years, a number of historians have sought to right the balance. Blessed with vivid imaginations and a gift for archival research, they have resurrected the sights, scents, and sounds of preindustrial environments, from Virginia DeJohn Anderson's study of animal husbandry in colonial America to Bruce R. Smith's exploration of early modern soundscapes. In this work, Emily Cockayne makes a significant contribution to our knowledge of preindustrial life—with two caveats. Rather than a panorama of quotidian existence, she concentrates on sources of daily discomfort and the physical and emotional reactions that they provoked: the "unseemly aspects of life in order to redress the balance in favour of the pleasures of the period" (p. 1). Second, this is primarily a study of urban nuisances, concentrating chiefly on London, Oxford, Manchester, and that famed fount of pleasure, Bath. One of the books' more interesting discoveries is the extent to which the natural world routinely intruded upon urban life for both good and ill. Certainly, the urban-rural distinction for the centuries preceding the industrial revolution is not always helpful.

Cockayne's prose is clear, free of jargon, and interspersed with rich quotations drawn from a wide array of primary sources including newspapers, government records, travel accounts, and literature. Numerous maps and illustrations contribute to the book's handsome design.

Of course, we have long known about the period's poverty and violence, and about the cheapness of life in England as well as in the rest of Europe. But Cockayne delves more deeply than previous historians to rid readers of any lingering nostalgia. After providing an overview of urban life in the first chapter, she devotes each of eight chapters to a different source of vexation. The titles, to say the least, are arresting, from "Ugly" and "Itchy" to "Dirty" and "Gloomy." Still, as Cockayne rightly points out, the book is no "litany of misery" (p. 1). The text contains a number of thoughtful insights, which are amplified in the conclusion. Class, for instance, was only one factor in determining the level of personal comfort. Also important was one's profession—whether a tallow-chandler, for example, or a hor-

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ner—as was the familiarity of a noxious smell or incessant noise. Nor did the march of time always improve urban conditions. Despite broader avenues, superior lighting, and improved sanitation, the air eventually became more polluted, at least by the nineteenth century. Nights were lighter than ever before, but days grew darker. Another conclusion, one in need of greater elaboration, is that "sensing is not only highly individualistic, it also historically constituted" (p. 16), changing over centuries or in the course of a single lifetime. And yet surely some sources of personal distress have been universal.

Cockayne's study, as she recognizes, does not address in any systematic fashion the greatest hardship of all, illness, references to which pervade early modern diaries. A persistent source of misery in its own right, sickness accentuated many of the less serious ones. That said, this is an excellent study of English urban life in all of its filth and stench.

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Virginia Tech

Earl A. Reitan. *Politics, Finance, and the People: Economical Reform in England in the Age of the American Revolution, 1770–92*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. Pp. viii, 278. $74.95.

Earl A. Reitan first published on the constitutional dimensions of eighteenth-century British public finance as long ago as 1966, and he developed his arguments in articles and essays in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, Reitan has branched out in different directions, even producing *The Thatcher Revolution: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, and the Transformation of Modern Britain* (2003), a study of the great changes in British politics under Margaret Thatcher and her successors.

This new book therefore marks a return to an earlier scholarly interest and the culmination, no doubt, of some forty years' intermittent thought and reflection on the subject matter. In view of the experience and mature consideration brought to the work, one hesitates to quibble, but the decision to concentrate on the period from the 1760s, when Reitan sees the first stirrings of economical reform, to the eve of the war against revolutionary France might be questioned. Why should the aftermath of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), or even 1770, as the book's subtitle suggests, be thought an appropriate starting date? Henry Pelham had embarked on a program of retrenchment after the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), which if different in some respects from what followed the end of the Seven Years' War, was similar enough to warrant consideration as the true beginning of the process.

The end date is perhaps less problematic. William Pitt the Younger's policy of cutting places in government pay after the American war (1775–1783) was brought to a juddering halt by the start of a new and even more demanding struggle against revolutionary France, in which Britain became a belligerent early in 1793. The French Revolutionary War, like earlier eighteenth-century conflicts but on a bigger scale, led to the substantial expansion of the armed services and significant growth in the revenue departments, not only wiping out the savings painfully secured during the preceding years of peace but moving the pendulum dramatically in the opposite direction.

Yet the outbreak of the war against revolutionary France was not the end of the story, as Reitan himself acknowledges in his brief afterword. The process of cutting back offices and public expenditure resumed with the eventual defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the coming of peace in 1815. The repeal of the wartime income tax by a rebellious parliament in 1816 cut state revenue and so obliged Lord Liverpool's government to accelerate its search for economies, and by the early 1820s a substantial reduction of offices in government pay had been achieved. Even so, calls for retrenchment and reform were to be the mainstay of opposition politics for many years to come.

But if one might question Reitan's concentration on the period from the end of the Seven Years' War to the eve of the French Revolutionary War, there can be little doubt that he brings an expert eye to bear on the developments of that time. He writes with great clarity and makes accessible to students as well as teachers a potentially obscure and dry subject. He rightly identifies it as central to the political debates of the time, which involved not just the high political elite but also parts of the wider public. As a sharply focused, well-researched, and thoughtful account of a key period of economical reform, this book can be commended to a wide readership.

Stephen Conway
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Timothy Jenks. *Naval Engagements: Patriotism, Cultural Politics, and the Royal Navy, 1793–1815*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 334. $99.00.

This book by Timothy Jenks serves as a self-conscious antidote to the brand of historical scholarship which maintains that war and patriotism contribute to a relatively cohesive sense of national identity—an approach exemplified most influentially by Linda Colley's perspicacious but nonetheless presumptive *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (1992). Where Colley finds community, plebeian acquiescence, and the local celebration of national identity, Jenks finds striking instances of conflict, resistance, and hostility within the patriotic culture that emerged in Britain in response to the Napoleonic Wars. His book is a prolonged exercise in cultural history that emphasizes the role of literary, political, and ideological representation in the contestation of national myths manufactured around the images of the loyal tar, his political defenders and detractors, and the navy itself.

If the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed an ostensibly overwhelming assertion of Brit-

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ain's naval supremacy and achievement, such protestations, Jenks argues, actually reveal less about a harmonious, univocal "Britishness" in the face of Jacobin threat and a good deal more about the numerous failures of the state and its functionaries to resolve or suppress the partisan and class tensions that lay at the heart of naval patriotism. Certainly, naval exploits were celebrated, politicized, and ultimately constructed as emblems of national identity, but it is precisely the constructedness of this emblematic identification that Jenks seeks to emphasize. "The point," he notes, "is that the symbolic *approached* [but] never fully realized the intended ideal of communal and national solidarity that loyalism sought. . . . Division, debate, and fractures were as evident as shared outlooks and assumptions" (pp. 142, 180).

Turning for evidence in support of this not wholly surprising thesis to an impressively wide array of public, visual, and literary forms—newspapers, caricatures, ephemeral and commemorative poetry, state pageants, illuminations, and naval theatricals—the author demonstrates that events as seemingly unanimous in their expression of nationalistic hubris as "The Glorious First of June" in 1793 or the Naval Thanksgiving for Admiral Adam Duncan's defeat of the Dutch off Camperdown four years later were, in fact, ideological stalemates, indicative of ongoing struggles among loyalism, whiggery, and popular radicalism. Military history is prone to overlook the significant political and social tensions attached to naval victory, failing to attend to the overlapping and frequently contradictory patriotic discourses, rhetorical modes, and national symbols available to Georgian political groupings from the 1790s up until Waterloo. Jenks attempts to remedy this negligence in a five-chapter, chronologically organized study that settles on a series of exemplary patriotic moments to show that the "unique national symbol" that was the British navy was also open to cooption and assault by a range of competing political and class interests.

The Westminster election of May–June 1796, for example, was a rather turbulent affair in which the eloquent John Horn Tooke used the hustings to contest various patriotic constructions advanced by the state. Appealing to plebeian agency, Tooke was eventually successful in his political race against the plain-speaking Tory candidate, Admiral Alan Gardner, taking advantage of the fact that popular radicalism was more capable than loyalist rhetoric of occupying the language of patriotism. Again, the naval mutinies of April–June 1797, which saw squadrons based at Spithead, Plymouth, and the Nore petitioning the Admiralty to address conditions and wages, was not a straightforward instance of rebellion but more importantly a profound "crisis for naval patriotism and the masculine images that underpinned it . . . fracturing the bond that linked admiral-heroes to the common seaman" (p. 77). Similarly, post-Nile (August 1798) celebrations in Britain did not result in social harmony and political agreement. Rather, the large corporate dinners and local fêtes that typified the rejoicing following on Nelson's early victory against the French revealed two opposing and unresolved attitudes toward the patriotic public sphere: one that sought its careful management and extension, another that sought to preserve that sphere's elite circumscription. Jenks reads Nelson's disfigured body as yet another defining context, in this case for the admiral's own cultural meaning in the years just prior to his death in 1806. Nelson's wounded body becomes, in this compelling interpretation, a contested metaphor for service and integrity, at once an "emblem of corporeal patriotism," a "symbol of representative national disfigurement," and an "object whose display . . . revealed the enduring loyalty of disabled veterans" (pp. 198, 211, 217). The final chapter examines the damaged reputation of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, perhaps the central figure in public naval culture between Trafalgar and Waterloo. Cultivating a popular rough-and-tumble naval persona in his run for Parliament in the Westminster election of 1807, attacking the system of naval pensions in 1810 and thereby bringing into mainstream political discourse a rare example of plebeian corporeal suffering, Cochrane was convicted—scandalously, we now know—in an 1814 trial that accused him of manipulating the Stock Exchange. He was effectively removed from the patriotic stage, becoming "part of one final wartime struggle over the loyalist and radical constructions of patriotism and the national will" (p. 275).

Jenks's multiple reiterations of this final point throughout the book tend to be distracting, lending a repetitive structure to an argument that could be organized more cohesively. Given the inevitably contested nature of military and political culture and, indeed, of hero worship in general, the reader is left without a clear idea as to why these particular illustrations of contingency and struggle should be highlighted at the expense of any other number of possible examples in the two decades examined. The book remains a highly informative examination of the role played by images of the navy and its heroes in an era of wartime patriotism, however, and serves as an eminently readable challenge to naval histories that are less attentive to the numerous tensions implicit in victory culture.

PETER W. SINNEMA
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ROHAN MCWILLIAM. *The Tichborne Claimant: A Victorian Sensation*. London: Hambledon Continuum. 2007. Pp. xii, 363. $49.95.

On Christmas Day 1866, a butcher arrived in London from Australia claiming that he was a long-lost English aristocrat and heir, Roger Tichborne. The butcher pressed his case with the Tichborne family and associates, some of whom recognized him as the lost aristocrat despite physical and other differences from Roger Tichborne. A bitter family controversy over the Claimant's identity ended up in court, where two successive Tichborne trials—the longest up to that time—captured the popular imagination. Meanwhile, the pub-

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licity surrounding the case turned the Claimant into a celebrity and his lawyers into national figures. Thousands of working and middle-class people supported the Claimant's bid for a baronetcy, sacrificing money and enduring ridicule to protest their support for a man widely considered in high society to be an impostor.

How and why did the Claimant become a figure of fascination and heroism for the Victorian working classes? Why did men and women join an anti-Catholic movement in defense of a man who claimed to come from a Roman Catholic family? In this meticulously researched, engaging, and valuable study, Rohan McWilliam explores the story of how a butcher with aristocratic ambitions became the hero of the most popular people's movement in nineteenth-century England. McWilliam, a leading historian of British popular politics, approaches the Tichborne cause célèbre as a way of analyzing the nature of radical politics between the defeat of Chartism in 1848 and the rise of socialism in the 1880s. While previous works have documented the story of the Tichborne trials and Tichborne himself, few have employed the case as McWilliam does to advance new understandings of the development of modern mass politics and the movement toward democratization. Drawing on methodological techniques of cultural historians such as Peter Bailey, Patrick Joyce, Judith R. Walkowitz and of the anthropologist Victor Turner, McWilliam builds on the precedent set by Michael Roe in *Kenealy and the Tichborne Cause: A Study in Mid-Victorian Populism* (1974) but charts new territory, yielding insights about how "working-class people employed non-class categories (such as religion, melodrama, and national identity) in making sense of society" (p. 330).

McWilliam draws attention to an area of popular politics that was not wholly defined by the assumptions of liberalism. He argues that the Tichborne cause reworked the culture of constitutionalism while maintaining older radical forms: the defense fund, the petition, platform agitation, and pressure group tactics. The Tichborne Cause became, in his assessment, a useful platform for working people because it linked so well with other radical causes: the natural autonomy of citizens, condemnation of the Lunacy Laws, the Contagious Diseases Acts, compulsory vaccination, land and legal reform, and the rights of a free press. However, McWilliam also sees the movement as deriving some of its appeal from forces that were often at odds with radicalism: popular Toryism, the language of drink, popular rights, national identity, and opposition to universal manhood suffrage. Arguing that Tichbornism spoke with ease to a politics and culture that was essentially libertarian, McWilliams concludes that no firm distinction existed between popular Radicalism and Conservatism in mid-Victorian popular politics.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one follows the chronological progress of the trials and the rise and fall of the Tichborne cause, documenting for the first time the dense network of connections especially around the Claimant and his lawyer, Edward Kenealy. Part two examines the relationship of the Claimant to popular culture with different chapters devoted, respectively, to spectacle, songs, mass politics, and melodrama. As with most ambitious books, some elements succeed better than others. The book's organizational structure sometimes hampers the author's stated aim of integrating the analysis of cultural production into the study of popular politics, since the history of the case is discussed separately from the analysis of how resources were mobilized to make it a cultural event. Among the topics that deserve more notice in the book include what was at stake for the (comparatively fewer) middle-class men and women of varying classes who threw their support behind the Claimant. While McWilliam's documentation of the efflorescence of popular visual representations and material artifacts related to the case is extensive, the exact nature and importance of the artifacts await further examination. Recent scholarship by Catherine Hall on the interconnections among Britain, Jamaica, and an insurgent Ireland around the time of the 1867 Reform Act might have helped locate Tichborne Radicalism in the context of a wider discussion in Britain at the time about what it meant to "belong" to the nation (or to be an "outsider"). Yet, these are minor criticisms. This book is a remarkable, fascinating study of Victorian popular politics that will interest many, including historians of class and British social movements and scholars of Victorian culture, legal history, mass politics, and communication.

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TOM BUCHANAN. *The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Britain: War, Loss and Memory*. (Sussex Studies in Spanish History.) Portland, Oreg.: Sussex Academic Press. 2007. Pp. x, 267. $32.50.

While at work on *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement* (1991), Tom Buchanan was chided by a colleague "that nothing new could be found to be said on this subject." Since then, his work on the Spanish Civil War's impact on Great Britain, particularly on the left, has expanded a new seam of historical inquiry, first opened by Hywel Francis's *Miners against Fascism: Wales and the Spanish Civil War* (1984). Buchanan has scrupulously explored and illuminated the hidden corners of party, policy, suffering, and sorrow that were inevitably part of the quotidian details of the lives of those who remained at home or volunteered to fight in Spain.

Two of his earlier books, and a number of important articles and reviews, have now received their coda in his sparkling new set of essays. In this collection, all of Buchanan's strengths as a historian are on display: tightly woven prose, clear argument, and relentless research. He has the ability to take a fresh and challenging look at issues over which the smoke long ago cleared, leaving a landscape of formidable clichés, most often mapped by the British Communist Party.

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The collection contains three previously published articles, one of which has been considerably revised after new archival materials came to light, and seven new essays. It begins with a particularly interesting exploration of how both the left and right developed canonical, and often stupefyingly uncritical, attitudes toward Spain and Francisco Franco's uprising against the Second Republic. In this connection, Noel Annan once observed that the Spanish Civil War "provided for the generation of the Thirties the emotional experience of a lifetime." The emphasis should certainly be on the "emotional" because, as Buchanan and others have pointed out, most views of Spain from the British Isles were distorted by crude stereotypes. When nineteen-year-old Bernard Knox fell wounded at Boadilla, he found himself reciting a Tennyson poem he had learned at school, "Fall into the hands of God/not into the hands of Spain." For many, those hands were "incompetent and lazy" or "cruel and violent." The task for the left was to construct an alternative image of a "new" Spain as "the heir to the principles of peaceful, democratic progress, confronting the most atavistic and anti-national forces in Spanish society." The right could exalt Franco as a "gallant Christian gentleman" defending the country from "external subversion" and internal chaos.

Two essays demonstrate Buchanan's refusal to accept the hoary shibboleths that have disguised the complexity of personality and historical testimony of some of the better-known British figures in the conflict. One of those lionized was the artist Felicia Browne, who was killed in the fighting in Catalonia and whose sacrifice did much to promote interest in the Artists International Association (AIA). Buchanan quotes a well-known passage from one of her letters that appeared to confirm that she was turning away from art because of the demands of a political life. He carefully puts the quotation in context—depriving it of a good deal of its propaganda value. Moreover, by taking advantage of a heretofore unknown correspondence with one of Browne's friends, he is able to liberate this talented, awkward, idealistic young woman from left-wing hagiography and restore something of the reality of her life and the promise and achievement of her gifts. A second essay re-evaluates in convincing fashion the circumstances of the death of Bob Smillie, known to most readers because of the elegiac and bitter tribute paid to him by George Orwell in *Homage to Catalonia* (1938), affirming that he died of neglect of his appendicitis. Each of these biographical inquiries is testimony to Buchanan's intention to redeem the solemn integrity of the lives and deaths of individuals who deserved much more than service as totems for ideological purposes.

Through a close reading of the correspondence between the Labour MP Philip Noel-Baker and journalist G. L. Steer, Buchanan tells us more than we knew about a very political man who opened the world's eyes to the destruction of Guernica. In another essay, he adds further evidence that Jim Fyrth and Angela Jackson were much too sanguine in their respective studies about the role of Communist Party politics and control among the nurses and administrators in Spanish Medical Aid. "Far from being marginal," he writes, "they were integral." He teases out the complex world of sometimes vicious intrigue and, more often, wholly admirable idealism that drove the volunteers into harm's way both militarily and politically. Finally, a chatty and absorbing chapter on the all but forgotten writer, John Langdon-Davies, gives us a new appreciation of his many estimable talents and projects.

Fortunately, Buchanan does not stop with the defeat of the Republic. He continues with a careful dissection of British attitudes toward Spain after 1945, demonstrating the sad effects of the advent of the Cold War and, particularly, mass tourism, and the resulting "normalization" of the culture between Britain and Spain that reflected closer economic and political ties. Although his final assessment of the postwar careers of those who had given their hearts to Spain is not as fresh as he suggests, nevertheless he tells his reader what a "good war" meant to those veterans.

We should be grateful to Buchanan for helping to remind us why Spain mattered so much. The volunteer George Leeson once said that if he was asked, "What is the most valuable thing that you've done in your life?" he would reply, "The day I decided to go to Spain." Despite a range of valuable contributions from others, Buchanan, more than any of his peers, has helped us understand why Leeson said this, and what his words meant to his generation, and those that have followed.

James K. Hopkins
Southern Methodist University

Peter J. Beck. *Using History, Making British Policy: The Treasury and the Foreign Office, 1950–76.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2006. Pp. xii, 310. $74.95.

Having worked in Britain for almost twenty-five years, my experience is that the one topic guaranteed to unite historians in discussion is the complexity and frustration of working with government archives. Peter J. Beck, a specialist in post-1945 British politics and foreign policy, has gone a step further: he has interrogated the interaction between the scholar and the government in the conversion of documents into "history."

Beck sets his narrative in the Britain of 1957, not only post–World War II but post–Suez Crisis. His entry is therefore one of political, economic, and cultural insecurity, not only in national projections of imperial tensions and social transitions but in the internal deliberations of government departments. These tensions are sublimated by the mannered verbosity of the civil service, however, as demonstrated in Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook's 1957 call for official histories because "they would enable the administrator to see his current problems in the perspective of the original decisions and of the modifications subsequently made, both in policy and in administrative practice" (p. 24).

Beck's command of his material is beyond question. He has meticulously worked through the archives to re-

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construct the most detailed of discussions, be it the study of government support for aviation or the historical examination of wages policy. Particularly in his consideration of the Treasury's commissioning and treatment of official histories, he sets out the intricacy of bureaucratic deliberation and dispute. The issue is where all this detail leads. In an admirable introduction, Beck opens with Margaret Gowing's 1978 attack on the lack of historical knowledge in government and puts the question of whether the scholar can provide a "usable past" for officials. He answers in the affirmative, quoting the broadcaster John Tusa: "The outlines of an answer . . . to today's problems 'are far more likely to lie in historical examination of the past rather than wholly unfounded speculation about the future'" (p. 21).

It is unclear, however, how Beck's case studies meet the demands of these questions and his position. For all the detail offered, his narratives are largely of history as tangential. Individual sentences illuminate pages of description. William Strang, permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, puts historical deliberation in its place: "Decisions on foreign policy have often to be taken at short notice on incomplete information and with not much time for thought" (p. 15). The permanent secretary at the Ministry of Transport asserts: "Whether reading about [past problems] in detail will ever help anyone else to do a different job in a different situation I cannot but doubt" (p. 108).

Building from the clichéd, it is an egregious mistake to follow George Santayana's edict that he who forgets history is condemned to repeat it. At the "micro" level, the British Treasury's investment in histories was partly motivated by a wish to learn from errors such as funding of the 1951 Festival Gardens project and inadequate handling of disaster relief. At the level of the "macro," however, civil servants were quick to draw red lines around the presentation of the past: "[Historians] should stop short at presenting the critical questions which their analysis reveals" (p. 149).

Thus Beck's book ends with the story of the 1976 closure of the sections producing historical memoranda and his wistful conclusion that "What this study has established is the difficulty of providing a meaningful common meeting ground between public policy and history in Britain" (p. 251).

Scott Lucas
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William J. Smyth. *Map-Making, Landscapes and Memory: A Geography of Colonial and Early Modern Ireland c. 1530–1750.* (Critical Conditions: Field Day Essays and Monographs, number 16.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, in association with Field Day. 2006. Pp. xxiii, 584. $80.00.

This book by William J. Smyth deals with the colonial transformation of Ireland, ca. 1530–1750. It begins with an analytical overview followed by a six-chapter section on the geography of conquest, resistance, and settlement. The analysis is broadly framed around colonialism and the related emergence of a specifically "early modern" Ireland. Within this broad framing the author focuses on the social, ideological, and material dimensions of the colonizing process. The analysis is pursued with respect to plantation, mapping, memory, and the transformation of the landscape and economy. Special attention is paid to the brutality of the Cromwellian conquest (ca. 1650), with attention also given to the atrocities inflicted on the planters during the rebellion of 1641. Another section provides three detailed case studies on the highly anglicized county of Dublin, the more Gaelic county of north Tipperary, and a hybrid of both in the case of County Kilkenny. A third section focuses on the consequences of colonization in terms of the territorial reorganization of the country and the upheavals evidenced by the transformations in economy, family naming patterns, and language. In each case the geographer's view is apparent as the author maps transformations in terms of their variations across the country. A final section compares the Irish colonial experience with that of North America. The story is capped off with a wonderfully concise rendering of the book in a concluding chapter.

The analytical framing in terms of social relations and ideology is not in itself unusual, but the way the author articulates these with a material geography of the country grounds the analysis in a manner that is thoroughly convincing. Mapping the land and resources of the country served to "mark out the terrain" and make the country "visible," not in the naïve sense of simple representation but rather in a process that intertwined geographic, cartographic, ethnographic, and lexicographic activities with colonial designs and a new way of viewing the world that was distinct from that of the native Irish. New boundaries and jurisdictions were created that served to imprint English property law upon the land. Maps were also central to military conquest, and as plantations expanded from the time of Henry VIII through the Elizabethan conquest at the turn of the seventeenth century the demand for cartographic surveys only grew. Although there were pockets of rebellion at the end of the seventeenth century during the English "Glorious Revolution," the widespread rebellion during the English Civil War ended with total defeat at the hands of Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army. Conquest cleared the way for the wholesale confiscation of land, the redistribution of which demanded a new map. Here enters William Petty, whose innovative methods and techniques produced a map of the entire country with all its civil, cadastral, and natural boundaries. Particularly fascinating about the Cromwellian conquest is that it was funded by what must be one of the greatest ad/venture capitalist endeavors of the time. Petty's valuation of the country in turn signaled the shift from a traditional/feudal regime to a modernizing capitalist one.

Colonization through plantation is evidenced in the transformation of the landscape by deforestation; enclosure; the establishment of garrisons, fortresses, vil-

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lages and towns; the planting of symmetric orchards and hedgerows; the creation of gardens; the building of roads and bridges; and the spread of furnaces and ironworks across the country. The establishment of a new and decidedly commercial system of farming stimulated new capitalist relations with the spread of fairs and markets, and a growth of trade that expanded the economies of, and connections between, town and country. Smyth successfully makes the case that Ireland was home to distinct social and cultural forms that were rather rapidly overwritten through a modernizing colonial and capitalist process.

Some readers might be surprised to hear that a case has to be made for considering Ireland a colony. However, the rise of revisionism in Ireland had at its core a critique of (or what was constructed as) a simplistic nationalist historiography that viewed the entire modern history of Ireland as an epic struggle for Irish freedom from colonial domination by England. Revisionists pointed out, for instance, that Irish nationalism could not be found prior to the late eighteenth century, that the dualist categories of Irish Catholic and settler Protestant obscured the complexity and heterogeneity of identity in Ireland, and that Ireland could not be understood as a colony once it was compared with patterns of colonization in Asia and Africa. The revisionist critique had a genuine impact and there emerged what has been called a "postrevisionist" historiography, one that acknowledges the complexities of the Irish experience but that nonetheless holds to a reading that insists that Ireland, for all its peculiarity as a case, was indeed colonized and that its history cannot be understood unless this foundational fact is recognized. Smyth's analysis acknowledges the diversity, particularly regional, of the communities that emerged from the clash and combination of old Anglo-Norman English, new Protestant English, dissenting Scots, and Gaelic lords. Although he sometimes seems to overstate the rapidity of the transformation, the sheer mass of evidence he marshals will leave few readers in any doubt that Ireland was colonized during this period. Smyth's nationalist lens does occasionally yield less than helpful results. For instance, the discussion of rebel atrocities during the 1641 rebellion comes off as defensive, with the role of the Catholic clergy absent of critique to the point of being almost apologetic. And while acknowledging the complexity of Irish identities, the categories of Irish and English, us and them, remains the dominant frame. One also gets a much greater impression of the author's sense of loss for traditional Ireland than one does for the positive effects of wresting Ireland out of feudalism and introducing new industries and the new science (oddly, the author labels the system of [feuding] Gaelic lords as "traditional," reserving the term feudal for the Old English). Thus revisionists, particularly those with a strong anti-nationalist disposition, will find lots to criticize here. Nonetheless, this is a truly exceptional book representing a lifetime of research. It will stand as a major contribution to our understanding of early modern Ireland, and is a major blow to the revisionist argument that Ireland was not a colony. Indeed, if colonization is understood as a process of conquest *and* incorporation, this book demonstrates both the colonial conquest of Ireland, and the beginnings of a process of incorporation that would define, in some key respects, Irish history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

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CRAWFORD GRIBBEN. *God's Irishmen: Theological Debates in Cromwellian Ireland*. (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 284. $65.00.

This is a well-researched and thoughtful analysis of historical ground that has already been covered quite extensively. Crawford Gribben opens his study by providing a useful historiography of Irish history prior to the troubles of the 1640s, thereby giving readers valuable context for the period he is discussing. This is followed by a narrower historiography of the 1640s and 1650s that explains quite fluently the political, religious, and social questions posed by recent scholarship. Finally, Gribben frames the scope of his own work by demonstrating the link between theological and ideological debate which he conceives as crucial in understanding the problems of Cromwellian administration in the 1650s.

Gribben gives a sensitive and considerate analysis of the thought of Cromwellian invaders along with the role of providence and eschatology in that thought. Many contemporaries believed that this was a unique opportunity for the spread of the Protestant gospel, but administrators were faced with enormous challenges, the main one being where to allocate ministerial resources. Should they devote them to the army or to the native Irish Catholic population? Also, "the ministers of the gospel" employed by the state had their own priorities, which created further difficulty for state policy makers.

The work moves on to the problem of conversion. There being no clear consensus among seventeenth-century Reformed Protestants about religion in Ireland, the nature of conversion was not a straightforward proposition. Religious dynamism among the invaders and Irish spiritual experience created confusion and disunity. Conversion demonstrated one aspect of the extent of that disunity as various divines differed about the degree that the supernatural played in evaluations of subjective or personal spirituality.

Following the debate about conversion comes probably the most divisive issue faced by the Cromwellian state in Ireland: the nature of baptism. Baptist lay preachers had latitude in Ireland because the state was very tolerant toward "theological novelty." Oliver Cromwell and many of his followers believed in progressive revelation. This meant that the state was circumspect about repression of any new movements of the "Holy Spirit." This opening allowed Baptists to be-

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come prominent in the early years of the crucial decade, but their growth was tied to the army and was short lived. Baptists contributed to religious confusion and disunity because of their ambiguity about the need for and relevance of a state church.

The relationship of the government to religion was an important one. Here Gribben's work is most insightful. The wide spectrum of theological belief among the personnel of the Cromwellian state made it extremely difficult to establish an ecclesiastical settlement that was of utility in social control. Gribben uses two incidents in Ulster—a clandestine marriage and the Presbyterian announcement of a fast day—to demonstrate this fundamental weakness.

The next discussion in the book is by far the most intriguing exposition. This is an amazing account of how the supernatural was apprehended by supposedly "conservative" theologians. Many Reformed theologians believed that "extraordinary" revelation ceased when the canon of the Bible had been settled by the early church. The mixture of Calvinism and progressive revelation produced some interesting varieties of thought, not always consistent, on the role of the supernatural in everyday life. Gribben ably demonstrates the gamut of beliefs and their ramifications.

The chapter on the role of women is probably the weakest part of the argument due to limited source material. Gribben seems less comfortable here, and his writing lacks the clarity and confidence that is found in previous chapters.

This is a first-rate analysis of a crucial decade in Irish history. Although the book covers well-plowed territory, Gribben takes a fresh, imaginative, and multidisciplinary approach to a period that has many times been examined in a more narrow fashion.

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PETRI MIRALA. *Freemasonry in Ulster, 1733–1813: A Social and Political History of the Masonic Brotherhood in the North of Ireland*. Portland, Oreg.: Four Courts Press. 2007. Pp. 303. $65.00.

Anyone who has witnessed an Orangemen's Day parade in Belfast, complete with men wearing sashes, jewels, and aprons, knows that masonic influences remain in the movement. Indeed, Catholic lore in Ulster sees little difference between the Orange Order and masonic lodges. Before 1800, as this book documents, such a merger of identities could not be assumed. Yet sorting out the differences between various lodges and other forms of voluntary association—often with religious or political agendas—is often impossible. By the last decades of the eighteenth century there were lodges full of Volunteers, a Protestant movement that initially supported Catholic emancipation, and yet others that in the 1790s supplied the form as well as the members for what became the radical United Irishmen. One of their founders, William Drennan, dreamed of founding a society with "much of the secrecy and somewhat of the ceremonial of freemasonry . . . that might strike the soul through the senses." (Drennan as quoted by Mirala, p. 189). Under the pressure of events, by 1794 the United Irishmen converted from being "a reform society into a revolutionary conspiracy" (p. 189). Little wonder that spying the ghost of the anti-Masonic Abbé Augustine Barruel and his conspiracy theory, most academic historians have stayed far away from freemasonry in general, and certainly Ulster freemasonry in particular.

With new research into archives previously unused, Petri Mirala aims to correct this academic lacuna. Part one of his book offers a painstaking reconstruction of the history of freemasonry in the province from its beginnings in the 1720s. The long-standing and close ties between Ulster Protestants and Scotland combined with the absence of lodges in any of the six counties before the eighteenth century suggests that by the 1720s English and not Scottish freemasons had become the driving force behind the spread of freemasonry in the British Isles. In Ulster and Dublin some lodges even became sites of religious toleration, and open-minded, literate Catholics and Protestants flocked to them. It was the unfolding of political events in Ulster during the late 1790s, and not some inherent anti-Catholic bias, that forged the links between freemasonry and Orangism, making "the Orange Order . . . in most respects a version of freemasonry" (p. 248). In reaction against a Catholic-led but failed revolution, a Protestant movement arose—secret, militant, and bigoted—that became a key player in Ulster's social and political life until very recently.

In the 1790s political radicals as well as loyalists used freemasonry as a template for their new political movements, however different their goals. The threat to Protestant ascendancy posed by the Rebellion of 1798, led as it was by societies devoted to secrecy, perhaps over determined a similar structure for the new and loyalist Orange Order. Back in the 1770s and 1780s both republicans and loyalists attracted to freemasonry had been inspired by events in America and by Washington's open embrace of the masonic order. In the post-1798 atmosphere, however, religious toleration, as well as Catholic-Protestant social relations, lay in shambles. Yet even then lodges for either Protestants or Catholics continued to exist in Ulster and Dublin and occasionally to make common cause. It was only after the 1810s that "the hostility of their own clergy" forced Catholics out of freemasonry (p. 247).

Mirala's book is a welcome addition to a growing academic interest in freemasonry as well as in the settings that permit religious toleration to flourish. It raises a question, however, that theorists and students of the history of civil society need to address. What is it about the act of socializing, complete with rituals and the aura of secrecy, that moves "the soul through the senses" in such a way that in France and America in the 1770s and 1780s, in Ulster in the 1790s, in Risorgimento Italy, or twentieth-century Spain, freemasons emerge as politically involved in excess of their numbers? The direction

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of their politics could be loyalist or radical, and everything in between, but they had turned nevertheless with confidence toward affairs of state. Elsewhere I have argued that the acts of speaking, voting, self-monitoring of behavior, and fraternizing with mere acquaintances, if not strangers, formed in some men the affect of governmentality. Rules of personal and public conduct, rituals and symbols, as well as an ideology of equality and merit unique to the lodges could mold political consciousness as well as empower. The wealth of material we now have on Ulster, thanks to Mirala, shows us how late in the eighteenth century the transformation of social experience into political aspirations occurred. His book also rightly highlights the pitfalls of making generalizations about the political direction that masonic fraternizing could or should take. It cautions us that local context was critically important and that lodges in rural County Down could be remarkably different from those in Armagh, a mere fifty miles away. To his great credit Mirala has put Irish freemasonry on the academic agenda and new work on the subject must begin with this book.

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PAUL BEW. *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789–2006.* (Oxford History of Modern Europe.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 613. $65.00.

In 1945, Irish Prime Minister Eamon De Valera was angered by Irish newspaper reports of Nazi atrocities, because, according to Paul Bew, they disturbed the theory of moral equivalence between the belligerents that had sustained his justification for Irish neutrality during the war. Bew's use of this little-known incident, rather than De Valera's notorious condolences on the death of Hitler, illustrates the welcome ways his book often covers familiar ground with fresh tracks.

Bew's focus is on the central issue in Irish political history over the past two centuries: the causes and consequences of the 1801 union between Ireland (later Northern Ireland) and Britain. Bew's book is an elegantly written and densely packed account that repays intense and extended study. His acute analysis is ever attentive to the ironies of political change. For example, the current Adams-McGuinness generation of leaders of the IRA–Sinn Fein movement came to prominence on the pledge of never negotiating without an undertaking of British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, which is precisely what they did over a decade later, to the fury of their ousted predecessors.

Among the features of Bew's extensively impressive research is a rewarding dialogue with commentators from previous eras. Stephen Gwynne is a Bew favorite, for example, and with reason, with his characterization of the "'fierce ebullience'" (p. 324) of the early Parnellites and his later unheeded recipe for Irish reconciliation: "Generous recognition for differing interests without regard to their numerical strength is the saving formula for Ireland" (pp. 432–433).

During the 1886 Home Rule debate, Lord Hartington predicted that "we shall hear a good deal of Mr. Burke" (p. 349). And, indeed, political thought is given proper attention here, not only that of Edmund Burke but also and more unusually that of Isaac Butt. Perhaps the most admirable element of this work, though, is the way in which it weaves British and Irish political developments together into a single story. "You know how much public events depend on personal feeling," as someone wrote of Daniel O'Connell's insult to the Prince Regent in 1812 (p. 88). Bew's account is of the continuum of political interventions between British and Irish politicians of all kinds, balancing the changing political forces in society with the dynamics of personal interaction and predilection. He thus shows just how politically close at one stage in their careers were Wolfe Tone and Lord Castlereagh, who were later the respective promoter and repressor of the 1798 rebellion. He tells of the distress of the Chief Secretary, William Wickham, at the destruction of Robert Emmet. He even suggests that Charles Stewart Parnell may have taken to politics out of boredom. There is a fascinating focus on the importance of civil servants, however, in the twentieth-century story, with Alfred Cope, Mark Sturgis, and John Anderson, for example, at Dublin Castle during the Anglo-Irish war, which Bew tends to see as an explicitly political engagement in which violence figured as a form of persuasion. "The 'peace process' and ruthless selective violence, not for the last time in Irish history, went hand in hand" (p. 410).

One of the great clarities of Bew's method is the way in which he fixes on some key moments as being of particular importance for subsequent developments: the failure of the emancipation negotiations in 1825, Parnell's moderation over coercion in 1881, and direct rule in 1972, to take a few examples. For Bew, 1825 was the lost opportunity to make the union work by gracious government grant of Catholic emancipation rather than by agitation. He sees O'Connell's inconsistency over the terms of emancipation as a sign of political opportunism but later perhaps relies too much on one letter from O'Connell to Paul Cullen, that may have been tailored to the latter's prejudices rather than indicative of the former's, to convict O'Connell of sectarianism.

In important ways this is a stimulating Ulster-centric study: with southern Ireland breaking away from the union, rather than Northern Ireland seceding from Ireland. In the book's conclusion, though, views cited of British statesmen on securing the union by the payment of the Catholic clergy rely on the debatable assumption that the Catholic Church has had an independent political power over its Irish followers. Arguments justifying discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland on security grounds are also adverted to, though of course not condoned. If it were, indeed, the case, however, that a substantial minority was deemed to be so untrustworthy as to justify excluding it from the functions of the state, then surely that of itself would be a

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conclusion more in favor of the "failed state" analysis of Irish republicans. Such considerations apart, though, this magnificent book is one that no serious practitioner of modern Irish history can afford not to read.

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RICHARD J. PYM. *The Gypsies of Early Modern Spain, 1425–1783*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. Pp. xiv, 219. $69.95.

Richard J. Pym's new book is an important addition to the scholarship on marginalized groups in early modern Spain. Previous studies of this topic have been limited by their focus on a particular region or period. Pym has remedied this with a study of chronological breadth that seeks to tie together evidence from various parts of the Iberian Peninsula.

Yet such a study of gypsies in Spain is both ambitious and methodologically fraught. As Pym acknowledges, we have no records from the gypsies themselves. They are only visible to the historian through the commentary of others, such as the *procuradores* (representatives to the Cortes), writers like Miguel de Cervantes, and the authors of various treatises. These mostly elite sources typically viewed the gypsy population as a problem that needed to be solved.

Bearing these limitations in mind, Pym is nonetheless able to craft a compelling analysis of the gypsy presence in Spain over the course of four centuries. Pym begins with the first recorded mention of the gypsies in Spain—a letter of safe conduct issued by the king of Aragon in 1425. In this period the gypsies were a largely peripatetic group, moving into Western Europe, perhaps seeking to blend in with Christian pilgrims. Gradually, however, this itinerant population began to settle in the peninsula. Pym argues that localized relations between non-gypsies and gypsies were marked by *convivencia*, a state of mostly peaceful coexistence, with intermittent periods of tension and conflict.

Elite sources, in Pym's telling, betray the *convivencia* of people's daily experiences. From almost the start, the gypsies were the target of restrictive legislation and negative literary stereotyping. The evolving Spanish nation-state of the early modern period employed various means to contain and control the gypsy population. The overarching concerns of all of this legislation were the itinerancy and cultural distinctiveness of the gypsies. Ferdinand and Isabel, concerned about the purported alms begging and vagabondage of the gypsies, issued an ordinance in 1499 designed to make the gypsies serve one master and become less itinerant. By the reign of Charles V and Philip II, gypsies without a recognized trade were sentenced to serve in the king's galleys. The seventeenth century saw a sharpening of attitudes and debate within the Cortes and court about possibly expelling the gypsies. Restrictive legislation went so far as to ban the use of the word *gitano*, the Spanish word for gypsy. Despite sporadic attempts by the crown to enforce its policies in particularly harsh ways, in the eyes of their elite critics, the gypsy "problem" remained unsolved. Ultimately, Pym concludes, this was due to support that the gypsies received at the local level and poor mechanisms of enforcement.

Pym also considers the role of literature and the church in shaping attitudes toward and treatment of the gypsies. With few exceptions, the portrayal of the gypsies in literature was negative, presenting them as thieving and conniving and often engaged in particularly heinous crimes like stealing babies. The church, on the other hand, did not mimic the state in its repression. The Inquisition certainly heard cases against the gypsies; the accusations against them were typically for offenses like sorcery and blasphemy. Yet sentencing in most cases tended to be lenient. The church was even willing in some instances to provide sanctuary to gypsies.

A strength of the book is Pym's contextualization of elite policy and legislation directed against the gypsy population. For example, he rightly argues that the increasingly harsh legislation of the seventeenth century must be seen in the context of the crisis and decline that Spain experienced in this period. Spain was anxious to define its cultural integrity and purity. Thus, Pym posits, we cannot separate the debate about the gypsies from the debate about the *moriscos*, who were, in fact, expelled in 1609.

My only criticism of the book involves its occasionally disjointed organization. While, for the most part, the study moves chronologically, this structure is sometimes interrupted by brief forays into other analytical topics. The topics themselves are always relevant, but do not necessarily fit where they are placed. In the chapter exploring the increased sentencing of gypsies to service in the king's galleys in the sixteenth century, for example, Pym interjects a fascinating analysis of the question of gypsy dress (something that the Spanish state frequently tried to legislate against). Such a discussion is critical to the overall study, but it is a bit misplaced at that particular juncture. Yet since all of the evidence and interpretation presented is relevant to the topic under study, this is only a small objection to what is otherwise a solid treatment of the subject.

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ÁNGEL ALLOZA APARICIO. *Europa en el mercado español: Mercaderes, represalias y contrabando en el siglo XVII*. (Estudios de historia.) Valladolid, Spain: Junta de Castilla y Léon. 2006. Pp. 260.

In 1633, the marques of Aytona declared to Philip IV of Spain: "the greatest blow that can be inflicted on France would be the destruction of its trade which would ensure the collapse of the French king." In fact, the efficacy of economic warfare, founded in part upon the growing interdependency of European trade and the importance of the Spanish market (and through Spain its Indies), had long been apparent, as Philip II had attempted to coerce Elizabeth I by means of an

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economic blockade in 1568. For many historians of Habsburg Spain, however, such measures were doomed to fail: Spain was increasingly too dependent on foreign goods, and efforts to strike at her opponents by means of embargos, which required the seizure of the ships, capital, property, and other goods of enemy subjects, were not very successful, a reality that was effectively acknowledged by granting import licenses to those same subjects. Ángel Alloza Aparicio is not so sure about this interpretation, and in a work that draws on the archival wealth of the Archivo General at Simancas, he admirably reconstructs the embargoes instituted by Philip IV and his son, Carlos II, in the seventeenth century and their struggle against illegal enemy trade.

The book opens with a chapter discussing the juridical origins of the practice of reprisals. Here, Alloza Aparicio observes a change, occurring around 1550, from individual reprisals to embargoes. Chapter two, on the pacific reign of Philip III (1578–1621), considers the structure of Spain's trade, including the actual and debated role of foreigners in it. That debate, and the accession to power of the reforming Olivares regime, produced the celebrated Pragmática de Reformación (1623), the objectives of which included the regeneration of Spain's economy and the enforcement of Spain's monopoly over the Indies. In subsequent chapters, the author tackles the successive embargoes and the war on illegal enemy trade that are his main concern. In 1623, the rebel Dutch were subjected to a general embargo following the end of a truce. In 1625–1626, Philip IV ordered the embargo of French goods and, following the abortive English assault on Cadiz in 1625, he also banned trade with the English. In 1635, Philip imposed another embargo on the property of Louis XIII's subjects and, in 1656, another on that of the goods of the English, which was only lifted at the Restoration in 1660. Subsequent conflicts between Louis XIV's France and Charles II's Spain brought further embargoes on French property in 1667, 1674, 1683–1684, and 1689.

Alloza Aparicio examines the evolution of the operation of the embargo. Guidelines about how to proceed in the seizure and disposal of what was effected grew more sophisticated as the monarchy sought to learn from earlier embargoes. As for the machinery, successive embargoes were overseen by specialist, ad hoc juntas or committees of reprisals, which from 1643 were incorporated into the Junta del Almirantazgo and into the Council of War, with its network of agents and its own jurisdiction.

As one might expect, implementation was not straightforward and often involved lengthy legal action, which sometimes dragged on long after the formal end of the embargo. Wives, for example, sought to recover dowries, and generally got them. In the non-Castilian territories, execution frequently fell foul of local authorities. And just who should be included? Were the Irish and Scots to suffer when English goods were embargoed? Far more problematic in this respect was the status of the numerous French immigrants, many of them resident for long periods and some of whom had been naturalized. Too often, the wealthiest merchants escaped the full rigor of the embargoes, either because they had been tipped off in advance (and shipped their goods to avoid seizure) or because they were able to do a deal with the king. Thus those who suffered most were the least able to survive the blow. Implementation was sometimes hindered by the clash of jurisdictions so typical of Habsburg Spain.

The embargoes were invariably accompanied by trade bans, although trade continued, illegally. The fight against this contraband trade was overseen by the Junta del Almirantazgo. While it was not a complete success, Alloza Aparicio takes issue with the view that it was a total failure. Given Spain's needs and the fact that not all Spanish ministers wanted to completely end the illegal trade, which, by granting licenses, they themselves were tapping, complete success would have been impossible. Instead they sought to contain it, not least as a means of pursuing their larger objective of waging economic warfare against Spain's enemies.

Alloza Aparicio is thus pursuing a revisionist agenda. Admittedly, the embargoes did not fully tap the real wealth of the foreign trading communities in Spain, and the later embargoes on French property brought in less than the earlier ones, although the figures tabulated for the Nine Years War may not entirely bear this out (p. 204). But Alloza Aparicio emphasizes the positive aspects of the embargoes. For example, for all its defects, the embargo imposed on the subjects of Louis XIII in 1625–1626 seriously damaged French trade in Spain and was the first of a series of similarly successful measures. The Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) offered testimony to the effectiveness and impact of these embargoes by including measures to regulate them in the future.

Alloza Aparicio may exaggerate the neglect of his topic, which has been the subject of works by Albert Girard, Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, Jonathan I. Israel, and others, all of whom appear in his footnotes. In addition, the problematic implementation of embargoes and trade bans and the nature of the evidence means that a complete and entirely reliable picture of their yield is not easy to ascertain, although the tables and appendices enhance the usefulness of this study. More might also have been said about the still rather neglected reign of Charles II. Nevertheless, Alloza Aparicio has made the first real attempt to explore fully an important aspect of Spain's economic and military policy for the seventeenth century as a whole. In doing so, he has thrown further light on the foreign community in seventeenth-century Spain and its domestic history. In the end, Spain looks less and less like the feeble, hopelessly ineffective creature of past accounts of a declining imperial power ruled by the "lesser" Habsburgs who supposedly succeeded Charles V and Philip II and more like one able to pursue complex policies with some success.

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CARLA RAHN PHILLIPS. *The Treasure of the San José: Death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 258. $35.00.

On June 8, 1708, near the port of Cartagena in today's Colombia, an English naval squadron commanded by Commodore Charles Wager attacked a Spanish convoy from Portobelo that included two heavily armed sixty-four-gun galleons, *San José* and *San Joaquín*. These vessels carried minted Peruvian silver coins, bars of gold and silver, emeralds and other precious gems in royal revenue; private treasure belonging to merchants; and likely some unregistered contraband specie. The English gunners fired their broadsides high, intending to disable the treasure ships, but in the midst of battle the *San José* exploded in a pillar of flame and carried six hundred men and its treasure to the seabed. The few survivors were unable to offer an explanation for the tragedy.

Over the centuries since the disaster, the story of the *San José* and its treasure was not forgotten. In 1984, rumors that the wreck site had been found triggered a legal dispute between an American salvage company that had purchased an old contract and successive Colombian governments. Today, some speculate that the wreckage contains the world's most valuable sunken treasure: a sum estimated from $2 billion to $10 billion.

For Carla Rahn Phillips, the sinking of the *San José* is significant beyond the terrible tragedy and can be used as a lens to view complex themes in a changing Spanish Empire. She examines the perilous situation of the wartime empire during a struggle of dynasties, the inefficiency and corruption of the transatlantic commercial system, the hardships and dangers of maritime service, and the political conflicts in Peru, where the treasure originated. This is a very well-written, analytical study based on extensive fresh archival research.

Constructed in 1697–1698, the *San José* and *San Joaquín* arrived in Cádiz in September 1700 and remained in port for six years while the garrison fended off a succession of English attacks. Appointed to command the *San José*, José Fernández de Santillán was an officer with decades of experience in transatlantic naval service and as a fleet commander. In 1702, he defended Cádiz and repelled the forces of Admiral George Rooke who, instead, occupied Gibraltar. Named the Marqués de Casa Alegre in reward for his services, Santillán sailed for Cartagena in March of 1706, as captain general of a small fleet of twenty-six ships bound for Tierra Firme and New Spain. There had been no fleet dispatched to Portobelo since 1696 and thus no trade fairs for Lima merchants. Peruvian authorities responsible for the defense of the Pacific coast of South America expressed grave fears about English and Dutch encroachments. In 1703, King Philip V appointed the Marqués de Castelldosrius, then Spain's ambassador in Paris, as viceroy of Peru with orders to restore the Portobelo trade fair and to rebuild the Armada (fleet) of the Southern Sea. Due to a lack of shipping, however, the viceroy elect and his entourage remained in Cartagena, where they suffered from the climate and tropical diseases. They encountered further delays at Portobelo and Panama awaiting ships from Callao. Finally, in late May of 1707, Castelldosrius assumed his office in Lima. The treasury was in deep debt and Peruvian merchants trafficked illegally and secretly with French contrabandists. Although the viceroy worked to revive the Portobelo fair and collected 1.38 million pesos for the crown, he was a controversial figure who died in office without learning that Philip V had dismissed him.

Meanwhile, Casa Alegre's Tierra Firme fleet waited at Cartagena until reports indicated that the Peruvian fleet had arrived in Panama. For safety on the return voyage to Cartagena, he divided the assembled treasure between the *San José* and *San Joaquín*. After the loss of *San José*, the survivors, including the *San Joaquín*, which was commanded by Miquel Agustín de Villanueva, reunited in Cartagena. In her research, Phillips discovered "conscious deception" and distinct contradictions in the reports submitted by Villanueva and other Spanish captains who failed to perform well in battle. The remnants of the 1706 fleet lay at anchor in Cartagena until 1710 when a French naval squadron was sent to serve as an escort force. Villanueva, in command of the *San Joaquín* without treasure aboard, fought an unequal engagement against five English warships. With his ship's sails and masts shot away, Villanueva surrendered and died of his wounds in Jamaica. The return voyage became even more chaotic when the French squadron abandoned the Spanish ships to find their own way back to Spain. Phillips estimates that when the two galleons sailed from Portobelo, the total amount of the treasure registered for the king was 1,551,609 pesos. When it sank, the *San José* had aboard half of this royal revenue and a much larger private treasure valued between 9 and 9.75 million pesos. Even with later exaggerations, the galleon carried a great fortune that remains to be discovered.

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ÁNGEL VIÑAS. *La soledad de la república: El abandono de las democracias y el viraje hacia la Unión Soviética*. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica. 2006. Pp. xxx, 551. €29.90.

More than seventy years after its outbreak, the Spanish Civil War retains the power to polarize historical debate. Within this debate, no issue is more controversial than the role played by the Soviet Union and communism. In the first of a projected trilogy of books on the wartime Spanish Republic, Ángel Viñas—a leading expert on the financial aspects of the civil war—presents a detailed new analysis of the war's opening six months and argues that the Republic's unprecedented alignment with the Soviet Union was both logical and justifiable. There is nothing particularly new in the thesis that Viñas presents, and it has been foreshadowed in the recent work of historians such as Enrique Moradiellos and Helen Graham. (Indeed, much of the material

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is also familiar from Viñas's own earlier work.) He argues that the democratically elected Republican government was abandoned with shocking speed by its putative natural allies, Britain and France, and that the advent of the non-intervention scheme in the late summer of 1936 completed the Republic's international isolation. Faced with imminent defeat, it was understandable that the new government of Francisco Largo Caballero should turn to the USSR as its only hope of salvation. The book concludes with the shipment of the bulk of the Republic's gold reserves to the Soviet Union and the arrival of the first Soviet tanks and planes in Spain, alongside the volunteers of the International Brigades. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, Viñas presents the Republican government as a regime struggling valiantly to restore internal order after the military coup, and to construct an effective war economy. Naturally, therefore, the treasury minister and future prime minister Juan Negrín emerges as a central figure in the Republic's struggle for survival and not, as many critics have painted him, a communist stooge.

The book's main novelty lies in the detailed reconstruction of key decisions. Viñas has researched widely and makes good use of new documentary sources (some of which are reproduced in a lengthy appendix). He is one of the first historians to have been allowed access to the private archive of Negrín in Paris, and this provides important new insights into the minutiae of government policy. Second, he uses the Soviet/Comintern archives to construct an interesting and nuanced view of Joseph Stalin's response to the Spanish Civil War, emphasizing the caution of the Soviet leader and his alertness to events as they unfolded in Spain. Third, Viñas has consulted recently released British intelligence intercepts that allow much greater insight into what the British government knew about the policy of both sides in the civil war, as well as the policy of the other great powers. This is invaluable material, although what is still missing in this account is an understanding of how intelligence fed into and influenced the deliberations of British diplomats and politicians.

Viñas makes no secret of his identification with the Republican side and is deeply critical of historians who have taken a contrary view of Soviet involvement—notably, Ronald Radosh, Anthony Beevor, and (with regard to the Republican gold) Pablo Martín Aceña. Viñas's style is combative and, at times, abruptly dismissive, and his strictures would be more acceptable if his own work did not sometimes fall short of the very high standards that he demands of his opponents. For instance, he returns in this book to the alleged "sabotage" of the Republican war effort by the British Midland Bank. However, the evidence of a conspiracy against the Republic is scant. Viñas claims that the conservative Spanish politician Juan Ventosa put pressure on the bank's chairman Reginald McKenna but admits that it is not known "how or when" this contact occurred (p. 405). More generally, he appears to have made no effort to consult the archives of the Midland, or indeed of any other private British banks, even though this is a theme that he has been pursuing in print for some thirty years.

Overall, although not convinced by his characterization of British government policy, I found Viñas's central argument compelling. There is little doubt that the Republican authorities had no practical alternatives in October 1936 other than to throw in their lot with the Soviet Union. Viñas makes a strong case for presenting this as a rational decision, reached by agreement amongst leading figures on the Republican side (whatever many may have claimed in their memoirs) rather than the maverick actions of an individual such as Negrín. Even so, it is surprising that Viñas fails to accept that the act of committing the gold reserves into the hands of Stalin's government inevitably placed the Republic at the mercy of the Soviet ruler. It will be interesting to see how Viñas analyzes the implications of this decision for the fate of the Republic in the course of this important trilogy.

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NIKKI SHEPARDSON. *Burning Zeal: The Rhetoric of Martyrdom and the Protestant Community in Reformation France, 1520–1570*. Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press. 2007. Pp. 206. $44.50.

Martyrologies were one of the most distinctive weapons of Reformation printed polemic. Their truth claims were unambiguous; their attempt to claim the high moral ground against the authorities in times of religious repression was unequivocal. Protestant historians (in particular) have tended to make extensive, even excessive, use of these texts as the evidential basis for the early history and subsequent evolution of the Reformation. Yet the more that literary and historical scholarship converges in the study of sixteenth-century martyrologies, the more problematic they become. Those under whose names they were published (John Foxe, Jean Crespin, Adriaen van Haemstede) have a curious authorial relationship to their texts (part author; part compiler; part translator; part orchestrator). They borrow extensively from one another, both in form and substance. Their truth claims are framed by polemical strategies and frames of reference. The texts were therefore unstable, responding to new material and reshaping their text to meet the challenges of their numerous and vocal critics. In this short study Nikki Shepardson focuses on some well-known passages from the five different editions of the famous French martyrologist Jean Crespin. Its objective is to reveal the "rhetorical strategies" at work in the texts. "Much of the historiography of the French Reformation," she claims, "has overlooked or underestimated the function of the rhetoric of martyrdom" (p. 23). She is particularly interested in the role of martyrologies after the period of official repression was over, and during the subsequent era of civil wars. This was when the two most substantial editions of Crespin's martyrology were published

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(1564, 1570). The contention is that the martyr narratives themselves became more "stereotyped," airbrushing out the unsightly brushstrokes of hesitancy and blemishes of indecision in matters of faith ("nicodemism"). The rhetorical deployment of martyr narratives "counterbalanced and complemented the overt resistance of the warring Huguenots, providing even further legitimacy to civil insurrection" (p. 26) and contributed to the building of a sense of community among the French Protestant minority.

These are ambitious claims only partially supported by the selected case studies Shepardson has chosen. The two case studies of female martyrdom (chapter four) readily indicate the creation of a conventionalized female martyr but offer no evidence for its impact after 1560. The discussion of "nicodemism" (chapter five) examines the connection between anti-nicodemite discourse and Protestant polemic without taking into account the extent of non-confessionalized allegiances revealed so convincingly by Thierry Wanegffelen (*Ni Rome ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle* [1997]). The book concentrates most on the trial and execution of the Paris magistrate Anne Du Bourg (chapters two and three). But this case was always going to be problematic for Protestant polemicists. It was a highly politicized show trial of a politically engaged magistrate, taking place at a moment of crucial significance in a period of bitterly contested royal "tutelage." The martyrologists were not short of material. In addition to the published interrogation, they had his "confession" as well as a speech that he had perhaps delivered before his judges as he came up for sentence. For Shepardson, the martyrologists problem was a rhetorical one: how to render Du Bourg as a "godly martyr-magistrate." She demonstrates how Protestant commentators airbrushed out his wavering confessional loyalties in the "fashioning" of his posthumous reputation. Far more problematic, however, was the fact that Du Bourg's trial raised issues of the legality and constitutional propriety of putting a judge on trial before his own court. There were plenty in the Protestant movement who wanted to keep the focus on the abusive, even tyrannical, authority of the French monarchy—even while there were others who sought to come to peace with it. So the complex Du Bourg case does not support the book's more general assertions about the role of rhetoric in creating martyr stereotypes and reinforcing senses of Protestant community. Part of the problem is that the term "rhetoric" is deployed altogether too loosely. Shepardson uses it to mean the more general "fashioning" of a narrative for polemical purposes. As a result, the more precise "rhetorical" tropes and allegories are rarely emphasized. Occasionally the martyrs are allowed to be rhetorical in their own right (as Du Bourg, who "tread [trod?] a fine line using rhetoric and his understanding of the law" [p.40]). Yet Du Bourg's most spectacular rhetorical gesture, repeating Christ's words from the Cross ("Mon Dieu, ne m'abandonne point"), passes without comment in Shepardson's analysis. To understand the rhetoric of Crespin's narrative, and its relation to other contemporary Protestant polemic, would require a more concentrated analysis itself than Shepardson provides, one that paid more attention to his editorial, glossing, and presentational techniques. Of the lamentable inaccuracies in the published transcriptions in this book (especially in the footnotes), however, the less said the better.

MARK GREENGRASS
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SARA BEAM. *Laughing Matters: Farce and the Making of Absolutism in France*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 268. $55.00.

Tracing the trajectory of farce in early modern France, Sara Beam argues that the history of this genre casts a new light on the mechanisms that lead to the development of absolutism. Rather than a top- down process, Beam sees the decision of urban elites to embrace the "discourse of absolutism" in the changing fortunes of farce. In the Renaissance, farce was a central form of civic entertainment acted out by members of the community. Its prestige was such that local elites or members of the middling sort (the *couche moyenne*) of tradesmen, artisans, and merchants performed farce on civic occasions such as saint's days and royal entry ceremonies. Under the pressure of prolonged disorder during the Wars of Religion (1562–1598), those who had supported farce gradually drained it of political content, stripped it of corporeal ribaldry, and turned it over to professional actors. In order to present a face of decorum, bodily self-control, and political obedience, urban elites marginalized farce by the early seventeenth century. Criticism of the monarchy moved off the stage and into pamphlets that addressed political questions anonymously.

Beam revises several important notions about the dynamics of popular culture in early modern France. She nuances Mikhail Bakhtin's influential argument about the anti-authoritarian potential of Carnival. Where Bakhtin sees festive inversion as disrupting Christian values, Beam presents farce texts and tropes in terms of their connection to basic Christian values. As for Bakhtin's reading of the body as a site of cultural resistance, Beam reminds the reader that the body was also crucial to Christian ideas about the sacred (p. 32). Beam also extends and expands notions of the public sphere. Usually seen as an eighteenth-century development, public debate of political issues was part of both farce and pamphlet discussions of politics. Moreover, farce included the marginal and illiterate in that public in ways that print culture could not.

Indeed, the political force of farce was central to the story of its eventual marginalization. In their concern about farce as a source of sectarian violence, local elites forced groups like the Basoche (the clerks of the Parlements), university students, and confraternities to either curtail the critical content of farce or disband entirely. Local officials wanted to at least appear to be

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imposing order: it was easier to quash farce performance than stop religious violence. Even when the genre survived the Wars of Religion, as with the confraternity of the Conards in Rouen, militant Catholicism contributed to the repression of farce because activists rejected it as a moderating influence in political matters (p. 139).

Beam emphasizes that farce did not disappear all at once or entirely, and argues that kings were usually following rather than leading in the changing taste around farce. Urban elites withdrew their support, their sons ceased participating in farces, and professional but socially marginal actors moved in to take over the roles. As they relegated the genre to the sidelines of urban life, elites insisted on curtailing the disruptive or political elements of farce. Kings were more tolerant of farce than were urban communities until late in the reign of Louis XIII. Direct royal intervention in theater regulation did not happen until 1630, after most professional actors had shifted to a more neoclassical repertoire. Beam thus inverts the claim made by Norbert Elias that civilizing came from the top and moved down. Beam makes clear the lack of interest and patronage of farce by local elites, perhaps downplaying somewhat the monarchy's encouragement of this shift by making its priority on obedience clear and by offering its backing to those who played along.

The monarchy also encouraged the relegation of farce to the sidelines more directly. Professional actors who steered clear of critiquing royal policies received the king's patronage. Royal efforts to make solicitors into venal officeholders put pressure on the clerks who made up the Basoche to conform to the magistrates' notions of propriety in order to obtain solicitor's posts. Moreover, the monarchy supported the emergence of the Jesuits as the premier teaching order. The Jesuits favored neoclassical theatricals and ballets that demonstrated the civility, bodily control, and self-discipline of their students. Despite repeated attacks on the Jesuits, kings conferred their patronage on the order and received flattering theatricals in exchange. Jesuit depictions of obedient students contrasted sharply with earlier university ribaldry.

Beam gestures briefly to the story of farce as it plays out elsewhere, but leaves the international fate of the genre largely untold. Since the repression of farce had so much to do with confessional conflict, Beam offers an intriguing way into the dynamics of early modern political change. Beam has set the standard for further exploration in this vein by offering a textured understanding of the elaboration of the French monarchy in its most expansive form in the seventeenth century.

KATHERINE CRAWFORD
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APRIL G. SHELFORD. *Transforming the Republic of Letters: Pierre-Daniel Huet and European Intellectual Life, 1650–1720.* (Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe, number 7.) Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 264. $75.00.

April G. Shelford's book centers on the figure of Pierre-Daniel Huet, member of the Académie Française and bishop of Avranches. Shelford uses her account of Huet's life and works to explore the workings of the "old" Republic of Letters, which emerged out of the Renaissance, and the process by which it was transformed into its "new" Enlightenment form at the end of the seventeenth century.

Shelford's rich and fascinating study (which is illustrated with a number of innovative diagrams) draws heavily on Huet's correspondence with various scholars of the day, as well as on his own works. She offers a more comprehensive picture of Huet than has previously been available, by integrating the neo-Latin poet with the Biblical scholar, scientist, and novelist. In order to achieve this, she adopts a thematic rather than a purely chronological structure.

In the first chapter Shelford deals with Huet's education and his Jesuit links. In particular, his relationship with his teacher Pierre Mambrun is explored. Chapter two considers his role as a leading neo-Latin poet and his membership of the Academia Briosa. The third chapter centers on Huet's involvement with women. Shelford sets out a useful contrast between the "Republic of Letters" and the "Empire of Women" as a means of exploring the similarities and differences between these two arenas. She also stresses the role that salons played in bringing about the transformation of the Republic of Letters. Chapter four focuses on Huet the scientist and considers his gradual shift from the neo-Aristotelianism of the Jesuits, via a brief flirtation with Cartesianism, to his late position as a Gassendist-Epicurean. Here, too, Shelford discusses Huet's links to André Graindorge and their creation of the Caënnais scientific society. In her last chapter, Shelford examines Huet's attempts to defend the old Republic of Letters in the late seventeenth century and explores the complexity of his position within those debates. In doing so she helps to illuminate the origins of the battle of the ancients and moderns and the means by which the Republic of Letters was gradually transformed. In her conclusion, Shelford takes the story on to consider what Huet would have made of the culture and morals of the Enlightenment.

Shelford succeeds not only in offering an integrated and more complete study of Huet, but also in providing a more subtle and nuanced account of the means by which the old Republic of Letters operated. As she demonstrates, far from simply calling for a return to ancient practices, its members sought to build on those classical foundations. Huet and his colleagues engaged in frank debate and encouraged the discussion and development of new, innovative, and daring ideas. Their conservatism lay less in the range of topics they were willing to discuss than in the audience with which they were prepared to engage, with certain ideas only being suitable for discussion within a carefully bounded community.

At several points in the book Shelford uses inventive means to answer important historical questions for

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which direct evidence is not readily accessible. For example, in order to gain a sense of the kind of conversation that went on in salons she turns to contemporary dialogues. While recognizing that they represent ideal forms rather than actual discussions, she suggests that they can nonetheless tell us something about salon conversation. In places, however, her use of contextual evidence is taken a little too far. In the first chapter a reference to Huet's autobiography leads into a lengthy discussion of the nature of autobiography in the seventeenth century and then mention of Huet's Jesuit education brings several pages on the Jesuit curriculum and educational practices. Similarly, in chapter two there is a detailed discussion of Jesuit theater, despite the admission that Huet apparently never performed in a production. This is a particular problem early in the book where the digressions sometimes threaten to usurp the as yet undeveloped central arguments.

While the rationale for the thematic structure of the book is convincing, there are some disadvantages. As one might expect, there are moments of repetition. For example, Huet's Jesuit education is considered at the beginning of both chapter one and chapter four. Second, the chronological overlap between the chapters makes it more difficult for the reader to build up a coherent narrative of Huet's life and works.

Finally, Shelford perhaps does not do enough to push the conclusions and implications of her study. Some bold suggestions about the potential of the topic are raised in the introduction, but she does not return to them at the end. Nevertheless, this is a meticulously researched study that undoubtedly offers a richer and more nuanced account of an important period in the history of ideas.

RACHEL HAMMERSLEY
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PIERRE H. BOULLE. *Race et esclavage dans la France de l'Ancien Régime*. Paris: Perrin. 2007. Pp. 286. €21.00.

In the past decade scholarly interest in France's connection to slavery has extended beyond its overseas territories and *comptoirs* to the hexagon. In the process scholars have debunked the belief that there were no slaves in France. Pierre H. Boulle's contribution to the scholarship on the slave trade and slavery spans several decades and the collection of essays under review reflects his many interests on the subject over time.

The volume is divided into three parts, each with a different theme. Part one contains three articles analyzing the construction of the concept of race in France prior to the eighteenth century. The two chapters in part two look at the status of slaves and free people of color in France, and those in part three examine the various groups of non-whites present in Paris and the provinces at the end of the eighteenth century. Whereas the first two parts contain articles that have been published elsewhere, the third is made up of four chapters, written over the period 1989–2006.

The volume's opening chapter, initially published in 1985, is an early example of the type of research that pushed back the chronology of racism as a social phenomenon from the nineteenth to the eighteenth century. Boulle traces the emergence of the modern concept of race to the middle of the eighteenth century and, focusing on the anti-abolitionists, argues that racism had its roots in the mid-eighteenth century. The second chapter (first published in 2003) reinforces the argument of race as a pre-nineteenth century phenomenon by examining a little known text by François Bernier (1620–1688), published in the *Journal des sçavans*. In the last chapter of this section, Boulle demonstrates that early anti-black sentiment founded in racial thought was essentially an elite stance of power to delineate and control blacks in much the same way as concepts of class were used to buttress elite positions in the social hierarchy. Readers of these three chapters will find little in their conclusions that is not now known to scholars of race and historians of the early modern period, but the section situates Boulle's work on the slave trade and slavery and reminds us of his early contribution to these debates.

The two chapters in part two of the volume enlarge on an article, previously published in the *Journal of the Historical Society* in 2006, about the legislation regarding blacks resident in France. Using a number of case studies to illustrate his point, Boulle examines the developments that led to the Royal Proclamation of August 9, 1777, prohibiting the entry into France of blacks and other people of color. Briefly tracing its legal antecedents back to the 1650 Code Noir, Boulle explains the opposition it aroused and the ways in which it was, on occasion, circumvented. The proclamation was a response to unfounded fears of an "ever-increasing" population of non-whites in France. The fundamental difference between the August 9 proclamation and the laws that came before was its exclusionary text, which did not distinguish between slaves and free people of color. In short all people of color, regardless of their economic status, were no longer welcome.

Part three moves into previously unpublished material and is, therefore, the most stimulating part of the book. The four chapters that comprise this section include: blacks and people of color in Paris, non-blacks from the Indian Ocean in Paris, young slaves and other non-white children, and non-whites in France after the 1777 census. Boulle produces a compelling and complex picture of ethnic diversity in eighteenth-century France by analyzing census material covering social, economic, generational, and ethnic categories. In addition to the information his charts and grafts provide, his conclusions are nuanced and, on occasion, surprising. In the first chapter of the section he demonstrates that the majority of colored people lived in affluent parishes and were well integrated, albeit usually suffering the same slights and denigrations reserved for white servants. In the chapter on colored peoples from the Indian Ocean, the census reveals that "negro" (*nègre*) was used as the generic term to categorize all people of color, whatever their "shade" or origin, but in spite of

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this their integration occurred fairly easily. Prejudice was less developed in rural than in urban areas due, Boulle surmises, to the fact colored peoples were in closer contact with workers and artisans, whereas in urban areas they were normally part of elite households. In the eighteenth century, racial prejudice was an upper class trait. These geographic and class differences, Boulle concludes, were among the reasons that blacks were so well received by the sans-culottes during the French Revolution.

This collection of essays attests to Boulle's significant contribution to the scholarship on slavery and race. Not only has he confirmed that race was a factor in eighteenth-century French society but he has also demonstrated that as an ideological concept and lived experience it was nonetheless very different from that of the nineteenth century.

PATRICIA M. E. LORCIN
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JOHN SHOVLIN. *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. 265. $49.95.

It would be a pity if intellectual historians, students of the Enlightenment, and specialists in the French Revolution ignored this ambitious and important book because its title is misleading. The book deals not with the interplay of real economic forces or political economy in the social science sense of the word. Nor does it chart the circulation or consumption of luxury objects. Rather this work focuses on thinking about economics and luxury. It is a study of words, ideas, "imaginaries," and especially origins.

John Shovlin explores the integration of economic debate into French political culture in the course of the eighteenth century and French Revolution. He has chosen a rich and heretofore neglected subject. "Between the 1750s and 1780s," Shovlin observes, "the propertied elite of the old regime turned its attention to economic matters as never before" (p. 1). "Wide public engagement with political economic issues" occurred, and Shovlin captures this engagement in an analysis of over a hundred pamphlets, books, tracts, and journals. Some of these texts are by known figures like Mirabeau, Turgot, or the Physiocrats. But the vast majority are "commonplace" and "obscure" texts written by "unremarkable" and heretofore unknown authors. Members of agricultural societies, provincial nobles, Parisian speculators, merchants, even a Grub Street writer (the author of *Anecdotes sur Mme Dubarry*): these writers prove that public criticism and debate existed in monarchical France as far back as the 1740s.

This flood of texts began with the debate on luxury. For Shovlin, the luxury debate planted seeds that grew and blossomed as the century wore on. In the 1740s, the critique of luxury focused on financiers and merchants. Then in the 1760s, luxury became separated from commerce which could now be rehabilitated while luxury's moral onus now attached to the nobility. In the 1780s, the rhetoric of degeneracy developed by luxury opponents was turned on the court and the crown who were blamed for the state's financial collapse.

The debate on luxury led right to the revolution of 1789 and beyond. "One of the objectives of this book," Shovlin writes, "is to shed new light on the origins of the French Revolution by considering the ways in which widely held political economic perspectives and ideas shaped elite attitudes toward aristocracy and absolutism" (p. 151). The "pre-revolutionary crisis" and the revolution that followed occupy the last third of the book, which is particularly successful in linking events, economic perspectives, and political groups be they Girondins or radicals. Shovlin focuses on key but little-known revolutionary actors like the Girondin Étienne Clavière or Jacques-Antoine Creuzé-Latouche and charts the evolution of attitudes toward property from 1789 through 1799. The effects of the eighteenth-century political economy did not stop in the 1790s. Shovlin pushes on into the empire, finding in Napoleon Bonaparte's close "attention to agriculture, commerce and manufacture" more outgrowths of the eighteenth-century debates. Even after Napoleon, "the debates of the pre-revolutionary decades and the 1790s created a distinctive French economic imaginary that would shape perceptions of material life in France through the following century" (p. 219).

This is an ambitious book that makes sense of a large and disparate body of literature. We have to thank Shovlin for giving us a new narrative to add to our tired lectures on the origins of the French Revolution. But we could also, like Marc Bloch, question the value of the search for origins. Was it the "shadow of the luxury critique" that made the patriots of 1789 attack the monarchy? And who were these critics of luxury? Shovlin repeatedly refers to his authors as "middling" people of the "middling elite" (p. 8). What does that mean? Shovlin does not elaborate, but determining the identities of the army of pamphlet writers he cites would require much more research and many more books. For now, it is enough that Shovlin gives us a new answer to an old problem—the origins of the French Revolution—and explains how the economic issues entered into public debate in the eighteenth century.

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LISA DICAPRIO. *The Origins of the Welfare State: Women, Work, and the French Revolution*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 259. $40.00.

In 1790, the French National Assembly created spinning workshops (*ateliers de filature*) to provide work to indigent Parisian women. Under the Old Regime, various governmental and religious institutions funded distribution centers where women could pick up raw materials to spin thread at home. Revolutionary legislators

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preferred to put women workers together in a common site where they could be supervised, rather than dispersed around the city. Lisa DiCaprio traces three main phases in revolutionary approaches to these workshops. During the first "liberal" phase from 1790 to 1792, administrators struggled to find a way "to make welfare pay for itself" as they introduced "economizing measures borrowed from private industry" (p. 55). Commercial viability proved an impossible goal, however, and during the second phase, the Jacobin government gave up on trying to profit from these workshops. The Jacobins also shifted production to the war effort, specifically hemp thread for making sails, and focused on improving the quality of the thread to make it suitable for such uses. The third phase, during the Thermidorean period, brought an end to the *ateliers* and a return to the Old Regime practice of distributing raw materials for women to card or spin cotton or hemp in their homes. DiCaprio argues that the Thermidoreans were driven by Rousseauian ideas about female domesticity, but her evidence suggests that they sought to avoid potential political disturbances, too, as home production would mean that "the disorders and abuses [of the *ateliers*] would cease" (p. 183).

The *ateliers* represent an interesting experiment on several levels, and DiCaprio draws out many fascinating details through her research into the administration and employees of the workshops. Of particular interest are the consequences of bringing large numbers of female workers under one roof. DiCaprio deftly makes use of archival materials to trace female politicization and efforts at organizing to improve their working conditions and their pay, as well as to defend the *ateliers* once they came under attack. During the year of the Terror, several supervisors and workers were charged with being counterrevolutionaries due to their criticism of the government, and some of them went to the guillotine. The testimony from these trials gives DiCaprio rich sources of information on the atmosphere and the discussions that took place in the *ateliers*. This evidence allows her to build a strong case for her argument that "the women workers in the *ateliers de filature* defined and claimed their rights of citizenship in an expansive way" (p. xi).

Although there is much of interest in this book, its overall structure and argument are somewhat disappointing. The introduction is overly brief, less than five pages. It lacks any discussion of historiography, and the author makes no effort to place the example of the *ateliers* into the broader context of welfare and charity more generally. The four chapters comprising the body of the book treat the subject in chronological order: first the transition from Old Regime approaches to charity to revolutionary experiments in assisting indigent workers; the second chapter treats the years from 1790 to 1792, when the approach of aiding workers using the methods of private industry dominated; chapter three moves to the Year II (1793–1794), the year of the Jacobin-dominated government and the Terror; and chapter four covers the Thermidorean period, when the *ateliers* were dismantled. Although such an organization seems perfectly logical, much of the material in these chapters is comprised of lengthy quotations from secondary sources, which left me wondering how much of her findings are really new. Both Dominique Godineau and Isser Woloch, whom DiCaprio cites and quotes repeatedly, have used many of the same sources to answer similar questions. Godineau's *Citoyennes tricoteuses: Les femmes du peuple à Paris pendant la Révolution française* (1988), translated as *The Women of Paris and Their Revolution* (1998), focuses on women workers and their participation in revolutionary politics; Woloch's "From Charity to Welfare in Revolutionary Paris," *Journal of Modern History* (1986), traces the evolution in ideas about welfare during the revolution. DiCaprio's contribution lies mainly in pulling together these themes of welfare, women, and politics.

The book ends with an epilogue that discusses the evolution of welfare ideology and legislation through the twentieth century as a "legacy" of the French Revolution. Though it is true that many ideas expressed in 1848, in 1871, and by Third Republic and Fifth Republic activists and politicians bring to mind the language and goals of the revolution, one could say the same thing for virtually all aspects of political and social thought. In addition, the length of the epilogue, about fifteen pages, precludes any thorough discussion of these trends that cover over 150 years and several different political regimes. DiCaprio's research on women's work and political activism is intelligently presented and her explanations for how and why revolutionary approaches toward welfare evolved are convincing, but her attempt to link the *ateliers* to the welfare state more generally is less successful.

Denise Z. Davidson
Georgia State University

Michel Biard. *Les lilliputiens de la centralisation: Des intendants aux préfets; Les hésitations d'un "modèle français."* (La Chose Publique.) Seyssel, France: Champ Vallon. 2007. Pp. 410. €28.00.

Since the bicentennial of the French Revolution, which coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall, historians, particularly those whose politics lean to the left, have been looking for a new overarching interpretation of the meaning of the events of the revolutionary era. Michel Biard's new book can be understood as a thoughtful rumination about the democratic implications of the French Revolution in a post-Cold War world undergoing significant social and economic changes as the European Union and globalization transform the administrative roles of the centralized French nation-state. He traces the evolution of the relationships of center and periphery, state and society, and administrative efficiency and public order through the intendants of the Old Regime, the legislative representatives on mission of 1791–1795, the departmental *commissaires* of the Directory, and ultimately the prefects. For Biard, all these provincial agents of the cen-

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tral state functioned as a sort of transmission belt between the dictates of the center and the needs of the locality; they were not the "heroes" in the ongoing top-down centralization of the French state suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville (pp. 48–71).

Biard demonstrates that these representatives of the central state had been under fire in the late eighteenth century. As demonstrated by the *cahiers de doléances*, despite the reform efforts undertaken by the intendants, as an institution, they had already been discredited thoroughly by 1789 (pp. 106–124). In a manner evocative of Dale Van Kley and Antoine de Baecque, Biard plumbs the depth of the discredit of the intendants through the murder of Bertier de Sauvigny in July 1789. This episode in the Great Fear lessened state opposition to the emerging revolutionary political culture. Instead of depicting the grisly event as a turning point prefiguring the elimination of the intendants later that year, Biard suggestively argues that this murder was the culmination of long-standing popular dissatisfaction with the institution and was part of an ongoing search for an answer to that critical, vexing question that lay at the heart of the French Revolution: how can meaningful citizen participation in government be combined with an effective state apparatus (pp. 125–157)? To Biard, the devolution of power to the regions and the emergence of the "global village" combine to encourage just such a reconsideration of how to reinvigorate contemporary democratic politics (pp. 9–13, 361–362).

Biard undermines any sense of a political "golden age" of decentralization under the Constituent Assembly. His reconstruction of the ongoing legislative debates about how to enforce the dictates of the central state in the provinces, which led to the dispatch of representatives on mission, is both convincing and advances our understanding of how revolutionary administration became increasingly politicized (pp. 171–191). This process took place both from above and from below as a look at the spread of the popular societies makes clear (pp. 329–331).

From an uncertain beginning in 1791, the demands of war and a multifaceted social, political, and economic crisis led French legislators to reimpose a more centralized administrative structure as an extraordinary intervention in the link between center and periphery. This structure successfully, albeit violently, prosecuted the war, creating a "black legend." Under the Directory, the *commissaires* were a very different, less intrusive, and ultimately less effective attempt to reformulate the administrative linkage between Paris and the provinces. Napoleon Bonaparte and his collaborators built on these attempts to create the prefects in 1800. Like their administrative precursors, the prefects were scorned by literary figures like Honoré de Balzac (pp. 15–27), but the "black legend" of "Jacobin centralization" contributed to by Tocqueville helped to prevent any fundamental restructuring of this administrative approach to the link between center and periphery until François Mitterand's first term as president in the 1980s (p. 319). The emphasis on denunciation and the poor link between historical fact and political rhetoric in contemporary discussions of administrative and political decentralization will likely be less familiar and therefore more interesting to North American readers (pp. 334–347).

For those familiar with Biard's important work on the representatives on mission, this book will situate his conclusions in a useful, long-term framework. Readers interested in the evolution of French administration and the political issues associated with the relationships of Paris and the provinces and the French state and society will appreciate Biard's synthesis. Finally, Biard has suggested the first steps in formulating a new understanding of the legacy of democratic politics during the French Revolution. By further complicating the "French model" of state development, Biard has made an important contribution to the field.

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Judith Surkis. *Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870–1920*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 277. $45.00.

Scholarship on the early French Third Republic in the last two decades has often pointed to a "crisis of masculinity" evident in the rhetoric of politicians, social scientists, health practitioners, and cultural critics who were attempting to negotiate the exigencies of a new democratic republic born in the wake of a shattering military defeat. France's paltry birth rate and fears of racial degeneration, combined with challenges from feminism and other expressions of female independence, resulted in a pervasive anxiety that pulsated through a variety of printed texts, ranging from novels and journals to scholarly treatises and parliamentary debates. As a deep reading and rigorous analysis of some of these texts, this book takes historiography in a new direction. Rather than suffering from crisis, masculinity as a norm, Judith Surkis argues, was not only contingent upon the demands of modern citizenship but, as such, unstable.

Surkis is certainly not the first historian to demonstrate the centrality of gender in conceptions of citizenship, but she does make us rethink the processes through which masculinity is defined and prescribed, and her book offers tools to apply her analysis to other historical and contemporary contexts. Republican citizenship required a definition of the male individual as one who would at once be free and socially responsible (the classic paradox in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* and in the first French attempt at republican citizenship in the French Revolution of 1789). But in the early Third Republic, intellectuals feared democratic freedom also opened the path to sexual deviance, especially among adolescents, bachelors, soldiers, and the colonized. Bourgeois social reformers, the author argues, thus focused on the regulation of male sexual desire as the means to create and discipline the male citizen.

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Surkis chose with good reason to focus primarily on texts related to three areas, the first of which is educational reform. The Ferry Laws of the 1880s were meant not only to democratize and secularize education, but to make it produce good citizens. Removing religion from the curriculum, however, invited decadence and insubordination; pedagogues sought to fill the moral vacuum with curriculum that would cultivate social responsibility as well as a sense of independence. The second area concentrates on social theory. Two chapters offer an innovative analysis of Emile Durkheim's writings. While Durkheim theorized that marriage was good for men and essential for the republic, he also acknowledged in *Suicide* that women did not derive benefits from this institution. Surkis might have explored this paradox further, especially since it offers an exemplary glimpse at the fictional basis upon which the republican moral vision was built. Why did Durkheim—and the huge audience he influenced—feel married women's lack of well-being did not matter for his theory about a social harmony based on stable marriage?

Public health constitutes the third area of focus. The growing threat of venereal disease, particularly during World War I and its aftermath, imbued sexual desire and deviance with even more poignant symbolic importance and further illustrated the paradoxical relationship between private liberty and civic responsibility. Adult men had a right to freedom (privacy), yet national health—and national defense—required hygienic sexual regulation. Because soldiers and colonized natives had the status of minors, hygienists were able to violate the privacy of French and colonial troops in order to experiment with pedagogical, medical, and disciplinary tactics, rendering hygiene "a flexible principle that at once constructed and reproduced sexual, racial, and class differences between subjects" (p. 224) and reinforced the norms of healthy heterosexual reproduction and white masculinity.

The epilogue applies the interpretive framework of male sexual desire as a problem to the contemporary debate about Muslim girls wearing the veil in public schools, and asserts that the veil signifies "improperly schooled male desire" that in turn "operates as a synecdoche for the violent and uncivil behavior of ethnically marked male youths" (p. 247). This interpretation is not only plausible but suggests the broader implications of Surkis's analysis and the extent to which assumptions about heterosexuality undergird the "fantasy" of republican ideology. However, it also elides the process of historical change—which is largely absent from the book as a whole. Surkis reiterates throughout that the prescriptive literature she analyzes both reflected and contributed to the republican moral vision from 1870 to 1920, but she does not address the question of what historical contingencies created that vision, nor how or whether it differed across time and outside the specific context of France. The reader is left wondering what happened to the relationship between social science discourse and republican ideology once women became citizens and homosexual couples won civil rights. Did this transformation de-center normative male heterosexuality in the republican moral vision? Surkis is more concerned with unveiling the power of the presumptions behind the moral vision than with recounting how they translated into policies that changed over time. Perhaps most importantly, her deeply researched and powerfully argued book demonstrates how a masculinity that was apparently in "crisis" nonetheless succeeded in maintaining material and symbolic power.

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J. P. DAUGHTON. *An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 330. $55.00.

Conventional scholarship views the history of French colonialism as a secular project of spreading modern republican "civilization" around the world. Usually historians of France's empire in Africa and Asia from the late nineteenth into the twentieth century focus on the metropole's effort to realize a vision of "Greater France" through exporting its language, institutions, and bourgeois values. Often scholars treat the *mission civilisatrice* as a preformed set of ideas and predispositions transmitted to the colonies and then turned back on the colonizer during the struggles for independence. J. P. Daughton challenges all of those interpretations in this book. Through his concentration on the interaction of French Catholic (sometimes Protestant) missionaries and colonial officials in Indochina, Tahiti and the Marquesas, and Madagascar during the formative period of France's overseas empire and its colonial ideology, Daughton provides an important contribution to the extant literature on colonialism, modern France, and modern religious history.

While it is a common refrain that Christian missionaries paved the way for European domination in Africa and Asia, more often than not that claim is left unexplored and unexplained. Daughton interrogates that assertion and finds that not only is the story more complicated, but often the missionaries opposed European intervention in what they claimed as their zones of activity. Catholic missionaries were especially reticent about the arrival of anticlerical republican officials dispatched to bring the French state's vision of a civilizing mission to areas where Catholics had labored to realize their ideal of conversion. Even here, though, the reaction of Catholic missionaries to the increased presence of the French state overseas varied depending on local circumstances and the personality and political acuity of the missionary leaders. Thus, in Madagascar Daughton notes a higher level of cooperation between nominally anticlerical government officials and Catholic missionaries than in Tahiti and the Marquesas, where confrontation ruled the day.

At another level, Daughton also complicates our un-

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derstanding of the nature of the secular *mission civilisatrice* purportedly guiding France's imperial drive and subsequent policies. Rather than a preformed doctrine transported throughout the empire in neat and uniform packages, Daughton argues that the interaction between Catholic missionaries and colonial administrators was fundamental to shaping the *mission civilisatrice* and, in the process, altered French Catholic missionaries' conception of their role in Africa and Asia. Despite its image as a bastion of secularism and modernity, France provided the vast majority of Catholic missionaries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, the Christian missionary movement was in profound ways a French activity. In the course of debates over the place of missionaries in France's empire, Catholics often asserted their national identity through pledges of loyalty to France and providing evidence of their service in the realization of the civilizing mission. While the missionaries may have had a slightly different interpretation of the totality of that project (insisting on religious conversion to prepare the ground for the acceptance of modernity), the Catholic missionaries justifiably claimed that they were doing the "civilizing" work that colonial administrators failed to carry out. Missionaries ran most of the schools and clinics in the colonies; they were frequently the only ones who understood local languages and could act as intermediaries between the colonized populations and their French overlords. In order to supersede the missionaries in influence, colonial officials invested more money in education and medical care. Consequently, the pressure brought by Catholic missionaries directly shaped France's colonial project. In the process, Catholic missionaries underwent a conversion of sorts through their adoption of nationalist and racist discourse as a means of self-preservation in the colonies. In the end they became integral parts of a colonial ideology predicated on notions of national supremacy, racial privilege, and cultural (including religious) transformation.

Daughton furnishes an important contribution to our understanding of the formative years of France's colonial empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His research is solid and the narrative is clearly presented. At times the work lapses into the tone of an apologia for Catholicism, reserving its harshest criticism for republican colonizers interfering in the selfless work of spiritual laborers. Moreover, Daughton admits that he has not sought to integrate indigenous voices into his narrative, although this deserves attention. If such voices remain absent, the reader is left with the impression that the articulation of colonialist discourse was a product of internal debates among European imperialists. The interaction of the indigenous with missionaries and administrators would further nuance the story of modern colonialism. Overall, Daughton's study provides a much-needed corrective to the extant scholarship on France's notion of the *mission civilisatrice*.

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ERIC T. JENNINGS. *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 271. Cloth $74.95, paper $21.95.

The French have a particular relationship to spas and hydrotherapy that has persisted to the present era. Spas are still regarded as attractive sites for rest and relaxation, water cures are reimbursed by the state for certain categories of illness, and the French consume and export enormous quantities of mineral waters that are bottled at the source and promise healthful benefits to the imbiber. A long-standing conviction on the part of French medicine about the benefits of hydrotherapy and a healthy climate lies behind this enduring set of cultural practices, producing a set of hygienic principles that were eagerly embraced by the self-improving middle classes as early as the first decades of the nineteenth century. An earlier book on French spas, Douglas Mackaman's *Leisure Settings: Bourgeois Culture, Medicine and the Spa in Modern France* (1998), provided a clear account of the interrelationship among medical ideas, health, and leisure in the metropole in the modern era. In this study, Eric T. Jennings hopes to incorporate colonization into this set of relations to demonstrate the connections among French identity, health, and the power hierarchies of the imperial process.

Jennings first examines the medical debate on the feasibility of the white races acclimatizing successfully to the climate and diseases of the tropics. Some doctors argued that invariant racial characteristics made it unlikely that whites could survive long in tropical climes, while others contended that white bodies could adapt, if only imperfectly, to these new environments, as demonstrated by the creole populations that flourished all over the colonial realm. Whatever they thought about white survival in a global empire, both sides on this medical debate agreed that the hygienic price to be paid for creolization was an inevitable physiological degeneration that degraded its victims in body and soul, separating them permanently from the racial root stock of the metropole.Finding ways to mitigate this fate became a principal concern of colonial medicine and imperial policymakers.

The medical regimes that emerged to fill this need were modeled on the domestic spa cures that had achieved the greatest reputations for the regeneration of toxic livers, spleens, and other internal organs and the restoration of healthful vigor, such as the spas at Vichy, Plombières, and elsewhere in France. The trick was to find locations in the colonies that replicated the conditions of cool, dry climate and mineral waters of the most successful domestic spas. In these sites,

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French military men, colonial bureaucrats, and missionaries could then reacclimatize their bodies to the baseline conditions of racial health that preserved their health, their whiteness, and their Frenchness. Regular trips to these venues, subsidized by the state, could stave off the dangers of tropical diseases, forestall the destabilizing dangers of "going native," and recreate in the fierce tropics a little patch of France in which French colonial elites could socialize with one another and with the well-to-do local creoles.

In consecutive chapters, Jennings tracks the development of these mostly high-elevation spas and acclimatization centers in Guadeloupe, Réunion, Madagascar, and Tunisia. He shows convincingly that in each case the aim was to adapt the regime of the European water cure to local conditions that in the colonial domain meant excluding native peoples and gendering the spa in the European fashion with separate sections for men and women. Jennings illuminates the fundamentally ideological nature of these arrangements in the medical explanations devised by colonial doctors and administrators to justify the struggle against the truly dangerous diseases of yellow fever in the Caribbean and malaria in the colonies of South Asia. In an echo of pre-Pasteurian medicine, doctors originally argued that these diseases could not flourish outside the foul miasmas of swamps and lowlands. Then, at the turn of the twentieth century, after Ronald Ross identified the mosquito as the disease vector of malaria, colonial officials justified the high-altitude spas on the grounds that mosquitoes could not live at these elevations, despite clear evidence to the contrary. In any event they persisted in arguing that hydrotherapy provided healthful benefits to those stricken with these diseases by readjusting the internal balance of minerals and salts. Once these doubtful medical rationales are swept aside, one is left, as Jennings persuasively argues, with the cultural and ideological residue of a colonial domination that sought to preserve racial and national superiority in the form of European identity and health.

Until almost the end of the French overseas empire, the spas functioned as points of mediation among colonial elites, creoles, and native peoples, serving, in both a real and a symbolic way, to keep imperial hierarchies and French identity intact. Jennings devotes a chapter to the spa at Vichy, which was, after all, the hygienic and fashionable model for all the colonial spas, not to mention spa culture worldwide. The most senior colonial officials took regular, discounted vacation cures at Vichy, whose waters had the reputation of curing even the most recalcitrant *mal de foie*, the archetypal organic complaint of all French sufferers. The presence of Vichy as the crown of hydrotherapeutic spas symbolized a dichotomy, says Jennings, of Vichy as cure and colonies as pathologies, with the colonial spas representing lesser kinds of the supreme version. We know there were multifarious ways in which the metropole/colony binary was constructed along a normal/pathological axis in the era of European overseas empire, but Jennings gives us another reason to understand the supreme hypocrisy of a French imperial vision that never in fact attempted to live up to its model of egalitarian assimilation.

In a final irony, the old colonial spas are mostly still in operation, but they are now under the management of the colonized peoples who had been previously excluded from taking the waters. The French still come to take the waters at these sites, but now it is for the exotic "native" experience that their colonial predecessors sought to escape.

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Sean Kennedy. *Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français, 1927–1945*. Ithaca, N.Y., and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 364. $75.00.

Paul Mazgaj. *Imagining Fascism: The Cultural Politics of the French Young Right, 1930–1945*. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 2007. Pp. 366. $65.00.

Especially since the late 1970s and early 1980s, an extraordinary number of excellent and important studies have appeared on both sides of the Atlantic dealing with the French far right, French fascism, and the cultural politics associated with these movements during the interwar years and through the Vichy period. Robert Soucy and Zeev Sternhell, among others, have produced numerous stimulating and conflicting studies dealing with French fascism, its origins, its associated movements and parties, and its relation to the more traditional right. In the areas of cultural politics and aesthetics, groundbreaking and provocative books dealing with influential writers and intellectuals and the publishing outlets that disseminated and promoted their works have been written by David Carroll, Alice Kaplan, Diane S. Rubinstein, Gisèle Sapiro, and Jacqueline Verdès-Leroux, among many others.

Given the richness and diversity of the work of these and other scholars, it is not easy to produce an original and stimulating study of the writers, politics, and movements of this period in French history. And yet both Paul Mazgaj and Sean Kennedy have accomplished precisely that. Both works are lucid, beautifully written and argued, and effectively organized. Moreover, each boasts an introduction offering an overview of the debates about fascism in the French as well as the European contexts that is both an admirable summary of the issues as well as a perceptive and original take on the topic itself.

Mazgaj's subject is, as his book's subtitle suggests, the Young Right (essentially young *maurassiens*) who emerged at the beginning of the 1930s and who proceeded to play important and indeed decisive roles in the intellectual far right's journey through the 1930s and through the Occupation. Mazgaj focuses especially on the figures of Robert Brasillach and Thierry Maulnier. He follows their respective itineraries

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through the Popular Front years, the French defeat of May–June 1940, the heady days of Philippe Pétain and his National Revolution, the German "occupation" of the Unoccupied Zone after the Allied invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942, and the collapse of the Vichy regime in 1944. In tracing these itineraries, Mazgaj offers lucid analyses of the writers' respective political and intellectual developments and their moves away from the more traditional *maurrassien* perspective to, at least in Brasillach's case, an open embrace of fascism and Nazism. For his political commitments, Brasillach was of course executed at the Liberation, whereas the more cautious Maulnier went on to enjoy a successful postwar career as a writer and intellectual.

Mazgaj's primary objective is to stress the essential continuity of the Young Right from the pre-World War I generation of mentors like Charles Maurras and Henri Massis through the interwar years and finally into the Occupation itself. Given this objective, one subject of Mazgaj's criticism is Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, whose pioneering and, for Mazgaj, narrowly focused 1969 study on the *nonconformistes* of the 1930s failed to provide an adequate "historical canvas" appropriate for understanding the politics and political evolution both of the *nonconformistes* and especially the Young Right. In this task, Mazgaj is quite convincing.

Mazgaj's approach raises, but does not deal with, the issue of the continuityof at least some of the Young Right's major figures into the postwar years, and their significant influence on the next generation. These figures include Jacques Laurent of *hussard* fame and the enigmatic Maurice Blanchot (both of whom Mazgaj discusses on occasion, but whose postwar influence he does not treat), and Maulnier himself. At least briefly addressing this continuity would be helpful to conclude the story.

While Mazgaj is thoroughly versed in the history and cultural politics of the French far right as well as the biographies and views of representative individuals, in his text he generally fails to engage directly and at length with the works and approaches of cultural critics who have written important studies on this topic. David Carroll's *French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture* (1998), for example, covers much the same ground as well as the same figures (Brasillach and Maulnier, among others) as does Alice Kaplan's earlier pioneering study of French cultural fascism, *Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and French Intellectual Life* (1986).This omission does not detract from the quality and richness of Mazgaj's own analyses, but it does fail to contextualize them adequately, so that their originality is not altogether apparent. A final quibble: given Mazgaj's focus on generational influences and networks in the interwar years especially, it is unfortunate that he does not mention Rubinstein's excellent 1990 study *What's Left? The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Right*, a work that does, in fact, cover much of the same ground.

Kennedy's excellent study of Colonel François de la Roque and the Croix de feu presents a compelling and balanced account of the growth and development of the interwar right-wing nationalist veterans' movement from a paramilitary league to the political party it became, the Parti Social Français (PSF). It also examines the background, motivations, ambitions, and tactics of the man who came to lead and dominate both the movement and party, de la Roque. As Kennedy states in his introduction, unlike earlier scholars who have dealt with the Croix de feu and the PSF, including Soucy, Kennedy is less interested in "categorizing" the movement as fascist, or not, than in "locating it on the spectrum of interwar European politics" (p. 10). Kennedy concludes that it was an "authoritarian nationalist movement" that sought to fundamentally recast France. The outcome of this ambition was essentially to contribute to a "sea change in interwar French political culture" (p. 10) that prepared the way for Vichy's National Revolution.

Founded in the late 1920s by Maurice d'Hartoy with money from the perfume magnate François Coty, the Croix de feu remained a relatively small veterans group under d'Hartoy and his successor Maurice Genay. The movement published a monthly, *Le Flambeau*, in which the first Croix de feu manifesto appeared in November 1929. Emphasizing national unity and the overcoming of class and political divisions, the manifesto championed military discipline and hierarchy. Although it stressed practical concerns, especially where the material needs of veterans were concerned, Kennedy argues that the movement was motivated primarily by "a nostalgia of the trenches and Georges Clemenceau's wartime government" (p. 26).

During the early 1930s and under the increasingly authoritarian leadership of de la Roque, the Croix de feu managed a remarkable growth in membership and visibility, easily outflanking its competition among other right-wing and ultra-nationalist movements. By spring 1934 it had grown from around 9,000 members in 1930 to some 130,000 members in metropolitan France and Algeria. The riots of February 6, 1934, in which the Croix de feu played a visible but somewhat cautious role, catapulted the movement and its leader onto the national stage. Its membership counted a half a million in spring 1936, and it was viewed by the Popular Front as its greatest threat on the far right. Following its "transformation" to the PSF, the movement continued to push an extreme right-wing agenda, along with the likes of Jacque Doriot's Parti Populaire Français and other movements. But for some fascist intellectuals the PSF remained too "staid" in its outlook and approach to assume the role of leader in France's national transformation. And, although as Kennedy observes, it helped prepare the ground for Vichy's National Revolution, neither the PSF nor its leader assumed a decisive role in the *État Français*. In fact, de la Roque eventually provoked the German "ally" to the point of arresting him.

Space limitations prevent more elaboration of both books here under review, which is unfortunate. Both are thoroughly researched and informative, and for the

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most part engage directly with, and make excellent contributions to, the large body of excellent scholarship. Both works provide the specialist and general reader remarkable insights not only into the intellectual and political right of the interwar years and Vichy, but into the broader political and cultural realities and transformations associated with the tumultuous years in French history between 1930 and 1945.

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ALAIN CHATRIOT. *La démocratie sociale à la française: L'éxperience du Conseil national économique 1924–1940*. Foreword by PIERRE ROSANVALLON. (L'éspace de l'histoire.) Paris: Editions La Découverte. 2002. Pp. viii, 419. €26.00.

In the 1920s European governments, inspired by the experience of economic mobilization during World War I and prodded by socialists and trade unionists, tried to bring organized interest groups more routinely into the policy-making conversation without granting them much formal authority. In France the experiment took the form of the Conseil national économique (CNE, or National Economic Council), which Édouard Herriot's *Cartel des gauches* government established by decree in 1925. With over 300 members representing employers, labor, consumers, farmers, and other groups, the new CNE grew in stature during the 1930s to become a significant advisory body and a site for labor-business mediation during the Popular Front, especially over how to implement new collective bargaining laws and the forty-hour week. Part battleground, part talking shop, the CNE principally sponsored policy studies with recommendations that often carried considerable weight. Its influence declined after 1938 when labor relations soured in the country. The Vichy regime abolished it in 1940. But the CNE left an enduring legacy in its successor institution, the Conseil économique et social of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

Alain Chatriot has made imaginative use of an immense archival record to write what will no doubt long remain the definitive study of the interwar CNE. The book is a model for analyzing how a novel, controversial institution gradually found its footing and gained legitimacy. The CNE, after all, had enemies from the start: communists who initially dismissed it as reformist, parliamentarians and local chambers of commerce who feared the dilution of their own authority, employers who viewed it as a stalking-horse for labor. Council founders also struggled with vexing questions of representation. Which of the several rival trade unions should represent labor? Should engineers, "intellectual workers," artisans, and even regions have their own delegates? Enormous effort went into surveying the country's associational landscape to determine what groups had the right to sit on the Council. Chatriot's research reveals a dialectic at work in which organizations fought for the legitimacy that membership on the CNE could confer, even as the Council's own prestige depended on getting the most influential groups under its tent.

Legitimacy grew, too, as Chatriot argues persuasively, from striking a balance between representation and expertise. The Council answered to the prime minister, and through his office it advised parliament. But for staff work and guidance, it depended heavily on young highfliers in the elite *grands corps* of the state civil service, especially sharp legal minds at the Conseil d'État like Alexandre Parodi, Pierre Laroque, and Michel Debré, who would go on to become national leaders after the war. As Chatriot shows, what made the CNE different from parliament and the ministries was its unique blend of putatively "neutral," top-level staff work, on the one hand, and interest group negotiations, on the other, that went into its policy reports and deliberations. Nowhere else in Paris did state-sponsored technical expertise and social bargaining come together with such regularity and with such forward-looking results—an example Jean Monnet would seek to emulate after the war in his approach to economic planning.

In its short lifespan the CNE never became the kind of interest group–based house of parliament that a number of politicians—from Alexandre Millerand in the 1920s to Pierre Mendès-France and Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s—wanted to see established in France. On the contrary, most interwar leaders, including the CNE's astute secretary general, Georges Cahen-Salvador, made sure its brief remained advisory. It never occupied center stage politically. But as Chatriot's study makes clear, the CNE served as a key arena for acclimating elites to the logic of a more *dirigiste* state, for legitimizing a larger role for interest groups in policy deliberations, and for propagating a "discourse of expertise" (p. 218) and "cult of competence" (p. 248) in French associational life.

Chatriot rejects the view that ever since the French Revolution a chasm has separated civil society and a Jacobin state at odds with each other. Rather, he sees state and society as more interpenetrating and mutually constitutive than historians often assume. The CNE experience, then, is for Chatriot a crucial chapter in the history of an evolving French style of social democracy in which civil society played a greater role in governance than we usually think. This splendid history of the CNE, confined as it is to a single institution, can only go so far in making this larger argument. Nor do Chatriot's sources allow him to study in detail the effects of the CNE on the interest groups and governmental agencies it involved. He nonetheless makes a powerful case for setting aside notions of the "eternal Jacobinism of the French administration" (p. 348) to discern how porous the boundary between interest groups and the state became in the 1930s.

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SHARIF GEMIE. *Brittany, 1750–1950: The Invisible Nation*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 308. £55.00.

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Sharif Gemie's latest book surveys the history of Brittany in the context of French politics since the mid-eighteenth century. Beginning with the contention that Brittany is today an "invisible nation," Gemie sets out to show why Breton nationalists "failed" in constituting not only a Breton nation-state but also much of a Breton national consciousness among inhabitants.

In part one, "Making Brittany," Gemie focuses on politics during the French Revolution as well as Breton and French constructions of Breton identity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He includes a very interesting chapter on what he calls "Oriental Brittany." Here Gemie notes similarities (and some important differences) in the way Brittany and "the Orient" were imagined by Chateaubriand, Gustave Flaubert, Ernest Renan, and particularly Pierre Loti.

In part two, "Ruling Brittany," Gemie traces the evolution of Chouannerie in the early nineteenth century, of national and regional politics in the nineteenth century, of Breton regionalism in the late nineteenth century, and finally of Breton nationalism in the interwar and Vichy years. This section includes both a synthesis of existing scholarship and the results of Gemie's own archival research, especially into the range of Breton festivals and the activities of Breton nationalist groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

According to Gemie, until World War II Breton nationalism "failed" because social and religious divisions proved stronger than a sense of Breton identity vis-à-vis the growing power of the French state. The battles of "Whites" versus "Blues," Catholics versus anticlericals, nobles versus laborers, pro-Breton aristocrats versus progressive middle classes and laborers instead largely mirrored the fault lines elsewhere in France. Gemie argues at several points in the book that Breton nationalism needed to become more republican, less aristocratic, and especially more socially progressive in order to have a mass following. Absent that, nationalism was not and could not be "successful." Here Gemie's point seems clear enough, though I am uncomfortable with after-the-fact assessments that find past actors failing: if aristocratic regionalists chose social exclusivity over a mass autonomist movement that might have led to greater Breton nationalist sentiment, does that mean they "failed" or simply pursued a different priority that made sense to them? Is it not as teleological—and thus in some way a denial of the importance of Breton regionalism itself—to argue that Breton nationalists "failed" as to say, à la Eugen Weber, that the French state "succeeded" in making Frenchmen into peasants?

Gemie's chapter on the Vichy period is especially significant, as those years seem to have been an essential catalyst. On the one hand, the extensive collaboration of Breton nationalists with Nazi authorities undermined Breton nationalism. On the other, the extensive cooperation of Catholics, Protestants, anticlericals, and communists in the Resistance tended to break down long-standing social barriers impeding a sense of Breton cultural identity that went beyond the traditional nineteenth-century religious and secular divides. Thus after the war, a cultural construction of a distinct Breton identity thrived, while notions of Breton political independence had been discredited by the association of Breton nationalists with collaboration.

This is a good book, though at times I would have liked Gemie to probe more deeply into the implications of some of his quite interesting suggestions. For example, in the chapter on "Orientalism" as applied to Brittany, Gemie duly notes the ways that Brittany was construed as "backward" and "savage" by nineteenth-century authors. In this chapter, he briefly mentions sexuality, almost as part of a list, in a three-quarter-page subsection. But to what extent was Brittany feminized in French commentaries beyond the citation from Loti? How so? How did both Breton and non-Breton commentators mobilize the language of gender as they discussed what Brittany and France were supposed, in their eyes, to be? Given work by Matt Matsuda and Anne McClintock, I would be interested to know more about the ways Brittany fit—and did not fit—an Orientalist model of "feminizing" the other.

In the end, much as I greatly appreciate this factual overview of Breton history as well as Gemie's portrayal of Breton festivals throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I am not convinced that Brittany is an "invisible nation" rather than a particular region. Admittedly, Brittany remains more distinct than most regions in France. However when compared to Alsatian, Catalan, or Flemish areas, Brittany does in fact fall into a pattern while still remaining unique. Are all these regions "invisible nations"? Then what do we mean by the term "nation"?

Whether or not one accepts Gemie's description of Brittany as an "invisible nation," this remains a quite useful book, replete with significant observations of likely interest to specialists of French regions as well as to students of Brittany in particular.

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Julian Bourg. *From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought*. Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 468. $32.95.

The year 2008 marks the fortieth anniversary of the events known to modern French history as "May 1968," and we may expect a fresh torrent of remembrances and analyses, both within France and elsewhere. Julian Bourg's important study takes its place alongside recent histories by Kristen Ross (2002) and Michael Seidman (2004), while advancing an argument qualitatively distinct from their somewhat conflicting views. Ross seeks to disinter the potentially revolutionary political significance of May 1968 buried underneath the avalanche of narcissistic accounts proffered by aging *soixante-huitards*, while the skeptical Seidman concludes that nothing of real political revolutionary significance occurred during that storied month.

Bourg has a different story to tell. His impressively thorough research—including interviews with a great

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many participants in the events—leads him to argue that something of profound cultural significance was set in motion by the festival that unfolded in the streets of Paris that spring. What emerged, he argues persuasively, was a new emphasis on ethics in French thought, coming after a generation preoccupied with questions of texts and discourse. Contemporary cultural historians have become accustomed to referring to the "linguistic turn" and its impact on historical scholarship. Bourg, for his part, discerns an "ethical turn," the first seeds of which were planted by those taking part in the daily innovations lived in the streets surrounding the Sorbonne. How should we speak to each other? How should we treat each other? These were the kinds of questions with which the revolutionary students grappled.

The path leading from May 1968 to the present state of French thought has been a circuitous one, and Bourg's careful tracing of it strikes the reader like nothing so much as the slow emergence of a photographic image in the darkroom, composing itself in its chemical bath. In this regard, his book is the kind of intellectual history that seeks to discover what we used to call "patterns of consciousness." The work of Martin Jay has provided some notable examples in recent years.

Bourg begins by describing the years immediately following May 1968, during which political activists, Michel Foucault among them, took up the cause of prison reform. Directly responding to the conditions endured by May radicals serving prison sentences, they raised important ethical concerns. Next, the author turns to the difficult, iconoclastic work produced by the collaboration between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Their 1972 opus *Capitalisme et schizophrenie, Vol. I, L'Anti-Oedipe* (*Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 1977) has long been regarded as the quintessential expression of the intellectual energies unleashed by May 1968. Bourg, however, finds in their eccentric theorizing of desire more stirrings of a new ethics, something which Foucault himself claimed for them a few years later. Foucault's assertion appeared in his preface to the English translation.

Bourg next examines the ways in which the early 1970s French feminist and gay rights movements wrestled with ethical questions, partly in response to Deleuze and Guattari. The subject of rape was one that often found feminists at odds with their *gauchiste* male counterparts, while the question of cross-generational sex created divisions between most feminists and those gay male activists, such as Guy Hocquenghem, who demanded an end to that particular prohibition.

Bourg argues that the so-called "new philosophers" who came to prominence, not to mention celebrity status (especially in the case of publicity hound Bernard-Henri Lévy), in the late 1970s, accelerated the "turn" toward ethical concerns. The former Maoists, he shows, increasingly embraced religion, particularly a kind of neo-Jansenism. One important result of this return to Jansenism was deep skepticism regarding political solutions, leftist or otherwise, to human problems. The deeply mystical Maurice Clavel was central to this development. Bourg describes the importance of his friendship for Foucault, despite the latter's secularist stance. While he is scornful of the rhetorical excesses and intellectual posturing of the *nouveaux philosophes*, they suit his purposes in the intellectual genealogy the book traces.

In the last part of his book, Bourg considers the influence of the growing ethical emphasis in French culture on the late work of, respectively, Jean-Paul Sartre and Foucault. They, in turn, thereby encouraged the further development of the central focus on ethics that this book does so much to reveal. Looking back over four decades of French history, Bourg shows that the terrain of political discourse has shifted from revolution to rights. Although he does not take up the topic of recent immigration in France, those who have studied it have found that the ranks of activists sympathetic to the *sans-papiers* include veterans of May 1968. The interventions of Tzvetan Todorov and Julia Kristeva on behalf of immigrants also come to mind.

Bourg's excellent study makes a distinctive contribution to the history of May 1968, and establishes an important new theme for French intellectual history.

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ELI NATHANS. *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility, and Nationalism*. New York: Berg. 2004. Pp. xvii, 294. Cloth $79.95, paper $26.95.

Although research for this first major English-language study of the evolution of German nationality legislation ends (apparently conveniently) with the 1999 Nationality Law, which has provided an opportunity for easing the integration of over 7 million foreign residents toward German nationality, the research for this volume began before this measure had appeared on the political horizon. Eli Nathans's volume is very much grounded in the legislation that preceded the 1999 measure, dating back to the early nineteenth century.

Following the traditional periodization of the evolution of the modern German nation state, Nathans begins with three chapters on the years 1815–1870 in which he compares "The Narrow-Heartedness of Small States" with nation-building and the consequently more inclusive nature of nationality law evolving in the ever-expanding Prussia. The chapter dealing with the smaller states takes the reader to one of the key origins of immigration and nationality control in premodern states, suggested in the subtitle of the book, in the form of utility, which has played an important role in subsequent legislation in larger European states. These smaller states, based on medieval restrictive practices determined by institutions such as guilds, remained exclusionist, believing that even the entry and consequent naturalization of small numbers of foreigners—including, at this stage, those from other German states—could seriously impair the welfare of long standing residents. Nathans contrasts this situation with the more

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inclusive nationality legislation of expantionist Prussia, which, inevitably, involved itself in "Breaking Town Walls."

Nathans entitles the second part of his volume "Citizenship Policy as a Political Weapon, 1871–1918." The opening two chapters here demonstrate the relationships among nationality law, labor importation, immigration control, citizenship, and race. Nathans devotes an entire chapter to Otto von Bismarck's policies toward Poles and Jews and examines the previously well covered subject of the deportation of Poles during 1885 and 1886. Nathans also points to the existence of racial hierarchies, which determined attitudes toward legal outsiders during this period. He further tackles the evolution of the 1913 Nationality Law, which determined much of the legislation that would follow during the twentieth century. This legislation was informed by the presence of millions of Germans abroad, who could keep allegiance to their fatherland in hopes that they would one day return home.

Rather bizarrely, the final part of the study links the Weimar Republic, the Nazi period, and the postwar years together in one section entitled "Nadir and Transformation, 1918–2000," although Nathans does devote one chapter to each of these periods. The chapter on the Weimar Republic stresses the importance of the Treaty of Versailles, which led to the rapid granting of citizenship to those ethnic Germans who wished to move out of territory lost in the postwar settlement. This contrasted to attitudes toward those Jews who did not possess German nationality, which remained virtually impossible to obtain. Perhaps because of the attention which the Nazi period has already attracted, Nathans deals with it in just eighteen pages. Finally, he brings his volume up to date, stressing the transformations which took place in German society as a result of the importation of foreign workers, which almost made the introduction of the 1999 law inevitable. Most importantly, this measure introduced *jus solis* to a citizenship system that had previously relied almost entirely upon *jus sanguinis*, meaning that the children of the millions of foreigners born in Germany could claim the nationality of their country of birth.

Nathans has written a good introduction to the evolution of nationality law in Germany over the past two centuries. Inevitably, in such a survey, some periods and themes receive rather cursory attention. Apart from the brief coverage of the Nazi period Nathans devotes just four lines to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), apparently justifying this by the fact that "the GDR was not characterized by much immigration." The volume offers more in its examination of the period before 1871 than in the coverage of the years since then. Nevertheless, Nathans keeps his volume together by pursuing the themes suggested in his subtitle throughout. He also deals well with the issue of "race" in the years up to 1945, devoting much attention to the marginalization of Jews before the Nazi period. Nathans further tackles the relationship of gender to nationality as another key theme, demonstrating that, for much of the past two centuries, women in Germany simply took the citizenship of their husbands, a situation that changed with the rise of gender equality after World War II. Written in often rather legalistic prose, Nathans's book is nevertheless a good starting point for those who wish to pursue the study of German, and European, nationality law and their relationship to immigration and ethnicity.

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JEFF LIPKES. *Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914*. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press. 2007. Pp. 815. $56.00.

War brings out the worst in Germans; at least, that is what Jeff Lipkes argues in this vividly detailed narration of the German army's invasion of Belgium in August 1914. Thousands of Belgians were summarily shot, murdered, raped, wounded, and killed in what Lipkes describes as sanctioned organized violence by German soldiers toward local residents, male and female, young and old. He describes how 6,000 Belgian civilians lost their lives at the hands of the German army in massacres in Liège, Aarschot, Ardenne, Tamines, Dinant, and Leuven. Lipkes has an obvious narrative talent and dedicates ten out of the fifteen chapters (a total of 500 pages) to recounting what happened in August 1914. He quotes extensively from eyewitness recollections to add substance and detail. His research assistants and translators are also to be commended for the wealth of beautifully translated material.

Although this bookis not the first study in recent years to do so, it helps to put to rest the accusations made at the time by the German authorities of Belgian *franc-tireur* activity against the German army, activity which, if it had occurred, would have vindicated the Germans for taking reprisal actions against Belgian civilians. These accusations were fomented by interwar politicians within and outside Germany and subsequently repeated by numerous historians. He shows that there were few (if any) *franc-tireur* attacks made by Belgian civilians in 1914 and that the persistence of the myth of *franc-tireurs* came out of a clever and successful misinformation campaign orchestrated by the German leadership that was aided by an overzealous Allied propaganda machine.

Where Lipkes's book is rich in detail and description—the tension, fear, and emotion of the massacres virtually drips off the page—it is much weaker in explaining why they actually happened. Lipkes's teleological analysis of the German soldiers' behavior is highly flawed. He assigns the occurrence of the massacres to national character, as something peculiarly "German," and as rehearsals (hence the book's title) for the more familiar historical realities of Nazi brutalities during World War II. He repeatedly presents woefully inadequate and unsubstantiated generalizations along the lines of "The invasion of Belgium precipitated a long chain of events that resulted in the murders of untold millions of civilians [during the Holocaust]" (p. 19); "In

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fact, virtually all educated Germans [in 1914] shared beliefs that can only be called delusional" (p. 550); and that the rationale behind the *franc-tireur* myth "is unsatisfying because it generalizes and universalizes what was in fact a German problem" (p. 550). Lipkes hopes to convince us that Germans, unlike any other European people, were innately barbaric and swept up in exaggerated patriotic pride, military arrogance, xenophobia, and a love for war. He uses descriptions of Germany and Germans made by literary, popular, and political observers in the prewar years to validate these claims. As a result of their national predilections, or so Lipkes would have us believe, the German soldiers responsible for the massacres in Belgium in August 1914 had a "deadened conscience" (pp. 570–571) that allowed them to kill, maim, and torture innocent civilians. This argument is so obviously problematic that it almost renders explanation redundant.

It is really not so far-fetched that in the extraordinary circumstances of war, excesses in soldiers' behavior toward civilians are not only possible but probable. Cynics would even argue that they are highly likely (an obvious contemporary example is the much publicized Abu Ghraib scandal in the current Iraq war). Lipkes would have been better served if he had integrated more of the readily available and massive historiography on Wilhelmine society, culture, and politics as well as the decidedly smaller (but no less significant) history of Belgium in World War I to contextualize and ground his bold arguments about German national character and soldiers' wartime behavior.

Lipkes narrates a compelling tale of the horror of war and explains the mechanisms behind a complex myth-making machine that tried to distract attention from the reality of the massacres. However, he tells us little about the context of the massacres and why they occurred or what their occurrence might tell us about the hysteria at work among German soldiers (and wider public) in the opening months of war. Instead he presents us with the unoriginal view that German barbarity sealed the fate of Belgian civilians in August 1914 and of millions of others in the Nazi era. Lipkes's myth is neither historically sound nor convincing. It certainly does not serve well the memory of the Belgian civilians killed in 1914 and their descendants, to whom he dedicates this weighty tome.

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ROGER CHICKERING. *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918.* (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 24.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 628. $99.00.

In this magisterial book, Roger Chickering combines his extensive empirical research on the city of Freiburg during World War I with his comparative reflections, published in a series of co-edited volumes, on the heuristic perspectives of the concept "total war." He has chosen Freiburg, a university town close to the Black Forest with a population of 85,000 in 1914, in order to prove his conceptual proposition that "total war requires total history" (p. 2). Hence his account does not only include chapters on topics usually found in histories of the home front during the Great War, such as the not unanimously positive reactions to the declaration of war in August 1914, changes in the workforce and the local economy, and remarks on the aggravation of class differences and the dysfunctionality of local government. An analysis of the increasing food crisis and the subsequent development of a black market is also a familiar feature of accounts on German society during World War I, although the extent of the city's re-ruralization is surprising and astonishing: by 1918, no less than one-third of the households were farming their own allotments.

Chickering understands the ubiquitous nature of total war as a material reality. In a brilliant and highly innovative chapter, for instance, he analyzes the war as an attack on the senses. From the strange taste of Ersatz bread and rutabagas to the changing urban scenery due to the restrictions on artificial light imposed in April 1915 in reaction to the first Allied air raids, the totality of World War I is made plausible in its physical dimension, in the way it fundamentally affected and changed the sensory perceptions of the people of Freiburg. Another chapter elaborates on this with regard to the constant rumble the people of Freiburg could hear from the frontline, which was less than thirty miles away. Physical reality also included the direct presence of destruction and loss of life through Allied air raids. On twenty-five separate occasions (Freiburg was bombed more often than any other German city during the war) French and British aircraft attacked, dropping a total of 289 bombs. The loss of life was rather limited; the air raids added only 31 civilians to the much larger death toll of 3,353 local soldiers. But the bombing war caused widespread fear and created nocturnal communities in the cellars of those houses where people sought refuge from the raids. In addition, the bombing fueled the totalization and escalation of warfare, albeit still on a modest scale. As early as 1915 city councilors had contemplated placing a POW camp in the middle of Freiburg to discourage further air raids. After a severe raid in April 1917, 250 British prisoners, most of them officers, were transferred to quarters in the old university building near the city center. As the streetlights were switched off, only that building was illuminated and "remained a lone beacon in the dark" (p. 301).

Whereas the all-encompassing nature of total war is described in great detail, Chickering pays less attention to the analysis of the social and cultural driving forces behind the mobilization and re-mobilization of the civilians despite extended and intensive material hardship. His remarks about the languages of grief and mourning provided by Catholic and Protestant clergymen are somewhat conventional, and his analysis of nationalist discourses and pressure groups is rather brief, although it provides some interesting details about the

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collection and publication of soldiers' letters by professors of the local university, and their contribution to the literary imaginary of the German war effort. The relative neglect of the social forces of mobilization for total war is the result of Chickering's deliberate decision to focus on the "self-realization of war, the fulfilment of its totality" as the central narrative of the story (p. 7). In this perspective, total war turns to a certain extent into an automatic subject. But the slightly teleological aspect of this approach does not diminish the substantial insights this total history of wartime German society from a local perspective yields. Chickering's book is thus not only a very detailed and rich account of the German home front from 1914 until 1918, but also a major contribution to the discussion about the forms and extent of total war in the twentieth century.

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Eugene R. Sheppard. *Leo Strauss and the Politics of Exile: The Making of a Political Philosopher.* (The Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry.) Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 191. $24.95.

Eugene R. Sheppard's study examines Leo Strauss, the Jew, the German, the Zionist, the critic of liberalism, and above all the philosopher. The Strauss that emerges from this meticulous study is a fervent conservative and an eclectic voice. Simultaneously shaped by the multiplicity of biographical, historical, and philosophical contexts, Strauss bridged some of the most extreme Weimar philosophical traditions in his own work.

Born into rural Hesse in the small town of Kirchhain, raised in a middle-class Jewish family, Strauss grew up within a Jewish community of religious observance and patriotism, a conservative region in which political antisemitism found receptive listeners. Recalling his childhood in a Zionist article, Strauss believed that the rural Hessen communities had "remained virtually untouched by the liberal Reform movement" (p. 10) in the nineteenth century. For him, his place of origin informed his philosophical and political views. Kirchhain also placed him in geographical proximity to the neo-Kantian and Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, whose philosophical work continued to emanate from Marburg even after his retirement in 1912. Strauss shared with many other German Jewish intellectuals of the period a great admiration for the Jewish neo-Kantian "because he was a passionate philosopher and a Jew devoted to Judaism" (p. 14).

Sheppard aptly traces the formative years of Strauss in Hesse and as a student, who enrolled at the University of Marburg in 1917 to take philosophy under the neo-Kantians Nicolai Hartmann and Paul Natrop. During the years of the Weimar Republic, Strauss pursued his intellectual curiosity further in theology, philosophy, and history at various universities and published in several Jewish and Zionist journals. After he completed his doctorate in 1921 under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer in Hamburg, he came under the intellectual influence of Martin Heidegger, who initially taught in Freiburg but took Cohen's philosophy chair in Marburg in 1925. Heidegger's magnetism further fermented a fascination that had already emerged in Strauss's dissertation on Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, a critic of the Enlightenment. In 1924–1925, Strauss also joined the ranks of intellectuals who lectured at Franz Rosenzweig's Free Jewish House of Study. Located at the crossroads of conflicting philosophical orientations, he was critical of liberalism and the enlightened faith in progress and reason and utilized Zionism mainly during this period to dissect German Jews' instability and misguided sense of security (p. 19).

The impact of Rosenzweig, Heidegger, and eventually Carl Schmidt gave Strauss's philosophy its unique voice. The bridging of divergent influences led some like Gershom Scholem falsely to identity Strauss as an atheist, which Scholem saw as a scholarly shortcoming that dampened Strauss's chances for a desirable position at the Hebrew University after 1933 (p. 73). Yet it was Strauss, as this study convincingly argues, who rejected the radical separation of reason and revelation. Philosophy, Strauss believed, remained inescapably linked to theology; neither the modern liberal state nor philosophy could negate the importance of theology and religious law and had to conceal their indebtedness and dependence. In his scholarly work, he unearthed the commingling of philosophy and law in the tenth-century Arabic philosopher and Neoplatonist Abu Nasr al-Farabi and traced this same confluence in the work of Moses Maimonides and Baruch Spinoza (pp. 75–76).

Strauss critiqued not only the secular posturing of modern philosophy and politics but also liberalism's failure to deal with National Socialism. It was in his 1932 review of Schmidt's *Concept of the Political* (1927) that Strauss denounced the complacency that permeated modern liberal civilization. As Strauss put it shortly after Adolf Hitler's ascension to power in 1933: "Just because the right-wing-oriented Germany does not tolerate us [the Jews], it simply does not follow that the principles of the right are therefore to be rejected" (p. 61). He indeed believed that "only on the basis of the principles of the right—fascist, authoritarian, *imperial*"—was it possible to marshal protest against Nazi Germany (p. 61).

Sheppard's perceptive study illuminates the extent to which Strauss's life, the Weimar context, and the philosophical traditions influenced him and conjoined in his attempt to understand the predicament of reason and revelation by scrupulously studying pre-modern thinkers in an effort to find some grounding for his own intellectual and biographical experience of exile. In Strauss's thinking exile (*galut*) had become the defining and permanent facet of Jewish life that could not be overcome without losing Judaism's foundation in divine law and messianic redemption (pp. 47, 126). Here Strauss in many ways approximated Schmidt's criticism of liberalism and understanding of politics. In the end,

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Sheppard is at his best in arguing and delineating the creative tension between Strauss and the non-Jewish philosophers like Heidegger and Schmidt, while Rosenzweig in the end remained much less important than Sheppard tries to suggest (p. 28). Notwithstanding this minor criticism, Sheppard's book provides a fresh venue to continue to investigate Strauss's trajectory from Weimar to Chicago.

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WOLF GRUNER. *Jewish Forced Labor under the Nazis: Economic Needs and Racial Aims, 1938–1944*. Translated by KATHLEEN M. DELL'ORTO. New York: Cambridge University Press, in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 2006. Pp. xxiv, 322. $75.00.

This volume makes available in English an augmented version of a study on the same subject published in German by the author in 1997. It demonstrates conclusively that forced labor by Jews during the Third Reich did not begin, as is often assumed, with the notorious wartime camp system of the SS but was instead initiated by civilian labor authorities in line with the persecutory measures adopted in the wake of the pogrom of November 1938. Jews who became eligible for governmental unemployment insurance benefits as a consequence of the boycotts and occupational prohibitions imposed by the Nazi regime were, beginning in newly annexed Austria and then throughout the Reich, required to take work assigned them by government offices in charge of labor affairs. Nominally they were employees covered by individual contracts, but in reality they had no choice of jobs, were segregated from non-Jews, and had to accept substandard wages. Increasing numbers were compelled by the labor offices to toil in labor camps remote from their homes, where their freedom of movement was tightly restricted.

As Wolf Gruner demonstrates on the basis of prodigious archival research, Jewish forced labor was extensively exploited to augment a German workforce diminished by preparations for, and execution of, Adolf Hitler's war. Gruner estimates that even before the war began, some 20,000 Jews were involuntarily toiling within the Reich, under supervision of the labor authorities, for private companies, municipalities, and government agencies. By the spring of 1941 the number had grown to 50,000. At least 400 Jewish labor camps, some of brief duration, were established in the Germany expanded by the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. In the wake of Hitler's military conquests, the author estimates that more than a million Jews were eventually subjected to servitude by the labor authorities, some 700,000 in occupied Poland alone, where more than 900 camps were created for the extraction of Jewish labor.

By 1942 this system was being eroded by other Nazi policies. The eastward deportations preparatory to genocidal slaughter reduced the supply of Jewish workers in Germany, who were increasingly replaced by laborers drawn from conquered countries, especially from Poland. In the eastern occupied areas, the SS established its own extensive system of forced-labor camps for Jews. Nevertheless, the author finds that the labor authorities proved resourceful in retaining a role in the exploitation of Jewish labor. Whenever possible, they resisted the deportation of their charges on the grounds that they were performing tasks essential to the war economy. Where the SS asserted its much harsher control over Jews, the labor authorities became willing accomplices.

Gruner maintains that the often-invoked charge that the forced labor of Jews in the Third Reich amounted to "destruction through work" does not apply to the system administered by the labor authorities. Although it operated within parameters set by Nazi racist doctrine, he insists that its rationale was economic maximization, not physical annihilation. Despite that system's repressive and exploitative nature, Gruner argues that the labor authorities' self-serving efforts to retain control over their victims eventually made it possible for tens of thousands of Jews to survive the Holocaust.

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PETER REICHEL. *Erfundene Erinnerung: Weltkrieg und Judenmord in Film und Theater*. (Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus.) Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 2007. Pp. 374. €12.95.

The theme of World War II and the Holocaust has occasioned a wealth of historiography, but few titles dealing with political and cultural developments have been as enlightening as Peter Reichel's new book. Seldom has a writer so successfully placed his work within the context of a complex moral framework while never losing sight of his role as a guide to the interface of aesthetics and politics. Reichel deconstructs the cinematic and theatrical interpretations of what he terms the "life myths" that comforted so many Germans and Austrians after the war. In carrying out this mission, he never loses sight of the fact that media productions often play a central role in public perceptions of historical events.

Reichel organizes his analysis around two major thematic areas, embracing both World War II and the Holocaust, concluding that each motif developed its own interpretive history. He focuses on the revolutionary activities of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and the military conspiracy that led to the abortive assassination plot against Adolf Hitler in July 1944; on whether Stalingrad should be interpreted as the criminal deployment of the Sixth Army or as a model of redemptive sacrifice; and on interpreting several outstanding East German DEFA films as both anti-fascist and anti-war productions. Turning to Auschwitz, he chronicles not only the postwar German amnesia about the crimes against humanity but each subsequent stage in the development of painful memory thereafter. He never loses sight of

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the political drama played out with unrelenting intensity at the national, state, and local level, as well as the major cinematic, theatrical, and television productions in its development. The Nuremberg trials, the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, the Auschwitz trial, and the Maidanek trials form major components of the book. Reichel analyzes the role of theater as a forum of justice, spotlighting the plays of Rolf Hochhuth, Peter Weiss, and Rainer Werner Fassbinder in this regard. His section on the importance of television films that made history—spectacular commercial successes such as *Holocaust*, *Heimat*, and *Shoah*—is noteworthy, and he deems *Schindler's List* to be in a class by itself.

Germans and Austrians were reluctant to admit their association with Nazi criminality after the war, and some of the most significant artistic productions of the period succeeded in transmuting their sense of guilt as members of the Nordic *Volksgemeinschaft* into the liberating role of innocent victims in the postwar national *Opfergemeinschaft*. Wolfgang Borchert's highly successful play, *Draussen vor der Tür*, played no small part in lending aesthetic accompaniment to this transfiguration from perpetrator to victim, and its lead character, the tortured Beckmann, became symbolic of his generation as a result. An identical function in affirming the virtue of the officer class was played by "General Harras" in Carl Zuckmayer's *Des Teufels General*, which enjoyed success on both the stage and screen. The work was a barely camouflaged study of the agony of the high-ranking Luftwaffe General Ernst Udet, who committed suicide in November 1941, and was successful in transforming the theatrical stage into a world court that severely judged the criminality of Hitler and the Third Reich.

Germans in the postwar era were divided as to whether the attempted assassination of Hitler by ranking military officers represented an act of treachery or heroism. Reichel judges the cinematic interpretation of the political and moral implications of the plot presented in Falk Harnack's *Der 20. Juli* to be superior to Georg Wilhelm Pabst's *Es geschah am 20. Juli*, and submits that Erwin Piscator's direction of Hans Hellmut Kirst's novel, *Aufstand der Offiziere*, staged at the Volksbühne in Berlin in 1966, was a fiasco. Further, the battle of Stalingrad presented artists with significant dramatic material, an opportunity not lost on the communist author Theodor Plivier, whose novel *Stalingrad* was a masterpiece. On the other hand, the popular film *The Doctor of Stalingrad* posited that nobility can be found in tragedy, and played into the Germans' unrelenting search for exoneration after the war. Major exhibitions regarding the Wehrmacht's complicity in atrocities and war crimes have not succeeded in rendering invalid the widely held view that the men of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army were victims, not accomplices, in Nazi criminality.

Media interpretation of the Holocaust, on the other hand, has forced the Germans to face up to the unvarnished truth about the extent of Nazi crimes, succeeding in bringing about a basic change in historic memory where nearly a half century of trials had failed. Claims of innocence gradually lost their currency. Charges of Marxist bias, Bonn-DDR disputes, renewed antisemitism, the defenses of Pope Pius XII, the tyranny of political correctness, the Goldhagen controversy, and the divisive political battles over the creation of museums and monuments all have been forced to give way to the truth conveyed by the moving image. It was after all, as the blockbuster *Holocaust* film so graphically demonstrated, Jews and not Germans who were gunned down by the Einsatzgruppen and cremated in the gas chambers. Reichel analyzes these themes with remarkable clarity of style and moral purpose.

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TIMOTHY L. SCHROER. *Recasting Race after World War II: Germans and African Americans in American-Occupied Germany*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. 2007. Pp. xiv, 295. $34.95.

Recently, historians have begun to investigate the afterlife of "race" in post-Nazi Germany. Such scholarship has posed the question of continuity across 1945 by inquiring whether, and in what precise ways, German society remained racialized in its social ideology, policy, and practices after 1945. Historical research on "race" after National Socialism has emphasized transnational dimensions and the transformative role that contact with American occupiers, culture, and anti-black racism has played in postwar Germany. For example, Uta G. Poiger first explored the social and cultural threat that the import and youthful consumption of "black" American music like jazz and rock 'n' roll was perceived to represent to the postwar reconstruction of national identity and gender norms by East and West German authorities alike. Others have probed the impact of U.S. race relations, via its segregated military, on postwar German notions of "race," norms of female comportment, and processes of democratization. In addition, historians have attempted to gauge reciprocal influence by attending to the question of whether and how African Americans' experience in occupied Germany affected American race relations and fueled civil rights activism at home.

Timothy L. Schroer's new bookis informed by and modeled on this scholarship. His first chapter sketches the history of German conceptions of race through 1945 and emphasizes the consistency with which racial difference, and specifically African origin and black skin, was linked to negative sexual, moral, and intellectual traits. This was accompanied by steadfast injunctions against race-mixing and a corresponding commitment to "whiteness," among majority Europeans and Americans alike, which both undergirded racialized conceptions of national identity and stimulated international solidarities across national borders into the post–World War II period. Schroer notes Germans' embrace of a distinct "Aryan" identity under National Socialism, then shifts to a discussion of American understanding

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of Nazi racism and preparations to counter it toward the end of World War II. American initiatives in this area, he concludes, dramatically constrained Germans' ability to invoke the language of race, conditioned Germans' racial understanding, and encouraged Germans to adopt the black-white binary and revel in a shared "whiteness" with the majority of their occupiers. These arguments, which highlight the particular transformative power of American occupation, are not new. The originality of Schroer's arguments emerges in chapters two and three, which exhaustively mine archival and published sources to provide a close analysis of the "racial logic" of American and German responses to the employment and policing of African American troops in occupied Germany; the incidence and significance of criminality and sexually transmitted diseases among their ranks; and in particular tensions between the American military government and the U.S. army (USFET and later EUCOM) regarding the regulation and behavior of troops on the ground in Germany.

Schroer's general analysis regarding the perceived crisis surrounding interracial sex between black GIs and white German women, and the moral condemnation of those women, is familiar. Nonetheless, he emphasizes more emphatically and in more detail than others have the dynamics, alliances, and disagreements on the ground in Germany among German authorities, American occupation officials, and U.S. military officers regarding interracial fraternization, and confirms German officials' increasing tendency after 1945 to object to it using moral (rather than explicitly racist) arguments; to target, and not infrequently incarcerate, German women rather than black soldiers (over whom they had no authority); and to opt, ultimately, for the "selective enforcement of racially neutral laws" such as those regulating communicable diseases or prostitution to discourage interracial sex (p. 118). In chapter four, he offers some interesting observations concerning the fetishistic appeal of black sexual partners for German women and white sexual partners for black American men. Moreover, he considers the "complexities of attraction and power" (p. 120) in these relationships, noting the relative powerlessness of white German women as compared with that of black American occupiers, who could at least appeal to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People back home to publicize instances of overt racism and mistreatment. In the final chapter, he abruptly switches register and explores the German reception of "black music," which was more negative for jazz (which connoted negative aspects of modernity and "racial mixing" to some) than for spirituals (which were viewed as "authentic" and "organic" expressions of American Negro suffering and spirituality). Schroer surveys official American debates about what types of music should be used for German re-education and to what effect. He also provides a nuanced discussion of the range of German responses, showing that when it came to music, notions of racial difference colored both evaluation and consumption. In surveying their interaction with black Americans and black music, Schroer sensibly concludes that "race" retained its conceptual importance for Germans after 1945, although it was formulated in increasingly cultural—rather than rigorously biological—terms.

Schroer does not chart new interpretive ground. His contribution is to fine-tune existing historiography and fill some gaps in the empirical record through careful archival research, particularly for the four years (1945–1949) on which he focuses. In its overall content and argument, the book echoes—too closely at times—Poiger's *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (2000), Maria Höhn's *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (2002), and my own *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (2005), yet lacks their broader periodization and analytical sweep. Rather than open up new research questions or fundamentally alter our understanding of the postwar process of racialization in Germany, Schroer's book adds interesting detail to the picture, particularly concerning the ambiguities and ambivalence in official American response to African American troops and their use in occupied Germany. Yet his efforts to reconcile analytically the social history focus of his early chapters with his final chapter on the reception of "black" music fall short, creating a sense of disjuncture that persists through his too-brief conclusion. While the book provides moments of illumination, its sum does not add up to more than its parts.

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ANDREW I. PORT. *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 303. $75.00.

For much of the nearly two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historiography of East Germany has been dominated by efforts to explain the communist regime's sudden collapse. Andrew I. Port's insightful book joins a growing number of studies that focus not on the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) inevitable end but on its durability. In his study of Thuringia's Saalfeld region, he takes the history of East Germany into the provinces and, more importantly, argues that East Germans at this local and regional level were not merely objects of state control but important participants in maintaining social and political stability. Although Port acknowledges that the GDR was a "police state," he ultimately explains the regime's survival as a product of "social fragmentation" that prevented mass political opposition and "official accommodation" that sought to ameliorate many of the material and political complaints that arose at the grass roots (pp. 109, 279).

Although not strictly chronological, the book's two sections divide at 1953, the year of widespread popular uprisings that nearly brought down the communist (Socialist Unity Party or SED) government. His study runs through 1971, when Erich Honecker took over SED leadership from Walter Ulbricht—an event without

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equivalent drama in Saalfeld. In part one ("Upheaval"), three chapters explore the SED's efforts to remake the region's politics and society in the aftermath of war and Nazi rule. The seven chapters in part two ("The Calm after the Storm") first consider the limits of state repression before investigating how local officials sought to manage the often competing demands presented by central economic and political plans and popular efforts to extract from the system as many material compromises as possible. Port concentrates on industrial workers and farmers (the former a bit more than the latter) and explores how they managed the evolving pressures of extreme housing shortages, collectivization, production norms, and party-political mobilization.

In the battle between state calls for increased productivity and worker demands for better working and living conditions, factory officials seemed most fearful about any step that might undermine shop floor harmony. They accepted the "soft" production norms many workers desired, which meant that even into the 1960s in some departments, norm fulfillment averaged 200 percent. Port concludes that East Germans like these workers possessed, within certain boundaries, remarkable room to contest, rework, and adapt the conditions they faced in their everyday lives. For local factory, collective farm, and party officials, these boundaries had been demarcated most iconically by the mass protests in June 1953, which both state and party officials at the time describe as explicitly political. Not surprisingly, then, repressive measures targeted those actions that these officials perceived as conspiring against the East German state, even if there was little evidence of that sort of organized opposition after 1953.

As did his East German subjects, Port wrestles to define the boundaries of "political" action. He muses about the possibility that "all nonconformist behavior was perforce 'political' because most East Germans knew that it would or could be interpreted as such by those in positions of authority" but warns against automatically "politicizing such behavior" and painting it as heroic resistance (pp. 280–281). Instead, he adapts Alf Lüdtke's term *Eigen-Sinn* (perhaps best translated as stubborn self-will) to describe workers' and farmers' efforts to work the system for their own (especially material) ends. This is a very productive analytical choice, but in seeking to avoid "politicizing" the small practices at the heart of his account, Port largely seals these actors off from the ways their choices necessarily underwrote the very hegemonic structures to which they were subject. Thus, when describing workers' ability to manipulate production norms to their benefit even as they were unable to eliminate the system as a whole, Port writes "[m]ost may have been remarkably *eigensinnig* in the way in which they pursued their own interests . . . but they were not in a position to burst the parameters set by the party and state" (p. 279). His use of *Eigen-Sinn* celebrates its admittedly limited liberating aspects while making less explicit its implication that these workers (along with the party and the state) also shaped these political "parameters."

Port effectively subverts any claim that iconic political moments—like the June 1953 uprisings or a change in GDR leadership—defined power relationships in the GDR. Instead these big events mattered to the extent that they put into relief the often contradictory meanings that workers, farmers, but also local and regional officials in Saalfeld attributed to the practices with which they navigated their daily lives. These meanings often remained rather ethereal, like the perfume that allowed police workers registering visitors from the West to "smell the difference" between them (p. 250). It is, however, in this sort of small detail that this book most fully realizes its promise, to explore how relationships between people mattered in making and sustaining the GDR.

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GUIDO RUGGIERO. *Machiavelli in Love: Sex, Self, and Society in the Italian Renaissance*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 285. $45.00.

This is Guido Ruggiero's third book on the history of sexual relations in Renaissance Italy. In 1985, using the criminal archives of Venice, he studied fornication, adultery, rape, sex with nuns, and sodomy. The material was stunning, but the author had not yet freed himself from the modern homosexual/heterosexual distinction. A second book in 1993 used the archives of the Venetian Inquisition to write extended narratives of passion and magic. This new book has a series of chapters in which imaginary literary works such as plays or novellas are compared with material drawn from the criminal statistics, the inquisition narratives, and the letters of Niccolò Machiavelli to show that imaginary actions and actual events illuminate each other. Literary scholars have been doing this for a generation, but it is relatively new for historians. The practice of literary scholars has often struck historians as either too schematic or too reliant on a very limited range of historical materials. On that last point Ruggiero is beyond criticism. One wishes however that he had counted the literary sources that literary scholars do not do. His first case study uses *Il marescalco*, a play by Pietro Aretino, to illustrate and extend the statistical findings on sodomy between younger and older males that he and Michael Rocke have established for Venice and Florence. But one wants to know how representative this work was in the entire corpus of Italian Renaissance plays.

One thing has changed spectacularly in Ruggiero's approach. The homosexual/heterosexual distinction has disappeared, and he takes for granted that all adult men in Renaissance Italy desired both adolescent boys and women. He still worries unnecessarily about Michel Foucault and his hypothesis as to whether sexuality and sexual identity existed before the nineteenth century. Ruggiero proposes that individuals in the Renaissance came to identities formed by the consensus of the var-

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ious communities for whom they performed themselves. I am not certain what this means, but it would seem likely that individuals have continued to do this to the present moment.

Chapters one and four are the strongest. In the first Ruggiero uses Aretino to argue that sodomy could be discreetly defended. This is likely enough, and one hopes that other areas of Italian high culture such as painting will be explored more systematically. Ruggiero mentions a painting by Giorgio Vasari, but there are the erotic drawings of Leonardo da Vinci and Parmigianino, the male courting couples in the back and foregrounds, and that army of adolescent angels and naked or half-naked Sebastians, Baptists, and Davids, all displaying young beauty to the lusting adult eye. Ruggiero uses Aretino to argue that men moved through more sexual stages then women did, from passive boy to active young unmarried man, to husband, to old man in his forties, and that a male might become stationary at one of these points. He wants to argue that a young man who wished to stay with boys and not move on to women as Aretino's protagonist does had acquired a sexual identity. This seems unlikely. But the boys who wished to remain passive after becoming men did acquire an identity and in other age-structured systems were given names for their roles such as *cinaedus* or *gallus* (Rome), *ibne* or *köçek* (Turkey), or hermaphrodite or bardash (Restoration England). In twentieth-century Syria and Mombassa where relations between males were organized by age differences, women took girls as lovers. There is no evidence so far for this in Italy, but if there were, it would make women's sexual stages as complex as men's. Chapter four takes a novella by Antonio Manetti about a joke that Filippo Brunelleschi played on Grasso the woodcarver and by brilliantly comparing it with a story from real life out of Machiavelli's letters, shows that Manetti's story had probably begun as a tale of the end of a love affair between two males when one of them was passing from boy to man. Chapter two is devoted to a novella but its accompanying real-life story is tangential. In chapter three the situation is reversed and the real-life abbot from the inquisition records overwhelms the commedia. Chapters five and six are on Machiavelli, make up half the book, and are supposed to be its climax. Chapter five takes the sexual lover Machiavelli presents himself as being in his letters and compares this with the characters in his comedies, arguing that Machiavelli puts some of himself into each of the male characters. The last chapter is on *virtu* and means to show how it was used to conceptualize identity and social order. It is difficult to follow and it causes the book to appear diffuse at its end. But the book as a whole is innovative in its technique, subtle and revealing in its arguments, and whenever it turns to the theme of sodomy, throws off brilliant light.

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QUERCIOLO MAZZONIS. *Spirituality, Gender, and the Self in Renaissance Italy: Angela Merici and the Company of St. Ursula (1474–1540)*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 247. $35.95.

This book represents the first modern English-language study on the subject and an important contribution to the literature on gender and religion in premodern Europe. Existing scholarship on women's spirituality tends to focus either on the late Middle Ages as a heyday of female religiosity or on the period after the Council of Trent as a time of curtailment of women's religious options. The Company of St. Ursula is usually dealt with in the latter narrative context, where it serves to illustrate Trent's more repressive aspects since the Ursulines were transformed into a cloistered teaching order after Trent. In concentrating on Angela Merici and her original vision for the Ursulines, Querciolo Mazzonis shifts the customary focus toward the first half of the sixteenth century and the company's earlier, less well-known history. He both highlights the extent to which Merici's institutional vision represents a culmination of medieval female spirituality and also identifies novel, forward-looking elements in the company's design, some of which outlived Trent-inspired reforms. In so doing, Mazzonis connects scholarship on medieval women's spirituality to the scholarship on changing female religious lives after Trent without resorting to a simplistic declension narrative. Along the way, he dismantles the common assumption that the company was founded for charitable work and teaching.

Mazzonis sees late medieval female religiosity as the most important context for understanding Merici and accordingly devotes the bulk of the book to situating her in that context. Merici appears at the zenith of a tradition of female "living saints" that goes back to the medieval penitential movement and groups such as the Beguines. Like these women before her, Merici eschewed the cloister to embrace a spiritual existence amid the bustle of the world. Her spirituality was deeply affective and mystical yet it propelled her into a range of activities—from civic peacemaking and political advising to preaching and exegesis—through which she bypassed social restrictions for women, again following a familiar medieval pattern.

Merici's true originality, so the argument goes, manifested itself in the attempt to make her highly personal spiritual experience reproducible for other women by creating an enabling institutional framework. Merici's Company of St. Ursula was an all-female and non-hierarchical organization that brought together lifelong virgins of all social backgrounds, who lived and worked in individual households but supported each other spiritually, with aristocratic widows, who managed the company's economic affairs. The company's rules were kept to a minimum and directed exclusively toward facilitating the virgins' constant and direct mystical communication with God. Membership implied a life-long commitment to living as a virginal Bride of Christ in a secular setting; marriage and the convent were no

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longer options. This permanent commitment set Merici's company apart from her medieval predecessors and amounted to codifying an altogether novel female identity: that of the religious virgin in the world, a precursor of the modern single woman.

In other respects, too, Mazzonis portrays Merici as part of a new era. The 1520s and 1530s were a time of widespread discussions about church reform and of religious experimentation that led to innovative foundations like the Jesuits. It was also an important moment in the history of Western subjectivity as complex notions of interiority and individuality took a firm hold. Older scholarship variously traced the origins of the modern self to Renaissance humanism (the Burckhardtian move) or the Protestant Reformation (the Weberian lens). More recently, medieval theology has been credited with fostering novel ideas about selfhood. Adapting the German confessionalization paradigm and its assertion of Catholicism's modernizing power to Italian developments, Mazzonis advances the intriguing claim that late fifteenth and early sixteenth-century Catholic spirituality was equally generative of a modern self as these other movements: it even enabled women like Merici to experience a Renaissance "self," albeit in the sphere of religion.

Based on a comparison with male contemporary writers, humanist and religious, Mazzonis establishes that the foundress of the Ursulines shared their belief in the self as a unique entity, with a complex emotional life and a free will. Her company's rule indeed granted each individual so much freedom in defining her relationship with God, "that one could say," Mazzonis concludes, "that the Ursuline was a 'Renaissance' individual" (p. 191).

But Merici's notion of the self also differed from that of male contemporaries. Male ascetic writers promoted a model of religious perfection in which a devout self struggled independently from a relatively distant God to overcome vice and thus prepare for future union with the divine. In Merici's model of religious perfection, by contrast, the self does not exist outside God at all but only comes into full being through constant union with the divine. Mazzonis pointedly labels this aspect of Merici's notion of the self—namely, the self's contingency upon the supernatural—"medieval" and "destined to decline" (p. 192). He is of course right in noting that suspicions toward unmediated mysticism mounted in the sixteenth century and the Council of Trent soon set strict parameters for sacred communications. As a result, the figure of the female living saint lost her public legitimacy and women in general lost ideological ground for the free exercise of individuality, intellect, and will.

Still, even if the figure of the living saint disappeared, the notion that one's individuality in the end flows from union with God remained valid for certain social groups well into the modern age. One wonders whether Mazzonis, who is otherwise so careful to reconstruct the alternate and often unconventional logic behind Merici's spirituality, did not shortchange her here by comparing Merici's model to an essentially Burckhardtian self, only to have hers fall short. It would seem worth exploring whether Merici (and other living saints) contributed instead to the long-term formation of an altogether different, alternate form of modern subjectivity that existed alongside the increasingly hegemonic humanist-liberal conception of personhood.

Overall this is a welcome new study of Merici and the Company of St. Ursula that contains much useful information for those with a general interest in the topic as well as interesting arguments for those more familiar with the literature on gender and religion in late medieval and early modern Europe.

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Irene Fosi. *La giustizia del papa: Sudditi e tribunali nello Stato Pontificio in età moderna*. (Quadrante Laterza, number 139.) Rome: Editori Laterza. 2007. Pp. x, 233. €20.00.

As the sixteenth century drew to a close, a re-emergent papacy fashioned an image of Rome and its territories as a model of good government. Central to this vision was the strict but balanced exercise of justice. Pope Sixtus V (1585–1590), a prime designer of this image, offered a fractious world the shining example of a state that purposefully prosecuted heresy and crime, restored public morality when broken, and maintained the peace. Needless to say, this propaganda effort concealed an infinitely more complex judicial world. In the last decades a growing number of historians have explored aspects of this world. In her new book, Irene Fosi draws especially on the Italian scholarship and her own archival work to propose a general overview.

In the early modern papal state, the pursuit of justice was highly idiosyncratic. As elsewhere in this period, it followed the binary tracks of civil and ecclesiastical law, and it set out to correct, according to not fully sorted out distinctions, both crime and sin. Yet in Rome and its territories all these endeavors were subject to one authority. The pope thus controlled a dizzying array of judicial institutions: the tribunal of the Governor of Rome; the civic court called *del Senatore*; the courts of the *Camera Apostolica* and the *Auditor Camerae*; the ecclesiastical tribunal of the Roman diocese, the Vicariate; the civic and diocesan courts of the subject provinces; the central tribunals of the papacy, including the *Rota*, the *Signatura*, the Penitentiary, and the Roman Inquisition; and, last but not least, the legions of confessors who wielded judicial powers in the forum of conscience. The result was a patchwork of jurisdictions for which the name of "justice system" would be inappropriate and anachronistic. Nor was this a stable universe. Following state-building arguments advanced by Paolo Prodi, Wolfgang Reinhard, and others (and echoing similar arguments made for other Italian states, such as Florence), Fosi observes a gradual penetration of the central Roman courts into the provinces.

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A major newcomer in this category, to which she devotes ample space, was the Roman Inquisition. Its integration within the world of papal justice and statecraft (a choice that owes much to Adriano Prosperi's pathbreaking *Tribunali della coscienza: Inquisitori, confessori, missionari* [1996]) is no doubt the most important novelty of Fosi's study.

In this picture of institutional fragmentation the author nevertheless discerns a common project: the disciplining of society. The papacy wielded its powers of temporal and spiritual justice in the public sphere to combat offenses ranging from violent crime to magic; it entered the private home to pursue domestic violence as much as bigamy. To what extent this project was successful remains unclear from the author's sampling of cases. Certainly outcomes varied dramatically. While the popes were able over time to tame the notoriously rebellious Roman nobility, the control of offenses like blasphemy, sodomy, and superstitious practices was much less successful; enforcement was often uneven, and many cases ended in settlement or dismissal. The reasons for this muddled result, Fosi suggests, lay in the structural weaknesses of the apparatus of justice. Institutions or officials with similar missions (such as provincial governors, bishops, and inquisitors) might collaborate on occasion, but were as often at odds with each other. Limited resources further conditioned judicial practice, as police were recruited among former bandits, unsalaried officials relied on coveted tax exemptions or gifts from interested parties, and papal clemency was sought through patronage. As a result, the judicial process itself was frequently contested for its partiality and venality.

Thus, Fosi concludes, high-minded ideals or proud claims were often far removed from "reality." Her book, clearly intended as a survey, does not delve into the deeper questions raised by this disparity or by the historiographical concepts (state building, modernization, social discipline) employed to frame the issue. Nor does it offer much systematic treatment of judicial institutions, procedures, or outcomes. Rather, by means of frequent examples and case studies, it illustrates the interconnectedness of diverse judicial bodies and practices, the ways in which individuals navigated the legal avenues open to them, and the socio-political contexts in which this occurred. In its comprehensive approach, the study also highlights elements of the judicial world (prisons, police, informants, confraternities) that are increasingly attracting scholarly attention. Fosi leaves her reader with a profoundly ambivalent portrait of papal justice. Even amid cries of severity or corruption, it was frequently preferred over other authorities; and while popes advertised themselves as the loftiest of judges, by the Enlightenment era negative publicity had forged an enduring myth of papal cruelty and obscurantism.

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BERTRAND FORCLAZ. *La famille Borghese et ses fiefs: L'autorité négociée dans l'État pontifical d'Ancien Régime*. (Collection de l'École Française de Rome, number 372.) Rome: École française de Rome. 2006. Pp. viii, 418. €50.00.

Swiss historian Bertrand Forclaz has produced one of the most substantial works on postmedieval feudalism in Italy since the work of Gerard Labrot on the Kingdom of Naples, published in the same series. In a field where single-fief studies are generally the norm, Forclaz surveys an entire "state" formed of thirty-one jurisdictions cobbled together by the Borghese family over a couple of generations, with the overt assistance of pontiffs who not only alerted their families of fiefs coming onto the market but then expanded the feudal rights the lords enjoyed. These feudatories retained extensive rights throughout the early modern period, though they were hemmed in by their vassals' appeals to higher authorities. This book is a corrective to a long-held view that the popes centralized government on Rome in the late sixteenth century.

The Borghese extracted very high dues from their vassals, almost a quarter of the harvest, compared to only ten percent in the Kingdom of Naples. Their feudal income included banalities, transit tolls, land transfer fees, and rights of justice and appeal (though not serfdom or corvées as in central Europe). As in Naples, the lord used the courts to increase the weight of these sources of income over time. The ability to extract fees from vassals was counterbalanced by the duty of providing grain for them in good times and bad and by donating money for masses and dowries for brides. Moreover, the lord delivered administrative posts and church benefices to his more literate vassals.

While feudal tribunals have been well studied by others, the special strength of this book lies in the way Forclaz shows how trials went to Rome for adjudication and appeal. Justice in the eyes of the Borghese primarily entailed the restoration of peace and the security of subjects, whose satisfaction solidified their allegiance to their lord: paternalist protection in exchange for loyalty. The harshest sentences were rarely carried out, in part because the culprits fled the jurisdiction; capital executions were exceedingly rare. The principal brake on harsh repression of villagers came from the prince's extensive use of pardon, which was often granted in exchange for a fee. The prince's generosity and magnanimity undercut the authority of the officials he employed in the village itself, who were limited-term outsiders. Conversely, the local magistrate's collusion with local notables generated victim complaints that justice was being denied, something the Borghese addressed through the use of special emissaries. But abuses do not appear worse than those encountered in state jurisdictions. We know something about them through the facility by which vassals delivered petitions to Rome—perhaps three or four every day! The lord appears to have sided often with his vassals against his own officials. These, after all, were "actors" who had a

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clear understanding of their predicament, and knew how to get results. Like Renata Ago and Caroline Castiglione, Forclaz underlines how much the peasants of Lazio mastered "adversarial literacy": it was in the lord's interest to be clement. Feudal justice was certainly not the brutal regime we sometimes imagine. If anything, it was too lenient and arbitrary.

Another good reason the prince had to be clement was the ease by which causes and people could be removed from his own jurisdiction. Several important Roman tribunals had purview over cases originating in the Borghese fiefs, launched by vassals who sought more stringent punishment of their adversaries or, in civil cases, on the urging of Roman creditors. The Borghese were especially careful not to give the powerful tribunal of the Governatore the pretext to intervene in the fiefs on pretext of repressing banditry, which was in continuous decline. They also took care not to antagonize ecclesiastics, who enjoyed extensive immunities and powerful supporters. Ecclesiastics enjoyed the support of the Borghese, who held extensive *giuspatronage* rights, and many of the feudal officials themselves were churchmen, a peculiarity of the Papal States. Most clerics or laymen could count on the prince's favor and held successive posts in the Borghese administration.

The lord was more vulnerable to the organized resistance of village assemblies. Until the eighteenth century, he was their major creditor, and often too the principal vendor of grain to village magazines. In 1704 the Papal Congregazione del Buon Governo, the regulator of local government, extended its purview over fiefs too. Roman officials began to support indebted communities in order to recover lands and income lost to feudatories. Some villages launched protracted lawsuits against important sources of feudal revenue, and often won. So, after a period of feudal growth, began a long twilight of power, influence, and revenue.

GREGORY HANLON
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CHAD BRYANT. *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 378. $49.95.

Chad Bryant's excellent new monograph examines the salient national question in the wartime Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Utilizing a variety of archival and printed sources he employs both top-down and bottom-up approaches to paint a rich picture of the complexities of German-Czech relations during the Nazi regime's five-year rule over the Protectorate. On the one hand, we see familiar figures—Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich and Edvard Beneš central among them—in a new light, reflected through the prism of the attempt to determine from the governmental side what the meanings of "German" and "Czech" were. On the other hand, Bryant sheds new light on the machinations of ordinary people trying to make sense of their identities in an era when their decisions could make the difference between life and death, or between being able to remain in their homes or being expelled. Here, he brings in denunciations, police reports, and even jokes to illuminate the vexing issue of national commitment. All of these sources contribute to the rich and vibrant descriptions that Bryant offers.

The central argument of the book is that the population of the Protectorate was "a hopelessly mixed people," to borrow the title of Bryant's first chapter, and Nazi plans to assimilate those Czechs who could be assimilated within the framework of racialist ideology and eliminate the rest developed in fits and starts until Heydrich's arrival in September of 1941. He "was genuinely determined to realize the complete Germanization of the Protectorate" (p. 159) and pushed the process of racial testing and registration forward. His assassination in mid-1942 caused the Germanization plans to falter, however, as Bryant points out. As the tide turned against the Reich and the Protectorate's economic importance to the German war effort increased in the months thereafter, the ideological foundation for Germanization was forced to give way to the practical need to achieve victory, and all such plans were put on hold. Nonetheless, the sharper ideological tone of Heydrich's regime, and the torrent of terror unleashed in retaliation for his murder, hardened the Czechs, such that a hatred of all things German characterized the final years of the war. My only criticism falls here, in that the period from Heydrich's assassination to liberation, as in so much other literature about the Protectorate, is given far less extensive treatment than the period prior to the assassination. Finally, the German authorities' attempts to decide who was Czech and who was German had an eerie analogue in the immediate postwar years, as authorities in liberated Czechoslovakia confronted the same questions in determining who should be expelled in the so-called "transfer" of the German population, covered in the final chapter. Here, again, questions of the "health" of the nation, and loyalty to it, came to the fore.

Some of the most interesting parts of this fascinating study examine the Nazi and Czechoslovak authorities' attitudes toward the difficult cases. These included the "amphibians" (p. 3), those who could move effortlessly between Czech and German cultures, as well as products of mixed marriages. The policies developed for these evolved in a convoluted fashion, especially those of the Nazis, whose racial science muddled the question significantly. The difficulties for the Nazis were not limited to such cases, however. Bryant also details the difficulties in German-German relations, as Protectorate Germans resented that they occupied lower positions in the Protectorate apparatus than did Reich Germans, and friction between the two groups continued throughout the war. Two groups of people did not cause classification difficulties, however, and they are not slighted: the Jews and the Roma. Because of the Nuremberg Laws, classifying and destroying the Protectorate's Jewry was not problematic, since, unlike at least some Czechs, the Jews could not be assimilated into the *Volk*. The deportations of much of the Pro-

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tectorate's Jewish population did not gain the Jews much sympathy from the Czechs, however, as Bryant notes the rise of Czech antisemitism in the period after Heydrich's assassination. Much the same, although with a sociological component to complement the racialist one, applied to the Roma.

While detailing the evolution of the national question, Bryant successfully pursues two further agendas. The first is to situate developments in the Protectorate within the wider scope of the European war. Events in, and plans for, the General Government in Poland, and the relations between Beneš and the Allies, strongly influenced the Protectorate. Simultaneously, he goes into great depth regarding what constituted resistance and what collaboration. This question, central to so much current research, is amply illuminated in its social setting, revealing the variable definitions of each term and how each was an act of performed identity. This book, then, ranges far beyond the Protectorate, and has much to offer all historians of modern Europe.

BRADLEY ABRAMS
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SERHY YEKELCHYK. *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 280. $19.95.

Serhy Yekelchyk's book has two claims to novelty. First, it is clearly aimed at students. The paperback edition retails at $19.95, and at only 280 pages, it is much shorter than either Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History* (1988, 666 pages) or Paul Robert Magocsi's *A History of Ukraine* (3rd ed., 2000, 815 pages). Second, as Yekelchyk himself argues, "this book does not follow in the footsteps of either the historians of the Ukrainian nationality (ethnic group) or those who trace the past of the lands that are now part of Ukraine. Instead, I argue that the present-day Ukrainian multinational state owes its existence to the Ukrainian national project" (p. 6).

Yekelchyk's project therefore has more in common with Magocsi's work, but he concentrates his history on the development of the "national idea" in the modern period. Only one chapter out of eleven covers the era before the development of a national movement, or movements, in the nineteenth century.

In the first respect, the book succeeds admirably. It covers the main periods and issues with great clarity, provides many refreshing new insights, and is written with style and panache. It will be hugely popular with students.

If it is sometimes less successful with the second aim, this is only because of the concentration on clear narrative. Mostly, however, Yekelchyk is remarkably successful at combining the chronological with the counterfactual, and in emphasizing the constructed nature of national identities while providing a clear-headed analysis of the nature of the building material to hand.

Yekelchyk's summary sections are usually spot on. In a short review, some brief examples must suffice. Yekelchyk argues that nineteenth-century intellectuals' staccato relationships with the Romanovs and Habsburgs led to a very uneven tempo in the development of a national "movement." "In the long run, their literary and political treatises proved weightier than the legacy of Kyivan princes and Cossack hetmans" (p. 52).

I particularly liked his apt formulation to describe the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1920. It should not be judged a failure because it could not achieve an aim, independence, that only emerged during its course. It "accomplished much, in that it established the modern idea of Ukraine and forced the Bolsheviks to create a Ukrainian republic within the Soviet Union" (p. 84).

Yekelchyk argues that Petro Shelest was never a nationalist. Conversely, despite the growing use of Russian, Soviet Ukraine never abandoned its dual character. Soviet patriotism coexisted with "establishment intellectuals" and "a limited mass culture in Ukrainian" (p. 174).

In short, this is a wonderful book, ideal for students and non-specialists alike. It takes the story up to the Orange Revolution in 2004, and provides an excellent primer for further study in either Ukrainian history or contemporary politics and society.

ANDREW WILSON
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JEFF SAHADEO. *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 316. $45.00.

Jeff Sahadeo aims to study how "Central Asian notables, merchants, and labor" contested "their subordinate status through a balance of accommodation and defiance," and how "[a]lliances and rivalries crossed as well as enforced ethnic, national, class, gender, religious, and generational boundaries" (p. 2). Often, however, he either neglects or employs incorrectly the Russian background essential for understanding the phenomena in Tashkent that he uses as evidence.

Sahadeo attempts to place the city in the context of European colonial societies in Asia and Africa but fails to describe the framework in which Tashkent, capital of Turkestan, operated: its place in the empire's political-administrative structure, the city's own administrative structure, and post-reform Russia's social organization. The author calls Turkestan a "province" both before and after that *oblast'* was separated from the jurisdiction of Orenburg's governor-general in 1867 and elevated to the status of a government-general in its own right. "The arrival ceremony" arranged to greet Turkestan's first holder of the post "privileged the governor-general as a symbol of political power, social unity, and colonial uniqueness" (p. 30). The reality behind the ceremony, missing from Sahadeo's account, was the governor-general's pre-eminence as an official directly responsible to the "White Tsar," whose plenipotentiary viceroy he was. Contrary to the author's insistence that the Russian authorities employed the term in a racist sense (pp. 100, 259 n. 119), "White Tsar," with its roots

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in Mongol terminology, had long been the customary appellation for Russia's sovereign in Central Asia.

Sahadeo uses as evidence of "a shift in power away from the purely military realm of empire toward the privileging of intellectuals' endeavors" a letter from a civilian member of the Turkestan branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society to "the military governor of the neighboring Semirechie province" (pp. 67–68). The letter protests the governor's refusal to invite to his region the Turkestan branch's survey team. Sahadeo does not state that from 1898 Semirechie was an *oblast'* of the Turkestan government-general. The ability of Semirechie's governor to refuse a request from the Turkestan branch, established in 1896, of which the governor-general was the honorary head, is mystifying—unless that refusal occurred in 1896–1897, when Semirechie was still subject to the Steppe government-general. Sahadeo does not date the letter.

The author refers to "the estate of merchantry (*kupechestvo*) and the estate of townspeople (*meshchanstvo*)" (pp. 52, 109). In fact, merchants and *meshchane* (artisans and laborers) belonged to subdivisions of the urban estate. Those whom Sahadeo calls "'first-level' merchants" (p. 27) were presumably merchants belonging to the first of the two guilds into which the *kupechestvo* was divided from 1863. The author claims a unique character for an "assembly" established in Tashkent in 1869: "Unlike similar institutions in central Russia, this one was not divided by estate" (p. 60). But neither were the rural *zemstva* (institutions of local self-government) introduced in central Russia from 1864 nor the urban governments introduced from 1870.

Sahadeo interprets the absence of the peasantry from the 1877 municipal census as an attempt by the authorities "to dissimulate lower-class, rural origins of their population and reinforce the idea of their community as one of progress and privilege" (pp. 109–110). He is unaware that the retired soldiers listed in the census, mostly former peasants working in the skilled trades that they had learned in the army, constituted a distinct social order. Only after the military reform of 1874 did conscripts at the end of their service return to their previous social estates; by 1890 a substantial number of peasants were registered in the city.

The author describes the protest march of Tashkent railway workers in July 1905 as a reaction to "the announcement of the weak, limited-franchise 'Bulygin duma' instead of the powerful, democratic legislative body promised by the tsar in the wake of public outcry over Bloody Sunday" (pp. 126–127). Nicholas II's instructions to Minister of Internal Affairs Bulygin contained no promise of such a legislature. The emperor merely authorized Bulygin to draft plans for a consultative body composed of the "worthiest people."

Sahadeo does not spell out where the dividing line lay between the authority of Tashkent's elected duma, established in 1877, and that of the officials chosen by the indigenous population to govern its own quarters, or the extent of the jurisdiction of Tashkent's military commandant. The author refers to the 1867 Provisional Statute on Turkestan as the basis for the "internal administration in Asian Tashkent" (p. 81), but not to specific provisions of either that statute or its 1886 replacement.

Sahadeo's thesis is that Russian society in Tashkent in the late imperial period was riven by tensions among the holders of political power, modernizing intellectuals, skilled workers, and the unskilled and poor, but that all of them behaved toward the native population in a manner that displayed their conviction of their own racial superiority. They thereby weakened the chances for success of Russia's alleged civilizing mission. Both this behavior and the conviction in which it was rooted persisted into the early Soviet era. The author's thesis is not novel, and the value of his evidence is seriously diminished by the book's shortcomings.

SEYMOUR BECKER
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OLGA LITVAK. *Conscription and the Search for Modern Russian Jewry*. (The Modern Jewish Experience.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 273. $45.00.

Olga Litvak looks at the expansive and manifold dimensions of the cantonists, underage Jewish soldiers in Nicholas I's army. The book has two aspects. First Litvak describes the fates of the boys, the state's desire for religious conversion, and the effect of recruitment on Jewish communities during Nicholas I's reign. Then she describes the aftermath: the memory of the cantonists preserved in a variety of literary genres, but especially in Yiddish, Hebrew, and Russian prose fiction, between 1856 and 1916.

The book asks a number of profound questions about historiography, but a central one concerns historical memory. How is memory transmitted or, in this case, how does the cantonist experience become transmuted into artistic fiction? Understanding conscription broadly, Litvak refers not only to the cantonists but to larger issues: state-Jewish relations, the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), and attitudes toward modernity. In short, the conscription theme allowed writers to deal with a large number of political, social, and personal issues.

Among a large number of writers—Osip Rabinovich, I. M. Dik, Grigorii Bogrov, J. L. Gordon, and Semyon An-sky (S. Rapapport)—whose work Litvak interprets, one paradigmatic author is Sholem Abramovich, better known by his pseudonym Mendele Moykher Sforim. According to Litvak, for Mendele "the conscription theme formed a cornerstone of the maskilic narrative of resistance to the historical realities of emancipation" (p. 102). Through his fiction, Mendele allegorically expressed his ambivalence about Jewish emancipation.

Many of the author's insights are brilliant and stimulate one to rethink accepted interpretations. Describing the absence of development and stagnation of the shtetl world in Mendele's *The Travels of Benjamin III*,

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Litvak writes: "Abramovich's paradigm of return... paved the way for the enlightenment ethos back into the center of modern Russian-Jewish culture. Embracing the elective affinity between the Haskalah and the Nicholaevan state, Abramovich exposed the embrace of emancipation as a form of living death; it was the unreconstructed mass of Russian Jewry in the Pale, seemingly dead to the world, that contained the seeds for Jewish regeneration. In the guise of Mendele, Abramovich wandered in circles through the ever-dying shtetl on a perpetual rescue mission of Russian Jewry from its well-intentioned reforming benefactors—the emancipating state and its self-appointed Jewish delegates armed with nothing but their diplomas" (pp. 114–115).

These are certainly rich ideas to mull over. However, I am not sure that I agree with all of them. After all, Mendele was himself a product of that emancipation and one of its progenitors. In addition, among the so-called Jewish nationalists, he refused to participate in radical anti-government expression, since he was a proud government employee, headmaster of a public Talmud Torah school in Odessa. To this writer, Mendele's attitude toward the emancipators was ambivalent rather than univocal. He was a comic genius whose satire was not malevolent, since, in addition to denouncing parts of Jewish life, he intended to evoke nostalgia and hope as well.

Litvak's treatment of the Hebrew renaissance in the early twentieth century is excellent. She reads modernist fiction through the lens of history, sensitively providing context for the work of Sholem Aleichem, L. A. Arieli, Joseph Brenner, and Judah Steinberg. Moreover, she has talent as a literary scholar. Take, for example, her interpretation of "Two Martyrs," An-sky's short story in which a conscript and his great-grandson are portrayed as tricksters who manage to rise in Russian society by convincing others they have been baptized. "Here An-sky offers the possibility of a Jewish counter-narrative under the ironic sign of play. Inherent in his displacement of the martyrological paradigm is a carnivalesque inversion of established social and political categories that govern both sides of the Jewish-Christian dialectic. Martyrdom, whether it involves the public killing of Jews or of Christians, is fundamentally a Christian event, rooted in the formative moment of the new faith; it enters into Jewish discourse precisely as a transformative act of cultural appropriation, a self-conscious critique of Christianity on its own terms" (p. 202).

This insight about Jewish martyrdom is merely one of a nearly endless number of insights that challenge the reader. It is not important whether you agree with all her ideas because the goal of the book is not to offer certainties, but to draw new interpretative lines that expand the field of knowledge. Litvak has succeeded entirely in this task.

BRIAN HOROWITZ
Tulane University

CORINNE GAUDIN. *Ruling Peasants: Village and State in Late Imperial Russia*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 271. $40.00.

"The peasant question" has preoccupied both Russian and Soviet rulers and historians alike. As a result, serfdom and emancipation, family life, communal and property relations, out-migration, gender, and "resistance" all have their accounts. But the turn to cultural history was not kind to peasants, so the bulk of the population of Russia faded into the background as historians looked to educated, urban writers of texts to extract subjectivities and identity. Recent monographs, including Jane Burbank's important volume on peasant adjudication, have kept the conversation on peasants going, and to this we can now add Corinne Gaudin's intricately argued and meticulously researched book.

Few today would argue that the peasant village was autarkic or isolated. By the end of the nineteenth century, the pathways to the village were clearly widening through schooling, military service, factory labor, and seasonal migration for farm work in the Russian south. Some have argued that the commune was in decline by the turn of the century and that the forces of modernization were sweeping away old practices and mindsets; indeed, this can be inferred from Burbank's study of court cases. Others have argued that modern institutions, including schools and even the army, became "peasantized."

Gaudin wants us to move beyond notions not only of backwardness and modernization but also of resistance and contestation. In her view, peasant behavior was in constant flux, displaying both internal solidarity and endemic conflict. Quoting Florencia Mallon, she argues that "as soon as . . . local power relations are taken into account, the solidarity and unity of the subaltern presence . . . begins to fall apart" and that "peasants . . . were complicit in their system of governance" (p. 7). She insists that revolutions are not "moments of truth" in which hidden transcripts become public; rather, they are exceptional times during which behavior has little in common with the "politics of accommodation" which rule everyday life. At the same time, she does not put much stock in linear schemes of modernization. Her story problematizes the "straightforward" narrative of a confrontation between a reforming state and a resisting peasantry. The interaction between state and peasantry is at the heart of her analysis, but ultimately neither wins out. The state sought to penetrate and transform village practices by introducing both formal law and private property. Intrusion indeed happened, through the introduction of the land captains in 1889, the provision of appellate opportunities for adjudication in the *volost'* (cantonal) courts, the regulation of communal inheritance and land distribution practices, and, finally, the ambitious Stolypin land reforms. The outcome, however, is not "modernization" or a "law governed state," but rather the continuation of arbitrary, inconsistent, and personal state intervention (*proizvol*); the undermining of traditional peasant prac-

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tices balancing equity, opportunity, and security; and a resulting exacerbation of conflict and tension, both in the village and between peasant and state. In her conclusion, Gaudin distances herself from the "pessimist" school of Russian historians often identified with the work of Leopold H. Haimson, but neither is she an optimist: "tensions permeating villages prior to 1914 ensure that the disruption of war would have devastating effects" (p. 208).

The book has an introduction and five packed chapters. The first establishes a framework of state institutions and concerns; the second examines the pivotal institution of land captains. Others treat the *volost'* peasant courts and "legal acculturation"; the village assembly and "contested collectivism"; and, finally, the Stolypin land reforms. Why, then, did post-emancipation reformist state policies produce such undesired results? Gaudin points out that the autocratic practice, stemming from "undergovernment," of ruling the village through "intermediary peasant corporate bodies" was "neither unusual nor unwise" in that Europe's Old Regimes did the same, and self-governing communal institutions could coexist with a powerful centralizing state. But she finds a fatal flaw in the compromises embedded in the emancipation legislation itself and inconsistent, even self-contradictory elements in the implementation of supervisory and regulatory practices over village life. This legislation had retained segregated peasant institutions and indirect rule over the countryside as temporary expedients, and by the 1880s everybody seemed to agree that these institutions perpetuated exploitation, corruption, and backwardness. Yet the ongoing struggle between paternalists and advocates of the rule of law led to contradictory policies and inconsistent practices. Moreover, the emancipation legislation waffled over the issue of individual property rights; both "actual usage" and redemption payments would subsequently be put forward as claims by peasants. Further confusing matters [were] the relations between two separate entities: land and administrative communes. As anxiety over conditions in the village mounted after 1881, the state penetrated the village and, according to Gaudin, fundamentally changed village politics. But the ensuing "propensity to sue and appeal" did not, as Burbank argues, reflect "integration into modern institutions and practices"; instead, it heightened insecurity in land and property rights and increased tension. When the ambitious Stolypin land reforms were launched, the situation became even more convoluted and beset with conflict, for Stolypin's other major reform, the attempt to sweep away corporate institutions and create unified local government (in an early twentieth-century version of Vladimir Putin's "vertical" rule) failed to win support in the Duma. Here Gaudin joins other recent historians who point to the failure in 1908 to win support for transforming local government as perhaps the decisive moment in the history of late imperial Russia.

The evidentiary basis for this argument is a mosaic constructed from archival documents (largely from Riazan, Moscow, and Tver); ethnographic reports; many of the same *volost'* court records Burbank used; and a rich monographic and memoir literature from around the turn of the twentieth century. Much of this literature is familiar to specialists, but Gaudin is deft at integrating primary and secondary sources, applying the comparativist's eye, and rendering judicious judgments about complicated and interwoven issues.. All in all, thisis a fine book, displaying the author's keen eye for detail and a commendable awareness that all peasant history is local, all the while engaging in the larger questions of the viability of state and empire before 1917.

Ben Eklof
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Alexander Rabinowitch. *The Bolsheviks in Power: The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 495. $34.95.

This masterful volume by Alexander Rabinowitch on the first year of the Bolshevik regime fills a gaping hole in the historiography of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union. One of the most important issues confronting historians of this era is how to explain the process by which the Bolshevik Party was transformed from a revolutionary into a ruling party, and how a revolution in the name of establishing a new type of democracy ended up establishing a new type of authoritarianism. If, as Rabinowitch has shown successfully in earlier books on the Bolsheviks (and as other historians have substantiated), Bolshevik success in 1917 was partly attributable to the party's relatively open, decentralized, and democratic structure and close rapport with factory and soldier supporters, how was the party (and state) transformed into "the highly centralized, ultra-authoritarian Bolshevik political system" of Soviet Russia? How were the soviets as democratic organs of self-rule and lower class self-assertion so quickly undermined? How was the popular demand for a democratic and multiparty government and an egalitarian society, a view shared by many Bolsheviks high and low, so swiftly subverted? The short answer, Rabinowitch argues convincingly, is that "Neither revolutionary ideology nor an established pattern of dictatorial behavior are of much help to explain fundamental changes in the character and political role of the Bolshevik party, or of soviets in Petrograd, between November 1917 and November 1918, although the impact of both cannot be entirely discounted." The Bolsheviks had to transform themselves into rulers "without benefit of an advance plan or even a concept" (p. 390). Most important in shaping their evolution were the realities the Bolsheviks faced in their struggle for survival. The details behind that conclusive answer make up this rich, detailed, fascinating book. Some will dispute the comparatively small role assigned to ideology, but if serious they will have to grapple with the author's deep research and analysis.

The book itself, long awaited, has an important history. It was already researched and partly written when

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the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. That collapse allowed Rabinowitch access to previously closed party and state archives relevant to the first months of Soviet rule. However disheartening it must have been for Rabinowitch to begin research anew, we can all be grateful that he did so. These archives immeasurably enrich the book, making it "possible to examine, for the first time, Bolshevik internal debates and decision making in Petrograd from top to bottom, the development of party and government institutions and their relationship at all levels, and the evolution of popular political opinion during the first year of Soviet power" (pp. xi–xii). They lend solid weight to the story the author tells and to the important revisions and clarification he makes in the historiography of this extremely important period.

Numerous important themes emerge in the course of the book, only some of which can be mentioned here, even briefly. Many of them are dependent on Rabinowitch's archival sources, but others grow out of his careful examination of long published sources. One striking theme is the initial lack of special concern by Bolshevik leaders with institutionalizing an authoritative role for party organs in directing state affairs, the problems caused by that, and how it finally was resolved. Contrary to traditional interpretations, Rabinowitch argues, "the large body of relevant sources now available leaves no room for doubt that for some time the need for a highly structured, all-powerful, centralized party dictatorship was by no means apparent to most Petrograd Bolsheviks" (p. 391).

The story of Bolshevik factional infighting is examined in greater depth here than previously. Particularly valuable is the author's detailed analysis of the fight of the "Bolshevik moderates" against V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky's ultra-radical course and in favor of broadening the new government's base of support and of greater respect for civil liberties and democratic practices. Rabinowitch is able to show with detail and clarity how the moderates were outmaneuvered by Lenin at every turn and defeated by the time of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, disappearing as an influential grouping. He sheds new light on the bitter, sometimes paralyzing, intraparty conflict over ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The new archive sources also make it possible to revise standard accounts about the murky interrelationships among the demise of the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), the origins of the Cheka, and the beginning of the Red Terror. Rabinowitch finds a key role in the latter played by the Bolsheviks' Petersburg Committee, which initiated a Red Terror there before the central authorities in Moscow called for it.

Very valuable is his account of the impact of the "colossal attrition" of qualified Bolshevik personnel out from Petrograd to government, military, and other duties; the approximately 50,000 party members in Petrograd on the eve of October 1917 shrank to 6,000 in September 1918. The close ties between party activists and the workers, soldiers, and sailors who had catapulted the Bolsheviks to power in October withered along with the shrinking of party activists, as did participatory democracy in the district soviets and other bodies. This, in turn, led the Bolsheviks to increased use of violence and electoral manipulation to retain power. At the same time, he shows the complexity of Bolshevik and Left Socialist Revolutionary (SR) cooperation and the key role that Left SRs at all levels of Petrograd government played in the survival of Soviet power in the northwest. The ongoing, if sometimes uneasy, Bolshevik-Left SR cooperation in Petrograd showed a different way the regime as a whole might have evolved had not tensions in Moscow between Bolshevik and Left SR leaders unraveled and then destroyed this cooperation.

One can only be awed by the research and effort that have gone into this monumental work of historical scholarship. It answers fundamental questions about the emergence of the Bolshevik regime and should be required reading for everyone interested in that important issue.

REX A. WADE
George Mason University

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

BRUCE LINCOLN. *Religion, Empire, and Torture: The Case of Achaemenian Persia, with a Postscript on Abu Ghraib.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007. Pp. xvii, 176. $30.00.

In his new book, which "is concerned with two timely topics—religion and empire" and "explores the contribution of religious discourse, practice, imagination, and desire to emergent imperial ambitions" (p. xi), Bruce Lincoln suggests that issues of empire and imperial ambitions "have acquired new urgency and cachet since the cold war gave way to America's War on Terror" (p. xii). The book contains an introduction and five chapters on cross-generic themes (chapter two, Center and Periphery; chapter three, God's Chosen; chapter four, Creation; chapter five, Microcosms, Wonders, Paradise; chapter six, The Dark Side of Paradise) and concludes with a brief postscript on Abu Ghraib. The comprehensive notes contain explanations of technical terms and references to the secondary literature.

The book targets "a general audience living in a world where the realities of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are far from academic," and, therefore, Lincoln has chosen to put them in historical perspective by exploring Achaemenian Persia, as "an example quite removed in time, space, and cultural peculiarities, but where similar issues arise in a form that is particularly dramatic and particularly revealing" (p. 2).

Lincoln's work is interesting and important both for ancient historians and scholars of religion and imperialism. To paint a cohesive picture of Persian imperial propaganda, Lincoln uses a wide array of sources in many languages, which results in an intriguing and nuanced appreciation of Achaemenid religio-imperial ideology rarely seen in Anglo-American scholarship on

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ancient Persia. He skillfully builds on the works of the French scholars Pierre Briant and Clarisse Herrenschmidt to reappraise Achaemenid history and historiography, on the one hand, while, on the other, paying close attention to formulaic discourse in the Achaemenid inscriptions left by Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and the later Persian monarchs. For instance, Lincoln points out that "Xerxes replaced one of his father's (Darius I, r. 522–486 B.C.E.) more expansive royal titles, 'King of lands/peoples of *all* races,' with a more modest substitute, 'King of lands/peoples of *many* races,' to acknowledge that the global nature of Achaemenian ambition had been checked when the Greeks defeated his forces at Salamis (480) and Plataea (479)" (p. 13). While closely reading the inscriptions, he appropriately recognizes the limits of the Persian historical record, emphasizing our dependence on foreign sources (Greek, Babylonian, Egyptian, Latin, and Biblical) for any historical information after Xerxes' accession (486 B.C.E.): "were we to rely on the inscriptions alone, we would be ignorant of the invasions of Greece by the Persians and the defeats they suffered" from Darius to Alexander (p. 14).

The long description of the Achaemenid empire and its religio-political ideologies, expressed in its imperial discourse, is summed up in the conclusion to chapter six in three components (pp. 95–96): the dualistic ethics according to which everything is either good or bad; a theology in which the king is God's chosen agent; and the representation of imperial aggression as a soteriological mission. As Lincoln argues, there came a time, however, when the contradictions "between sacred discourse and bestial practice . . . built into the deep structure of the empire" needed a different discourse to contain them, resulting in "euphemism, blurring the issues, invoking the divine, flogging scapegoats, slandering critics, and reasserting one's devotion to traditional ideals" and a need "to persuade itself—once again!—that it is doing God's work." This leads seamlessly into the short postscript on contemporary matters.

A slight criticism regards Lincoln's brief presentation of Achaemenid religion, as in the preface: "for our purposes, it is relatively inconsequential whether we regard the imperial religion as Zoroastrian in a strict and narrow sense (i.e. consciously adhering to religious reforms effected by Zarathustra) or more broadly as Mazdean (i.e., marked by worship of 'the Wise Lord,' Ahura Mazdā, who is understood as pan-Iranian, and not a strictly Zoroastrian, deity)" (p. xiii). There are several problems with this statement; most importantly, Lincoln does not mention the growing trend in scholarship on Zoroastrianism of problematizing the assumption of Zarathustra's historicity and his "reform" of pre-Zoroastrian pantheism. Once the "reform" can no longer be used as a yardstick for what constitutes "authentic Zoroastrianism," the Achaemenid inscriptions would then need to be compared with the entire ancient Zoroastrian literature (not only what is allegedly by "Zarathustra himself"), and the question of whether the Achaemenids were Zoroastrians can only mean: do the elements of the sixth-fifth-century Achaemenid religion, *mutatis mutandis*, agree with the *Avesta*, a corpus of pre-Achaemenid, orally transmitted, sacred texts? The answer, in my opinion, is a qualified yes, as I agree with Lincoln that the "question of labels and classification" is far less important than identifying the Achaemenid religion's "core principles" (p. xiii).

Lincoln has written a compelling and readable account of Achaemenid imperial ideology and a book that can be profitably read by historians, classicists, and Iranists alike. I conclude with thanks to Yuhan S.-D. Vevaina for discussing the book with me and assistance with this review.

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EMILY GOTTREICH. *The* Mellah *of Marrakesh: Jewish and Muslim Space in Morocco's Red City*. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 201. Cloth $65.00, paper $24.95.

The Jewish Quarter of Marrakesh, known as the *mellah*, was founded around 1557 under the Sa'dian dynasty (1511–1659), following the first walled and gated Jewish quarter in Fez (1438) and preceding the *mellah* in Meknes (1679). In the nineteenth century similar neighborhoods were established in other Moroccan cities. While Jewish neighborhoods and streets are found throughout the Middle East, to my knowledge these are the only such quarters mandated and regulated by an Islamic state.

From wide reading and from Moroccan, French, British, and Jewish community archives, Emily Gottreich has recreated the geographic, demographic, economic, political, and social situations of Moroccan Jews. Why were *mellah*s founded and what does their existence tell us about the place of Jews in Moroccan society? The answer in this solidly researched, vividly descriptive, and deeply understanding book, does not conform to conventional expectations.

First, the *mellah* was not an expression of Muslim ideologies. The first three Moroccan *mellah*s were founded by new dynasties who showed their Muslim credentials by segregating Muslims from foreign influences and by asserting authority over the *dhimmi*s (non-Muslim subjects in a state governed by Sharia law). Adjacent to the *kasbah*, or royal city, the *mellah* of Marrakesh also facilitated taxation and control.

In the nineteenth century, the Jewish population, which focused on its synagogue, ritual baths, schools, and courts of law, was augmented by a constant flow of temporary residents: the sultan's *mahalla*, visiting with his harem, soldiers, functionaries and courtiers, and his favorite Jewish craftsmen, including tailors, jewelers, embroiderers, and musicians; pilgrims visiting saint's graves, rabbinical students, refugees, and Palestinian Jews seeking alms. The Jews of Marrakesh were also connected to smaller Jewish communities in the surrounding region, providing them with education, spouses, commerce, and refuge. Itinerant traders ex-

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changed goods between town and country. Pilgrims exchanged visits to the graves of urban and rural saints.

In the late nineteenth century, Marrakesh Jews become the intermediaries between Europeans and the Moroccan population. They used their networks abroad and foreign language skills to become translators, agents, and servants of the Europeans. Still, not all Moroccan Jews were in the vanguard of Europeanization. Most Jews were artisans, shopkeepers, and workers dealing in local products; they kept Moroccan dress and resisted the educational efforts of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which had set up missionary schools to civilize oriental Jews. Although the majority of the *mellah* population were Jews, the *mellah* was not a Jewish ghetto but a quarter for non-Muslims. It was founded at a time of the influx of new populations: Fasis (from Fez), Atlas villagers, Christian artisans from Europe, merchants from Holland and Britain (including Franciscans who lived in the most beautiful houses), and Iberian Catholics who had a sector of their own. In the late nineteenth century, the *mellah* harbored many Protestant missionaries and European consuls and merchants.

Although they were not residents, Muslims also had a large presence in the *mellah*. Muslim shoppers came to the *mellah*, especially on Friday morning. Muslims owned about ten percent of the property in the *mellah* and landlords came to collect rents. Muslim pilgrims came to saints' tombs. Mostly, the *mellah* was the illicit entertainment quarter. Muslims came for alcohol, gambling, contact with Europeans, and to visit the numerous Jewish prostitutes.

Reciprocally, Jews had some presence in the medina. Gold and silversmiths, moneylenders, tailors, peddlers, and porters typically went to the medina. Jews were not allowed to own property in the medina, but they rented storage and selling space. When they went to the medina, however, they risked insults and relegation to the inferior status of *dhimmi*. Sumptuary rules required Jews in the medina to remove their shoes.

Thus, the *mellah* did not isolate Jews but facilitated their interactions with the sultan and his entourage, the Muslims of Marrakesh, and with Jews and Muslims residing in the surrounding region. It was a base for the reception of Europeans, both Jewish and non-Jewish, and for mediation between Europe and the rest of southern Morocco.

Jews and Muslims were ambivalent about each other. For Muslims, the *mellah* was the sin quarter. For Jews, the medina could be threatening, but commerce overcame the divide and made a bridge between the two sectors of the city. Jews and Muslims also venerated many of the same saints. Aside from this, however, we learn little about the subjective views and feelings of Jews and their perceived place in Moroccan society. I would like to know more about what Jews felt about the advantages and liabilities of a society that did not in principle accept them as full members but in fact accommodated their presence.

With the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912, Jews began a steady exodus from the Marrakesh *mellah* to France and to North America. In 1956, Jews were made full citizens of a newly independent Morocco, but, except for a few hundred mainly sick and elderly, the remaining Jews left for Israel in the 1970s and 1980s.

This learned book conjures up a world now lost. It is a comfort that we still have this intimate portrait.

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RICHARD C. KELLER. *Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 294. Cloth $70.00, paper $25.00.

Tunisian filmmaker Salma Baccar's 2006 film *Khush-Khash* (*Fleur d'Oubli*) is set in the postwar 1940s and narrates the story of a bourgeois Tunisian woman addicted to drugs and committed to the colonial asylum at La Manouba on the outskirts of the capital—"L'Hôpital pour les Maladies Mentales." Once confined there, the protagonist and her entire world unravel. Founded in the late 1920s, despite resistance from some French officials opposed to squandering scarce resources on a facility for the "native insane," La Manouba was showcased as a model of colonial benevolence and the psychiatric modern. Nevertheless, arguments promoting its construction played upon public fears about the dangers posed to social order by Muslim lunatics, not properly confined or cared for, in an age of mounting popular, nationalist resistance to colonial rule. Indeed, colonial authorities confined Tunisian nationalists and literati in the Manouba asylum after conveniently determining that they, too, were "insane."

Madness provokes a wide range of social responses—revulsion and reverence, fascination and fear, compassion and condemnation—conditioned by the ways in which insanity is understood within a specific culture at a particular historical moment. Treatment of those judged insane largely depends upon the presumed etiology of the disturbances—whether located in spirit, mind, or body. A mad man or woman might be regarded as enlightened, touched by God, in communication with worlds unseen, or conversely, as possessed of malevolent spirits and thus dangerous, or as suffering from pathologies whose origins are organic, psychogenic, or moral. When the authorities defining mental incapacity, proposing treatments, and enforcing remedial regimes are from a different cultural system, within a larger context of extreme power asymmetry, such as in settler colonial societies, the likelihood of widespread abuse, the violation of fundamental human rights, and the destruction of "local social worlds" is virtually guaranteed.

Richard C. Keller has written a very important book that not only offers new understandings of French colonialism as it operated on the ground in North Africa but more generally demonstrates how knowledge and science, race and power, were insinuated into the

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emerging field of psychiatry. Much to his credit, the author embraced a daunting research project that systematically compares the complex relationships between the profession of psychiatry as practiced in the three North African colonies and then independent states as well as in France during the colonial and postcolonial eras. His arguments are informed by an impressive corpus of documentation consulted in France and the Maghreb. Particularly valuable are the sources generated by North Africans, for example, the family papers of early North African pioneers in psychiatry or the archives of the principal asylum in Tunis, the Manouba hospital. By employing these materials, Keller gives voice to the colonized and their morally shattering experience of seeking (or being forced to seek) assistance from a branch of modern medical science that promised to heal but instead proved uncomprehending at best and, at worst, grotesquely inhumane.

Situated at the juncture of intellectual history and colonial studies and the histories of science and medicine, this book traces the emergence of a new medical specialty and a diagnostic empire that went hand in hand with colonialism in Algeria. The Algiers School became the center for the study of the interplay between race—invariably glossed as religion or Islam—and mental illness, increasingly defined not as a personal, family, or communal matter but as a public, political, and therefore imperial problem. Keller begins his investigation of madness and colonization in the mid-nineteenth century, when European novelists, travelers, and physicians conjured up North Africa as a space of violence, lurid sexuality, and insanity. The "inherent" madness of the Muslim world constituted its fundamental difference from the secular, sane, and enlightened West. In addition, poor whites, who inevitably threatened the boundaries of colonial rule—as well-documented by a number of studies—became even more dangerous as mad poor whites and were therefore often "repatriated" to France for confinement and treatment safely out of public view. In brief, his research reveals the processes that transformed notions of madness from an affliction, principally found among native North Africans, that French colonialism, "civilization," and modern medicine would "cure" or attenuate to a radically different position: colonialism with its inequities, violence, and humiliations as the cause of mental alienation.

One of the most compelling chapters, "Violence, Resistance, and Poetics of Suffering," resurrects the stories of individual resistors and colonial subjects, some of them with degrees from French medical institutions. A good example is the physician-nationalist, Dr. Salem ben Ahmed Esch-Chadely, born in Tunisia in 1896, whose 1929 dissertation submitted to Paris constituted a riposte to the Algiers School that sought the causes of psychoses in a pathological combination of Semitic race and Islamic religion. Passionately devoted to nationalism and the decolonization of medicine, Esch-Chadely found the courage to complain to the United Nations in 1948 of human rights abuses at the Manouba hospital—eight years before independence from France—charging that Nobel laureate Charles-Jean-Henri Nicolle was employing North Africans as guinea pigs in drug trials for typhus at the Pasteur Institute in Tunis. That Manouba patients were being used as unwilling test subjects was corroborated by a nurse who worked at the Manouba in that period, a fact that Keller unearthed by his energetic excavation of the sources. Among this study's many strengths is the fact that Keller links phases of scientific thinking on insanity and the insane among the "indigenous" peoples of the Maghreb with literature and film produced by North African writers, filmmakers, and artists. Especially moving is his treatment of the Algerian writer Kateb Yacine's novels in which insanity serves as the frame for the colonial experience in and of itself—what Yacine so poignantly called "the accumulation of suffering."

In addition to breaking new ground, Keller's study is truly courageous, since he starts where Michel Foucault left off in probing the dark intimacy between prison and asylum. He provides solid evidence regarding the ways in which colonial psychiatry from the start was deeply involved in invasion, occupation, and conquest and he employs strong, evocative language, such as the "weaponization of medicine." Keller does not shy away from making explicit connections between the pathologies of colonial psychiatry as practiced in the Maghreb and in France—or elsewhere in European empires—and today's Orwellian world of "Big Pharma" and rationalized, corporatized, industrialized torture made possible by academic complicity in the militarization of psychology, psychiatry, and knowledge about human fears and suffering. Given the political and cultural conditions in which psychiatry evolved, it is no surprise that colonial practitioners and institutions conducted trials upon North African—largely Muslim—patients without their knowledge or consent, subjecting them to excruciatingly painful and ultimately useless experimentation that were based upon the premise that, as Arabs, Muslims, and Africans, they did not "feel" or suffer like Europeans, or whites, or Christians.

Herein lies one of the genealogies of the racialized pseudo-psychological "study" by Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, first published in 1973, then in 1976, only to be revised and republished in 1983. Despite the fact that its data and methodology, to the extent that they even existed, were woefully out of date by its 1973 publication, Patai's book appeared yet again in 2002 with a foreword by U.S. Army Col. Norvell De Atkine, who touts the work despite (or because of?) its reliance on essentialist and quite disturbing categories dealing with "the realm of sex," "extreme fears," and "hatred of the West" that allegedly apply only to Arabs. Of a highly dubious scholarly value when it first came out thirty-five years ago, the book served as introductory reading for U.S. army and marine officers sent to Iraq in 2003 by the administration of George W. Bush to help them "understand" the Arab mind that, being "obsessed by sex," would only submit to, break under, extreme forms of violence and humiliation—sexual perversion being one of them.

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Keller's study should be required reading for scholars and students concerned with French colonialism in the Maghreb and globally, with comparative empires, and with the history of science, medicine, and race. But it is also important for a more general readership curious and courageous enough to draw lessons from Keller's research and from the history of French colonialism in North Africa to comprehend where America is right now, how we got here, and what the future holds for our own empire.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

GWYN CAMPBELL, SUZANNE MIERS, and JOSEPH C. MILLER, editors. *Women and Slavery: Volume 1, Africa, the Indian Ocean World, and the Medieval North Atlantic*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 2007. Pp. xxvii, 399. Cloth $55.00, paper $30.00.

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

To the Editors:

I was inspired by Barbara Weinstein's fine "Developing Inequality" (*AHR*, February 2008, 1–18) to expand briefly on a few of her points regarding current trends among historians. I agree that past disillusion with recent theories of development and the rise of postcolonial and other trends privileging culture have resulted in relative inattention to important questions regarding economic and geographic forces that lead to growing inequalities—spatial, racial, and class—in most of the world.

While it is true, as many recent scholars might say, that people do not act until they perceive and construct problems to be addressed, this does not imply that it is enough to deal with the cultural aspects of such problems and devote little attention to the real changes in economics, geography, and technology and their impact on class and social relations. Today, for example, there is an acceleration of human-influenced change in geography and ecology, such as the desertification of much of Africa and the invasion of the world's forested areas and their populations by loggers—both of which are causative factors in the growth of human conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Such ecological changes and their societal results in the past have had some scholarship, but not nearly enough for the world as a whole.

Many of the world's recent economic trends, which are often similar to those of the Gilded Age, are heavily influenced by the self-interested policies of large corporations. They have the tools to combat trade unions, go to the places with the lowest wages, influence subsidies and tariffs so that many agricultural products from Asia and Latin America cannot compete with those from the West, and encourage wars and interventions when their interests are challenged. These developments have their roots in history, and the story of past policies can shed important light on recent ones.

The emphasis of many scholars on race, class, and gender could have meant research into the reasons for growing class inequalities, but in many cases it has not. The decades-long attack by corporations and often governments on independent trade unions is an important factor in the growing class and location inequalities that are seen in most of the world, yet they have received relatively little attention other than from historians of the United States. Historians should also give more attention to why even successful campaigns against racism and sexism have resulted in improvements for one group of women or minorities while others' lives have not improved—and in some cases have worsened. This does not diminish their important achievements, but could point to some lessons for future activists.

The ostensible abandonment of meta-narratives and even of causation on the part of many scholars usually does not extend to those narratives that privilege the non-West and play down modern economic differences between West and East, such as those of Kenneth Pomeranz and Andre Gunder Frank. In reaction to past narratives that implied or stated Western superiority, many scholars now highlight the past contributions of non-Western cultures, without explicitly recognizing that such contributions do not obviate the need to examine reasons for different arcs of economic change. There is often a reluctance to take a dialectical view of both Western and non-Western societies, all of whose changing features affected different groups differently—some of which both contributed to and subtracted from the well-being of different groups, or even the same group. There is often a reluctance, in reaction to exaggerated Eurocentrism, to see the West as a modern pioneer in anything important, whether capitalism or ideas of democracy or human rights. Emphasis has, understandably, rather been on the important other side

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of the dialectic—the West as pioneer in cultural, physical, and aggressive attacks on non-Western peoples.

Different civilizations have pioneered at different times in developments that increased material production while also introducing new problems and inequalities, and these developments need more discussion by historians. Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, while oversimplified, points to the reasons for the priority of the Near and Middle East in having the geography and domesticable crops and animals that encouraged the earliest development of agriculture and animal husbandry. He and a few scholars, including myself, have pointed to factors in the later desiccation, soil salinization, rise in nomadism, and relative economic decline of much of this region (Nikki R. Keddie, "Material Culture, Technology, and Geography: Toward a Holistic Comparative Study of the Middle East," in Juan R. I. Cole, ed., *Knowledge and the State in a World Civilization*). Many scholars have pointed to the falsity of blaming "Islam" for this relative decline, but very few have gone further in researching and discussing the details of the ecological, geographic, and economic factors involved in this relative economic decline in relation to the economic rise of the West. Doing so would provide the basis for a convincing explanation of the relative (and possibly temporary) advance of the West vis-à-vis the Middle East to replace the distortions about the overwhelming role of "Islam" found in works by David Landes and others.

More attention by historians to ecology, geography, technologies of production, the economic activities of powerful and of oppressed groups, and the material evidence provided by archaeology and the natural sciences would greatly improve the comprehensiveness of historical writing, especially in areas now dominated by postmodern trends. Such work sometimes involves special training in other disciplines, but several historians have been able to do it, and more are needed.

Nikki Keddie,
Emerita
University of California
Los Angeles

Barbara Weinstein does not wish to respond.

REVIEWS

To the Editors:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to Paulina Numhauser's review of my *Native Insurgencies and Genocidal Impulse in the Americas* (*AHR*, February 2008, 231). Unfortunately, the review fails to engage with the focus of the book. Most notably, Numhauser dismisses the relevance, and even the existence, of indigenous historical traditions in their resistance to European domination. Even more remarkably, she avers their incapacity to articulate their own indigenous, non-Christian vision of the world.

Numhauser asserts that "the colonization of Hispanic America was largely carried out through an intense process of miscegenation . . . The result . . . was a hybrid population, both physically and culturally." There is no doubt that as the colonial enterprise advanced, miscegenation and cultural hybridity emerged, varying greatly by region. By focusing on miscegenation, however, Numhauser marginalizes the roles of conquest, demographic implosion, the brutality of colonial relations, and the resilience of native culture. Furthermore—and most disturbingly—she dismisses the fact that native peoples continued, and continue, to exist with a sharp sense of their ancestral heritage. She even erroneously refers to Tomás Catari as a mestizo.

She continues, "It is hard to believe that a society with this composition would have dealt with internal tensions through genocide or ethnocidal violence." Instead of challenging the abundant primary source evidence offered, she ignores it. Acknowledging that I deal with the issue of cultural assimilation (chapter 8 is dedicated to it), Numhauser sees this incomplete assimilation as contradicting the thesis. This is incorrect, as in almost every millennial movement there is some degree of cultural assimilation, and in almost all genocides some of the victim groups are spared for slavery. This does not make such movements any less millennial or genocidal. No one would argue, for example, that the fact that Hitler did not kill every Jew or every person of Jewish ancestry in Nazi-controlled areas mitigated the genocidal nature of the Holocaust.

Numhauser is also incorrect in her assertion that I do "not discuss the most relevant aspect of these rebellions: the source of their millenarian tendencies." The indigenous origins of millenarianism are discussed in relation to the focus of the book: the subaltern genocidal nature of caste wars (see, for example, pp. 75–77, 88–89, 108–109, 118–119).

Numhauser asserts that "Andes millenarianism can be traced to the proselytization of the area by the Society of Jesus." While there is no doubt that Túpac Amaru was influenced by the Jesuits and that some native prophecy was influenced by Christian beliefs, the scope of her assertion is extraordinary! It dismisses with a single sentence the role of native oral history, indigenous prophecy and, in the Andes, the concept and role of the pachacuti, or a cyclical destruction of the world! As a reviewer of Numhauser's work has noted (*Hispanic American Historical Review* 87, no. 2 [2007]: 389–391), it is far from certain that "books like the well-known chronicle of Garcilaso de la Vega were based on material propagated by the mysterious Jesuit Blas Valera." Furthermore, to the extent that there was Jesuit influence on Túpac Amaru, it did not extend to the masses. Indeed, his Catholicism alienated many of those who acted in his name, and contributed to the progressively nominal nature of his leadership.

Numhauser notes the lack of clerical/Jesuit influence outside the Andean region and asserts that this "un-

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dermines the author's argument." Numhauser is again projecting her own views upon the book, restating her belief that native peoples can only act under clerical tutelage.

Genocide, especially when carried out by the oppressed against their oppressors, is always an uncomfortable topic. It is nonetheless important to acknowledge—as this book demonstrates with a wealth of archival sources—that retributive genocide by provoked indigenes targeted the persons, culture, and allies of their Hispanic oppressors and that this resistance was not a product of European tutelage. It fundamentally drew upon, was inspired, and was impelled by indigenous millenarian traditions and hopes.

NICHOLAS A. ROBINS

PAULINA NUMHAUSER RESPONDS:

I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to respond to Nicholas A. Robins and to elaborate upon some of the points I could not present in detail due to the brevity of the review.

In his response to my review of his book, Robins writes, "the review fails to engage with the focus of the book," a point he reiterates in the final paragraph: "It is nonetheless important to acknowledge—as this book demonstrates with a wealth of archival sources—that retributive genocide by provoked indigenes targeted the persons, culture, and allies of their Hispanic oppressors and that this resistance was not a product of European tutelage." I would like to highlight the curious idea of "retributive genocide," whose connotations and rationale are deeply distressing.

As I mentioned in my review, Robins supports his thesis using three cases—considered indigenous rebellions—that occurred in dissimilar periods and regions. The first case is the Pueblo Indian uprising in New Mexico in 1680. The second, which is treated in more detail, is the Great Rebellion initially led by mestizos Túpac Amaru and Tomás Catari. That rebellion began in 1780 in the highlands of Peru, which today are shared by Peru and Bolivia. The last uprising Robins analyzes took place in Yucatán, Mexico, in 1847. These rebellions, according to Robins, have in common (among themselves and with other rebellions) their millenary spirit and a "genocidal impulse."

However, Robins seems to ignore that a series of indigenous revolts occurred in eighteenth-century Peru. Many of them were headed by charismatic leaders who claimed legitimate succession rights after proclaiming themselves heirs of one of the monarchs from the pre-Hispanic Inca dynasty. Even though the rebellion led by Túpac Amaru II (1780) has attracted much attention, Apu Inca Juan Santos Atahualpa's 1742 rebellion is the more interesting. The rebellion took place in the central Peruvian rainforest and had important short- and long-term repercussions in the region. This man, educated in the Jesuit college for Indian nobility at Cuzco (as was Túpac Amaru II), proclaimed himself legitimate king of the Incas, starting a rebellion that resisted suppression by the authorities for more than a decade. Although this movement was imbued with strong millenary feelings of Jesuit origin—according to the few documents preserved—both the discourse and the practice of this indigenous leader were essentially pacifist, and attempted to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. This clearly disproves Robins's thesis.

The author confuses anti-Hispanic feelings, hatred among classes, or unhappiness caused by circumstantial problems that existed in eighteenth-century Peruvian colonial society with xenophobia, an ideology that has clear European origins and is anachronistic.

Another serious problem in Robins's book is his limited knowledge of the literature on this subject that has been published in the last decade. In his letter, he demonstrates his ignorance of recent important studies that refer to the mechanisms that allowed the Jesuits to instill a series of subversive ideas among the indigenous masses. One of these mechanisms was a system of alternative writing created by members of the Company of Jesus called the *tocapus*, which consist of a series of ideographic figures of pre-Hispanic origins that were given a Christian connotation and reproduced as squares in both textiles and ceramics. The *tocapus* helped in the conversion to Christianity of the Andine population, but also were an alternative form of communication with them. This had such a profound effect that even today, *tocapus* are being accepted and used as symbols of Andine identity.

Moreover, using a misleading quotation from my review, Robins's letter also attempts to mislead readers regarding the mestizo Jesuit Blas Valera, arguing that he wasn't a source used by the chronist Garcilaso de la Vega. The work of Garcilaso was fundamental and inspirational reading for the indigenous rebel leaders of the eighteenth century. It is Garcilaso himself (not myself or the reviewer of my book) who authenticates such an assumption: in his *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, he quotes Valera's texts on several occasions.

When we ask ourselves, from a historiographical point of view, once the colorful central thesis is separated from the rest of the text, what is left of Robins's book? The answer is, unquestionably, too little.

PAULINA NUMHAUSER
Universidad de Alcalá de Henares

TO THE EDITOR:

We greatly value Oded Brosh's overall appreciation of our book *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War* as offering "a novel, intellectually worthy, and stimulating thesis" (*AHR*, April 2008, 617–618). However, we must take exception to his gratuitous and erroneous dismissal of several specifics in our argument as "making mountains out of molehills." Two such examples are especially egregious.

Brosh disparages one such case as "an informal chat between two gossipy Israeli has-beens." Since he does

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not name them, readers of the review can hardly guess that one of these interlocutors was no less than Isser Harel, who not only spoke with the authority of a recently retired Mossad chief, but acted in his subsequent official capacity as the Prime Minister's Special Adviser on Intelligence. The other was Moshe Sneh, an incumbent and very active leader of the Communist Party. As Harel later wrote, he was fully aware that Sneh was certain to relay any information he received to the USSR. Informal or not, such "back-channel" meetings are frequently the conduit for the most sensitive exchanges.

The Soviet document reporting and analyzing Harel's announcement to Sneh that Israel was bent on developing and acquiring nuclear weapons explicitly states how seriously it was taken in Moscow. Brosh may be right that for an Israeli official to convey such a statement "would have been irresponsible, foolish, and potentially suicidal"—indeed, its actual consequences can quite aptly be so described, as our book goes on to relate. But Brosh's judgment that therefore Harel's disclosure "makes no sense" does not refute the documented fact that it did take place. Actions that turn out to be historically momentous can be, and quite often are, extremely ill-advised.

In another example, Brosh criticizes our devoting an entire chapter "to a document dated five days after it was delivered." This completely misrepresents the case in question. We referred to the publication, in an official Russian Foreign Ministry collection, of a letter that purportedly requested Finland to transmit to Israel a Soviet protest note dated 5 June, although Finland actually began to serve as the USSR's protecting power in Israel only six days later, after the Soviets severed diplomatic relations with Israel. The protest note itself was, in the event, handed directly to Israel on 5 June, and the cover letter was *never* delivered to Finland.

This is no mere clerical error. We challenge Brosh to provide any better explanation for it than ours: that the Soviets prepared the paperwork in advance for a rupture which was anticipated to be implemented on 5 June, but developments on the ground disrupted the plan. Both of these episodes are in our view highly significant, and his pejorative use of "conspiracy theory" for our interpretation thereof is unwarranted, as we neither state nor imply anything more occult, bizarre, or sinister than the routine mold of covert planning, collusion, and operations. The term "conspiracy" appears only once in the entire book, and that too in jest.

Though he acknowledges our factual exposures to be numerous and new, Brosh also belittles some of the weightiest instances: for example, that it was top Soviet pilots, in the USSR's most advanced, yet experimental and secret, craft, who performed the overflights of Dimona (which he agrees were pivotal in motivating Israel's preemptive strike), and that Moscow committed its naval and air forces for a direct intervention against Israel. This intervention went far beyond a "contemplated" "contingency plan": it was operationally activated, and if the unexpectedly devastating results of Israel's first strike had not thwarted its full implementation, it would have amounted to much more than "minor skirmishes." Even separately, and certainly in sum, the above elements (along with many others in the book) cannot but overturn the hitherto conventional concept whereby the Soviet Union did its best to prevent an Arab-Israeli war in 1967, and steered clear of any direct military involvement therein. The nuclear aspect and its impact on the timing of Soviet action, which Brosh endorses, was a central but not exclusive feature of the USSR's actual moves.

ISABELLA GINOR AND GIDEON REMEZ,
Jerusalem

Oded Brosh does not wish to respond.

ERRATUM

On p. 442 of the April 2008 issue, in J. B. Shank's featured review of Jonathan Israel's *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752*, we mistakenly referred to Robert Darnton as Roger Darnton. The editors regret the error.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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